

**The Paradox of Sense, or On the Event of Thought  
in Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy**

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
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**Abstract:** Written under the double heading *The Paradox of Sense, or on the Event of Thought*, this dissertation is a study of the doubled pathway of articulation in Gilles Deleuze's philosophy. With the repetition of the heading, we want to suggest that, in fact, these two pathways unfold with respect to the same Event. The question which way do we turn, away or towards the virtual, is equivalent to the question, what difference is there. The double pathway defines the central problematic of this dissertation: in the first place, the line of articulation leads to the expression of sense in the proposition, meanwhile with the repetition of difference, another pathway of articulation is retraced that revolves around speaking the event. With the event the question becomes: What does it mean to speak the event once beings are taken to be events?

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*Eterror* by Viktor Timofeev

## Introduction

### *The Question of Sense*

What if there were no sense [...] other than the sense that is lost, the pre-sense that is found always already before us? [...] It is always too late for the question of sense, too late or too soon, it comes down to the same.<sup>1</sup>

Written under the double heading *The Paradox of Sense, or on the Event of Thought*, this dissertation is a study of what we call the doubled pathway of articulation in Gilles Deleuze's philosophy. With the repetition of the heading, we want to suggest that, in fact, these two pathways unfold with respect to the same Event. Being occasioned by one and the same Event, the two pathways are encompassed in the same problematic repeated in the heading. This problematic corresponds to a central question, which is: How does something new become expressed of beings? At its core, this question is essentially an ethical one: What does it mean to speak "for" another?<sup>2</sup> Such a question is just as much about who speaks, as it is about what is spoken of. Deleuze's attitude on the formulation of questions is clear in *Dialogues* (2007):

Questions are invented, like anything else. If you aren't allowed to invent your questions with elements from all over the place, from never mind where, if people 'pose' them to you, you haven't much to say. [From questions grows] the art of constructing a problem, a problem position, before finding a solution.<sup>3</sup>

It is fitting then that we pose our question in a somewhat unfamiliar fashion than the way in which inquiries directed at Deleuze's philosophy are usually formed. In this study, we do not promise to resolve this question. Instead, we intend to pursue the problem that lends its sense to it: the condition in light of which something new is said of beings.<sup>4</sup> For Deleuze, questions are defined by a twofold reference that preserves their openness. They are "aimed at a future (or a

past),” or both times simultaneously.<sup>5</sup> The question seeks after the condition, and the condition in the mode of the problematic lends its sense to it.

When asking how the new is said of another, we are inquiring after the genesis of the ground of beings, on the basis of which something meaningful can be said of them. Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which this meaning has been approached. The dividing line is between those who interpret sense<sup>6</sup> as abiding with models of recognition, and those who determine sense as co-present to paradox. Deleuze’s paradoxical constitution of sense renders the new something untimely, the always new in being, which not only makes it impossible that we treat it as an instance of signification, but also that in relation to paradox, it is the instance that displaces identification. The power of paradox has been long affirmed.<sup>7</sup> According to Deleuze, paradoxes are

recreational only when they are considered as initiatives of thought. They are not recreational when they are considered as ‘the Passion of thought,’ or as discovering what can only be thought, what can only be spoken, despite the fact that it is both ineffable and unthinkable—a mental Void.<sup>8</sup>

Emerging with the groundlessness that raises the ground, paradox involves having to speak without having the tongue to do so, having to think without having an image to approximate.<sup>9</sup> Our doubled heading, hence, inquires after the same instance; thought appropriated to paradox, the unformed, is the Event of thought. In the constitution of sense, paradox is the affirmation of the movement of sense in two directions simultaneously. It generates the unlimited becoming of events in the reversible directions of the past and the future at the same time, all the while eluding the present. Deleuze’s argument is that, in affirming the becoming of events, paradox deposes recognition in two ways: “paradox is initially that which destroys good sense as the only direction, but it is also that which destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities.”<sup>10</sup> The two aspects of *doxa* are themselves related to the doubled directionality of

events. The event expresses itself or is the expressed that subsists in *actual* expressions, meaning that it becomes possible to grasp it as moving in one direction only. Deleuze writes that “good sense is said of one direction only: it is the unique sense and expresses the demand of an order according to which it is necessary to choose one direction and hold on to it.”<sup>11</sup> The idea that sense moves in one direction, pertains to the attribution of sense to the object; it is the determination of the object as coinciding with its supposed identity. In the other direction, we do not have the paradoxical instance that fractures the subject position, thereby giving way to the new, to the passion of thought, but the correlation of good sense with the model of recognition. Deleuze claims that “in common sense, sense is no longer said of a direction, but of an organ. It is called ‘common,’ because it is an organ, a function, a faculty of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same.”<sup>12</sup> The crowning achievement of philosophies of representation is common sense, because it enables the abstraction of sense in the form of signification, which is thereafter deployed as a determining instance of an unspecified object.<sup>13</sup> On both sides of the frontier, sense merely reinforces orthodoxy. Hereafter, “it matters little whether philosophy begins with the object or the subject, with Being or with beings, as long as thought remains subject to this Image which already prejudices everything.”<sup>14</sup> Bound by this image, philosophy is incapable of overturning *doxa*, or contributing to the endeavour of bringing the new to beings. Deleuze asks, “what is the fate of philosophy which knows well that it would not be philosophy if did not, at least provisionally, break with the particular contents and modalities of *doxa*?”<sup>15</sup>

In contrast to philosophies built on modes of recognition, Deleuze conceives of sense as an unlimited becoming, so as to articulate something excessive that belongs to the ideal stratum of its constitution. In *The Logic of Sense* (1969), he argues that the event “implies something



excessive in relation to its actualization,” something that overthrows the worlds, individuals, and persons, in which the event is becoming actualized.<sup>16</sup> In his other key text, *Difference and Repetition* (1968), in which sense is approached as Idea, he writes that “there is an excess and an exaggeration peculiar to Ideas which makes difference and repetition the combined object, the ‘simultaneous’ of the Idea.”<sup>17</sup> Why argue that there is something excessive about the ideal stratum of sense? While this question can be taken up in a variety of ways, for us, it is a question of the becoming of beings, of the differential relation of beings, which renders sense something excessive with respect to the actual terms of any relation. To begin with, Deleuze argues that this becoming does not mean that one term “becomes the other, but each encounters the other, a single becoming which is not common to the two, since they have nothing to do with one another, but which is between the two, which has its own direction, a block of becoming, an a-parallel evolution.”<sup>18</sup> What he calls a singular becoming is the ideal stratum consisting of a combinatory of events that determine a differential relation, or better yet, such events are the differentiations that make the relation a block of becoming. The premise that underlies this claim is that it is never on the basis of a repetition of the Same or the identical that a differential relation is composed. Every encounter with a sign<sup>19</sup> disguises the return, the repetition, of difference that transforms the relation as such. We can, then, say that there is something excessive about events because the ideal stratum is irreducible to the actual terms, which themselves involve asymmetrical modes of becoming with respect to it. The singular becoming of beings is not the same as the beings enveloped in the relation.<sup>20</sup> But this is only because this becoming is itself constituted as a function of the paradoxical instance or the Event, which is the return of difference. Deleuze’s central thesis in *Difference and Repetition* that repetition defines the theatre of the future, that it should be conceived of as novelty when adequate to difference, is

revisited in *The Logic of Sense* with the double directionality of sense. The paradox of the unlimited becoming of event is encapsulated in the idea that the Aion, being the empty form of time that makes the difference, renders the event something “always already passed and eternally yet to come.”<sup>21</sup> In the direction of the past, it is that which selects the ground of events, bringing them to a point of actualization in the present, while in the other direction it continues the becoming along with the constitution of the differential relation. We refer to the events that constitute the becoming as the primary line of articulation in the course of which sense is essentially produced as effect. According to Deleuze, the event makes language possible because it is “endlessly born in the future direction of the Aion where it is established, and somehow, anticipated; and although it must also say the past, it says it as the past of the states of affairs, which go on appearing and disappearing in the other direction.”<sup>22</sup> The principal saying, then, revolves around sense becoming expressed or explicated in the present. Thus far, we have referred to event and sense interchangeably because, for Deleuze, they are indeed the same thing, “except that [with the primary line of articulation] sense is related to the proposition.”<sup>23</sup> This relation of sense to the proposition marks the passage of the actualization of sense; it becoming expressed in the proposition and attributed to an actual being. With respect to this pathway of articulation, the ideal stratum of sense is that line or complex of determining events that serves as the frontier of propositions and states of affairs. It severs the event on the whole from corporeal content, so as to render it expressible as such. This same frontier perpetually displaces the point of convergence of content with the propositional mode of expression. This is because sense, as the sayable of becoming, is the said of states of affairs.

A set of problems arise as consequences of the movement from the principal pathway of articulation to the other one in which what is excessive in the Event becomes sayable. Deleuze

argues that sense is one of the dimensions of the proposition insofar as it is expressed by it, but that it is nevertheless distinct from the propositional mode of expression. Reduced to the propositional mode of expression, sense mistakenly becomes interpreted as one and the same thing as signification.<sup>24</sup> For Deleuze, sense cannot be the same as signification as it is located in the complex theme or the problem, in relation to which propositions are solutions. It might be more adequate to say, then, that sense is the extra-propositional dimension that subsists in the proposition as it becomes explicated. Now, there are several delicate issues that arise when we force sense to become equivalent to signification in the expression. The leveling of sense to signification amounts to the treatment of repetition in the encounter as an object of representation. By grasping sense as the identical in light of signification, we inevitably give way to what Deleuze calls the “long perversion which places [the problem] under the power of the negative.”<sup>25</sup> He rightly argues that “it is at the same time and from the same point of view that we claim to understand repetition in terms of the Same and explain it in negative fashion.”<sup>26</sup> Where sense is conceived of as signification, it simultaneously gives way to the negative, or, conversely, to the analogies of judgment. From this perspective, the philosophy of difference is itself sacrificed. The return of difference is not interpreted as the continued becoming of sense, as paradox, but as a contradiction that must be overcome in the identity of the concept, or subordinated in a so-called higher instance of the act of judgment. With respect to the first we have the partitioning of the becoming into two aspects, conceptual difference and difference without a concept.<sup>27</sup> Their dialectical relation is the becoming identical of the concept. In the second, we have the subordination of the event to qualities in a slightly different way. Here, the organ of recognition works to raise, or rather abstract, the sense to the level of universal predicate, whereby it becomes expressed as the identity of the undetermined concept. Thereafter,

this sense is the possible that essentially distributes beings, instead of being that which is produced with the singular becoming of beings. We agree with Deleuze that these erroneous interpretations of the event, nevertheless, arise with the eternal return of difference. In the instant of turning or reversal, the return

gives rise to a certain illusion in which it delights and admires itself, and which it employs *in order to double its affirmation* of that which differs: it produces an image of identity as though this were the *end* of the different. It produces an image of resemblance as the external *effect* of ‘the disparate’. It produces an image of the negative as the consequence of what it affirms, the consequence of its own affirmation.<sup>28</sup>

While sense is indeed an effect expressed in the propositional mode of expression, it is the simulated sense of, what Deleuze sometimes calls, the ontological sense or (quasi)cause.<sup>29</sup> This means that it is produced in light of the paradoxical instance, the unformed, that selects the events of a repetition on the basis of the different; a difference that is felt but, nevertheless, disguised in the repetition of the past. The turning in the other direction whereby the becoming of the event is continued, presents the instance of the doubling of the affirmation of the event on the basis of the different. In Deleuze’s philosophy, this second affirmation is the affirmation of the eternal return of difference, the being of becoming itself, which is the affirmation of the continued becoming of beings. It is an affirmation that is affirmed of all beings. This second affirmation not only opens up another line of articulation of that which is excessive in the Event, but abolishes the moment of the appropriation of the simulated sense in signification. With this paradoxical Event, we have the birth of the actor that “neither allows [themselves] to be represented nor wishes to represent anything.”<sup>30</sup> Instead, the articulation of that which is excessive in the event comes down to articulating others as events, whereby new modes of existence becomes possible. Repetition adequate to difference opens up the future of the *act* of thought.

The problematic we are dealing with under the concept of the two pathways of articulation, is the fundamental idea propelling Deleuze's philosophy. From his earliest writings to his latest essays, the relationship of the actual and the virtual remained his basic concern. With these lines of articulation it is always a question of which way to go, away or towards the virtual. One of the lines is the actualization of the virtual, as the actual and the virtual enter into what Bergson called the tightest circuit. The other line presents that which is excessive in the event, it need not be actualized or could not be actualized as such. It instead counter-actualizes the event. With the relationship of these two lines, we find the intersections of what Deleuze and Guattari understand in *What is Philosophy?* (1994) as the respective tasks of science, philosophy, and, the arts. If we follow the principal line of articulation in which the problem is explicated in the domain of solutions, we find the juncture where the task of philosophy and science intersect. If we turn to the other, it becomes a question of what it means to embody the event, as artistic creation does, or to speak the event in concepts, as philosophy aims to do. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Deleuze's philosophy of the event. We are aware of four major texts published on the theme, *Deleuze and Language* (2002) by Jean-Jacques Lecercle, *The Priority of Events: Deleuze's Logic of Sense* (2011) by Sean Bowden, *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event* (2012) by Francois Zourabichvili, and, *Deleuze's Logic of Sense: A Critical Introduction and Guide* (2008) by James Williams. *Deleuze and Language* is the first book to exhaustively engage with the themes of *The Logic of Sense*. This dissertation differs from it in many respects, the central distinction being that we are not placing the emphasis on Deleuze's study of language. Neither are we interested in engaging with the themes of *The Logic of Sense* alone, particularly the strand of psychoanalysis that runs through that text. *The Priority of Events: Deleuze's Logic of Sense*, is a study of the *a priori* genesis of sense, through a reading of the central figures and

philosophical approaches that influence Deleuze's theory of sense. While this text is a helpful tool for anyone seeking to understand some of the key concepts in *The Logic of Sense*, the inquiry that underpins it is not similar to our own. We find greater affinity with Zourabichvili's text, *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event*, in which he places the emphasis on the event as an encounter with a sign that forces thought. While we commend Zourabichvili in having delineated how the differential relation unfolding in time involves the univocal sense of being in the becoming of beings, our problem with the text is that it does not deal with what Deleuze calls the simulated sense with respect to the univocal being. As a result, the critique of the dogmatic image of thought is not oriented enough: How is it directed at our time for the sake of a time to come? The central inquiry, broadly structured as the doubled pathway of articulation, produces a problem that, at its core, is an ethical one. We know of no other work that expresses this problem in quite the same way, or no other that has engaged with the strands of Deleuze's philosophy through the prism of the problem that we formulate in the course of this study.

We begin our study with an exploration of the ontology of sense as Deleuze does. The introductory chapter involves a review of Hyppolite's *Logic and Existence*, which played an essential role in Deleuze's efforts to construct a discourse of being distinct from Hegel's. The question is what sort of logic or discourse of being can realize the doctrine of complete immanence. While Hyppolite is convinced that, unlike thinkers before him, Hegel's dialectic was able to effectively realize the doctrine of complete immanence, Deleuze questions whether it "is the same thing to say that Being expresses itself and that it contradicts itself."<sup>31</sup> For him, Hegel's contradiction essentially violates the doctrine of complete immanence, because it does not affirm the higher instance of difference in which being expresses itself for-itself. Difference is subordinated to the concept or sense. His review of that text demonstrates that Deleuze became

interested in a theory of expression that would affirm difference as such. He begins to lay out such a theory in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1677). For Deleuze, Spinoza's *Ethics* is an onto-ethology or a pure ontology as ethics, in which the doctrine of immanence is affirmed. In that text, Deleuze develops a new logic of expression, in accordance with which sense becomes formulated as the expressed. Although Deleuze does not argue that Spinoza is a philosopher of the event, it is clear that Spinoza's pure immanence in which beings are *manners of being* as the expressed of substance or Being, moves in that direction. Deleuze gathers something essential from Spinoza which is repeated in his joint work with Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*:

Whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to something a confusion of plane and concept results so that the concept appears as a transcendent universal and the plane becomes an attribute in the concept. When understood in this way, the plane of immanence revives the transcendent again.<sup>32</sup>

Spinoza's pure immanence furthers the philosophy of the event in many ways. When we ask how something new is expressed of beings, why the expressed is not the essence of a being, but beings taken as events, or how it is that a singular sense is expressible of a becoming that implicates beings, Spinoza's pure immanence comes to mind. While it is true that Spinoza had affirmed the univocal being by furthering the doctrine of complete immanence, for Deleuze, Nietzsche effectively realizes this doctrine with the eternal return. The tracing of the philosophical trajectory that had influenced Deleuze's theory of sense allows us to formulate our central problematic in the latter part of the chapter. We have introduced this problematic here as the doubled articulation of the event, as corresponding with the doubled affirmation put forth by Nietzsche and taken up by Deleuze in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962).

After having laid out our problem, we return to the doubled articulation in the introduction of the second chapter, entitled, "The Virtual and the Actual Object." To a large degree, this chapter deals with the first line of articulation, the relation of sense to the proposition, or the

point of intersection of the problem and the domain of solutions. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze argues that there are two moments in the history of philosophy when the old metaphysical Essences were essentially overthrown. Sense was discovered with Stoic philosophy, and then with transcendental philosophy. We begin with Deleuze study of the *lekton* or *legen*, the incorporeal meaning, in Stoic philosophy. After we have dealt with the Stoic influence, the question becomes in what way is sense related to the proposition as its fourth dimension as Deleuze seems to think. Part of our analysis of the dimensions of the proposition, denotation, signification, manifestation, involves an engagement with theorists that conceive of sense as signification and the concept as function, including, Gottlob Frege, and, Bertrand Russell. If sense is not signification, if it is not the undetermined concept expressed in the form of the function, then, what is it? Deleuze's central argument in the "Third Series of the Proposition" is that none of the other dimensions of the proposition can ground the grounded itself, hence, leading to the vicious circle of the dimensions of the proposition. Here, it is not a matter of showing how sense works from the outside, but how it is already installed *a priori* in the relations of the proposition as that which produces their vicious circle, all the while displacing it or unfolding it from within. This leads us to the second central undertaking of this chapter, which is the inquiry into the transcendental itself. What sort of transcendental field is capable of expressing Deleuze's theory of sense, all the while effectively grounding the expression of sense in individuals, persons, and classes? The study of the transcendental field allows us to take up one of the pressing themes deserving of attention in *The Logic of Sense*, which is Deleuze's engagement with Husserl. By outlining Husserl's theory of sense, particularly his two-membered predicative process, which, as suggested by the doubling of the process, resonates with our central problem, we intend to show the ways in which Deleuze distinguishes himself from that



project. The principal problem, for Deleuze, is that “Husserl does not think about genesis on the basis of a paradoxical instance, which properly speaking would be non-identifiable.”<sup>33</sup>

Together with the fourth, the third chapter lays out the pathway of the second articulation of the event. This chapter, being written on the syntheses of time, deals with some of the essential themes in *Difference and Repetition*. Our inquiry, which is how the new is expressed of beings, requires a close study of Deleuze theory of time, since it is in time that the becoming of beings unfolds. There, we intend to follow the thread of time as it is outlined by Deleuze in the three syntheses of time, so as to show how they all culminate in one and the same Event. In effect, we are repeating the central thesis of *The Logic of Sense* that sense moves in two directions simultaneously, that of the past and the future. Our interest in the theory of time is much more specific than this, however, since what we are seeking after is how someone manages to think something new with the highest affirmation in the eternal return. By revisiting Deleuze’s plane of immanence, we want to emphasize that, for him, the making of a life that unfolds in time, is not the supreme object of knowledge, it does not concern the acquisition of knowledge as with Husserl. Rather, the becoming of beings unfolding in time defines what it means to learn. It is only in the process of learning that something new becomes sayable of beings. We turn to Deleuze’s theory of learning in the last chapter of this dissertation, “Deleuze’s New Meno.” In accordance with this new Meno learning would not be oriented towards the past, but the future. Deleuze’s study of the apprenticeship to signs in *Proust and Signs* (1972) demonstrates the two sides of aesthetics, the making of a life as a work of art, and the work of art as the creation of a life. We continue the inquiry into the theory of learning by, then, turning to what Deleuze, like Heidegger, understands as the grounding of the problematic field in learning. In doing so, our aim is to explore the differential relation that constitutes the Idea itself. If each encounter with a

sign presents us with the repetition of the past in which difference is introduced, then, learning essentially involves the transformation of this relation prior to the constitution of beings. Indeed, the paradoxical instance, the return of the different, requires not only a fracturing of the self, but the other as well, as a function of which the problematic field itself unfolds. For Deleuze, since learning is essentially oriented towards the future, it involves not “a mythical past or former present, but [...] the pure form of empty time.”<sup>34</sup> With respect to this theory of learning, thinking is no longer an abstract possibility, or a distant object of contemplation. Neither does it conform to some image, model, or presupposed aim. It arises by being coupled to that which is outside of thought, that which does not think, but must be thought as such. It is only once the field reverses itself, when it makes the difference in the direction of the future, that we manage to think and articulate something new of beings. To be on the way to thinking, one must learn. Saying the Event, both, the counter-actualization of the event so as to bring something to existence that had not existed, and the critique of dogmatic image of thought explored in the previous chapters, emerges with the Event of thought.

*The Problem of Sense Introduced*

Never shall this force itself on us, that that which is not may be;  
While you search, keep your thought far away from this path.

- *Parmenides*

This chapter lays out the groundwork for the logic of sense. It is the groundwork for the logic of sense in two ways. In the first place, we trace a selective trajectory of Deleuze's thought in which he experiments with the idea of sense prior to writing *The Logic of Sense*.<sup>1</sup> Second, the groundwork for the logic of sense involves the laying of the ground of the emergence of sense. It is only once we have laid out this ground, once we have traced the twists and turns in Deleuze's thinking on the matter, that we are able to formulate the problem of sense, that of the doubling of the pathway of articulation. If laying the ground serves as the *logos* or logic in light of which the *legein* emerges as the saying, then, we must inquire what sort of ground informs it. The principal way in which Deleuze approaches this question is by proposing alongside Jean Hyppolite that being is sense, not essence: "That the world is sufficient is not only to say that it is sufficient *for us*, but that it is sufficient unto itself, and that it refers to being not as the essence beyond the appearance, not as a second world which would be the intelligible world, but as the sense of this world."<sup>2</sup> With the renunciation of the second world which had violated the doctrine of complete immanence, the question becomes how this being expresses itself, or, alternatively, what sort of ontology is the ontology of sense. It is on this terrain, on the terrain of the ontological sense, or as Deleuze also refers to it, the univocal being which is said in the same sense of all the senses, that the nature of the simulated sense becomes a point of contention. Deleuze's early engagement with Hyppolite's text on Hegel, *Logic and Existence*, in which Hyppolite claims that Hegel's

discourse of being realizes the doctrine of complete immanence, propels Deleuze to put forth an alternative logic explored in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*. The key argument that encapsulates his response to Hyppolite's text is that it is not the same thing to say that difference expresses itself and that it contradicts itself. By turning to Spinoza's plane of immanence and Nietzsche's eternal return, Deleuze seeks to explore an alternative logic of expression that would essentially replace the point of contradiction with that of the repetition of difference; the ontology of which is fully fleshed out in *Difference and Repetition*. Here, we can identify two points that are of importance in Deleuze's thinking through of the notion of sense. Firstly, by putting into question the point of contradiction, Deleuze wants to move away from the tendency towards attributing the plane of immanence to a transcendent universal.<sup>3</sup> Once he has moved away from this universal along with the sort of being that is implied by it, the problem becomes how the return of difference, the ontological sense itself, is linked to the simulated sense. The relationship of the univocal being with the singular sense of a becoming is captured in the problem of the doubled pathway of articulation in the last part of this chapter.

How should the reader approach this chapter? Deleuze's studies of major thinkers in the philosophical tradition, including, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Leibniz, among others, can generate much confusion for the reader who is unfamiliar with his philosophy, or what philosophy is according to him. Oftentimes, it is unclear whether the ideas explored in such studies can be attributed to the thinker under consideration. As such, Deleuze is often thought to have misread or misappropriated aspects of another's thought, all in an effort to compose a philosophical lineage that displaces the Hegelian interpretation of the history of philosophy. In addition to this, it is difficult to discern which ideas Deleuze adopts as being his own, and which ones he abandons as specific to another's philosophical system. The question becomes, what role does x or y play in

Deleuze's philosophy? In other words, is he a Spinozist, a Nietzschean, or anti-Hegelian? Which one is he? Deleuze and Guattari's joint work *What is Philosophy?* serves as a response to such questions. The two define philosophy in the following way: "Philosophy is a constructivism, and constructivism has two qualitatively different aspects: the creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane" of immanence.<sup>4</sup> According to Deleuze and Guattari, each philosophy lays out a plane of immanence. While these planes cannot be thought to compose a historical becoming, aspects of the respective planes of two or more philosophies may overlap, all the while maintaining their distinction. In reading Deleuze's studies of major thinkers, we must be able to discern the plane of immanence that belongs to each, while also grasping at what point the two overlap or meet up. On the other hand, when reading Deleuze's central philosophical texts, *Difference and Repetition*, and, *The Logic of Sense*, we must treat these figures as conceptual personae with which Deleuze creates specific concepts. Being able to discern between these two ways of reading Deleuze, between his reflections on the history of philosophy, and the doing of philosophy, which are both present in his studies of other thinkers, prepares us for a more robust engagement with him.

### **The Hegelian Proximity or Distance<sup>5</sup>**

Deleuze never wrote a volume on Hegel. In *Difference and Repetition* he conceived of an alternative philosophy of difference without taking the immensity of the Hegelian system too seriously. Perhaps because of this, there is a general sentiment that Deleuze did not know his Hegel, and that he did not take good care in reading him. Even so, a look at the trajectory of Deleuze's philosophical thought demonstrates Hegel to be just as influential in orienting it, as thinkers to whom he devoted his praises, and about which he wrote full length volumes. In his

approach to Hegel, Deleuze is Nietzschean, not merely in his interpretation, but in his mannerism; he created philosophy in an innocent way without ever appearing as though a laborious struggle needed to be waged against Hegel.<sup>6</sup> One cannot go so far as to say that Hegel's problems became Deleuze's concerns, but that he offers an alternative solution to the problem of immanence by placing it on a terrain that is foreign to dialectical being. The two positions do not have a hidden resemblance, nor are they in need of reconciliation.<sup>7</sup> The fundamentals of his position can be found in the "Review of Jean Hyppolite, *Logique et Existence*" (1954). While it is not immediately obvious what role Hegel plays in *The Logic of Sense*, the title, at the least, alludes to Hyppolite's argument that Hegel's logic is one of sense.

In *Logic and Existence*, Hyppolite's efforts are directed at demonstrating that Hegel's logic realizes the doctrine of complete immanence, which, he asserts, a philosopher such as "Spinoza had not been able to realize."<sup>8</sup> The principal argument supporting the thesis of his text is that there is no second world beyond this one. The metaphysical duality of essence and appearance, which results in another world that limits what is knowable, is replaced with the logic of sense. Because ontology is not the ontology of essence, being, the Absolute, "is not thought anywhere else than in the phenomenal world."<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the genesis of being proceeds in accordance with Hegel's dialectical logic, as the being which is thought and lived as sense. Deleuze expresses an affinity with Hyppolite's principal argument when writing: "That there is no 'beyond' means that there is no 'beyond' of the world, and that in the world there is no 'beyond' of thought."<sup>10</sup> However, if the Absolute, determines itself by appearing or alienating itself in the phenomenal world, how can it be said that being is sense and that sense is being? This question is of special importance because sense, for Hegel, never proceeds from the depths of the inexpressible. Hyppolite's response is that sense is already there as the being of the sensible, but

that it is not thought for-itself. He writes that it is “being which posits itself as sense, and this means that sense is not alien to being, is not outside of or beyond it. This is why sense also comprehends non-sense, the anti-Logos; it is in itself just as much as it is for itself, but its in-itself is for itself, and its for-itself is in itself.”<sup>11</sup> Such a formulation is meant to simultaneously involve the essence of appearance as the negation of the sensible thing, and the differentiation of the Absolute being which comprehends itself as the becoming of sense. The positive determination of the Absolute, or the negation of the negation, enables one to grasp the “identity of being and difference as sense.”<sup>12</sup> Hyppolite concludes that immanence is complete in Hegel’s philosophy, because logic is the absolute genesis of sense, as the being of sense, and the sense of being (the in-itself and for-itself). Alternatively, the contradiction produced by the self-division of the Absolute is overcome when we arrive at the absolute knowledge that the same sense is both, essence and appearance. From the perspective of absolute knowledge, the opposition of that which is, and that which is not, is superseded. The logic, as the genesis of sense, not only creates a particular sense in which thing and thought are identical, it is also thought for-itself as the absolute form that “knows itself as the sense of all of the senses.”<sup>13</sup>

### **Depth and Height**

Allow me to highlight some of the essential moments of the text, so that Hyppolite’s central thesis is better understood. Hyppolite begins as Hegel does in *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Modelling his argument after Plato’s *Sophist*, he differentiates Hegel’s philosophy from two other types that remain on the level of immediacy. In the first place, it is the immediate sense-experience of pure singularity which is put into question. Thereafter, it is the understanding which errs, insofar as it posits the different qualities of a self-same thing as

indifferent, even while such qualities are contraries or opposites. The former is inexpressible in language, while the latter produces a language of abstract determinations, which essentially reinforce the nothingness of the former. The problematic of contraries, along with an altered topography of depth and height, will be given new life by Deleuze in a number of series in *The Logic of Sense*. The question that best captures the first section of Hyppolite's study is the following: "What is the sensible outside of the sense with which language endows it?"<sup>14</sup> Such a question is relevant, as sense has a double meaning, as if operating in two directions at once, externalizing itself by appearing, and internalizing itself as essence. Quoting Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Hyppolite writes that sense is both the "organ of immediate apprehension," and, the significance or thought of the thing. After having demonstrated that sense goes in two directions at once, Hegel goes on to emphasize that, "a sensuous consideration does not cut the two sides apart at all; in one direction it contains the opposite one too, and in sensuous immediate perception it at the same time apprehends the essence and the concept."<sup>15</sup> Here, we already have a response to the stated question, which is that the sensible does not exist outside of sense. At the same time, however, because a sensuous consideration merely foreshadows the concept, it maintains its problematic status. But, perhaps we are being too hasty. We have not taken up the other side of the question, which is an inquiry into "the sensible which *is* outside of the sense." The other side of the question must be considered as it demonstrates that the sensible, as nothingness outside of sense, continues to "haunt" consciousness.

In "The Ineffable," Hyppolite notes that philosophical inquiry into the sensible, as it is given in sense-experience, produces the worst type of knowledge by beginning from a faulty premise. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel argues that this type of approach seems like the most natural way of proceeding, since the thing is present to the ego in its essentiality, or in the simple



fact of being there. However, he quickly adds that, when *we say* ‘this’ thing, we must recognize that the thing present “exists in its certainty through the other”; it is mediated, just as ‘this I’ which says it, is mediated.<sup>16</sup> Rather than experienced in its pure singularity this instant, the thing becomes expressible in language as a universal ‘this.’ Hegel claims that, as a memory archive, language remains the truth behind sense-certainty, even though the ‘meaning’ of what we say when we say ‘this’ thing is not thought for-itself. Philosophies that reject the becoming of sense cannot produce a concrete being in- and for-itself, the existence of which must be recognizable in language, because pure singularity cannot be formulated in the stated medium. The sensible outside of sense, therefore, has no existence. Such a claim quickly gets us to the heart of Hegelianism. Pure becoming without mediation enslaves us to the destiny of ephemeral being, whereas the concrete becoming of sense leads to the freedom of grasping our world through our own actions.<sup>17</sup> Consciousness as sense “recognizes one moment in the other: its purpose and action in fate, and its fate in its purpose and action.”<sup>18</sup> Such knowledge must be expressible in language, since language deals with universals which are held in common within a community. “In language,” Hyppolite writes, “self-consciousness, qua singularity being for itself, comes as such into existence, so that it exists for others.”<sup>19</sup>

Though sidestepping the sensible singularity seems straightforward, and we accede because there appears to be little gained by turning to universals, it is a significant move. As Hyppolite shows, there is much more implied in the argument, which we gain in later sections of the *Phenomenology*. The argument is that even if we proceed without knowing what we ‘mean’ when we say ‘this’ thing, we never begin from the sensible outside of the sense that expresses it in language. To state this differently, we cannot begin outside of sense from the ineffable, because, for Hegel, a pure singularity which omits mediation marks nothing else than the

dissolution, or death of an instant. “This dissolution, this non-sense is then the truth of the rejection of mediation.”<sup>20</sup> We never go from pure becoming, which is essentially inexpressible or the *anti-Logos*, to language. The expression of sense cannot originate with non-sense or the ineffable, since the ineffable overcomes the finitude of pure singularity in an absolute transcendent, which itself remains inexpressible.<sup>21</sup> Hyppolite, thus, asserts that philosophy cannot hold the ineffable higher than speech, since that would signal its own destruction as a science of absolute knowledge. If the truth of the purely lived sensible singularity is its own dissolution, how is such dissolution explained if the doctrine of complete immanence is to be maintained? Hyppolite argues that in order for us to grasp how essence itself appears, immediacy must first be negated. The dissolution of the sensible is not, however, the same as its negation. The “becoming of the sensible is in itself its essentialization, but essentialization is not there as such.”<sup>22</sup> This essentialization refers to the being which interiorizes itself; it is saved in memory or available for recollection by being reflected in thought. But also, in interiorizing itself, being becomes different from itself, it is appearance. Hyppolite, thus, writes “being which appears is identical to itself in its difference, which is essential difference, that is, the difference of itself from itself. It is different from itself in its identity; it contradicts itself.”<sup>23</sup> The logic therefore embraces the movement of sense in two directions simultaneously. These two directions are actually one and the same thing from the perspective of the Absolute itself, even if at first they appear contradictory. Hyppolite shows that, being negates itself by becoming appearance, and affirms itself as the essence in appearance, in the same movement.

By inquiring into the dissolution of sensible singularity, we have already made a transition to the Absolute, as the being which determines itself in accordance with dialectical logic. This shift underlies a key claim made by Hyppolite that discourse in Hegel’s philosophy is not a

discourse *of* man, but a discourse *of* being. By arguing that the absolute is already there in the *Phenomenology*, he makes the claim that language is, for Hegel, both, human speech held in common, and the discourse of being and universal self-consciousness. This duality is present in Hyppolite's questions, which in some ways resonate with our own: "How can being say itself in man and man become universal consciousness of being through language?"<sup>24</sup> Or, alternatively, "how can language [...] human speech, be simultaneously that of which one speaks and the one who speaks?" These questions are as interesting as they are important. Their complexity is compounded by the notion that sense does not proceed from the ineffable. That is to say, for Hegel, there is already an "existing universe of sense," a language of universals in which being is expressed, so that anything which is thought for-itself can only be thought as a universal.<sup>25</sup> But how can Hyppolite affirm that such discourse is the discourse of being, rather than man? Before we can attempt to formulate Hyppolite's response to these questions, we must turn to universals as they are immediately grasped by perceptual understanding. The pitfalls of the understanding are precisely in that it posits universals in their positivity, as indifferent differences. We have outlined Hegel's critique of depth, now we shall turn to the errors of height.

Our inquiry into positive diversity returns us to the problem of difference, the Platonist account of which in the *Sophist*, was of special relevance for Hegel.<sup>26</sup> Of course, there is a drastic difference between the two. As Hyppolite notes, Plato's dialectic, according to Hegel, is an immobile one, since he did not raise difference to contradiction. Nevertheless, Hegel's universals, as they are presented in actual experience, can be interpreted through Plato's lens of change and rest.<sup>27</sup> Because change and rest are two sides of the same coin, they are the engine of negativity that subverts empirical thought. We already saw this change when discussing the disappearance of the sensible. Hegel also presents such a passage by referring to the structure of

the present, which he proposes is a universal *Now*, *This Now*, designating that which is and is no longer. In this passage from that which is, to that which is not in the present instant, he argues that an “other [...] is set up: the *This* is superseded: and this otherness, the cancelling of the former, is itself again annulled.”<sup>28</sup> For *This Now* to appear as such, the previous one must have disappeared, since *This Now* must itself appear. But Hegel claims that:

To represent that a thing has disappeared, it is not enough to perceive a contrast between the past and the present; it is necessary [...] to turn our back on the present, to dwell on the past, and to think the contrast of the past with the present in terms of the past only, without letting the present appear in it.<sup>29</sup>

If we are to think how things in their distinction from the rest nevertheless sustain change so as to become determined, this passage must be approached from the perspective of the past. On this rare point, Hyppolite agrees with Henri Bergson, whose philosophy of continuous duration is otherwise placed under great scrutiny in *Logic and Existence*. The passage itself in Hegel’s philosophy is drastically different than that of Bergson’s. For Hegel, the past externalizes itself in the present, just as this thing in the present must negate itself, or become determined by no longer being as such. It is only in this passing, which itself forms an opposition, that things themselves can be thought. Thought itself does not produce opposition, things themselves manifest such opposition. Hyppolite, thus, argues that:

Hegel’s originality lies in the rejection of this merely human explanation of negation—an explanation that we find for example in Bergson—as well as in the rejection of the particular privilege granted to the thought that would nevertheless maintain that ‘Being, the thing, is in a sense always positive.’<sup>30</sup>

If it is indeed the case that temporal mediation produces both the appearing of the thing, while also determining it, why is this mediation not apparent to consciousness? Although naïve consciousness undergoes this passage of reflection into itself in relation to the other, the ‘I’, Hegel argues, “is always forgetting it again and beginning the process all over.”<sup>31</sup> This is the

explanation of how consciousness cancels itself in immediate sense-certainty. Perception, however, differs from this. Perception begins with the positivity of being, particularity, the positivity of universals which are not yet determined concretely. It apprehends things as consisting of having a manifold of properties considered exclusively or separate from the others, even while the understanding grasps this thing as identical to itself throughout time. Hegel calls this sound *common sense*, or the “sophistry of perception,” because it “seeks to save these moments from their contradiction, tries to keep them fixed by distinguishing between ‘aspects,’ by using terms like ‘also’ and ‘so far as.’”<sup>32</sup> Here is where language held in common becomes problematic, since empirical knowledge affirms contrary qualities of something, rendering one false and the other proposition true, as it becomes opportune to do so in accordance with experience. It is not as though empirical thought does not recognize difference and identity. Indeed, the being which it apprehends is taken to be identical to itself while being different from others. However, the difference that it grasps is an external one, since empirical thought does not realize how a thing can be for-itself, all the while passing into the other. This is because it rejects the sort of opposition found in the diversity of things. Even though it posits change and rest as two sides of the same coin, empirical thought cannot explain how something can preserve its identity all the while determining itself by negating itself in its other. “Empirical thought [thus] recognizes only exteriority or separated interiority.”<sup>33</sup> In other words, it cannot explain on what basis something establishes such a distinct form of existence.

Hyppolite claims that because it rejects mediation, empirical thought is not only an empty form of thought that proceeds by comparison and similitude, but the determinations through which it supposedly conceives of things, are mere abstractions external to the terms. “In diversity the different things are individually what they are, and indifferent to the relation in which they

stand to each other. This relation is therefore external to them.”<sup>34</sup> But according to Hegel, if empiricism is overcome through the opposition of things themselves, this is because negation is already present in being. Negation is already present once things themselves are thought to have a distinct existence from others. Hyppolite writes: “already in order to discover a thing that differs from another, and from all the others, is thereby a thing that contains negation.”<sup>35</sup> Opposition is posited as soon as something distinct is posited. For Hegel, then, identity itself is affirmed in self-difference, or through negation. In other words, positivity can only be affirmed of the thing insofar as it negates itself. Echoing Plato’s formulation of change and rest in relation to difference, Hegel writes:

Difference as thus unity of itself and identity, is in itself determinate difference. It is not transformed into another, not relation to an other outside it: it has its other, identity, within itself, just as identity, having entered into the determination of difference, has not lost itself in it as its other, but preserves itself in it, is its reflection-into-self and its moment.<sup>36</sup>

While the identity of something is positively determined insofar as it excludes the negative, it is affirmed as such as having this or that property, insofar as it externalizes itself in a relation. Likewise, the negative differs from the positive insofar as it stands for the differentiation of the thing, by virtue of which it can be determined to be identical. In other words, the negative and positive subsist through each other.<sup>37</sup>

Hegel will go on to resolve the problem of contrary qualities by arguing that the contradiction of sense moving in two directions simultaneously, must itself be reconciled in the absolute. We will elaborate on this shortly. In the first series in *The Logic of Sense*, “Of Paradoxes of Pure Becoming,” Deleuze will reformulate this problem of contraries by arguing that universals themselves do not capture pure becoming. Deleuze claims that becoming in two

directions at once, cannot be thought in fixed terms, or from the perspective of the present or agent. Referring to the stories of Lewis Carroll, he writes:

*Alice and Through the Looking Glass* involve a category of very special things: *events*, pure events. When I say ‘Alice becomes larger,’ I mean that she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is *to elude the present*. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to *the essence of becoming* to move and to pull in both directions at once.<sup>38</sup>

For Deleuze, Hegel betrays the double directionality of becoming by artificially proposing there to be a separation of terms where none exists. If we presuppose the terms to be separate, if we conceive of their becoming in fixed terms beginning from the present as such, their passing into the other cannot be thought in any other way than through the anthropomorphic concept of opposition. Deleuze, hence, not only proposes that the Hegelian movement is artificial, unable to tear itself away from the barriers it has set for itself, but also that this becoming, as it is perceived in the ontic realm, is merely transposed into the ontological. Conversely, for those sympathetic to Hegel’s philosophy such as Slavoj Žižek, Deleuze’s sophisticated argument simply reinforces indifferent differences, hence, also leaving being indeterminate.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, the reversals of becoming, of being large and small at the same time, do tend towards an indifferent difference. But, as Deleuze notes, this is an “optical illusion” through which Alice, the subject that fixes the limits, remains the same. While Hegel is concerned with demonstrating the identity of the subject, for Deleuze, such identity is fictional, just as the absolute self or subject that contradicts itself as it externalizes itself, is also fictional. By referring to becoming as event, Deleuze does not merely want to displace the primacy of the copula, but also the sort of being that is implicit in

such a formulation. For him, being is not the absolute being of dialectical logic; it is the return of becoming in which identity is subordinated to difference. This sort of becoming is not contradictory, but paradoxical.

Does this mean that becoming is itself inexpressible for Deleuze? This dissertation revolves around this question. In that same series, Deleuze evokes Plato's *Philebus*, in order to distinguish between two types of things:

that of limited and measured things, of fixed qualities, permanent or temporary which always presuppose pauses and rests, the fixing of presents and the assignation of subjects [...] [and a second,] a pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-mad, which never rests. It moves in both directions at once.<sup>40</sup>

The question is: What sort of relationship do these types have with language? Deleuze puts forth a working response while again referring to Plato, this time to the *Cratylus*:

Sometimes Plato wonders whether this pure becoming might not have a peculiar relation to language. [...] Could this relation be, perhaps, essential to language, as in the case of a 'flow' of speech, or a wild discourse which would *incessantly slide over its referent*, without ever stopping?<sup>41</sup>

These questions presuppose an insightful and innovative reading of the *Cratylus*. In that text, Plato reflects on two types of languages, one which pertains to the becoming of things, and another in which the thing referred to and the instance of naming seem to coincide. Of course, Plato concludes that the meaning of the being must be grasped in the naming, but the process itself of having arrived at this conclusion is of greater interest. Deleuze gathers from all of this that there seem to be two sorts of languages, one of pauses and rests, and the other discourse intimately intertwined with the becoming. These two types of languages will define what he calls the secondary organization of sense, and the tertiary order in which the secondary inheres: "Is it not possible that there are two distinct dimensions internal to language in general—one always concealed by the other, yet continuously coming to the aid of, or subsisting under, the other?"<sup>42</sup>



By putting into questions whether we proceed from a language of pauses and rests which assign identities to things affirmed through the copula, or if there is another language, one of verbs of pure becoming, in which “all identity disappears from the self, the world, and God,” Deleuze is challenging Hegelian indeterminate universals, which in the course of determination, lead to singularities “imprisoned in the Self or a superior I.”<sup>43</sup> This other dimension of language will not merely be in the service of the dominant one, it will not “fill out” the empty term by determining it through movement, hence, becoming a sense of sense as in Hegel. Due to the accusation that Hegel merely reinforces the language of fixed identities, by way of which he himself perpetuates common sense, Hyppolite’s claim that language in Hegel’s philosophy is simultaneously the language of man and of being becomes suspect.

### **Language, Thought, and Sense**

The problem of sense is revisited by Hyppolite on the level of language, the importance of which has become evident. Perhaps it is not even correct for us to say on the level of language, since for Hegel, we can never think the sense of something without already presupposing the existence of language. This is precisely the difficulty, as a result of which the error of conceiving of sense as signification emerges. If it is indeed the case that the thought of sense arises as such only insofar as there is language through which the existence of something becomes expressible, then, in turn, we must explain how this sense, which Hegel presents as a universal, becomes determinable a priori in the absolute, even if it is not thought for itself as this particular sense in the empirical. Or, alternatively, we could say that the universal already exists, but merely in the abstract form. In other words, if we are to state the property that defines this or that thing, we must recognize that this property, as a universal, pre-exists the conditions in which it is

determined. This is the problem, the complexity, to which Hegel formulates his response. The dialectical movement by way of which the universal is itself determined is absolute knowledge. In this form, it is the discourse *of* being. The dialectical logic, in which the absolute expresses itself, is there in the domain of language. One and the same logic expresses the sense of being. This is precisely why linguistic expression is not thought to be human expression alone, but is the house of being. It is, however, in the same movement that Hegel goes wrong, interpreting the becoming of sense as the becoming of the concept.<sup>44</sup>

What about artistic expression? Could poetry be the other language, the language of the sensible itself? Hyppolite does put forth a response to these questions. “Couldn’t we prefer the *image* to speech as *the carrier of sense*?” he asks. He quickly dismisses the importance of this question, however, when noting that poetry “seems to be sense for itself,” but it does not reflect this sense, or does not know itself to have formulated a sense.<sup>45</sup> In other words, poetry seems to prefigure sense without giving way to it. It is not the sense of sense. Art, including poetry, he argues, is a “sort of nature that disappears [...] gradually as we go to signify it on purpose, as we go on to untie the knot of determinations, in light of sense.”<sup>46</sup> The sensible which it fuses with sense, without expressly stating it, disappears as soon as we determine it. It is no longer poetry. It finds its truth in its other, philosophy. In this way, artistic expression shares in the alienation of sense in language in general. Indeed, for Hegel, sense is already there in language even if we are not aware of what we mean when we say ‘this’ thing. But this thought of being which is there in language must become the thought of thought, or as stated previously, the sense of sense. On what basis is such an argument made? Or how does Hegel explain the alienation of sense in language? While we explore these questions, it is better at the same to inquire as to how the dialectic in the phenomenology and the dialectic in the encyclopedia reconnect, without one

being prior to the other. Hyppolite frames this inquiry in a slightly different way when asking: “How [does] the thought of being which constitutes language become the thought of thought, without it being the case that this reflection on language itself emerges from language?”

In the previous discussion, we noted that the passage of the sensible is itself present in reflection, and that the universal is already immanent in nature as logos. “In this dialectic, the sensible becomes the Logos, meaningful language, and the thought of the sensible does not remain interior and mute. It is there in language.”<sup>47</sup> According to Hegel, the movement from the passage of the sensible, to its becoming expressed in language, is performed by thought. The passage of the sensible is interiorized in thought, and the thought itself is exteriorized in language. This is the first form of memory, the one in the phenomenology. That of which one speaks, and the one who speaks, are inseparable, according to Hyppolite. This is not only because the sensible is interiorized in thought, but because the subject too must externalize him or herself in the same process. Hereafter, linguistic expression can no longer be understood as the mere reflection on the self, or on a thing that is external to the self. It is an expression in which the self says itself and its other. But this language is still not aware of itself as the discourse of being, since in exteriorizing itself, thought is alienated thought in language. Or as Hyppolite writes: “the passage from sensible to sense and from thought to its own alienation in language—these two movements coincide.”<sup>48</sup> In this sense, thought as alienated in language, acquires the same status that the sensible itself has in experience. “This exteriority, the open system of language and speech, is thought in itself, the thought that turns itself into a thing, a sensible being, a sound, while the thing itself is negated, interiorized into thought.”<sup>49</sup> In other words, we no longer need refer to the sensible being itself outside of language, it is now language that is turned into a sensible *sign*; a content in which the signification itself is alienated.

Language is already, then, according to Hyppolite, the mastery of the sensible, in which signification is *intuited* there in the exteriority of language. This is the second form of memory; language as an archive or storehouse of the “existential aspect of thought” that must be thought for-itself in order to become the sense of sense, or thought of thought.<sup>50</sup> Just as the sensible singularity is negated in experience, the determination of sense in language is the second negation, a new negation, exercised on the sensible sign. The sensible sign is treated as content which is progressively raised to the level of form. Raised to the level of form, it is thought for-itself, rather than thought in-itself, or intuitive thought.

With the idea that there are two types of memory, we seem to have a response to the dilemma we outline in the above introductory statement. We inquired as to how it is possible that the universe of sense pre-exists the thought of the thing, not only because we wanted to inquire as to why Hegel argues that the sensible singularity is in itself inexpressible, but because we wanted to grasp how it is that the thing thought for-itself presupposes this sense. Hegel rightly recognizes the difficulty of this task, when writing that “to comprehend the position and sense of memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of the hardest points, and hitherto one quite un-regarded in the theory of spirit.”<sup>51</sup> What is it that we are after here? In Hegel’s philosophy, we are delving into the intersecting point of the particular and the universal. How the becoming of the sensible can already be one and the same as the becoming of sense. How it is that something can be thought for itself in its particularity, while being expressible as this or that sense, which already exists in language, as if language were already implicitly there in thought. Here, we are not discussing the dialectical logic of language considered on its own terrain, but have attempted, instead, to dabble in the intersection of Hegel’s two memories we highlighted above. But it is not as though the analysis of language is not already implied in such

a consideration. We are merely grasping it from its other side, as it connects to the phenomenology, rather than how one arrives at the sense of sense on the level of discourse. The two, however, are inseparable for Hegel. This is precisely why Hyppolite argues that:

to understand the intimate connection of these two memories and their inseparability [...] is to understand thereby even the concrete identity of the immediate and the universal, to catch the glimpse already of the reason why the Logic will be able to treat immediate being, the structure of the sensible, while remaining in the universe of significations.<sup>52</sup>

Having paused at this intersection, we will now turn to Hegel's discourse of being, his determination of the concept.

### **On the Absolute: The Being of Sense and Sense of Being**

In arguing that there is such a thing as absolute being, Hegel wants to demonstrate that being itself, while having a different form of existence from finite beings, nonetheless, is the reason behind their coming into appearance. He, hence, wants to make the absolute be the ground or condition of the appearing, while making appearing itself become the reflection of the absolute by way of which it determines itself. Since this appearing is, simultaneously, the internal differentiation of the absolute, a moment of its self-genesis, it cannot be considered to be external to it, even if in empirical consciousness it is taken as such. Its total self-genesis, shall we say the coming into its own of the concept equal to its content, is the sum of the moments by way of which it determines itself. Here, the difficulty for Hegel will be to demonstrate how this absolute as infinite being is able to determine itself by reflecting itself in appearance, all the while not being determined by phenomena, since they themselves are finite. The resolution to this problematic, as Hegel frames it, is found in the concept of negativity, which itself bears the affirmative position, the Logic of the absolute. In order that we may understand what is meant by

the Logic of the absolute as the sense of being, we must untie the moments that compose the whole of the transcendental. Seeing that our task is to explain Deleuze's position in the appendix to Hyppolite's text, we will move through these moments quite quickly.

For the most part, Hyppolite posits the dialectical development of the absolute in the last chapter of his text, "The Organization of the Logic: Being, Essence, Concept." Just as the first position in the absolute is nothingness, the first term of the method, its beginning, is the universal which is indeterminate. The two involve one another. As immediacy, which is not meant to be sensible immediacy, being in its own self-relation is pure thought. In order that it may emerge from this self-relation, it must be thought or realized in the concept. Hyppolite, hence, writes:

Being, considered as irreducible to pure thought, is the absolute self-relation which is also pure thought. Thought does not lack being; it lacks determination. And being, this mere self-relation, also lacks determination. In the form of being and nothingness, of being and the question of being, their opposition is reciprocal. [...] But this very simplicity of the beginning is its determination.<sup>53</sup>

To realize the concept is to determine it, just as the absolute in its self-division determines itself in the doubling of essence. It might seem strange to draw these two movements together, since in the latter the absolute does not emerge from itself or is not realized, while in the former, the immanent self-relation of the absolute says itself in the dialectic. Or, alternatively, here sense "hears itself" so that it may become expressed. The difference is that in the former we stop with essence, the self-negation of being, while in the other, we have negated this negation. The dialectical method is this expression, as the discourse *of* being. Now, in order to demonstrate this movement, Hyppolite opens up the discussion of the absolute when noting that the negation of nothingness, the immediacy of the absolute, is, both, the progressive presentation of being as essence, and the self-relation of the absolute in its becoming for-itself. We will set aside this contradiction, so as to firstly lay out the field of reflection.

The field of reflection is the sphere of essence in which the whole of being is itself negated. By the whole sphere of being negated, Hyppolite means that being in its immediacy is negated, or, rather, it is not immediately present in the field of reflection for-itself. Because essence is the negation of being as immediate, we are not aware that the position itself, or essence, is engendered by the logic of sense.<sup>54</sup> What is this essence as negated being? Hyppolite writes that: “being opposes itself to itself; negates itself as being and posits itself as essence. But essence is appearance. Essence is posited in appearance, that is, negated being, and there alone.”<sup>55</sup> We must be careful when articulating this idea, since the negation of the whole of being is its self-negation so that essence is posited, while when Hegel says essence is appearance, he is saying that the absolute negates itself in its other, so that it may reflect itself or determine itself. Thus far, we have stressed that appearing is the self-reflection of the absolute, its difference from itself, and that, in turn, this appearing is itself the determination of being as essence. The double movement is simultaneous, being indicative of the doubling of essence; what in Deleuze’s philosophy will be re-interpreted as the double directionality of sense. These two directions, the doubling of essence, is the self-division of the absolute, its negation in its other, which is the appearing of being in the determination as essence. In order to express this idea Hyppolite argues that: “The movement of the logic of essence is a double movement in one alone. It is the movement by which being negates itself, turns itself into appearance, and the movement by which, while negating itself, it posits itself, makes itself essence in appearance.”<sup>56</sup> On the one hand, as appearing, being as essence is the condition of this appearing, but if we follow the other direction, essence is the internal reflection of being, its determination, like the echo of appearing. “In immediate being, it is non-being which is the ground into which all particular beings

disappear or from which they emerge. In essence, it is being itself which reflects itself, insofar as being appears.<sup>57</sup> As appearing, being is its own reflection as essence.

By not passing into itself or being for-itself, Hegel merely means that being is posited as essence; this is why it is not immediately visible. As non-being, it is its other, which is not the sensible, but the becoming of the sensible. This is precisely what it comprehends and interiorizes as its own limit; the limit being its position, or essence. In other words, this self-negation, reflection of the absolute in its other, is at the same time the cancellation of the whole; this is why the beginning is itself considered to be nothingness, or the nothingness which becomes being in the same movement. In externalizing itself, the absolute is not delimited by its other, its other, instead, negates itself in order to become. It severs itself from finite life, it becomes infinite life; it is its opposite. On the other hand, the self-limitation of the absolute, which is the reflection of its other in itself, is, as we have noted, a determination. Now, the dialectic itself is not apparent in the determinations of essence, since essence is merely the appearing of being. Yet, as Hyppolite writes, what allows these determinations to show themselves as moments, is that the absolute itself is implied in each of the determinations, already there as the first, even if it is posited retrospectively as the second. He, hence, argues that:

The result is that the absolute, by positing itself in each of its determinations, appears to itself entirely in each (since each refers to the other). The absolute is their mediation, the reflection of one of the determinations into the other, which is at the same time external reflection (relation of one to the other), and internal reflection (self-relation).<sup>58</sup>

The external reflection refers to the externalization of being, while the internal is its return to itself, its determination as essence.

The whole problem on the first level is that in positing essence, being does not pass into itself, or does not show itself as for-itself. In turn, then, essence appears to be distinct from



appearance, the other of which it is the reflection. Since it is the negation of the immediacy of being, it cannot explain the passage by way of which it becomes its other, in appearing. In other words, essence as appearance opens up the contradiction itself, since essence as position is simultaneously the negation of being in its other, appearance. As such, Hyppolite writes that essence “is the un-resolved contradiction, since it is simultaneously the negation of being and the negation of this negation.”<sup>59</sup> But isn’t this contradiction, the difference of posited essence and the appearance which is not the same as this essence, already the differentiation of the absolute, its self-reflection? Isn’t this precisely the question of being which provokes thought to think the non-thought so as to determine the concept? Hyppolite will go on to say that the contradiction expresses itself due to the self-division of the absolute. What is being said here is that, essence, as a particular sense, is itself not distinct from being. It is itself the reflection of being. How so? He argues that: “Essence is indeed being-in-itself and for itself, but it is still in itself. Its comprehension is not its own comprehension. Essence has *reintroduced* the immediacy of being; this is why it is no longer essence, but concept.”<sup>60</sup> Essence reintroduces the immediacy of being, since it is itself produced by the dialectical logic of the absolute. Its own appearing is recognizable retrospectively, as immediately involved in all of the determinations, as the universal logic that connects and posits them, by beginning the process of self-division again. It is in this sense that the difference of essence and appearance is itself overcome. It is overcome in the self-relation of the absolute as mediation. Hyppolite sums up this thought by noting that:

the genesis of sense was implicit in the prior spheres; this genesis is the Logic, because the Logic is the constitution of being as sense, comprehension, not as reference to a thing comprehended distinct from the movement of comprehension, but this movement itself as intelligible genesis of the thing. [...] The logic is the absolute form which is its object for itself.<sup>61</sup>

As object for itself, the logicity of being is the universal sense which is already there contained in each particular sense. Considered for-itself, or reflected in thought for-itself, it shows itself to be immediately there in the field of reflection as the “ground behind the appearance as essence.” According to Hyppolite, the logic of sense demonstrates how the concept is already there as essence, “being is shown across essence as sense,” or, better yet, “the universal expresses it and gets expressed in it.”<sup>62</sup> He continues to note that, “it is like a second being behind the first, but when we no longer abstract from its position, when we comprehend it as self-positing, as self-constituting, then, it is no longer essence but sense.”<sup>63</sup> By no longer being essence but sense, the absolute challenges any sort of abstraction of essence as an indeterminate determination. It overturns its differentiation in the other in order to posit a new position, in other words, to begin the cycle all over again. To reiterate, it is able to do this because its self-division is immanent in every position. It, therefore, no longer contradicts itself, since it is identical to itself in positing itself. This is what is understood as the double negation, or the negation of the limitation, by way of which the absolute itself is affirmed in its identity.<sup>64</sup> Such affirmation, for Hegel, involves the thought of absolute being, which is posited as a universal sense or concept. As universal sense, it “contains intrinsically every particular sense. [...] It now knows itself as the sense of all of the senses.”<sup>65</sup> Or, it is the Logic that explains how the essence as particular sense appears in the universal, and how this universal underpins the particular.<sup>66</sup> Hyppolite concludes his text by noting that: “Hegelian Logic is the absolute genesis of sense, a sense which, to itself, is its own sense, which is not opposed to the being whose sense it is, but which is sense and being simultaneously.”<sup>67</sup> By briefly exploring essence and appearance we have, hence, demonstrated how the being of sense and the sense of being are involved in one and the same dialectical development of the absolute. Or how the “circle of Essence takes up that of

Being, and the circle of the Concept that of Essence.”<sup>68</sup> This duality in unity is the rationale behind Hyppolite’s claim that immanence is complete in Hegel’s philosophy.

As the reader will notice, Deleuze’s primary position in the appendix to *Logic and Existence* is to affirm, alongside Hyppolite, that ontology must be ontology of sense. The whole problem, however, lies in the positing of this sense. Deleuze articulates this problem when writing: “The difference between thought and being is sublated in the absolute by the positing of the Being identical to difference which, as such, thinks itself and reflects itself in man. The absolute identity of being and difference is called sense.”<sup>69</sup> To a Hegelian, this articulation may appear as though proposing no problem whatsoever, or, alternatively, if it is perceived as problematic, the problem would lie in Deleuze’s formulation of Hegel’s logic. From Deleuze’s perspective, however, the difference made cannot be sublated in the absolute. Such a sublation, for him, is merely the reduction of difference to the identity of the concept. Besides the vague argument that difference cannot be reduced to identity, what is behind Deleuze’s objection? In order for Hegel to eliminate the contradiction that he has himself posited in his system of thought, he must reduce the differentiation of the absolute to the position already stated. In other words, the sense of being, which is the highest knowledge for Hegel, is proposed as identical to the being of sense, but it is not adequate to its genesis, or becoming. It is as though, in thinking the absolute itself, Hegel closes the circle where the absolute opens itself up to a new position, a higher differentiation; contradiction gives birth to ground. He sacrifices difference to ensure the consistency of the position; to preserve the status of the copula, or identify the sides of the absolute which he frames as contradictory. But when Deleuze critiques Hegel sense of being, he does not merely seek to reform his logic, so as to render it more consistent with the philosophy

of difference. He seeks to uproot the entirety of the logic. This is reflected in the series of his inquiries in the conclusion of the review:

Can we not construct an ontology of difference which would not have to go up to contradiction, because contradiction would be less than difference and not more? Is not contradiction itself only the phenomenal and *anthropological* aspect of difference? [...] Is it the same thing to say that Being expresses itself and that it contradicts itself? [...] Does not Hyppolite ground a theory of expression where difference is expression itself, and contradiction is merely the phenomenal aspect?<sup>70</sup>

Scholars have placed the emphasis on the first question as the central one that will preoccupy Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*. As Leonard Lawlor writes, Deleuze is inquiring into “what concept of difference is needed for an ontology of sense to be adequate to a philosophy of immanence?”<sup>71</sup> The other aspect of this philosophy of difference is, however, to render contradiction superfluous, or to show it as the mere anthropological aspect of difference. When Deleuze proposes that contradiction is the anthropological aspect of difference, he is taking issue with the whole notion of the absolute as Subject, which differentiates itself by reflecting itself. In this sense, ontological contradiction is the same as ontic negativity, the latter being projected onto the former.

That contradiction is itself modelled after phenomenal opposition is likewise a point of contention for Hyppolite, who asks:

If it is the case that [Hegel] speaks of one self-same negativity is there an equivocation here? We cannot [sway away from] asking this question, and the issue is especially to discover whether Hegel has more or less transposed an ontic negativity into an ontological negativity, a real opposition into a logical contradiction.<sup>72</sup>

Hyppolite’s response to this question is in the negative, since the absolute thinks itself in its other. It is in no way limited by the phenomenal realm. According to him, Hegel’s dialectical method is adequate to being. In contrast, Deleuze argues that it is not the same thing to say that being expresses itself and that it contradicts itself. It is not clear in the review as to why he

distinguishes between the expression of being and its self-contradiction. But having in mind that Deleuze will go on to write a minor thesis on Spinoza, entitled, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, we see that this distinction is the germ of the development of a new logic. Deleuze cannot be reconciled with Hegel precisely because the dialectical logic cannot be rearticulated so as to reflect a new philosophy of difference. For Deleuze, “the source of the difficulty was already there in the logic,” this is why he will go on to posit an alternative logic by turning to Spinoza.<sup>73</sup> Let us stay with the idea that Hegel’s dialectic cannot be rearticulated so as to reflect a new philosophy of difference by briefly turning to the central argument that Deleuze puts forth against him in *Difference and Repetition*.

In his defence of the Hegelian position in “Limit, Ground, Judgement... Syllogism: Hegel, Deleuze, Hegel and Deleuze,” Jay Lampert argues that Deleuze reduces the Hegelian ground to the Leibnizian notion of convergence, when the ground is “the source of still more difference.”<sup>74</sup> The problem for Deleuze is not that Hegel appears to have conceived of difference as sort of convergence as Leibniz had done, neither is the idea that the absolute realizes itself with ever more differentiations put into question by him, since the ground is indeed the rendering infinite of the concept, so requiring ever more differentiations. The point is that, the ground as ‘still more difference’ does not save Hegel from a Deleuzean critique. It is instead the basis of such a critique. It is not enough to extend the ground in order to demonstrate how difference works on its terrain. What Hegel calls contradiction is radically reformulated in Deleuze’s philosophy as the moment of differentiation, expressed in the questioning instance, *what difference is there; a difference that pertains to the movement from one level of repetition to another*. For Deleuze, difference does not “resolve itself” in the ground as it does in Hegel. It is primary, meaning that it is the moment of groundlessness showing itself in the ground as erecting the ground itself. The

entirety of the process of erecting the ground from the perspective of groundlessness presents the difference; *it is the singular event itself in the making*. The so-called higher position for Deleuze does not involve “reaching the infinite” of contradiction, or raising difference to contradiction. What is this higher moment but the affirmation of absolute knowledge, the realization of the dialectical logic itself in the concept, in which the essence of the finite is said from the perspective of the infinite?

There is a significant reversal of this moment in Deleuze’s philosophy, here referred to as the paradox of sense or the Event of thought. This moment is not a preservation of what came before. It is not a raising up. It is a releasing in the highest affirmation in which the difference is made. This is why Deleuze claims that “difference is light, aerial and affirmative. To affirm is not to bear but, on the contrary, to discharge and to lighten.”<sup>75</sup> In other words, when we claim that Hegel seems to have closed the circle, or that he reduces difference rather than raising it up to a higher position in contradiction, we are arguing alongside Deleuze that the dialectical circle saves the whole in a “gigantic memory,” that the ground is the “power of memory” which carries “the average forms to infinity.”<sup>76</sup> In the place of the selection of difference on the basis of representation, Deleuze argues for a repetition that would affirm the “formless power of the ground.”<sup>77</sup> In contrast to representation, “repetition is the formless being of all differences, the formless power of the ground which carries every object to the extreme ‘form’ in which its representation comes undone.”<sup>78</sup> This unlimited return of difference is Deleuze’s univocal being, the ontology of sense, which expresses itself in the same sense. But doesn’t this mean that difference is left undetermined? This is precisely what Lampert asks in the concluding arguments to his paper. He writes:

If each determination is already a difference, then making it different will not negate it. But does this mean that difference has no determinate content? If each

determination were a general ‘mixture’ [...], then while the upside would be that identity [is] lost, the downside would be that so was difference. But if differences are indeed determinate, why not call them negative? After all, they would override boundaries, flee constraints, abstract from properties, become-other, etc.<sup>79</sup>

In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze warns against this sort of interpretation of difference. He notes that:

what is common to metaphysics and transcendental philosophy is, above all, this alternative which they both impose on us: either an undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness, formless nonbeing, or an abyss without difference and without properties, *or* a supremely individuated Being and an intensely personalized Form. Without this Being or this Form, you will have only chaos.<sup>80</sup>

Deleuze is not satisfied with expressing difference under the concept. Neither is he willing to leave difference indeterminate. The difference made in the doubled affirmation, what he will call the eternal return, is the ground made from the perspective of groundlessness, not the other way around. It is a reversal, a kind of turning inside out of the surface, in which identity is said of difference, groundlessness as raising the ground, and determination as both determination and indetermination at once. Having outlined the core of Deleuze’s critique of Hegel’s dialectical logic, we will now turn to his development of an alternative logic by way of Spinoza.

### **A Spinozist Expression: Toward a New Logic**

When introducing Hyppolite’s central thesis in *Logic and Existence*, we briefly highlighted that, for him, Hegel was able to realize the doctrine of complete immanence that Spinoza had fallen short of fulfilling. Hyppolite sums up the problem that Hegel has with the Spinozist system when writing: “The Spinozistic substance still lacked the principle of *self-reflection*. It was in itself pure activity, self-causing, but its activity did not exhibit itself as mediation, as *self-becoming*.”<sup>81</sup> We wrapped up the discussion by emphasizing Deleuze’s remarks on Hegelian dialectical logic. Those remarks characterize the fundamentals of Deleuze’s project, which is to

develop a philosophy of difference that is not only an alternative to Hegel's, but also realizes the endeavour initiated by Martin Heidegger. Deleuze's position on Hegelian negation is elaborated in *Difference and Repetition*, in which he argues that dialectical movement is an artificial movement. His critique of dialectical movement echoes Hegel's refutation of Spinoza. According to Deleuze, it is Spinoza—a thinker he acclaims as a philosopher of pure affirmation—who realizes immanence, with the *Ethics* being a book of pure ontology.<sup>82</sup>

Hegel's position on Spinoza's system is clearly articulated in two brief sections of the *Science of Logic*.<sup>83</sup> Hegel does not outright refute Spinoza's philosophy as false. He, instead, seeks to demonstrate that his thought, despite lacking dialectical development, nevertheless marks a progression towards the form of thought which is of the highest standpoint. This is consistent with his position that "the true system as the higher must contain the subordinate system within itself."<sup>84</sup> Hegel argues that Spinoza's system can only be refuted if we are able to show that the dialectic is already immanent to the relations of substance, and that such relations, in turn, lead to the concept. The crux of his refutation is the following:

[Spinoza] does not advance to a cognition of negation as absolute, that is, self-negating, negation; thus his substance does not itself contain the absolute form, and cognition of it is not an immanent cognition. True, substance is the absolute unity of thought and being or extension; therefore it contains thought itself, but only in its unity with extension, that is, not as separating itself from extension, hence in general not as a determinative and formative activity, nor as a movement which return into and begins from itself.<sup>85</sup>

Because the attributes are not themselves opposed in Spinoza's system, there is no movement in it. In other words, since there is no opposition, there is no becoming in the attribute. As there is no becoming in the attribute, especially the attribute of thought, Hegel argues that thought is an external reflection in Spinoza's system, leaving substance itself indeterminate. According to Hegel, Spinoza's philosophy stops at an indifferent substance, because it does not reach the



“highest standpoint,” which is the self-negating negation of substance, or alternatively, the absolute determinateness of the Notion or concept.

The problem is that Hegel interprets extension and thought as two substances, which must be opposed in order for one to become the other. He is, hence, mobilizing a specific lens through which to read thought and extension as two substances, the reciprocal relations of which, results in the identity of the concept. For him, then,

the Notion, the totality resulting from the reciprocal relation, is the unity of the two substances standing in that relation; but in this unity they are now free, for they no longer possess their identity as something blind, that is to say, as something merely *inner*; on the contrary, the substances now have essentially the status of an *illusory being*, of being moments of reflection, whereby each is no less immediately united with its other or its positedness and each contains its positedness within itself, and consequently in its other is posited as simply and solely identical with itself.<sup>86</sup>

This positedness or position is the substance as cause of itself, but now reflected for-itself in the concept. It is not merely in itself, but being for-itself, it displaces the opposition or contradiction of two substances, in order to reflect its identity, or become absolutely determined in thought as purely self-related. Here we see that in the same move, Hegel both refutes Spinozism as having reinstalled Cartesian dualism, while showing that the attributes, which he mistakes as two, must be raised to contradiction, so that the reflection of the absolute becomes an immanent reflection rather than an external one. In contrast, Deleuze will spend a significant chunk of his *Expressionism in Philosophy* defending the idea that Spinoza displaces such a dualism. This defence is strategic, since there is no mention of Hegel, only the refutation of the Cartesian system by Spinoza.

Before we move on to consider the logic of expression, we want to note that Deleuze corrects the Spinozist system, or rather, accentuates different elements of it, in such a way that he not only dissolves the basis on which Hegel refutes Spinoza’s philosophy, but also develops a

philosophical system which he claims to be consistent with the pillars of Spinoza's logic. We will see that Deleuze also finds substance itself problematic. His Nietzschean correction of Spinoza, will delve on the same point, but from an entirely different perspective than Hegel. The logic of expression which is set up in *Expressionism in Philosophy* will, nevertheless, remain as the genuine logic of univocal being, affirmed in Spinoza's philosophy, and advanced by Deleuze in his other works. *Expressionism in Philosophy*, published in 1968, but written in the late 1950's,<sup>87</sup> is Deleuze's minor thesis accompanying his major thesis, *Difference and Repetition* (1968). The latter work along with *The Logic of Sense*, published a year later, and some fourteen years after the appendix to Hyppolite's text, are works that Deleuze's is no longer dedicating to the history of philosophy, but texts in which he is "doing" philosophy. In all of the works mentioned, he is developing the ontology of univocal being, which promises to be an effective displacement of Hegel's absolute being that expresses itself or says itself in language.<sup>88</sup> In other words, he is seeking to lay out a univocal being that likewise is not simply a human expression, but the discourse of being. According to Deleuze, such a univocal being is affirmed by the Spinozist system, because that system furthers the logic of expression. The logic of expression is the only one which is able to realize the doctrine of complete immanence. In this subsection, we will inquire as to how the logic of expression is furthered by what Deleuze calls Spinoza's plane of immanence.<sup>89</sup>

### **On the Univocal Nature of the Attributes**

The whole of Spinoza's *Ethics* hangs on the primary definition of the absolute with which he opens the text. Absolute being whose essence it is to exist in itself, as opposed to finding its existence in another, nevertheless requires philosophical demonstration in order to be explicated.

This seemingly simple definition is not hypothetical; it is itself a definitive ontological proposition demonstrative of the act of thought from which all else expressed follows. The *Ethics* is consistent with the logic of expression in *Expressionism in Philosophy*, if we pay close attention to the terminology of essence and existence deployed by Spinoza. The subtle shifts in expression produce different levels of reality. On the absolute, Spinoza writes: “by cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot *be conceived* except by existing.”<sup>90</sup> As we read this definition along with Deleuze’s insights, we already find within it a genetic function which acquires expressivity in the attribute of thought. Deleuze employs this definition, along with those that follow, to argue for the primary triad of expression consisting of substance, attributes and essence: “substance expresses itself, attributes are expressions, and essence is expressed.”<sup>91</sup> Spinoza’s first use of the concept of expression is in D6, when he conceives of the attributes in relation to substance, writing: “By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one *expresses* an eternal and infinite essence.”<sup>92</sup> Deleuze captures the relation of substance, attribute, and, essence, through the prism of expression by arguing for the distinction of terms, each having a definitive function in the logic, insofar as it is conceived of in relation to the other two. Substance and attributes are distinct because attributes express essences. Essence is distinct from attributes, insofar as essence is the “expressed of substance.”<sup>93</sup> While, as expressed, it has no existence outside of the attribute, it is distinguished from it by being the essence of substance.<sup>94</sup> Attributes are not themselves essences, they constitute the existence of substance, or are the forms through which substance finds expression, rather than remaining bound up potential. Conversely, we cannot confuse essence with substance, since essences find expression through the attributes themselves. Deleuze sums up the introduction to the structure of

expression, noting: “It is through attributes that essence is distinguished from substance, but through essence that substance is itself distinguished from attributes: a triad each of whose terms serves as a middle term relating the two others.”<sup>95</sup>

Now that we have set up the first triad of the logic of expression, we will explain the relation of the terms by turning to the fundamental idea that makes such relation possible. This is the real distinction of the attributes themselves. In order to demonstrate the distinction of terms, Deleuze focuses in on Spinoza’s differentiation of real from numerical distinction, which is also the basis of Spinoza critique of the Cartesian system of thought. The argument is that: “there are not several substance of the same attribute, and numerical distinction is not real.”<sup>96</sup> The second argument, which is drawn from the conclusions arrived in the first, is that there is only one and the same substance for all attributes. The idea that attributes are expressive of substance poses some difficulties which we will present in order to demonstrate what this notion of the expressed consists of. The principle problem lies with the attributes themselves which present multiple substances, while at the same time conceive of one and the same substance which, by being independent of other substances, is in itself indivisible. The question that dominates the first part of Spinoza’s *Ethics* is, hence, can there be more than one substance, and, if so, on what basis can we distinguish one from another? This is also the question that Deleuze attempts to resolve in the first section of his study. According to Deleuze, there is an ambiguity in Descartes dual aspect of attributes, particularly, the way in which attributes relate both to substance and to the modes; the movement of “really distinct to really distinct things.” That attributes qualify substance is not in question. The problem is that the distinction in substance of attributes relies on the modes themselves which share the same attribute. The modes, which are thought to distinguish one and the same substance of an attribute, introduce a numerical distinction. Spinoza objects on two

fronts: firstly, modes are not substances distinguished by a single attribute, and, secondly, if we were to presume that more than one substance existed of an attribute, it would have to be numerically distinct rather than really distinct. By refuting the notion of modes as substances that distinguish one and the same attribute, Spinoza is stating that the attributes cannot be numerically distinguished by modes, as if parts constituting a whole. His rationale is that such parts, now conceived of as numerically distinct substances, are limited by one another, hence, finding their cause in something external to the attribute which is now made finite. Again, this sort of demonstration is based on the premise that two things can only be distinguished by the attribute they hold in common; an attribute which is presupposed as infinite. “Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of substance or by a difference in their affections.”<sup>97</sup> Since modes are finite, if we presume that they themselves distinguish the attribute which they hold in common, then the attribute itself cannot be infinite. If we are to presume, however, that substance is indeed infinite, then, we must search for the cause of the distinction of things in something other than numerical distinction.<sup>98</sup>

For Spinoza, numerical distinction is not a substantial distinction, because it supposes substances which are produced by something other than themselves, hence, putting into question the notion that substance is “what can exist by itself.” Or, as Deleuze notes, two substances rely for their distinction by sharing one and the same attribute, so that the numerical distinction of substance is contradictory to the nature of infinite substance.<sup>99</sup> Numerical distinction belongs primarily to finite modes, rather than to the substance of attributes since parts, even if considered from the perspective of a whole, cannot “reach” infinity. Deleuze himself concludes the discussion by writing:

there cannot be several substances with the same attribute. From which one may infer: from the viewpoint of relation, that one substance is not produced by another;

from the viewpoint of modality, that it belongs to the nature of substance to exist; and from the viewpoint of quality, that any substance is necessarily infinite.<sup>100</sup>

The finite modes therefore are not substances or substantial parts which distinguish one and the same attribute. This distinction is important to setting up not only the real distinction of attributes, but also the distinction of the essence of substance, and the essences of modes. Once Spinoza has demonstrated that numerical distinction is not a real one, he goes on to make a substantial shift by arguing that there is only one substance for all the attributes. Deleuze explains this fundamental shift by noting that there is continuity in Spinoza argumentation from the dismissal of numerical distinction, to the claim that attributes are not themselves numerically distinct substances constituting one and the same substance, as if parts relating to the whole. He writes that, since “numerical distinction is never real; then conversely, real distinction is never numerical [...] so there is only one substance for all attributes.”<sup>101</sup> How is the real distinction of the attributes conceived of in the *Ethics*? On the real distinction of the attributes, Spinoza writes in A5: “things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.”<sup>102</sup> As we have seen, the nature of the attributes is infinite, proven a posteriori by the notion that finite modes themselves cannot be substances which distinguish an attribute. Or, the attribute in question cannot be determined by the division of finite things, or by the modalities of thought. What is at stake in such a claim? We have a more concrete sense of what is at stake in the distinction, when Spinoza writes that: “It follows...that God, or all of God’s attributes, are immutable. For if they change as to their existence, they would also change as to their essence, that is ... from being true become false, which is absurd.”<sup>103</sup> An attribute such as thought, must be infinite, one and the same for all modes sharing in the attribute. Again, these distinctions are based on the idea that

substance must be infinite or unlimited by a finite part or thing, which would “deny existence to its nature.”<sup>104</sup>

But if we have shown that the substances of attributes are infinite, how has this demonstrated that they are distinct? Spinoza writes that:

God’s attributes are to be understood [as] what *expresses* an essence of the divine substance, that is, *what pertains* to substance. The attributes themselves, I say, must involve it itself. But eternity pertains to the nature of substance [...] Therefore each of the attributes must involve eternity, and so they are eternal.<sup>105</sup>

Moreover, he goes on to say that, “the existence of substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth [...] and from this we can infer in another way that there is only one [substance] of the same nature.”<sup>106</sup> According to Spinoza, then, the attributes express the essence of substance, but the existence and essence of substance is one and the same. Hence, it must be so that the attributes are infinite in nature, while together constituting the absolute infinity of substance. The attributes following from the nature of God, thus, must themselves be infinite according to Spinoza: “For since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more power it has, of itself, to exist. Therefore, an absolute infinite Being, or God, has, of himself, an absolutely infinite power of existing. For that reason, he exists absolutely.”<sup>107</sup> Each attribute must express an infinite essence, while Being itself must consist of attributes that are infinite, because it is absolutely infinite. Attributes, which are like points of view on substance, express the existence of substance, which is one and the same. As expressive or attributive, the attributes according to Deleuze are genetic or dynamic elements. The attributes must be affirmed as such genetic elements, in order to demonstrate how substance “explicates” itself. The existence of substance is affirmed by the real distinction of attributes through which it “explicates” itself. Since it is the attributes which constitute or qualify the existence of substance, the more attributes that qualify a thing the more reality or perfection it has.<sup>108</sup> The structuration

of the logic of expression, as Deleuze rightly recognizes, depends upon the real distinction of the attributes. In order to assert that substance, finding expression in the attributes which are by *its* nature infinite, so as to affirm itself as the same thing, we must distinguish them really and not numerically. Not only is the real distinction of the attributes fundamental in demonstrating the existence of one substance, which is the cause of itself, it has a pertinent role in refuting the Hegelian critique of Spinoza. Deleuze, thus, spends a bulk of the first section dealing with the Cartesian elements in Spinoza's philosophy, in order to show that the distinction of the attributes is consistent with the idea of an indivisible substance. Real distinction as the foundation for refuting Descartes' position is also meant to debunk the Hegelian refutation of Spinoza.

The analysis of real distinction, Deleuze argues, is the only one which "shows it to be possible to ascribe all attributes to one being, and so to pass from the infinity of each attribute to the absoluteness of a being that possesses them all."<sup>109</sup> The attributes considered as substances are qualitatively distinct, or they qualify substance, but they are not ontologically distinct from the perspective of substance.

The idea of expression, in the *Ethics*, adapts this initial step: the essence of substance has no existence outside the attribute that express it, so that each attribute expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence. *What is expressed has no existence outside its expressions; each expression is, as it were, the existence of what is expressed.*<sup>110</sup>

Now, the difficulty of this position shows itself when the multiplicity of the attributes is affirmed, but all together they are thought to express one and the same essence of substance.<sup>111</sup>

Again, Deleuze reiterates that the essences expressed are not the essences of attributes, but ontologically one and the same essence of substance. What is expressed of substance in the attributes is its sense or essence, but what expresses itself in the attributes is one and the same substance. Hence, Deleuze writes that: "the rule of convertibility states that every essence is the essence of something. Essences are really distinct from the viewpoint of the attributes, but



essence is single from the viewpoint of the object with which it is convertible.”<sup>112</sup> By delving into the multiplicity of attributes as expressing one and the same substance, Deleuze is inquiring as to how multiple attributes or divine names can designate one and the same thing or object. He resolves this dilemma by arguing that the essence which is the expressed of attributes, is distinguished from them, insofar as what expresses itself in essence is “one in the same thing for all attributes,” which are only formally distinct.<sup>113</sup> If we inquire as to

what exists through itself, in such a way that its existence follows from its essence? This is clearly substance, the correlate of essence, rather than the attribute in which essence has existence solely as essence. [...] All existing essences relate or are attributable to substance and this inasmuch as substance is the only being whose existence necessarily follows from its essence.<sup>114</sup>

To reiterate, the expressed essence or sense itself has no existence outside of the attribute which is expressive of it. It is not the sense of the attributes, but of what expresses itself through them.

What does it mean for a substance to be the same for all attributes or to have an identical being in all of them? What does it mean for all attributes to designate one and the same substance? Ontologically, God’s existence is equal to his essence. Deleuze conceives of substance then in the following way: attributes constitute the essences *of* substance, but they have the identity of being or “designate” one and the same substance because that which is expressed by them expresses itself in the same sense of all the attributes. When arguing that they designate one and the same thing, the attributes must not be confused with the modalities of attributes, which would be properties attributed to substance. Spinoza himself opposes such a formulation when writing that “the actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, like will, desire, love, and the like, must be referred to *Natura naturata*, not to *natura naturans*,” the former pertains to what follows from God’s nature or from his attributes, while the latter is conceived through itself.<sup>115</sup> We have yet to prove the way in which the attributes are “said” in one and the

same sense, but the logic of expression, thus far, simultaneously preserves the “identity of being and distinction of formality.”<sup>116</sup> The attributes which are expressive of substance, tell us that God is a thinking Being and an extended Being. But what expresses itself, is precisely the same thing from the perspective of substance, as it has the same sense in both attributes. The attributes follow from it in the same way, or as Deleuze notes, “each attribute is a verb, a primary infinitive proposition, an expression with a distinct sense; but all attributes designate substance as one and the same thing.”<sup>117</sup> The relevance of this first conception of sense or essence in Spinoza according to Deleuze is that it demonstrates that the attributes affirm the univocal being. By univocal being, he means that being expresses itself in the same way in all the attributes. Now, these attributes, which Deleuze interprets as infinitive propositions in that text, are re-expressed in the modes as “‘participial’ propositions which derive from the primary infinitive ones.”<sup>118</sup>

### **On Univocal Causality**

Having set up the first triad of the logic of expression, Deleuze turns to the re-expression of substance in the modes through the attributes. The rationale behind conceiving the expression of substance in modes as a re-expression is that the essence of substance, which finds expression in the attributes, is not the same as the essence of modes. The difference is precisely that the essence of modes is dependent upon the modification of substance, which, as before, finds expression in the attributes. It is in this sense that we can say that the modes are affections of the attributes, or that the attributes are re-expressed in the modes. In other words, while the essence of modes is contained in the attributes, the attributes themselves are not constitutive of this essence. It is the modification of substance that is expressed by the attributes in the modes. Deleuze frames the second triad of the logic of expression in the following way:

Each attribute expresses itself, the dependent modes are expressions, and a modification is expressed. [...] A modification has no existence outside the modes that expresses it in each attribute, but it is expressed as a modification of substance, the same for all modes differing in attribute. [...] In principle, a mode is an affection of an attribute, a modification an affection of substance. One is understood formally, the other ontologically.<sup>119</sup>

Before we specify how the distinction formulated in the latter part of the above quotation will be the problem that preoccupies Deleuze in the second part of his study, we would like to highlight that, despite claims to the contrary, the notion of re-expression is not foreign to Spinoza's thought.<sup>120</sup> This is demonstrated in the *Ethics* when he writes:

Since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely, those which follow necessarily from his absolute nature and others had to be produced by the mediation of these first things, it follows [...] that God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him [...]. For God's effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause. [Nevertheless] God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things, except perhaps so that we may distinguish them from those things that are produced immediately or rather, that follow from his absolute nature. [...] All things are, are in God, and so depend on God that they can neither be nor be conceived without him.<sup>121</sup>

This quotation demonstrates that the two triads of expression are not exclusive of one another. What follows immediately from God's absolute nature (*natura naturans*), which is its essence expressed by the attributes, cannot be severed from what is expressed by the attributes in the modes (*natura naturata*). But the modes are expressive of an effect, insofar as this effect is attributed to a modification immediate to substance, its acting power as cause. This is God's re-expression; it is the cause of all things in the same way that it is the cause of itself. Modes as the effect of God's cause are *conceived* through the attributes, which is to say that their cause is found in God and not the attributes.

In the previous discussion, we point out that the attributes are formally distinct, while designating one and the same thing ontologically. This argument is the basis on which the second triad of expression is built. In turn, the second level of expression must maintain the integrity of

that argument. Even while we explore two points of view on the modes, we must maintain the univocal nature of the attributes. The modes themselves are grasped as the affections of attributes, and affections or modifications of substance. As Deleuze noted, the former is understood formally, while the other ontologically. This is not to say that the affections of attributes themselves do not presuppose the modifications of substance, but only that there are two ways of approaching the modes. We can either understand them through their effects external to the cause; or we can comprehend them through the complication or modification of substance which is their cause. As we are invoking comprehension, however, in each case they are grasped through the attributes, since the attributes are the common forms of substance and modes. If we are to understand them as affections of attributes, then we must deal with the problem of epistemological parallelism, which nevertheless, as we noted, implies the modification of substance. That demonstration will return us, however, to the modification of substance itself, or what Deleuze refers to as ontological parallelism. There we must inquire as to how a modification can be conceived under two powers, all the while ontologically being one and the same modification. The entirety of Deleuze's demonstration is not only meant to depose opposition in the attributes, but also contradiction on the ontological level.

Most readers of Spinoza are familiar with the identity of order of the attributes, or what is more typically referred to as parallelism. This idea is demonstrated by Spinoza in few short passages in "Of the Mind." There he argues that the object of the mind is the body, insofar as the ideas of the affections of the body exist in God, rather than existing in the mind itself. Alternatively, one and the same modification of God is expressed in multiple ways by different modes of attributes simultaneously, or as Deleuze puts it: "Because attributes constitute one and the same substance, modes that differ in attribute form one and the same modification."<sup>122</sup> Does

this mean that the mind knows the body? This is clearly not the case. Even though “the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body,” whether it is my body or another, the intelligence does not directly know the body, neither is it the cause of changes in the body.<sup>123</sup>

While the same modification is expressed in a mode of the attribute of extension, and a mode of the attribute of thought, the two attributes maintain their separate spheres of expression. This is what Spinoza means when writing that:

The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute. [...] For each attribute is conceived through itself without any other. So the modes of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but not of another one.<sup>124</sup>

The central idea reinforcing the equality of the attributes is the modifications of substance. Each attribute must be conceived through itself, rather than being thought through the other, as though the other were its opposite.

As Deleuze argues, however, because the attributes refer to one and the same substance, there is a constant relation between them. What happens in one is reflected in another. He interprets such an identity of order to take place between two things or two series, “which bear to each other a constant relation such that there is nothing in one to which there corresponds nothing in the other, while real causality between them is excluded.”<sup>125</sup> The idea that the modes of attributes form a correspondence, all the while maintaining their autonomy, is an idea that will influence Deleuze in *The Logic of Sense*. In the “Fourth Series of Dualities” and elsewhere, sense will be considered as an effect expressed in the dual series of propositions and things, in general. More broadly, Deleuze’s philosophical style in *The Logic of Sense*, the short series which seem to end abruptly, bearing little continuity with what follows or has been said, can be understood as reflecting what he finds in Spinoza’s philosophy, including his method.<sup>126</sup> The problem that *The*

*Logic of Sense* reflects, simply by way of the style in which it is written, is also one that Deleuze explores as the Spinozist problem in *Expressionism of Philosophy*. Because the modes of attributes are expressive of effects, the question is: Can the effect give us knowledge of the cause? Or, alternatively, how can we arrive at the adequate knowledge of the cause? It seems as though knowing by virtue of the effect, only gives us common notions or the ideas of affects, not the third kind of knowledge. For the most part, Spinoza will argue that knowing by the effect, or having common knowledge is sufficient, even if it is not the highest form of knowledge. Indeed, a large section of his *Ethics* is indicative of this type of knowledge, having been written on the affects. The question, nevertheless, remains, and in a sense bridges *Expressionism in Philosophy*, and *The Logic of Sense*: Can the continuous variation or modification of being be thought on its own terms? How, if in any way, is it implicated in the effects themselves?

Thus far, we have repeatedly invoked the modification of substance without explaining its significance. In order to consider modification on the ontological level, we must return to the opening statements on the second triad of the logic of expression. The second triad, indeed the modification of substance itself, is a response to the question of production: “Why does God produce anything at all?” This is essentially the question: Why does God re-express himself? On the most basic level, modification itself is the sufficient reason behind the existence of things or modes. But having said that the essence of modes is not the same as the essence of substance, insofar as modes explicate the modifications of substance through the attributes, how are we to grasp such production? We must approach production from the perspective of power. In discussing the attributes in the previous section, we noted that the attributes express the essence of substance, which is its absolute infinite power of existing. It is in this same sense that God produces anything at all. Deleuze writes that:

To say that the essence of God is power, is to say that God produces infinity of things by virtue of the same power by which he exists. He thus produces them by existing. Cause of all things 'in the same sense' as cause of himself, he produces all things in his attributes, since his attributes constitute at once his essence and this existence.<sup>127</sup>

Since God produces all things by virtue his power of existing, his existence is equal to his power of action. Or alternatively, God creates as he exists so that his power of action is always realized, or is one and the same as his power of existing. As infinity of modes proceed from God's power of existing, then, God, Deleuze notes, has the capacity to be affected or modified in infinity of ways. This capacity to be affected, of which God is the active cause, therefore, corresponds to his power.<sup>128</sup> Because God is always the active cause of his affections, meaning that he is not acted upon, or does not suffer action by something external to substance, his existence is identical to his essence. This argument preserves the one laid out in the first triad of expression, which is that the essence of substance, its quantity of reality or perfection, is identical to its existence, which, as we have seen, is its capacity to be affected.

The image gets more complicated on the level of the modes. As we noted, God is cause of himself in the same sense as he is the cause of the modes. By virtue of its participation in the absolutely infinite power of God, the essence of a mode is likewise its power to exist. It is a degree of power. By this degree of power we mean that it too has a certain capacity of affection, which is specific to it. However, while God exists through himself, or is self-caused, the essence of a mode cannot be said to be the cause of its existence. Deleuze writes that "finite beings do not exist and are not preserved by their own power, but are dependent for their existence and preservation on a being able to preserve itself and to exist through itself."<sup>129</sup> A finite being, therefore, has a certain essence or degree of power, because it participates in the power of God. It participates in the power of God, by explicating this power in the attributes themselves. It is in this sense that the attributes contain the essence of modes. Does this power, however, remain

fixed or does it vary? This is one of the central problems that Deleuze will have to tackle in his study of Spinoza. The question revolves around the way in which a mode exercises such power. Unlike substance, a mode is *a part* of nature, which means that its power of affection is “exercised, either in affections produced by external things (those affections called passive), or in affections explained by its own essence (called active).”<sup>130</sup> Broadly speaking, active affections increase our power to act, because they enable us to think the cause behind such affections, while passive ones confine us to the imagination. The former can be explained by the mode’s participation in the power of God, since, in essence, God cannot suffer action or a limitation on the power of action, while the latter cannot be attributed to him. Doesn’t the passage from the infinite to the finite introduce an inconsistency in the doctrine of complete immanence? Let us briefly turn to what Spinoza means when he says that a mode is a part of nature.

According to Deleuze, there are two ways in which the mode is a part of nature. Since modes explicate substance through the attributes, or the attributes contain the essence of modes, we must inquire as to how modes are parts without introducing a numerical distinction in the attributes. The attributes being infinite qualities, are indivisible. As a part, a modal essence is a degree of power, or, as Deleuze refers to it, an intensive quantity. “Modal essences are thus distinguished from their attribute as intensities of its quality, and from one another as different degrees of intensity.”<sup>131</sup> This is their intrinsic distinction. In this respect, a modal essence does not divide the quality of the attribute, but simply exercises a certain degree of such a quality according to its capacity. That modal essences are degrees of power or quantitative intensities pertains to all attributes, not merely the attribute of Thought, but also the attribute of Extension, in which no part as such exists prior to the production of modes. It is in this sense that one mode can be conceived of as distinct from another, without introducing numerical distinction in an



attribute. Moreover, once we conceive of modal essences as different degrees of power, meaning that they individuate the attributes in different ways, then, we can change our perspective to consider them as extrinsic or extensive parts in their relative separateness from one another. It is in this respect, also, that we can say that the essence of a finite thing is distinct from its modal existence. A mode's determinate existence, in general, does not depend on itself; it has as its cause another mode or part, which also exists. Even while "the essence of such a mode is itself a degree of power [...] the mode cannot exist unless it actually has an infinity of parts," which configure the horizon or limit in which its degree of power is exercised.<sup>132</sup> Alternatively, the limit of an essence of a mode corresponds to extensive infinity, or the extrinsic parts acting on one another, in such a way as to form "greater or lesser infinite wholes."<sup>133</sup> But having separated the modes extrinsically from another by virtue of their differential individuation of the attributes, now we must explain how it is that in their separateness, they do not compromise the univocity of cause. The trouble is that while the distinct essence of each mode may be accounted for by the different quantity of a quality or attribute, we still do not have an adequate idea as to how substance itself modifies, and, conversely, how it is that the modes themselves affect one another externally without endangering the doctrine of immanence. The most forceful argument able to explain, simultaneously, how the modification of substance expresses itself as the variation of a power of a mode, and how its capacity of affection as its essence can remain fixed or limited in experience, is that of relation. The theory of relation upholds the univocity of cause.

What is a relation in Spinoza's philosophy? The simplest expression of what a relation is for Spinoza is found in the second part of the *Ethics*, when he writes that: "By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. And if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to

that extent, as one singular thing.”<sup>134</sup> Singular things are like points of view on a relation. We can conceive of a relation as having an effect on the terms involved, but also, as being one singular thing that produces an effect. When a being inquires as to what the singular essence of a thing is, it cannot approach this being apart from a relation, even if, for now, this relation is an extrinsic point of view on substance. “A modal essence,” Deleuze writes, “expresses itself eternally in a certain relation, within its various different levels. [...] But we should not confuse the essence and the relation in which it expresses itself.”<sup>135</sup> A difficulty follows from this modal distinction. As we have said, the modal essence which expresses itself in a relation, does not determine the formation of such a relation. But, then, doesn’t the mode itself, in accordance with its capacity to be affected enter into specific types of relations? Deleuze writes in “What Can a Body do?” that:

A horse, a fish, a man, or even two men [...] do not have the same capacity to be affected: they are not affected by the same things, or not affected by the same things in the same way. A mode ceases to exist when it can no longer maintain between its parts the relation that characterizes it; and it ceases to exist when ‘it is rendered completely incapable of being affected in many ways.’ In short, relations are inseparable from the capacity to be affected.<sup>136</sup>

There are two ways in which one could resolve the apparent difficulty. Firstly, finite beings do not always have encounters in which they exercise active affections explained by their own essence. Nevertheless, even in suffering an affection or experiencing passive feelings, its capacity is being exercised. It is all that it is going to be in this very moment. Secondly, we can explain the distinction from the perspective of the attributes. Deleuze writes that “each existing mode explicates the attribute in the relation that characterizes it, in a way extrinsically distinct from other ways in other relations.”<sup>137</sup> In other words, not only is the essence of a mode exercised in different relations, but modes themselves explicate the attributes in different ways in accordance with the relation in which they find themselves. Since modes do not cause the existence of the essence of different modes, but are only the causes of affections on existing

modes, it cannot be said that essence is the same as relation. It can only be said that an essence is exercised in a particular way in accordance with a relation.

The question that now arises, the one we have been skirting around, is: how can we know the singular essence of something? This is the same as asking: how can we have adequate knowledge of its cause? In order to tackle this question, we must turn to the other power which is implied in ontological parallelism. By briefly looking at epistemological parallelism, we saw that a mode of the attribute of thought corresponded to a mode of the attribute of extension. The series of dualities or idea-object pairs, demonstrate that to every idea in the attribute of thought, there corresponds an object of that idea. Or as Spinoza puts it: “A mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways.”<sup>138</sup> Rather than looking at the idea-object pairs, under ontological parallelism, Deleuze is inquiring as to how they are one and the same thing by having an identity of being. We have already shown that God’s capacity of existing and acting is identical to his formal essence, which is constituted by the attributes. Furthermore, we argued that, by existing, God produces infinity of things, the essences of which are contained in the attributes. But because God understands himself as he produces, to the power of existing we must add the corresponding power of thinking, the latter being God’s capacity “to think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways.”<sup>139</sup> According to Spinoza, everything which God creates also *exists* as an idea in his understanding. The thing which exists by virtue of God’s power of existing likewise exists as an idea of an affection of God. When we say that an idea exists as such, we want to make a distinction between the attributes, and the being which expresses itself. Deleuze’s argument is that the two powers of God cannot be identical to the two attributes that are known by human beings. By this, he means that the power of existing is not the same as the attribute of Extension, since the things of the understanding

have existence as well. In turn, the modes, of which there is a conception in God, need not be expressed in the attribute of Thought.

However, if we want to have an objective idea of an affection of God, this idea must be reflected in the attribute of Thought. If God has a conception of a thing that exists as such, and this idea can only be reflected objectively in the attribute of Thought, then, the infinity of things will be reflected an infinite amount of times in the attribute of Thought. “Given a substantial modification,” Deleuze writes, “it will be expressed only once in each of the other attributes, but an infinity of times in infinite understanding, and therefore, in the attribute of Thought.”<sup>140</sup> This is the sense in which the attribute of Thought has a privileged status in Spinoza’s philosophy. God’s idea can only find objective expression in the attribute of Thought, even while, by virtue of existing, it may express itself an infinite amount of times in the infinite attributes. As such, we can have an adequate idea of some singular thing that exists, if we have an idea of God as its cause, since the idea of this singular thing exist in God as a modification of substance, or an affection of God. The idea of the affection of God is reflected in the attribute of Thought, as the idea of the idea of this affection. To have an objective idea of God is, therefore, to have an adequate knowledge of the cause. This is to say that we are ignorant of the cause of the effect that a relation produces, so long as we have inadequate knowledge of the objective idea of God, as the cause of a singular thing. By virtue of the connection of causes, God is the cause of a singular thing, in the same sense that he is the cause of an idea of this thing in the attribute of Thought. Because in either case, the expression is identical, according to Deleuze, there is no contradiction. We do not have knowledge of the singular thing through itself, but due to a modification of substance, which expresses itself objectively in the attribute of Thought. What is expressed, in accordance with this logic, is the sense or essence of a singular thing. “The

knowledge of God's essence, of particular essences as they are in God, and as conceived by God," these three aspects of the logic of expression do not form a contradiction in Spinoza's philosophy.<sup>141</sup> The only way in which a finite being can realize this kind of knowledge, is by exercising its capacity to be affected in a relation, whether this relation be with itself or another. We have explained how it is possible to have an adequate knowledge of the cause by looking at the identity of being. Next, we would like to outline the experiential aspect which realizes such a possibility.

### **On the Knowledge of Singular Things**

Thus far, we have mentioned the three types of knowledge in Spinoza's philosophy. The first type of knowledge revolves around the affections of the body. This is why in "Spinoza and the Three 'Ethics,'" Deleuze refers to the first type of knowledge as knowledge of signs. A sign, he writes, is

always an effect. An effect is first of all the trace of one body upon another, the state of a body insofar as it suffers the action of another body. It is an *affection*—for example, the effect of the sun on our body, which 'indicates' the nature of the body and merely 'envelops' the nature of the affecting body.<sup>142</sup>

When the mind has images of the affections of bodies, then, according to Spinoza, it merely imagines, or experiences things through the senses. This is, for him, the lowest type of knowledge because we are at the whims of sensations, feelings, or emotions, which can shift and vary depending on what sort of encounters we find ourselves to have made. Of course, this type of knowledge, just as what Deleuze interchangeable refers to as a sign, effect, or affection, is implied in the other forms of knowledge, but under the form of the attribute of Thought. We discussed the second form of knowledge when exploring what Deleuze calls epistemological parallelism. Here, Spinoza's argument is that to a thing desired, loved, envied, or hated, there

corresponds an object that is also desired, loved, envied or hated. He calls these common notions, because they are ideas of affections that are common to our body and another. Being themselves adequate ideas, the common notions compose Spinoza's practical philosophy, or the practical principles by which one can live one's life in a satisfactory way. They form the condition that enables us to attain the third type of knowledge.

Earlier, we defined the essence of a mode as its capacity to be affected. These affections are understood in two ways by Spinoza. When the capacity of being affected is not explained by the mode's essence, the mode undergoes passive affections. An active affection is explained by the mode's essence, because it increases its power of action. While this capacity varies depending on the sort of encounters a mode makes or what sort of relations it is entangled in, at each moment, the whole of its capacity is exercised. Since a mode is a finite thing involved in a variety of relations, its capacity to be affected is, according to Deleuze, always a mixture of passive and active affections. By this he means that

the proportion of active and passive feelings is open to variation, within a fixed capacity of being affected. If we manage to produce active affections, our passive affections will be correspondingly reduced. And as far as we have passive affections, our power of action will be correspondingly 'inhibited.' [...] Both together, in their varying proportions, constitute the capacity to be affected.<sup>143</sup>

When asserting that the capacity of affection is both of these types of affection in inverse proportion, Deleuze is saying two things: firstly, that the passive affects do not explain the essence of a mode, because they merely express the imperfection of its finitude. The passive affects are involved in the capacity of the mode, not because they constitute its essence, but because they inhibit what it can do. When a mode experiences passive affections, it exercises its capacity to be affected in an active sense, even if this is minimal. The being makes a life, even if it is not the good life. Once Deleuze has asserted that the active affections alone constitute the

essence of a mode, he says that a mode's essence or capacity to be affected, not only varies, but is magnified, the more affections it is able to experience. By arguing that an essence varies, he wants to say that there is no metaphysics of essences in Spinoza's thought. This is what Spinoza essentially means when writing that: "He who has a body capable of great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal."<sup>144</sup> The opposite would be that a mode's active affections are inhibited by passive affections, such as sadness, so that its ability to experience affections of the body in great many ways is limited.

If a mode should exercise its capacity of affection in the active sense, then, its power of action or force of existing would show itself to be equivalent to its essence. Knowledge of the third sort arises when a mode is overcome with active joys or affections as it comprehends its power of action, or knows itself as the formal cause of its own essence.<sup>145</sup> It combines this power of action, with the understanding. As Deleuze notes, when a mode exercises the "capacity of being affected by active affections, [...] the capacity appears as a force or power of acting. The power of understanding or knowing is the power of acting proper to the soul."<sup>146</sup> It is by virtue of the amplified power of acting, that the essence of a mode becomes expressible in the attribute of Thought. It is able to think itself, its other or things, and God. Now, what does this essence itself express, or what is affirmed by it? Deleuze writes that:

Essences are [...] expressive: not only does each essence express all the others in the principle of its production, but it expresses God as this principle itself, containing all essences, and the principle of which each particular essence depends. Each essence is part of God's power, and is thus conceived through God's essence, insofar as God's essence is explicated through that essence.<sup>147</sup>

Forming an idea of one's essence means knowing how another essence is involved in the expression of our own, by virtue of having an adequate idea of the principle of production of all essences or how such essences depend on God for their genesis. Having an adequate idea of the

principle of production, therefore, involves understanding God as “containing all essences, and comprising all in the production of each.”<sup>148</sup> This type of knowledge, which we discussed under the heading of univocal causality, allows us to affirm the existence of great many possible things, or how other essences are produced by having an adequate idea of our own. Now, in understanding how each essence is part of God’s power as his affection, we also grasp how the adequate idea of our essences is caused by the idea of God, because it is “conceived through God’s essence,” or the attribute of Thought, which constitutes his essence. It is in this sense that we have an objective idea of God as a thinking thing. “From this kind of knowledge,” Spinoza writes, “there arises the greatest satisfaction of mind there can be, that is, joy; this joy is accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently it is also accompanied by the idea of God, as its cause.”<sup>149</sup> The third type of knowledge reproduces the active affections, by allowing us to affirm the power of action of the mind itself. For Spinoza, such power allows us to exercise our freedom, because we become more capable of producing active affections. These active affections are not meant to keep others in servility or bondage, but are likewise directed at affirming their freedom. Hence, Spinoza’s practical principles by which one can live his or her life in a satisfactory way.

In many ways, our study of sense in Deleuze’s philosophy reflects the three fundamental determinations of expression that he outlines in his concluding remarks to *Expressionism in Philosophy*. There he writes that

the concept of expression applies to being determined as God, insofar as God expresses himself in the world. It applies to ideas determined as true, insofar as true ideas express God and the world. It applies, finally, to individual determined as singular essences, insofar as singular essences express themselves in ideas. So that three fundamental determinations, *being*, *knowing* and *acting* or *producing*, are measured and systematized by this concept.<sup>150</sup>



These three determinations preserve the doctrine of complete immanence in Spinoza's philosophy, as they unfold according to the logic of expression. We have seen that this logic is triadic, that which expresses itself, the expression, and what is expressed, are distinguished. In the first place, we demonstrated how the logic of expression affirms a univocal being which expresses itself in the same sense in all the attributes. We next turned to the second triad of expression to show how the essences of modes are expressions, the attributes express themselves, and what is expressed is the modification of substance. In the last part on knowledge, we touched on what it means to have an adequate idea, or "what expresses itself in a true idea."<sup>151</sup> In each case, according to Deleuze, "the paradox is that 'what is expressed' has no existence outside its expression, yet bears no resemblance to it, but relates essentially to what expresses itself as distinct from the expression itself."<sup>152</sup> We saw this paradox arise when we discussed how singular essences, the essences of the modes, involve, not only the affections of God, but the essence of God, in their expression. In upholding the immanence of expression, what such a formulation allows us to do is express an idea of a singular essence, without being able to extricate it from its production. This is precisely because the modification of substance is what expresses itself as the expressed of the expression. Though Deleuze does away with substance entirely, the expressed itself is maintained in his philosophy as sense. Sense always finds its place in the logic as that which is expressed. In our exposition of *Expressionism in Philosophy*, we have shown that the three ways in which Deleuze goes on to articulate the expressed in *The Logic of Sense*, as infinitive, as effect, as ideal sense, can be found in their initial state in his study of Spinoza.<sup>153</sup>

## The Nietzschean Sense of Affirmation

In an interview “On Philosophy,” Deleuze comments: “I’ve tried in all my books to discover the nature of events; it’s a philosophical concept, the only one capable of ousting the verb ‘to be’ and attributes.”<sup>154</sup> After giving due credit to Spinoza as a thinker who had affirmed univocal being, how does Deleuze intend, in the first place, to oust the verb ‘to be’? Why would displacing this verb play such a pivotal role in his philosophy? In *Difference and Repetition* he argues that in Spinoza’s philosophy

there still remains a difference between substance and the modes: Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than themselves. Substance must itself be said *of* the modes and only *of* the modes. Such a condition can be satisfied only at the price of a more general categorical reversal according to which *being is said of becoming*, identity of that which is different, the one of the multiple, etc. That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a principle become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in a general, already understood as identical. Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal return.<sup>155</sup>

When Deleuze claims that substance must turn around the modes, it is not as though he is saying that the modes are the same as the being of becoming. He is, however, arguing that the only thing that can be affirmed of being is the becoming or metamorphoses of the modes. In this respect, being is said in the same sense of all of becoming: Becoming returns! Being is said of difference.<sup>156</sup> The idea that becoming returns was already apparent when in our discussion of Hyppolite’s *Logic and Existence*, we referred to Deleuze’s “Of Paradoxes of Pure Becoming.” The being of becoming is not merely the Nietzschean correction of Spinoza,<sup>157</sup> it is meant to displace the identity of the concept or sense that realizes itself in the dialectical logic. In our study on Spinoza we placed the emphasis on Deleuze’s new logic, in this section on Nietzsche

we want to demonstrate how the identity of being cannot be anything more than the affirmation or repetition of difference, a formulation that completes the logic. Deleuze's philosophical quarrel with Hegel is not simply over the dissolution of difference in the concept, but of how being expresses itself, or what sort of discourse is the discourse *of* being.

### **Eternal Return: Displacing the Verb "To be"**

Earlier we claimed that Spinoza had affirmed univocal being. Now we are saying that the eternal return is the Nietzschean correction of Spinoza. Are we being inconsistent? In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze places the accent on three moments in the history of philosophy in which the univocity of being has been advanced. Spinoza holds second place in these three moments, the third being Nietzsche's eternal return. With the eternal return, Deleuze argues, univocal being is not merely thought as in Duns Scotus' philosophy, or affirmed by Spinoza, but "effectively realized."<sup>158</sup> What we intend to do in this section, is show how the eternal return realizes the univocity of being, by focusing in on the role Nietzsche plays in Deleuze's efforts to displace the verb to be. While we cannot take up Deleuze's overturning of Platonism here, it is the common root that binds him to Nietzsche, in his endeavour to displace the verb to be. Equally, whether or not Nietzsche actually overturned Platonism, being Heidegger's question, is something that we cannot consider.<sup>159</sup> In what way does Nietzsche, however, set out to overturn Platonism, or, more specifically, the antinomy of being and becoming? In "The Overturning of Platonism and the New Meaning of Appearance," Michael Haar presents the sequential development of the problem in Nietzsche's thought. In some of his earliest writings, Nietzsche seeks to displace the notion of the true world by praising the life lived amongst appearance: "My philosophy, Platonism overturned: the further one moves away from true being, the purer, the

more beautiful, the better it is; Life in the midst of appearance as goal.”<sup>160</sup> But in affirming appearance, Haar asks, doesn’t Nietzsche nevertheless maintain the antinomy, for what else could appearance be but illusion? Doesn’t a life in the midst of appearance reinforce nihilism which revert us to its other, the true being? Nietzsche’s answer in *The Twilight of Idols* is a definite no: “We have rid ourselves of the true world: what world are we left with? Perhaps that of appearances? [...] But no! Along with the true world, we have also rid ourselves of the apparent world.”<sup>161</sup> Perhaps it is not even a question of overturning the Platonic antinomy, but more so, as Nietzsche notes, of unlearning it. Isn’t the one who is capable of living life amidst appearances, skimming the surface or skin depth of things, the one who has indeed unlearned it? Once we put aside the antinomy, what do we have left, however? We have a being whose goal is the willing of the endless return of appearances. No longer resenting the passage of time itself, for Nietzsche, only such a being is capable of extracting a form from chaos. “To impress upon becoming the character of being—this is the highest form of the will to power. [...] That everything returns—here a world of becoming comes closest to the world of being.”<sup>162</sup> To realize Nietzsche’s eternal return, which impresses the mark of being upon becoming, we must unlearn the antinomy.

Nietzsche recognizes the doctrine of eternal return in Stoic teachings, who according to him had inherited the concept from Heraclitus. Nietzsche, for whom Heraclitus plays the role that he himself plays in Deleuze’s philosophy, claims that the Stoics had made an “old song” of the eternal return. One can turn to his early writing, “Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,” in order to grasp the comparison that I have drawn. In that piece, Nietzsche contrasts Anaximander, who had left coming-to-be in the indefinite, to Heraclitus who did away entirely with the duality of indefinite being and definite beings,<sup>163</sup> by cancelling being altogether as

separate from the world of becoming. The aim of the two Hellenistic philosophies is different, one inquiring into the passing of beings as a sort of atonement for having separated from being, the other testifying to the innocence of existence, of the becoming of beings. A fragment demonstrating Heraclitus' position is too interesting for us to skip over for the sake of brevity: "I see nothing other than becoming. Be not deceived. It is the fault of your myopia, not of the nature of things, if you believe you see land somewhere in the ocean of coming-to-be and passing away."<sup>164</sup> But if there is not such land in the ocean of coming-to-be, in what way can the eternal return express that being is becoming? Heraclitus notes that becoming is like the "everlasting *wave beat and rhythm of things*. And what did I *see*? [I saw] lawful order, unfailing certainties, ever-like orbits of lawfulness."<sup>165</sup> For Heraclitus, this eternal coming-to-be expresses nothing but the world of play, the innocence of creating and dissolving a form, so that we may create once again by starting the game anew. "In this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibit coming-to-be and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any moral additive, in forever equal innocence. [...] Such is the game that the *aeon* plays with itself."<sup>166</sup> We can now see why Nietzsche thought that the Stoics, like Zarathustra's caricature, had made an old song of the eternal return. For him, the Stoics had already made a *useful* doctrine of it; they evaluated the doctrine for the purpose of conceiving a morality. And so, he writes, that the Stoics misinterpreted Heraclitus, "dragging down his basically aesthetic perception of cosmic play to signify a vulgar consideration for the world's useful ends."<sup>167</sup>

In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze recognizes that, in affirming becoming, Heraclitus is Nietzsche's precursor. But, what does it mean to affirm becoming? What is affirmed of becoming? His response to these questions frames the way in which the eternal return will be further explicated in *Difference and Repetition*. He writes that:

In the first place, it is doubtless to say there is only becoming. No doubt it is also to affirm becoming. But we also affirm the being of becoming we say that becoming affirms being or that being is affirmed in becoming. Heraclitus has two thoughts which are like ciphers: according to one there is no being, everything is becoming; according to the other, being is the being of becoming as such. A *working thought* which affirms becoming and a *contemplative thought* which affirms the being of becoming. [...] For there is no being beyond becoming [...]; becoming is the affirmation of being.<sup>168</sup>

That being is becoming means nothing more than that being cannot be conceived of as separate from becoming, it is becoming as such. In what sense is it becoming, however? Deleuze argues that only in its returning is being becoming. In being affirmed of becoming, being is affirmed for-itself as the repetition of becoming. There are two affirmations, or a double affirmation, involved in the realization of the eternal return: the affirmation of becoming and the affirmation of the being of becoming. This double affirmation, in the place of the Hegelian double negation, will remain relevant for us throughout this dissertation for a number of reasons, the primary one being that we are attempting to understand the relationship of a singular or simulated sense articulated of becoming, and the being of becoming itself. The two are not separate. When we say along with Deleuze that becoming is affirmed and then that the being of becoming is, in turn, affirmed, we do not mean that this is their order of production, even if it is their order of presentation. As we will see, the eternal return, as the synthesis of time that works in reverse, forms a single becoming. But this is precisely why the whole is quite complex.

Because in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and elsewhere, Nietzsche refers to the eternal return as a tortuous circle, how is the return of becoming itself not the return of the identical? This is the question to which *Difference and Repetition*, right to its concluding arguments, serves as a response. The whole of the philosophy of difference is compromised, if we are unable to demonstrate how the eternal return breaks the vicious circle to then form a line or, as Nietzsche calls it, the “supreme constellation of being.” It is not as though Hegel does not conceive of a

constellation of being, his genius lies therein. But Hegel imprisons himself in his logic. He cancels the gaping abyss or nonsense, in order to affirm the circle of the absolute. As though addressing Hegel, Nietzsche writes in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*:

‘Behold,’ *I continued*, ‘this moment! From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not whatever can walk have walked on this lane before? Must not whatever can happen have happened, have been done, have passed before? And if everything has been there before—what do you think, dwarf, of this moment? *Must not this gateway too have been there before?* And are not all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it *all* that is to come? Therefore—itsself too? For whatever can walk—in this long lane out *there* too, it *must* walk once more.’<sup>169</sup>

There are two affirmations in Nietzsche formulation of the eternal return: it is continuation and moment. The difficulty of articulating the eternal return as embracing these simultaneous conceptions of time is likewise evident in Deleuze’s colloquium on Nietzsche, when he inquires:

How does one explain that [the eternal return] is both cycle and moment: on the one hand continuation; and on the other, iteration? On the one hand, a continuation of the process of becoming which is the World; and on the other, repetition, lightning flash, a mystical view on this process or this becoming? On the one hand, the continual re-beginning of what has been; and on the other, the instantaneous return of a kind of intense focal point, to a ‘zero’ moment of the will?<sup>170</sup>

There are two ways in which these two directions of the eternal return are explained, which, nevertheless amount to the same thing. In the first place, as Nietzsche writes, when one says “yes to a single moment [they] say yes to all of existence.”<sup>171</sup> To say yes to a single moment, means not only to affirm that which has been, but to will it yet again without dwelling in the past. Listen to Heraclitus’ dictum, there is no land in the ocean of becoming. This willing is always oriented towards the future, the moment is itself conceived as the creation of the world anew. This is tragic joy. Once a form has been found, it must be lost to the abyss, because a being that says yes to becoming, cannot will anything other than the continuation of such becoming. Therein is its ethical decision. The ring must be a broken one, lest we appropriate beings to not-being, which

would be violent. Deleuze, too, joins continuation and moment together when arguing that the eternal return is the repetition of the future. All of time unfolds as a function of the caesura, being itself the moment that decenters the circle. How does Deleuze show this?

In joining peak and abyss together, Nietzsche formulated a paradoxical logic in which chaos and necessity are both affirmed, their synthesis being conditional upon the circle itself being a broken one.<sup>172</sup> If *amor fati* or the love of destiny is affirmed in the eternal return, this is only from the perspective of a chance point that gathers the degrees of being in a supreme constellation. The chance point of pure affirmation, is the “the celestial necessity that forces even *chance events* to dance in stellar formation.”<sup>173</sup> How can the supreme constellation of degrees of being embrace necessity, while also being a formation of chance events, which are these degrees? A detailed response to this question can be found in chapter 3 of this dissertation. Here, we will only demonstrate how this is possible. Deleuze interprets Nietzsche’s events as degrees of intensive quantities or differences, which, from one to the other, form the continuous variation of the constellation of being. The constellation is not presented all at once, but repeatedly differentiated from one degree to another, from one intensive difference through all the degrees which repeat one another. In being bound to repeat that which is singular to a life, the repetition of the different degrees of being, is the in-itself of the past. Throughout *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze will refer to the presentment of the degrees of being as a sort of effect, “like an optical effect, or rather the erotic effect of memory itself.”<sup>174</sup> Only once this constellation becomes a “freeze-frame” is a simulated sense articulable.<sup>175</sup> But the problem is not merely that it becomes articulable, but “under what conditions it becomes language.”<sup>176</sup> Stated otherwise, by what necessity does a form emerge from chaos? It emerges by the same necessity that the whole of the constellation itself arises. As that which unfolds the line or constellation of being, the



eternal return is the formlessness which insinuates itself in the form that it creates. Once becoming is itself affirmed, the eternal return “comes back and flows back through all the modifications,” showing itself as that which is repeated in all of the degrees of being, as their reason for differentiation.<sup>177</sup> By being that which is repeated in each repetition of difference, it is, according to Deleuze, the differentiator that causes ‘chance events to dance in a stellar formation.’ But doesn’t the eternal return, then, lend its affirmation to the form of becoming? Why does it dissolve the form in showing itself as the differentiator of the constellation? Here is where Deleuze’s thought reaches the highest peaks, thinking that which is supremely elusive—showing simply that it is ‘there’:

There is eternal return in the third time (the repeated, the future, repeats itself): it is here that the freeze-frame begins to move once more, or that the straight line of time, as though drawn by its own length, reforms a strange loop which in no way resembles the earlier cycle, but leads into the formless, and operates only for the third time and for that which belongs to it.<sup>178</sup>

In the first place, we become equal to the being of the past, but the past or repetition only arises by virtue of that which is repeated each time, the future. This means that the repetition of the past happens “once and for all,” it shall never return in its specific configuration. It is in this sense that everything which is said of becoming is contingent, it does not occur outside of the differential relations of living beings. This is what is beautiful about the idea. As that which causes becoming to return, the eternal return, however, “returns for all times, for eternity.”<sup>179</sup> What returns for all eternity is the yet-to-come, “the becoming-identical of becoming itself” on the basis of the different.<sup>180</sup> The identical as continuation is second principle, principle become, because it revolves around the different.

We have returned once more to the following question: What is affirmed in the eternal return? According to Deleuze,

repetition is the condition of action before it is a concept of reflection. We produce something new only on condition that we repeat—once in the mode which constitutes the past, and once more in the present of metamorphosis. Moreover, what is produced, the absolutely new itself, is in turn nothing but repetition. [...] [The eternal return] causes neither the condition nor the agent to return: on the contrary, it repudiates and expels these with all its centrifugal force. It constitutes the autonomy of the product.<sup>181</sup>

Again, here is where we find Deleuze's profound insight. Along with being the repeated of the constellation, the status of the eternal return is to pose itself as a problematic. In posing itself as a problematic, the eternal return gives way to a solution, the solution itself being a new repetition on the basis of the different. If a simulated sense only remains in the infinitive, this is because in the eternal return it becomes possible for us to replay it in a different way, depending on what sort of solution we find to the problematic that the eternal return poses. Seeing that the agent that becomes equal to the past is expelled, the eternal return demands the creation of a novel response. This is precisely why a simulated sense is dependent upon the ontological sense of the eternal return as its cause. Deleuze, hence, writes:

There is a necessary linkage between the ontological sense and the simulated sense. The second derives from the first; in other words, it remains adrift without autonomy or spontaneity, a simple effect of the ontological cause which plays upon it like a tempest. How could representation not profit from this? [...] This means [that] the identity of the simulacra, simulated identity, finds itself projected or retrojected on to the internal difference. The simulated external resemblance finds itself interiorized in the system. The negative becomes principle and agent.<sup>182</sup>

As you probably already suspected, this is the juncture at which Hegel and Deleuze become irreconcilable. It is precisely in the reversal that Hegel would have argued that the absolute must negate the negation in order that it is affirmed. As we have already noted, Hegel interprets this simulated identity as being the end of the different, when, for Deleuze, such identity is the mere consequence of the eternal return.<sup>183</sup> On the whole, Hegel negates difference in order to affirm the identical or the resemblance of the two senses; the moment when ground is made. Because he

succumbs to the image of identity, for Deleuze, Hegel's selection, his philosophical determination of the concept, is indicative of an exhausted will that cannot create the novel. Can anything novel be created *with* Hegel?

Deleuze does not only argue that the eternal return is affirmed of a singular becoming, but that it is itself the doctrine that realizes univocal being. Repetition for-itself gives us the imperative to think being as that which is common across all differences. By common, we mean how differences are "inter-expressive" with regards to their sense. As the being of becoming, the eternal return can be said to be the same across all forms of becoming. Demonstrating this idea, Deleuze writes: "being is said in a single and same sense, but this sense is that of eternal return as the return or repetition of that of which it is said."<sup>184</sup> That of which it is said is difference itself, or the Different. Or, to put it another way, due to this doctrine, what is common across all differentiations, is the return of difference. More than this, in being the said of difference, "the univocity of Being signifies that Being is Voice that it is said, and that it is said in one and the same 'sense' of everything about which it is said."<sup>185</sup> Wasn't it Nietzsche himself that declared in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, that "here, the words and word-shrines of all being open up before me: here all being wishes to become word, all becoming wishes to learn from me how to speak."<sup>186</sup> All becoming seeks to express itself in the same way. Each becoming can be said to unfold in the *same sense and by the same logic*, even while each must not be mistaken as having an identical sense. As Deleuze notes, being "is equal for all [distinct senses] but they themselves are not. It is said in the same sense, but they don't have the same sense."<sup>187</sup> Not only does this mean that, that which differs expresses itself, or that differentiation is itself expression, but that the discourse *of* being has been transformed entirely. It is now a discourse *of* the return of difference, or of

differentiation. The discourse of difference becomes the “single language which expresses” the multiplicity of senses, even while they themselves are not the same.<sup>188</sup>

In light of the way in which we have framed this new discourse, we can begin to understand why the language of *The Logic of Sense* must be a language of becoming without pauses and rests. Isn't the discourse of being as the return of differentiation indeed the other language that Deleuze seeks out in Plato's *Cratylus*, but just as well could be Dionysus' music? What sort of expression can articulate this other language? Deleuze's response is that the discourse of being is not merely brought to light in philosophy. Neither is it found to be the logic of linguistic expression alone. Unlike Hegel's dialectic being which is realized in philosophy, and has as its other artistic expression, expressionism in Deleuze's work deals with three different things, concepts, affects and percepts. Each of these has a distinct relationship with the plane of immanence we have been describing. The plane of immanence, he argues along with Guattari, is a *prephilosophical* plane, or better yet, as he notes elsewhere, it is a life. In the introduction to this dissertation, we noted that the plane of immanence cannot be immanent to anything, whether this would be the concept, an actual being, or something else transcendent, such as God. The sense produced cannot be extricated from the genesis of its production, so as to identify with the predicate. When interpreted as one and the same as the predicate, sense is taken as an end in the form of judgement; it is vulnerable to being appropriated by the moral vision of the world.<sup>189</sup> Extricated from the genesis, it is the mere essence of this or that thing, an essence which is either becoming realized, or an essence to be realized. In contrast to the moral image, Deleuze defines the sense of something in accordance with what it can do. What a thing can do defines its multiple *manners of being*:

People, things, animals distinguish themselves by what they can do, i.e. they can't do the same thing. [...] If I say that reasonable, is not the essence of man, but it is

something that man can do, it changes so that unreasonable is also something that man can do. To be mad is also a part of the power of man.<sup>190</sup>

Because sense is produced concretely by what a thing can do, there is no way of determining a priori, or once and for all, what a thing is. This is an ethical position, an ethology, in contrast to the moral vision. Deleuze concludes that:

The ethical discourse will not cease to speak to us, not of essences, it doesn't believe in essences, it speaks to us only of power, that is, the actions and passions of which something is capable. Not what the thing is, but what it is capable of supporting and capable of doing. And if there is no general essence, it is because, at this level of power, *everything is singular*.<sup>191</sup>

### **A Note on Learning Something New**

Nietzsche's problem is the problem of life, in part, because it is not enough that we denounce the anthropological illusions that philosophy itself perpetuates. It is indeed the case that, after Nietzsche, it is possible to direct criticisms against those who conceive of consciousness as having the force to unify the manifold of intuitions. And against those who conceive of the conscious ego as the cause of its own thoughts, which, in turn, enables it to treat the body as its instrument, including other living beings that supposedly do not possess thought. And against those who, by perceiving it as the locus of knowledge, believe themselves to have grasped the essence of action. These fictions of consciousness are fortified by language, since it is only in language that such a thing as a subject announces itself. It announces itself as the measure of all things. It designates things as though conforming to the world of perceptions that it has conceived for itself. It imprisons itself from all existence, so as to prolong itself. The problem of the conscious ego runs deep. To it, nothing further from its sphere of influence has existence. Even those conceptions that it mimics as its own, have little to no value to it. All habituations which it entails become the route to nihilism. It is a happy accident that it is self-

destructive. Surely such criticisms show that consciousness no longer has a stranglehold on thought, and, by extension, on knowledge, that it used to.<sup>192</sup> But the problem of life is greater than philosophy. By transforming itself, philosophy can merely join in the effort to overcome anthropocentrism. The criticisms of the conscious ego are not sufficient to overcome it. Nietzsche's goal is not merely to critique the subject. His cleverness lies in having posited the body as the locus of thought, due to which the traditional concept of the subject is displaced.

It is the body which can teach us something new. This is because by learning we mean something very specific. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche writes: "To the despisers of the body [...] I wish them neither to learn afresh, nor teach anew, but only to bid farewell to their own bodies—and thus be dumb."<sup>193</sup> Nietzsche's novelty lies in him having conceived of the organism as a thinking thing. By organism, he did not merely mean the human organism, but all living beings. Because all living beings have a specific capacity to contemplate or incorporate the world, each thing is a thinking thing.<sup>194</sup> But one might ask oneself, what do organisms contemplate? Organisms contemplate inorganic life. It is in this sense that an organism can be thought to have a memory. The act of incorporation is itself simultaneously memory. Haar writes that:

In every operation of the unconscious or in every perception—even more than in every conscious and pondered action—the entire organic past is reactivated and prolonged. 'In every [contemplation], the whole organic prehistory comes to play.' As well as being the summary of the entire past of the biological line, the [organism] is also bearer of the whole future of that line.<sup>195</sup>

Each act of contemplation is a repetition of the in/organic past of the organism. Sure, the organism itself has a past that is specific to it, but the process of contemplation is itself a tracing of another sort of memory, an impersonal one, that the organism shares with the world. This is what Deleuze seeks to demonstrate with the three syntheses of time in *Difference and Repetition*,

themselves based around this relationship of organic and inorganic life. If the organism itself thinks as it incorporates that which is foreign to it, then, conscious thought is merely the metastable state that emerges at the end of that process. It is, as Nietzsche notes, “nothing but a crude and simplified form of that thought.”<sup>196</sup> But precisely because conscious thought is the mere result of an unconscious process that such a thing as a subject could be mistaken as the cause of actions. The error lies in perceiving the brain as the locus of knowledge, rather than viewing it as a complex organ of the organism as a whole.<sup>197</sup>

The oldest illusion, the one that originates with the ancients, is that knowledge is followed by action, that we can build this bridge between the two.<sup>198</sup> If we carry through with Nietzsche’s proposal that indeed it is the organism that now thinks, doesn’t this mean that knowledge is itself compromised? If we do not base our actions on knowledge, what are they based on? In the “The Unknown World of the Subject” Nietzsche writes: “Is it not the ‘dreadful’ truth that [...] no matter how much we know about an act this knowledge is never sufficient to accomplish the act, that the bridge connecting the knowledge of the act with the act itself has never yet been built?” Is it possible to build this bridge? Isn’t this the same question that was posed with regard to Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge? This comparison is not coincidental, since Nietzsche recognizes Spinoza as a precursor. In a letter he outlines his similarities with Spinoza, “namely [their joint tendency] to make all knowledge the *most powerful affect*.”<sup>199</sup> But the point is that even if we achieve this knowledge, if we realize knowledge as the most powerful affect, we still cannot say that the act itself is determined by it. An action itself implies the unknown. As Deleuze notes: “[Of what] else can one write but of those things which one doesn’t know, or, knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having something to say. We write on the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and

transforms one into the other.”<sup>200</sup> The bridge connecting knowledge and action remains problematic in Deleuze’s corpus. On the one hand, knowledge has a dogmatic role to play. This is precisely why it is replaced with the theory of learning in relation to which thought becomes the most powerful affect. One never begins to think by decidedly engaging in thought. Rather, thinking itself is generated by something ‘non-thought,’ or outside of thought, that *forces* itself upon it. On the other hand, knowledge is not altogether abandoned, since the creation of concept in relation to a problem is a type of knowing, while the problem is a type of intuition. Nevertheless, for Deleuze, even if we replace knowledge with the concrete process of learning, the bridge connecting it with action continues to be put into question.

### **Sense, Evaluation, and Critique**

There are two major ethical pronouncements that stand out in Deleuze’s philosophical corpus. In *Difference and Repetition*, he tells us that there are two principles that define his ethics of intensive quantities: “affirm even the lowest, [secondly] do not explicate oneself (too much),” or do not explicate *once and for all*.<sup>201</sup> To the first one, we must add another fundamental insight from the twenty-fifth series of “Univocity” in *The Logic of Sense*. When reflecting on what it means to accomplish the event, Deleuze says something peculiar, hitherto unaddressed in the secondary literature:

It would be necessary for the individual to grasp herself as event; and that she grasps the event actualized within her as another individual grafted onto her. In this case, she would not understand, want, or represent this event without also understanding and wanting all other events as individuals, and without representing *all other individuals as events*. Each individual would be like a mirror for the condensation of singularities and each like a distance in the mirror. This is the ultimate sense of counter-actualization.<sup>202</sup>



While these pronouncements may appear disconnected, they follow directly from the highest affirmation in the eternal return. They are directed at one and the same thing. In not explicating too much, not once and for all, one understands others as events. Why would understanding other beings as *events* have any significance? If the eternal return is the affirmation of the being of becoming, then, in affirming the becoming of beings, we must let beings become what they already are. This is the sense in which we grasp Nietzsche's *ecce homo*; how one becomes what one is. Letting beings become what they already are means affirming their futural possibility of becoming-other or different, since, even when minimal, this is the sort of affirmation necessary to making a life.<sup>203</sup> We do not merely affirm others as events because we create a life with them,<sup>204</sup> but because we come to understand how it is that all beings implicate being in their becoming. Since this kind of affirmation is central to us when thinking about the singular sense of the becoming of beings, the infinitive that is expressed of this becoming, we will later return to these assertions. For now, we want to stress that affirming the possibility of beings to become-different involves two mutually inclusive things: it involves *furthering* their ability to be affected in a great number of ways, so that their power of action (their power of existing) enhances.<sup>205</sup> In being able to individuate in great number ways, we must assert that a singular thing has a multiplicity of senses, each depending on the sort of relation it is involved in. Moreover, affirming the becoming-different of another, involves not explicating this other once and for all, or saying everything all at once.<sup>206</sup> We cannot fix what this or that thing *is* once and for all, not only because a simulated sense depends upon the ontological sense, but because in affirming becoming, we affirm it for the third time only. The being of the past never returns in the same configuration, just as the actor never responds in same way to the problem set before it. By

exploring how Deleuze discusses sense in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, we intend to propose what this problem could be.

Deleuze argues that by introducing sense and value into philosophy, Nietzsche was able to accomplish the critical project which Kant had inaugurated, but failed to carry out to the end.<sup>207</sup> The claim that Kant was unable to grasp that the value of values are themselves evaluations that presuppose modes of being or ways of existing, in-themselves having no other inherent value beyond what is made of them, is a familiar one. That sense is a concept that Nietzsche had brought to philosophy, however, is strange idea to propose. How does Deleuze interpret the concept of sense in Nietzsche's thought? The primary definition of sense is the following:

We will never find the sense of something (of human, a biological, or even a physical phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition, but a *sign*, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force.<sup>208</sup>

Sense, at least in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, corresponds to the quality or type of force that is expressed by the 'thing.'<sup>209</sup> A 'thing' as such is no longer anything but a sign or symptom of a force, while a force, by appropriating it, has a certain quantity of reality. As Michael Hardt points out in his introductory remarks to the text, much like the 'thing', an utterance is a symptom of a type of force, since it is indicative of a way of living. It allows us to inquire as to "what mode of existence is needed in order to be able to utter it?"<sup>210</sup> An utterance is, thus, equally symptomatic of a quality of force that appropriates a quantity of reality. By proposing that we find the sense of this or that thing by studying the sort of force that appropriates it, Deleuze is arguing that things themselves do not have some sort of an inherent sense, and that a thing is able to embrace a plurality of senses, all the while having an essence or force that is specific to it. In a seminar on Nietzsche, he claims that:

A thing never has only one sense. Each thing has several senses that *express the force* (1) and *the becoming of forces* (2) at work in it. Still more to the point, there is no 'thing,' but only 'interpretations' hidden in one another, like masks layered one on the other, or languages that include each other.<sup>211</sup>

We find the sense of something, when we come to understand the mode of existence that is expressed in it (verbs imply modes of existence that things actualize in different degrees). Since the same thing changes sense depending on the force that appropriates it, according to Deleuze, the history of a thing, in general, can be understood as a "variation of sense(s)."<sup>212</sup> What is he aiming at with the idea that a thing never has one sense and, in turn, that sense itself varies depending on the becoming of forces? In the first place, he wants to demonstrate that a thing can have a plurality of senses, without these senses being contradictory. In taking this position, Deleuze wants to show that Nietzsche's "pluralist idea that a thing has many senses, the idea that *there are many things* and *one thing* can be seen as 'this and then that' is philosophy's greatest achievement, the conquest of the true concept, its maturity and not its renunciation or infancy," as Hegel believed.<sup>213</sup> Second, pluralism does not mean that all evaluations are themselves equal. Instead, the critique of the evaluation of values emerges together with the pluralist idea. We hope to show this in what follows.

The reader will notice that we have mentioned at least two aspects of force, one which appropriates the thing, and the other as the force that the things itself expresses. The two should not be confused, but neither are they separate. The first refers to the quality of force expressed in some thing, the second to the quantity of force. A quality corresponds to a difference in the quantity of force. When Deleuze argues that the thing is an expression of force, he is reading Nietzsche alongside Spinoza. For him, the capacity to be affected is one and the same thing as the expression of force. Just as the capacity to be affected is exercised in a relation, there is no such thing as a singular force, only a relation of forces that produce this or that quality of force,

broadly understood as active and reactive. Deleuze, hence, argues that: “every force is essentially related to another force. [...] The relation between forces is in each case determined to the extent that each force is affected by other, inferior or superior, forces. It follows that will to power is manifested as a capacity to be affected.”<sup>214</sup> This idea is reiterated in on *Foucault*, where Deleuze writes: “force is never singular but essentially exists in relation with other forces, such that any force is already a relation, that is to say, power: force has no other object or subject than force.”<sup>215</sup> In order for a being to be affected, it must implicate itself in a relation, which it explicates in accordance with its own capacity to be affected. No force is exercised without varying a being’s expression of force. In being exercised, the capacity to affect is a reflection of the capacity to be affected. It is a reflection of what sort of sensibility a thing is capable of. One cannot think of the sensation or effect of a joint act and an encounter, without also thinking of it as an affect upon one and the same being. That is to say, force is a “thing which affects and is affected.”<sup>216</sup> If Deleuze reads Spinoza’s passive affects in much the same way as Nietzsche’s reactive forces, this is because those that further reactive forces do not merely subjugate others, but themselves in turn. The whole question is in what way can we distinguish between reactive forces that subjugate a living being when expressed by it, from the active ones which do not? Though this question seems to have been resolved in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, in an interview, “Portrait of Foucault,” it arises yet again: “What is this ‘line,’ or this relation that’s no longer a power relation? Isn’t it foreshadowed earlier on?”<sup>217</sup> In the work under consideration, Deleuze writes that essence “will be defined as the one, among all the senses of a thing, which gives it the force with which it has the most affinity.”<sup>218</sup> Admittedly, such an assertion is difficult to demonstrate. It is meant to distinguish relations in which a being exercises its capacity to be affected in an active sense, from those relations in which its expression of force is thwarted.

Seeing that all relations imply some sort of inequality, even when the ‘same’ sense is expressed by two things, on what basis does Deleuze make such a claim?

There are two ways in which inequality is discussed in the text. The first pertains solely to the individuation of beings, which accords with their specific capacity to be affected. In “Against the Dialectic,” Deleuze writes that:

In Nietzsche the essential relation of one force to another is never conceived of as a negative element in the essence. In its relation with the other the force which [is] obeyed does not deny the other or that which it is not, it affirms its own difference and enjoys this difference. The negative is not present in the essence as that from which force draws its activity: on the contrary it is a result of activity, of the existence of an active force and the affirmation of its difference.<sup>219</sup>

To the sensitive reader, the idea that a force makes itself obeyed will be repulsive, while the idea that beings enjoy their own difference, or that, indeed, their *difference is itself enjoyment*, will be truly beautiful. What we must keep in mind is that, for Deleuze, what makes itself obeyed in a relation is the difference of another; that it becomes an object of affirmation. And “who says that there is more thought in labour than in enjoyment?”<sup>220</sup> This position is consistent with the one that Deleuze puts forth in his study on Spinoza. The exercise of one’s capacity to be affected is always an activity. In this respect, even a reactive force draws its activity from an active one, in order to deny that which it is not, or negative life in general. It “says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’ and *this* No is its creative deed.”<sup>221</sup> The negative is a result of activity, rather than that which renders activity possible. Even when the negative is a violation of difference, the affirmation of difference, to whatever degree, is itself necessary if a relation is to be maintained. This is why there is no relation without the inequality of forces. A relation is not possible between two identical things. In turn, reactive forces mobilize a type of conception of difference from their perspective of inequality, in order to establish servile modes of

existence. If reactive forces are able to triumph over active ones, doesn't this mean that they are superior? Deleuze argues that reactive forces are not superior to active ones, but that they do triumph because they separate active forces from what they can do. Reactive forces direct active ones by framing the sort of conditions under which active forces are themselves exercised. But we can never affirm the being (the return) of becoming-reactive, precisely because reactive forces merely reproduce nihilism.<sup>222</sup> How can it be said that that which diminishes life is responsible for generating it? The negative does indeed contradict itself, but purely on the ontic level.

Earlier, we emphasized that “each thing has several senses that *express the force* (1) and *the becoming of forces* (2) at work in it.” We have outlined the way in which a thing expresses a force, but we have not touched on what the becoming of forces refers to. According to Deleuze, a relation cannot be reduced to the forces implied in the same relation. The relation itself has an internal will that is not identical to forces, but is involved in it as the differential or genetic element of the reciprocal genesis of forces. In order to demonstrate this, he writes:

We must remember that every force has an essential relation to other forces, that the essence of force is its quantitative difference from other forces, and that this difference is expressed as the force's quality. Now, difference in quantity understood in this way, necessarily reflects a differential element of related forces—which is also the genetic element of the qualities of these forces. [...] The will to power is the element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation. The will to power here reveals its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces. In this synthesis—which relates to time—forces pass through the same differences again. [...] The eternal return is the synthesis which has as its power the will to power.<sup>223</sup>

A reader unfamiliar with Deleuze's philosophy would probably find it quite difficult to discern what is being said in this long passage, so we will do our best to simplify the matter without being reductive. The internal will, which Deleuze grasps as the will to power in Nietzsche's thought, is the synthesis of the relation between two beings.<sup>224</sup> It is not reducible to either one,

since it is the genesis of their respective individuations. It is, as it were, that which is affirmed in a relation, which insists in a relation, at each point that a relation itself is renewed. Each encounter that implies this or that relation, insists the repetition of the whole of the past, consisting of the degrees of that which is synthesized of a given relation. The repetition is not the relation, but what is impersonal in a relation, belonging to neither one of the terms. Even if this internal will is implicated in this or that essence as it expresses itself, essences are not identical to the quantitative differentials of the genetic field. The degrees of that which is synthesized of a given relation is the second way in which Deleuze understands the unequal. By unequal degrees of differentiation, he does not mean that there is some sort of a hierarchy of forces reinforced by the will to power. It would be ridiculous for us to claim that this internal will is one and the same thing as the relation of force to force, since it in no way constitutes a power relation. Rather, if it is to serve as a genetic element of any relation whatsoever, it must be the power of the eternal return. Because it is the power of the eternal return, it cannot be said that it is the same thing as that which it conditions. Conversely, that which is conditioned does not transcend the genetic field itself. Instead, it is the differentiation of the whole of the field that makes possible a higher affirmation, another sort of individuation, a new way of feeling and acting. Nietzsche expresses a similar sentiment when writing: “we are more than the individual: we are also the entire chain, with the tasks devolved upon all the futures of the chain.”<sup>225</sup> The eternal return frames the problematic, while our constitution is a response. It is in this sense that a mode of existing is already an evaluation.

Wherein lies the problematic? We have to briefly return to the degrees of being in order to sketch out our problem. What are these degrees of being which constitute the becoming of beings? Deleuze argues that “the will to power itself has qualities, *sensibilia*, which are like the

becoming(s) of forces.”<sup>226</sup> This formulation is rooted in Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power as a primitive affective form. It is likewise motivated by what Spinoza’s calls affections of God.<sup>227</sup> In *Difference and Repetition* these affective forms constitute what Deleuze will refer to as the *sentendum* or that which can only be sensed, rather than represented, from the perspective of the transcendental use of the faculties. Such affective forms have a special relationship to thought. If the thinker proceeds through the degrees of being without being aware of thinking, as though a spectator of the whole process, this is because these syntheses are passive. It is only once this affective power is brought to its height, once the thinker is metamorphosed, that becoming says itself or expresses itself. Why this awkward expression? How could becoming say itself? Despite his questionable reference to a subject, Haar rightly recognizes that the *fatum*, the voice, “does not come from me. [...] It is impossible to separate what belongs to the subject and to the *fatum*, which is not object but not merely intimately the subject.”<sup>228</sup> We say that sense is said of becoming, or, that becoming says itself in the expressed, rather than referring to a subject that manifests the saying. The sense expressed of another being, cannot be severed from the becoming of beings which itself triggers a thinking belonging to no subject. But it is precisely because sense is said of becoming that one of the aspects of the problematic is posed on this level of affirmation. The question becomes which one is the being? Traditionally, this question is “what is it?” This is what Deleuze finds illuminating in Nietzsche:

We are led to essence only by the question: which one? For essence is merely the sense and value of the thing; essence is determined by the force with affinity for the thing and by the will with affinity for these forces. Moreover, when we ask the question ‘what is it?’ we not only fall into the worst metaphysics but in fact we merely ask the question ‘which one’ in a *blind, unconscious and confused way*. Essence, being, is a perspectival reality and presupposes a plurality. Fundamentally it is always the question ‘What is it for me’ (for us, *for everyone that sees etc.*).<sup>229</sup>



These thoughts render the problem multidimensional. The being is not what it is perceived to be. It is pure enjoyment, the enjoyment of its own difference. How do we evaluate its essence as such? We evaluate it in this way because it is concretely affirmed as such in the becoming of beings. The answer to the question which one is it arises with the movement in reverse of the constellation of being. It marks the return of differentiation, or the continuation of the becoming of beings. Now, the sense of the being presupposes a plurality, not merely because it is an object of affirmation *for me*, or because it exercises its capacity to be affected in multiple relations, but, also, because, by affirming it in this way, we reject all of the senses, in general, that appropriate this being in such a way as to reduce its capacity of existing. We part ways with history, including the perceptions of our time; we “blow up the history of mankind in two,” as Nietzsche said.<sup>230</sup> How loud is this event that blows up history in two, however? “I have unlearned belief in ‘great events’ whenever there is much bellowing and smoke about them. And believe me, friend infernal-racket! The greatest events—they are not the noisiest but our stillest hours.”<sup>231</sup> We must not misunderstand the negativity involved in such an act as being the same as that of reactive forces. According to Deleuze, critique as a kind of negativity grows out of an affirmation. Evaluation gives birth to the critique of ways of living that diminish life.<sup>232</sup> The problem that the eternal return leaves the actor with is precisely that, the problem of life. The actor asks her or himself: How can something new become expressed as the new in being? Deleuze responds to the first question as Nietzsche does, we must invent possibilities of life by rendering something visible in a new light.<sup>233</sup> We must intervene in our own time for the benefit of a time to come.

## *The Split in the Pathway of the Articulation of Sense*

### **The Virtual and the Actual Object**

You will either be forced to abandon logic,  
or else you will be led to invent one!<sup>1</sup>

In the first chapter, we left off by emphasizing a kind of double optics around which the paradox of sense begins to become apparent. When discussing what Deleuze will call the question-problem complex, we referred to the transcendental field, the determinations of which are like virtual images of past events, and the actual object itself, which appeared as though severed from the field once the constellation was brought to a halt. This double optics is of immense importance for Deleuze. One of his last essays, entitled, “The Actual and the Virtual,” is a testament of his continued effort to articulate the fundamental idea that orients his philosophy.<sup>2</sup> He opens up that piece by arguing that “philosophy is the theory of multiplicities, each of which is composed of actual and virtual elements. *Purely actual objects do not exist* [even if it can be said that only actual objects *exist* as such]. Every actual surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual images.”<sup>3</sup> Thus far, we have pointed out that objects, according to Deleuze, are signs. They are signs because the virtual is part of the real object itself, or, rather, the object points to the virtual aspect which is its objective dimension. “Every object,” Deleuze notes, “is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another, one being a virtual image and the other an actual image. They are two unequal odd halves.”<sup>4</sup> Echoing Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects, the idea objects, having a *quasi-sein*, subsist *between* realities, but cannot be thought to exist in actuality.<sup>5</sup> We placed the emphasis on ‘between’ realities, because the virtual and the actual “correspond to the most fundamental split in time.”<sup>6</sup> How do these idea

objects relate to actual objects according to Deleuze? While we cannot flesh out this relation in great detail here, we will begin to do so in order to frame the discussion which follows.

Just as the constellation of being embraces two unequal compositions, there are two paths through which the complex entanglement of the actual and the virtual can be approached. If there are two paths, away and toward the virtual, this is because a double movement happens at once. The actualization of the virtual on the one hand, and the dissolution of the actual object as it becomes indiscernible from the virtual, on the other, are two paths laid out simultaneously, even while the sort of process implied by each is different. The actualization of the virtual corresponds to the fragmentation of the continuum of virtual images. Since the constellation of being is composed of singular determinations or virtual elements, which are like cuts in the continuum, the process of actualization happens with these cuts on the plane. This is why Deleuze argues that the “the process of actualization undergone by the actual is one which has as great an effect on the image as it does on the object.”<sup>7</sup> The process of actualization marks the limit of the unchangeable and the changeable. That is to say, in one direction it is the complete determination of the object, and, in the other, it is the progressive determination of the transcendental field, as it constitutes what Deleuze defines as a singularity. We should not mistake the actual with actualization. “The actualization of the virtual is singularity whereas the actual itself is individuality constituted. The actual falls from the plane like a fruit, whilst actualization relates it back to the plane as if to that which turns the object back into a subject.”<sup>8</sup> The products of actualization themselves form a dimension of solutions, a distinct line of the constitutions of the actual object. Before we pinpoint why, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the products of this pathway are the supreme object for science, we would like to briefly turn to the dissolution of the actual object as it becomes indiscernible from the virtual.

Turning to the other pathway, Deleuze traces another aspect of the transcendental field as though now being an entirely different plane. He writes that

the actual and the virtual coexist, and enter into a tight circuit which we are continually retracing from one to the other... [There is] no longer an actualization but a crystallization. Pure virtuality no longer has to actualize itself, since it is a strict correlate of the actual with which it forms the tightest circuit.<sup>9</sup>

Earlier, we stressed that what is affirmed in the eternal return is becoming itself. This is precisely the process that Deleuze is tracing out when he argues that the virtual elements form the tightest circuit with the actual to the degree that we can no longer distinguish the two. This means that the actual becomes a pure virtuality; the sign which “forces sensation and that which can only be *sensed* are one and the same thing. In effect, the intensive or difference in intensity is at once both the object of encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility.”<sup>10</sup> With this idea, Deleuze wants to stress that virtual elements communicate “directly over the top of the actuals which separate them.”<sup>11</sup> Now the field is traversed at an infinite speed without any divergences in the continuum. The field has become a problematic object for-itself. It is what Deleuze calls pure immanence. In “Immanence: A life,” he defines pure immanence as “everything prior to that which constitutes the subject and the object.”<sup>12</sup> But what is this ‘everything’ prior to the subject and the object? The plane of immanence, he notes, is “a *singular essence (or Event), a life*,” which consists of virtualities, singularities, events.<sup>13</sup> It is distinct from ego consciousness, because consciousness is posited once the subject and the object are produced outside of the transcendental field. However, “as long as consciousness traverses the transcendental field at an infinite speed everywhere diffused, nothing is able to reveal it;” it is immanent to the entirety of the plane of immanence, rather than the plane of immanence being immanent to it.<sup>14</sup> Although it is not our intention to make one pathway the focal point of philosophy over the other, it is our aim to stress, alongside Deleuze and Guattari, that the

supreme object of philosophy is to give this pre-philosophical plane, implied by both, a “consistency without losing the infinite (or absolute speed) into which thought plunges.”<sup>15</sup> By juxtaposing the point of actualization of the virtual as the object of science, and the field becoming problematic as the object of philosophy, we already see that the task of philosophy is distinct from the one that science sets for itself.

In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that philosophy is concerned with the continuous variations of the plane of immanence, which it attempts to render consistent by creating concepts. They think the plane of immanence as moving at an absolute speed, a single continuous wave of intuitions if you will, while concepts are “like multiple waves” of intensive features that together aspire to become that speed of thought; a thought without an image. Acting as infinitive, the concept, has no spatiotemporal reference or fixed reference points: “it is self-referential; it posits itself and its object at the same time it is created.”<sup>16</sup> The object of the concept is not a state of affairs, but the inseparability of its components that together enunciate a problem.<sup>17</sup> While the components themselves are relative to one another, as it surveys all of its components, the concept arguably achieves an absolute speed of thought. This thought, the enunciation of a problem, has a special relationship with the plane of immanence, which acts as a horizon of conceptual events. It is “the reservoir or reserve of pure conceptual events: not the relative horizon that functions as a limit, which changes with an observer and encloses observable states of affairs, but the absolute horizon [...] which makes the *event as concept independent*” of them.<sup>18</sup> The plane of immanence is like a reservoir of pure conceptual events, since, according to the authors, it is that which presents the non-thought, or the outside of thought, to which the act of thinking addresses itself.<sup>19</sup> The plane is not the concept of all concepts, because this would mean that concepts are no longer created in response to the

singularity of a problem. Their distinction maintains the continued importance of the philosophical endeavour, which is the creation of new conceptual events that have the potential to transform the state of affairs of our time. In contrast, the authors argue that science

relinquishes the infinite, infinite speed, in order to gain *a reference able to actualize the virtual*. [...] In the case of science it is like a freeze-frame. It is a fantastic *slowing down*, and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualized.<sup>20</sup>

Science, then, concerns itself with the point at which the actualization of the virtual gives itself a referent, states of matter or mixtures, presented in the form of functions, and related to discursive systems as propositions. Its task is to map out what the authors understand as a plane of reference, or what Deleuze refers to in *Difference and Repetition*, as the field of scientific solvability. Science is understood as a fantastic slowing down, because the variables which it plots on a plane of reference are successive actualizations of the virtual. The challenge that science has is to extract these products from the virtual, without cutting them off from the processes of production, thereby creating a closed system. “It is difficult to see,” the authors write, “how the limit cuts into the infinite, the unlimited. Yet it is not the limited thing that sets the limit to the infinite, but the limit that makes possible a limited thing.”<sup>21</sup> While scientific solvability has a separate domain from philosophy, the two distinct planes that they construct, share a point of intersection.

Although the two pathways imply one another, the first, from the virtual event to its actualization, best captures the point of intersection of the object of science and philosophy. Here, the continuous variations of the plane of immanence are no longer inseparable.<sup>22</sup> Instead, the repetition of differentiations forms the relative limit that prepares the actualization of the virtual event. In the first chapter, we expressed this relative limit as a point of articulation; the splitting and intersection of two orientations. The essential question was: Which one is the

object? Better yet, the question is: *Which way*, towards or away from the virtual? When we delve into this question, aren't we delving into the precise intersection where the "symmetry between the saying and the said" in the proposition breaks?<sup>23</sup> This point is the relative limit, or the effectuation of the virtual event, that, both, relates and disjoints what will become the proposition, and the state of affairs that serve as its reference.<sup>24</sup> This complex relationship, which we will attempt to lay out in the next section of this study, is explored by Deleuze in the first half of *The Logic of Sense*. But if the plane of immanence always renews itself in the direction of the future, or doubles itself by reversing, this is because the event itself is subtracted from states of affairs. "The event is pure immanence of what is not actualized or what remain indifferent to actualization, since its reality does not depend upon it. The event is immaterial, incorporeal, unlivable: pure *reserve*."<sup>25</sup> It is pure reserve because it has always begun again, never having ended. It is from this perspective that the counter-actualization of the event becomes possible. Although counter-actualization does not belong to philosophy by right, philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattari, aims to *speak the event* in order to "give a new event" to beings.<sup>26</sup> A large section of *The Logic of Sense* is dedicated to the ethics of the event, or what it means to counter-actualize the event. Before we turn to a more nuanced study of the first pathway of articulation and leave the second for a later time, we would like to explain why it is that Deleuze deems it necessary to insert himself in a debate on logic, despite his claim that of all finite thought, logic is, by far, the most reductionist branch of science.<sup>27</sup>

Why does Deleuze deem it necessary to critique well established theories of sense when putting forth a new "Image of Thought" in *Difference and Repetition*? In what way does the act of thought itself figure into all of this? While his critique of the dogmatic image of thought is not geared solely against logicians, when Deleuze questions whether the traditional notion of

sense is adequate to the genesis of thought, or, alternatively, whether the form of recognition can be conflated with sense, the work of Gottlob Frege comes to mind. Allow us to highlight Frege's position on sense. In "On Sense and Reference" (1892), Frege argues that "connected with a sign (name, combination of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which may be called the reference of the sign, [is] also what I should like to call the *sense* of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation (thought) is contained."<sup>28</sup> Frege distinguishes between two domains connected with the sign of the object. The thought to which the sign is connected, is the sense of an expression, while the object that the sign denotes is the reference. We see here that the sign corresponds to a definite sense and to a specific reference, but it is unclear as to how it is that the sense and the reference connect, since they are two distinct dimensions of a proposition. The sense is not the same as reference, since two sentences with the same reference can have different cognitive values. Is the sense of the morning star and the evening star identical? Frege's response is that, while the reference is the same, the sense is not. The two are defined differently: "If we say 'The Evening Star is a planet with a shorter period of revolution than the Earth,' the thought we express is other than in the sentence 'The Morning Star is a planet with a shorter period of revolution than the Earth.'"<sup>29</sup> The question of interest here becomes, what is a thought according to Frege? In on "Thought" (1918), he clearly states that a thought is not an idea which the person discovers and has ownership of, but, rather, something that already exists to which the person "comes to stand in a certain relation" with.<sup>30</sup> According to Frege, thought has an objective content that is commonly recognized by everybody, or it is the common property of many, rather than being a psychological entity discovered by the person (for example, the Pythagorean Theorem). A thought can stand alone. In some cases a sign may have a sense without necessarily having a reference. However, Frege argues that because logicians seek after truth, their task is to



progress from sense to reference. For him, not only is truth assessed from the perspective of the reference, but the value of a thought depends on this advancement. As we saw with the famous example of the evening star and morning star, the truth value of the statement is not decided from the perspective of the change in sense, but from the perspective of the reference itself. In this respect, the truth or falsity of a proposition appears to be indifferent to sense, even though, to begin with, an expression must have a sense as its condition to be evaluated as true. It is indeed difficult to specify how it is exactly that we are able to progress from sense to denotation.

In the “Image of Thought,” Deleuze cuts straight to the heart of the problem. He argues that while sense is thought to be the condition of the true, it is conceived of as indifferent to what it grounds or conditions. In this case, truth and falsity continue as though unaffected by this new value of sense. He writes:

Either too much is said, or not enough: too much, because the search for a ground forms the essential step of a ‘critique,’ which should inspire in us new ways of thinking; not enough, because so long as the ground remains larger than the grounded, the critique serves only to justify traditional ways of thinking.<sup>31</sup>

In the first place, too much is said because the condition itself is not the condition of real experience, but a condition of possible experience. Sense grasped in this way serves as the formal condition of the possibility of truth, rather than being its intrinsic genesis. Deleuze intervenes in this debate on logic precisely because, for him, the discovery of the new dimension of sense has profound implications for how the grounded is conceived. This means that the dimension of sense becomes something other than what Frege understood by it. “We cannot accept,” he writes, “that the grounded remains the same as it was before, the same as when it was not grounded, when it passes the test of grounding.”<sup>32</sup> A designated state of affairs, that which is constituted, now has an immediate relationship with sense. Its process of constitution depends upon it. Designation, he notes, “would never be grounded unless it were understood as the limit

of a genetic series or the ideal connections which constitute sense. If sense points beyond itself towards the object, the latter can no longer be posited in reality exterior to sense, but only at the (relative) *limit* of its process.”<sup>33</sup> Conversely, whenever the designated is grasped as external to the genesis of sense, what we have are mere examples, cases, and hypotheticals, with which logic seems to be preoccupied. Meinong adequately expressed why it is that we cannot entrust logic with the task of thought, when writing: “A science of the object of cognition: does this mean anything more than the demand that what is already known as the object of cognition now be made the object of science, and thus the object of cognition for a *second time*?”<sup>34</sup> The act of thought is sacrificed whenever we reduce it to an encyclopedia of knowledge, or that to which it inevitably leads to, everyday forms of recognition which presuppose natural common sense, and good sense in the form of the identity of the object: Are the morning star and the evening star the same? Is it Theodorus or Theaetetus passing by? This brings us to the second aspect of the problem. According to Deleuze, too little is said because sense as condition in formal logic seems to be merely abstracted from that which it conditions. This means that the transcendental is implicitly modelled in the image of empirical content. Forms of recognition, which find their compliment in already actualized objects, entirely sidestep the intrinsic genesis of sense. More will be said about this later, but for now, it suffices for us to reiterate that, for Deleuze, actual state of affairs are considered to be the solutions of a problem, the two realms bearing no resemblance.

Sense, being ideal or like the idea, is located in the problem itself.<sup>35</sup> According to Deleuze, it is the extra-propositional dimension of the proposition. “The failure to see,” he writes, “that sense or the problem is extra-propositional, that it differs in kind from every proposition, leads us to miss the essential: the genesis of the act of thought.”<sup>36</sup> When we confuse sense with the form

of recognition, we miss the genetic power of thought, the problem itself. In order to give a new image to this act of thought, Deleuze calls the Fregean sense signification,<sup>37</sup> while referring to the instance of grounding as sense; the extra-propositional dimension of the proposition. Sense now becomes that which is imperceptible from the perspective of the form of recognition, while being that which can only be sensed from the point of view of the transcendental use of the faculties. It is this sensed that gives itself to language. It makes language possible. Deleuze writes that:

Sense was first discovered in the form of an impassive neutrality by an empirical logic of propositions, which had broken with Aristotelianism; and then, for the second time, sense was discovered in the form of a genetic productivity by transcendental philosophy which had broken away from metaphysics.<sup>38</sup>

With this new theory of sense, Deleuze does not seek entirely to do away with propositional knowledge, instead, his aim is to lay out a transcendental logic capable of, both, grounding it, and critiquing it. Now, in order for us to grasp how thought itself “produces something interesting when it accedes to the infinite movement that frees it from the truth as supposed paradigm and reconquers an immanent power of creation [...] it would be necessary to go back up the path that science descends, and at the very end of which logic sets up its camp.”<sup>39</sup> So as to grasp the genesis of sense, we must turn to the virtual, the sphere that Deleuze conceives of as Thought-Nature; the non-thought that addresses itself to thought. Here, “*logic is silent, and it is only interesting when it is silent.*”<sup>40</sup>

## A Stoic Inspired Drama: Sounds, States, Surface

“What is most deep is the skin.”<sup>41</sup>

If thinking has a specific topography, what it means to be oriented in thought as Kant said, then, the Stoic reorientation was the earliest image of thought capable of displacing Platonic dualism. As Deleuze argues, the dualism is not between the Ideas and that which receives the action of the Idea, the copies that participate in them. It is instead a dualism of Ideas and the pure becoming of simulacra that elude them. The Platonic image of thought suffered from a certain slippage at each point it had to confront the simulacra, mixtures of pure becoming without measure, which it cast as rebels.<sup>42</sup> We see the problem of the simulacra crop up in the *Cratylus* when Plato erects an idealist language that attempts but fails to capture flux, but also when he has Socrates ask the essential question: What is x? Whenever his interlocutors are asked about such signifieds as beauty, they designate an object or offer an example. These are dismissed straightaway, being incapable of attaining the Essences.<sup>43</sup> Deleuze argues that it is these denotations that hurl us into the depths, the pure becoming of things, since they evade signification. Having posed the problem badly, Plato leaves us in a compromising situation. As Deleuze notes, either we ascend to the level of the Essences, which have no measure for the perpetual flux of living things, or we are hurled into the depths of things, where linguistic expression is reduced to sound without sense. Deleuze finds a way out of this situation by turning to the Stoics. With the Stoics “everything (that was eluding the Idea) now returns to the surface” where sense is produced.<sup>44</sup> The surface of incorporeal or ideational entities, as the Stoics conceived of them, assist Deleuze in reorienting the image of thought. The simulacra are no longer rebels that evade the Idea, but change their nature when climbing to the surface. The Idea no longer refers to height. It becomes these superficial and simulated effects which do not

have existence apart from the compounds of bodies, even while having a sphere of combination of their own.

The autonomy of the surface independent of, and against depth and height,” Deleuze writes, is due to “the discovery of incorporeal events, meanings, or effects, which are irreducible to ‘deep’ bodies and to ‘lofty’ ideas. [...] For the principle frontier is displaced. It no longer passes, in terms of height, between the universal and the particular; nor, in terms of depth, does it pass between substance and accident.”<sup>45</sup>

What, then, are these incorporeal surface effects? How do they make verbal expressions possible without doing away with becoming?

### **Two Planes of Being: Existence and Subsistence**

Stoic philosophy is composed of three parts, physics, logic, and, ethics, each of which has a place in *The Logic of Sense*. Although it is questionable how far afield Deleuze follows the Stoics in each of the three tiers composing their philosophy, or if the Stoic vision is consistent with all aspects of his philosophical project, we find that, along with other French intellectuals of his time, and scholars of formal logic, he deemed their contributions to be essential. The Stoics, including the Stoic tendency that Deleuze finds in the works of Lewis Carroll, are of great interest to him, because they distinguished two planes of being or two types of *something* (quid/what): that of the mixtures of bodies, and, incorporeal entities (void, place, time, and expressible/to say, or *lekton/legen*). Because the Stoic ontology only embraces singular entities, the non-something which are universal concepts, or ideas like Platonic entities, are outside of the domain of something.<sup>46</sup> Let us firstly outline the corporeal plane. Akin to Spinoza’s system, at least in this respect, the Stoics conceived of all states of matter as generated by two interacting and inseparable forces: that-which-acts, and, that-which-is-acted-on, or passivity.<sup>47</sup> What is perhaps most relevant about the physical theory of the Stoics is that, due to the inseparability of

these forces, bodies are not external to one another, one acting and the other being acted upon, as though already constituted. A mixture or compound, as Chrysippus conceived of it, implies the mutual penetrability of bodies, which are causes amongst themselves, or for each other. This means that passivity is not the effect of a cause, but refers to the *hyle* or unqualified matter that is shaped by the action.<sup>48</sup> We should like to say that one and the same body acts on itself by acting, but this is not entirely accurate, since passivity is meant to capture the change of a body, or responds to the problem of physical change, and no two bodies can occupy the same space. These forces are central because, together, they demonstrate the reversibility of the positions of bodies as, both, active and passive, in their intermingling. To show the reversibility of the active and the passive, Deleuze asks a strange question which points to an exchange, a relation, that is irreducible to the corporeality of beings (to eat): “do cats eat bats?” or “do bats eat cats?” We could also ask: when in an embrace, does the left hand clasp the right one or the right hand the left? Perhaps a more puzzling question would be related to what Deleuze understands as contemplation after Plotinus: Does the flower smell itself by smelling what composes it?<sup>49</sup> Let us leave aside this notion of contemplation for a later time, as well as the act of clasping, which is gesturing an incorporeal, in order to further elaborate on the states of affairs of bodies.

Deleuze agrees with the Stoics that only corporeal beings exist in the present, or that only the present is corporeal, since it is the actual temporality of their blending. The “living present,” Deleuze writes “is the temporal extension which accompanies the act, expresses and measures the action of the agent and the passions of the patient.”<sup>50</sup> The passions of the patient, what is ‘left’ *in* the body, would point to the past and the future as dimensions *of* the present. Now, because the limited present of specific state of affair consists of partial encounters, Chrysippus calls these imperfect mixtures.<sup>51</sup> Conversely, according to Stoic cosmology in general, a perfect

mixture would consist of the chain of causes, or all combinations at once, that constitute the living cosmic present. Because the totality of combinations cannot be known, even by the wisest of sages, a more powerful agent was conceived so as to interconnect all of the parts. In order to extend the chain of causes all the way up to the cosmic level, the Stoics thought of a self-moving element pervading all matter, serving as the ultimate blender or crafter.<sup>52</sup> In other words, the ultimate blender, Zeus or the “Through,” would be the active element pervading all compounds. As Deleuze notes, this permitted the Stoics to extend the chain of causality to encompass an ever growing present able dissolve the dimensions of the partial present. While Deleuze does not critique Stoic cosmology, it is clear that he cannot follow the Stoics all the way up the cosmic level, at which point they thought it was necessary to install the One as the ultimate measure. Instead, he emphasizes the mistrust that the Stoics themselves held in their ability to provide a measure for each partial mixture. He expresses this mistrust in a dramatic way when saying that *Chronos* wants to die. Being extended to the cosmic level, the good present can no longer provide a measure for the partial present. The present becomes measureless as the past and the future take revenge of *Chronos*.<sup>53</sup> Deleuze accentuates the other aspect of Stoic philosophy, which is that mixtures of bodies are causes of effects that essentially subvert the present by outright disturbing the chain of causes. This subversion turns us to the other plane of being, to which Deleuze dedicates much of his efforts in *The Logic of Sense*.

While causes are reserved for the realm of bodies, the question is, what do these causes *give way to*? Deleuze argues that causes give way to something that differs in kind from them, incorporeal events, which are the effects or ‘results’ of mixtures. Being inseparable from that which exists, these event-effects have a minimum of being in that they subsist or inhere in the present state of affairs. It is due to their subsistence that the present loses its measure as it is

subdivided in two directions at once. In turn, it is their continuous subdivision that directs us to the unlimited becoming of events that elude the present, hence, giving way to another reading of time, that of the line of *Aion*. When Deleuze argues that events are like crystals, growing at the edges, he is referring to the effects that are produced by the relations of beings. Even while they are brought about by existing beings, incorporeal effects, being like doubles, escape corporeality. He depicts these virtual events in an interesting way, when writing that: “Events, differing radically from things, are no longer sought in the depth, but at the surface, in the faint incorporeal mist which escapes from bodies, a film without volume which envelops them, a *mirror* which reflects them.”<sup>54</sup> While effects can be said to mirror the relations of beings, they are thought to have their own sphere of organization. Deleuze finds the Stoics useful precisely because they split the causal relation in order to express the distinction of the corporeal and the incorporeal. One of the tricky aspects of the text is this split. It is unclear how effects are produced by the mixtures of bodies, all the while maintaining their autonomy. With the notion that effects have an autonomous sphere, Deleuze wants to demonstrate that, while effects are not causes in relation to each other, they do have a bond which is itself *quasi-causal*. The self-referential surface of events, which has a peculiar way of producing events, is what he will call the transcendental field, referred to with respect to Stoic vocabulary, as the line of the *Aion*. In light of this ideational cause, events now refer to two environs. The Stoics, he writes, “clearly saw that the event is subject to a double causality, referring on one hand to mixtures of bodies which are its cause, and on the other, to other events which are its quasi-cause.”<sup>55</sup>



## The Event and Language

Once events leave the realm of bodies they climb to the surface. But “what does the wise man find at the surface?” Deleuze writes that they find a complex of event-effects that “release the purely expressible with its two uneven halves.”<sup>56</sup> This purely expressible is the verb, but this verb in the infinitive, he notes, is silent. The question for Deleuze is how this silence, which is a speaking without speaking, becomes, both, verbal expression and attributable to actuals in which sense occurs. The latter two, propositions and actual states of affairs of bodies, form series of two unequal halves within which the event is expressed. Their inequality does not imply something negative or an opposition, but the circulation of sense throughout the series.<sup>57</sup> We will discuss this threefold structure in a moment. What matters for now is that, according to Deleuze, the surface of events itself makes language possible by tearing sounds away from the corporeal in which they would be nonsensical, or alternatively, the purely expressible gives way to the expressed in the form of language. There is an essential relation between the event and language for Deleuze: “it is the characteristic of events to be expressed or expressible.”<sup>58</sup> This is indeed a thought provoking position. The statement is an indicator of two different organizations of language, and, in our view, it invokes a traditional philosophical problem of great importance. The event is meant to capture the essence of what it means to speak. It is, as he notes, the essence of speaking. In line with the Stoics conception, the incorporeal event is the *lekton* or *legein*, most adequately translated as “to say.”<sup>59</sup> Different images of thought are produced depending on the way in which a thinker posits the connection of *logos* and *legein*. In the first section of this dissertation, we attempted to set up the ground for Deleuze’s transcendental logic. We intended to set up the ontological status of *legein*, by tracing the sort of philosophical trajectory that influenced Deleuze’s image of thought. To us, this was a necessary move, in part because

contemporary authors continue to have problems with what this *legein* is. With respect to the Stoics, the problem is exacerbated when views promoted in modern formal logic are superimposed upon the former. As Charles Kahn argues, “in certain respects an ancient doctrine may be obscured rather than revealed by a reconstruction in terms of 20<sup>th</sup> century logic.”<sup>60</sup> While modern scholars seem to be in agreement that the ideality of *legein* is distinct from the Platonic essences, in order to grasp what it is, the overwhelming reference point is Frege’s theory of sense. This is the case even though it is commonly understood that the Stoic theory of meaning is essentially non-referential or intentional.<sup>61</sup> Because the Stoics identified two things along with the *legein*, the comparison seems to be justified. These three things are laid out by Sextus:

The Stoics say that three things are linked to one another: what is signified, what signifies, and what exists. Of these, what signifies is the sound, e.g. the sound Dion; what is signified is the very thing which is suggested by the sound and *which we apprehended to subsist with our thought* [...]; and what exists is the external object, such as Dion himself. Of these things two are bodies, namely sound and what exists, one is not a body, namely the thing signified, [or] the *lekton*.<sup>62</sup>

These three things have led commentators to identify *legein* with Frege’s mode of presentation, because what formal logic is interested in is how meanings have an objective value apart from the mind. In other words, how it is that meanings can be commonly held regardless of the individual mind. While we are in agreement that the subject does not create meanings, meanings taken in the Fregean sense disconnect the Stoic theory of nature from their logic. Stoic sayings are in no way commonly held thoughts. They are singular expressions that are attributable to states of affairs. What seems to be the problem is the sound itself as sign, which would bring us back to Plato’s *Cratylus*. Are names arbitrary or do they themselves carry some sort of an objective essence that realizes itself historically?

For his part, Deleuze is not reconstructing Stoic logic. He is, instead, experimenting with their concepts in order to produce a new theory of sense. The transcendental field, being itself a

modern conceptual invention, cannot be attributed to the Stoics. Nevertheless, the Stoic bond of events captures what Deleuze wants to communicate with the idea that singularities compose the plane of immanence. This idea is expressed again with respect to temporality, when he writes that it is the “essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events at the surface as effects (*Aion*).”<sup>63</sup> To some degree, we have already discussed how these events compose what Deleuze conceives in *Difference and Repetition* as the being of the sensible, or that which can only be sensed. The being of the sensible, being imperceptible from the perspective of the empirical use of the faculties, addresses itself to thought. It is the outside of thought, without which we would never begin to think. This connection is what Deleuze refers to as *Thought-Nature*. If transcendental logic is silent, this is because, in our view, it is essentially a gathering or composition of the *logos* that make language possible.<sup>64</sup> In the Nietzschean sense, Deleuze asserts that if we ask ‘who speaks?’ sometimes we answer with the one who manifests, other times, it is the combinatory of these singularities together with the abyss that speaks; to speak without speaking.<sup>65</sup> In other words, it is the complex of singular events that expresses itself. This position resonates with some aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy.<sup>66</sup> In light of Heraclitus, who had influenced Stoic *logos*, Heidegger argues that *logos* is a gather-ness of Being, a gathering which is an essential coming into unconcealment (an optics/a showing), that directly gives itself to *legein*. In its relation to *logos*, *legein* is the gathering that apprehends.<sup>67</sup>

We will return to this gathering of virtual events in the third chapter when discussing the past. Here, we want to stress that events compose the transcendental field or a surface, an idea that allows us to distinguish two readings of the event, which is, as we noted, doubly caused. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze places the emphasis on the superficiality of events, meaning that we are in the realm of sense whenever we begin to speak. In order to make sense, we need not

reflect upon what is being said. We, on the other hand, have pointed to the other reading of the Event, the event as an encounter with a sign that forces thinking: *the Event of thought*. Are these two readings contradictory? Not necessarily. Let us consider what Deleuze says in *Difference and Repetition* with respect to this question. He writes: “The privilege of sensibility as origin appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces sensation (the sign) and that which can only be sensed are one and the same thing, whereas in other cases the two instances are distinct.”<sup>68</sup> In an encounter, the sign itself becomes one and the same object as that which can only be sensed, while in other instances, a sign and the being of the sensible are not the same object of thought. There seems to be a delay between the two. This conception of the sensible may not be entirely foreign to the Stoics. Referring to Sextus’ writings, Adam Drozdek highlights that an existing thing (what we take to be a sign) is “that which activates the cognitive presentation;” it activates something in the soul by “inducing a corresponding sensation.”<sup>69</sup> This corresponding sensation is not a corporeal. Rather, as Sextus asserts, it is an intelligible that inheres in the thought.

The distinction we have drawn between the two readings of the event has returned us to the other area of inquiry: how is the event related to a state of affairs? In effect, we are again asking how the event gives way to verbal expression, but now from the perspective of the series. We have already put forth a working definition of *legein* or to say, and its linkage to states of affairs and sounds, by referring to Sextus’ reflections on the Stoics. The Stoic notion of *legein* as the signified is quite fascinating, even paradoxical. According to them, it is not the actual object indicated by the sound that becomes meaningful, rather, it is the sound that gets the sense or meaning. To utter and to say are two distinct things.<sup>70</sup> Deleuze often refers to this nuanced distinction by quoting Chrysippus’ saying: “if you utter something, it passes through your lips.”<sup>71</sup> In this case, what passes through your lips is not the sense of the actual object, say a house, but

its mere utterance, a breath, which is itself a nonsensical corporeal just like the actual object. With respect to the incorporeal, then, what we say when we utter the sound ‘house’ is not the house itself, “but the incorporeal meaning which the house gets.”<sup>72</sup> In turn, the sense which lends itself to the sound ‘house’ cannot itself be called a house. Being something other, it opens up an indefinite regress in language, or its infinite proliferation. One of the paradoxes of sense is this regress, “I never state the sense of what I am saying. [...] But on the other hand, I can always take the sense of what I say as the object of another proposition whose sense, in turn, I cannot state.”<sup>73</sup> Similar to Heidegger’s conception of the house or *dwelling* as the first term of art in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, for Deleuze, what we call a ‘house’ is a compound of sensations, the being of which are nonhuman becoming(s).<sup>74</sup> The sense is equivalent to this compound of sensations. In other words, the sense is made in concrete occasions.

Now, in order to demonstrate the linkage between the saying and the state of affairs, Deleuze relies upon Emile Brehier’s account. It is worthwhile quoting Brehier’s position here:

When the scalpel cuts through the flesh, the first body produces upon the second not a new property but a new attribute, that of being cut. The *attribute* does not designate any real *quality* [...], it is, to the contrary, always expressed by the verb, which means that it is not a being, but a *way of being*... This way of being finds itself somehow at the limit, at the surface of being.<sup>75</sup>

The incorporeal event is not a corporeal entity, since it is a way of being, or as Deleuze calls this coming-to-be, a becoming. In its expressed form, this incorporeal is sterile: it neither acts, nor is it acted upon. A way of being is expressed by the infinitive form of a verb, like to clasp, to green, to cut, while compounds determine qualitative and quantitative states, the clasping of hands, the green of a tree, the cutting of flesh; utterances that make no sense without it or as Deleuze would say, events “confer on these elements an expressive value and a function of ‘representatives’ which they did not have by themselves.”<sup>76</sup> But because the former has an operation of its own,

effects only being bound to other effects, an event escapes the present. As the infinitive suggests, an event is always in the process of becoming, it has never ceased becoming. Moreover, as the attribute of states of affairs, the event subsists in the present, pulling it in two directions at once. As Deleuze writes, it is “that which has just happened and that which is about to happen, but never that which is happening.”<sup>77</sup> If we were to assume that the verb as disposition or attribute of states of affairs was somehow realized from the standpoint of corporeality, then, the state of affairs would cease becoming, meaning that the verb would no longer be attributable to the states of affairs. Conversely, if a thing was identified in accordance with some classification system as conforming to this or that form, then, likewise, we would cease being able to say something meaningful of it. The idea that what can only be said of things is their singular becoming is the *ethics of saying*. It essentially affirms of things singular ways of being.

### **The Fourth Dimension of the Proposition**

After having shown that it is characteristic for events to be expressible as the sense given to an utterance, Deleuze goes on to consider the way in which sense is then related to other modes or dimensions of the propositions. His study of the dimensions of the proposition demonstrates that he was not only an avid reader of the philosophical tradition, but that he also knew the kind of debates that were being had in modern formal logic. Deleuze notes that three relations in the proposition have been recognized by most authors: denotation, manifestation, and, signification. As discussed, denotation is the relation of the proposition to the actual object, which serves as its reference. A denotation refers to a particular state of affairs, and fulfills the criterion of true or false when the object itself corresponds to the selected image or sign.<sup>78</sup> Another dimension is that of manifestation, usually referring to the person who begins to speak

in order to express desires and beliefs. Because manifestation refers to the personal, it is thought to be the dimension that makes denotations possible. Where a discrepancy has been found between the two, philosophers have attempted to correct it, by constituting a transcendental subject or the cogito, which serves as the ground of judgements for denotations.<sup>79</sup> The third dimension, being signification, refers to universal or general concepts, but also more broadly, it deals with “elements of propositions ‘signifying’ conceptual implications capable of referring to other propositions, which serves as premises of the first.”<sup>80</sup> In the latter case, Deleuze is referring to the range of significance of the function, which is also referred to in formalized logic as the concept. The logical value of signification is that it constitutes the condition of the true. However, as we see with the work of Bertrand Russell, the range of significance of the function, or its conceptual implications, not only constitutes the true and the false, but also gives way to the absurd.<sup>81</sup> The absurd implies a state of affairs that is non-existent. The pertinent line of inquiry for Deleuze is, which of these dimensions of the proposition is primary with respect to the others, and to which dimension does sense belong, if any?

The question of primacy arises because there are two dimensions serving as foundation. We first noticed that manifestation is what makes denotation possible, but then said that signification is the condition of the true. With manifestation as the ground for denotation, it is the ‘I’ which begins. Having the capacity to unify all of its intuitions, it is always the transcendental subject which begins in the order of speech. The problem with manifestation as foundation, however, is that significations are presupposed whenever we set the transcendental subject or the cogito as beginning point. In order to demonstrate this presupposition, Deleuze points to Descartes’ cogito, which envelops other conceptual components, such as being rational, that are immediately involved whenever one manifests. Manifestation therefore already envelops a world

of conceptual significations, which form the domain of language. We have considered this domain by briefly looking at how language functions according to Hegel. Language is considered to be a kind of archive of memories of the existential aspect of thought, which is naturally implicit or immediate whenever the subject speaks. We must then seriously consider if signification is capable of grounding denotation. Having dealt with the problem of representation in greater depth in *Difference and Repetition*, in *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze focuses in on the primacy of signification from the perspective of modern formal logic. Russell's theory of types, nevertheless, invokes Deleuze's study of Aristotle. It is no coincidence that Deleuze should revisit Stoic logic rather than relying upon Aristotle, the founder of logic. The Stoics were the first of the ancients to have put forth an original logical theory after Aristotle.<sup>82</sup> Deleuze's basic problem with the system of organization that underlies Aristotle's logic is that it subsumes difference under the identity of an undetermined concept. Aristotle's logic functions around three terms, genus, species, and, individual, which determine the hierarchical distribution of beings by a process of division. Deleuze is most interested in the process of division through which Aristotle determines the essence of beings from the most general to the most specific. Through the process of division or the distribution of beings, we see that the greatest difference can be found at the specific level of the individual. The key problem for Deleuze is that genera, being predicated of things and essentially implied in their definition, are logically prior to difference, while difference is dependent upon the genera, which dissolve this difference. As Henry Somers-Hall notes, "the highest point in the hierarchy [...] cannot itself be the result of differentiation, as, if it was, this would presuppose a higher genus, from which genus would itself be divided."<sup>83</sup> This is precisely what Aristotle does. He distinguishes the differentiae, the genera, from the genus, which is now predicated of them. But being predicated of the genera, it is predicated of



itself, despite being the highest term of differentiation, which itself is not dependent upon it. Somers-Hall accentuates this contradiction, showing that in order to uphold the system, Aristotle leaves the genus undetermined. This opens him up to Deleuze's critique that there seem to be "two 'Logoi' differing in nature, but intermingled with one another" in Aristotle's philosophy: the logos of species, which depends upon the identity of the concept of genera, and the logos of Genera, which is implicated in diversity, while being entirely separate of it.<sup>84</sup> The contradiction is not delimited to the universal form on which all subsequent division is dependent. It is apparent at the level of specific differences as well, the consideration of which demonstrates a definitive divergence between Deleuze's project in *The Logic of Sense* and Aristotle's logic. For Aristotle, the essence of the individual is fixed. All of its states up to the present moment are continuous with it, meaning that its prior states are taken to be states of matter that progressively fulfil the potential of form. Perhaps Aristotle has something important to underline, however, when proposing that the essence of a being is grasped only once it has ceased to be. As Somers-Hall points out, "essence as 'what it *was* to be a thing,' is essentially retrospective. This means that the becoming of [a being] is related entirely to an atemporal state of being."<sup>85</sup> From the perspective of Stoic logic, once a thing has ceased to be, or, in this case, once its essence has been determined, nothing can be attributed to it. Determined retrospectively, essence opens up a contradiction on the specific level. It can simultaneously be said that a thing is and is not. This is perhaps why Hegel finds Aristotle to be of great interest, despite the distinct way in which the undetermined concept determines itself in his philosophy.

While the importance of Aristotle's logic for the comprehension of Deleuze's project is undeniable, here we only wanted to highlight the problem that afflicts it, in order to reflect upon Russell's theory of types from a certain vantage point. Russell's theory of types runs into the

same contradiction that Aristotle encounters with respect to the genus.<sup>86</sup> He attempts to correct this contradiction by proposing that no class of all classes is a member of itself. A proposition about all members of a class is nonsensical or meaningless. How does Russell arrive at this conclusion? Take the following contradiction considered by him: “Epimenides the Cretan said that all Cretans were liars, and all other statements made by Cretans were certainly lies. Was this a lie? The simplest form of this contradiction is afforded by the man who says ‘I am lying’; if he is lying, he is speaking the truth, and vice versa.”<sup>87</sup> Here, it is presumed that Epimenides the Cretan is both lying (x) and not lying (not x or w). In this case ‘w,’ would be the class of all classes which is not a member of itself. But then, as Russell notes, the logic must follow that ‘w is not a w,’ giving way to y, and so on indefinitely. He writes that this

makes it evident that the notion of ‘all propositions’ is illegitimate; for otherwise, there must be proposition [...] which are about all propositions, and yet cannot, without contradiction, be included among the propositions they are about. [When we suppose] the totality of propositions, statements about this totality generate new propositions which, on pain of contradiction, must lie outside the totality. It is useless to enlarge the totality, for that equally enlarges the scope of statements about the totality.<sup>88</sup>

Russell’s claim that no class of all classes can be asserted, or alternatively, that there is no such thing as a proposition about all propositions, seems to have resolved the contradiction, except that now we must inquire as to what this higher type might be, by virtue of which no totality may be asserted. This higher type is of course the undefined or general enunciation, which constitutes the range of meaning of a propositional function. The propositional function is not the same as particular enunciations, which are the values of a function. For Russell, the propositional function (for example, x is rational) constitutes the possibility of meaning, the range of significance of the function, although it is obviously not one and the same as its values.<sup>89</sup> The scope of significance of the function is considered to be the condition of all possible values, or

“all arguments for which the function is true, together with all the arguments for which it is false.”<sup>90</sup> Whatever does not fit the criteria is considered outside of the function, thereby being nonsensical. Deleuze’s argument is that Russell resolves the contradiction that presents itself by abstracting from the conditioned. In other words, signification is only able to found denotation insofar as it gives itself a ready-made denotation. The argument is made again in *What is Philosophy?*, where Deleuze and Guattari argue that of all finite thought, logic in general is, by far, the most reductionist branch of science. Indeed, the authors go so far as to question its scientific validity when they sever scientific statements from logical propositions, which they claim are mere forms of recognition. It is questionable whether the act of thought can be entrusted to logic. The fundamental problem with the propositional function is that, because it “considers empty reference in itself as simple truth value, it can only apply it to already constituted states of affairs or bodies, in established scientific propositions or in factual proposition, [...] or simple opinions.”<sup>91</sup> It suffices to say that, for Deleuze, Russell’s higher type, the empty or undefined reference, cannot serve as the condition of denotations.

Thus far, we have moved within what Deleuze calls, after the Russellian expression, the vicious circle of the three dimensions of the proposition. While the response is probably already apparent, the question is, can sense be interpreted as one and the same as signification. This distinction seems to get at the crux of Deleuze’s philosophy as a whole. In *Difference and Repetition*, their difference is stated clearly: “We must distinguish sense and signification in the following manner: signification refers only to concepts and the manner in which they relate to the object conditioned by a given field of representation; whereas *sense is like the Idea* which is developed in the sub-representative determinations.”<sup>92</sup> As the ideational stratum which is expressed in the proposition, sense must be its fourth dimension. Such a dimension should not be

superimposed a posteriori, but must be shown as generating the other dimensions of the proposition from within. Deleuze points out that we can already infer it from the vicious circle of the proposition, which has shown that the other dimensions cannot provide the real genesis behind the conditioned. The ideal stratum of sense is a truly revolutionary discovery. In the first section of this dissertation, we explored some of Deleuze's writings on sense prior to his publication of *The Logic of Sense*. We put forth a reading of the simulated and ontological sense, in order to show that the simulated sense is a kind of product that does not sever itself from the process of its production.<sup>93</sup> These two aspects of sense are synonymous with the two readings of the event in *The Logic of Sense*. Sense, as Deleuze writes, "is at once both the site of an originary truth and the genesis of a derived truth."<sup>94</sup> It is jointly form and abyss: that which exists as the expressed of the proposition, and that which is extra-propositional or silently subsists, as it does not merge with the proposition itself. This distinction is artificial of course. We are saying one in same thing, but considering it from two viewpoints. Now, the simulated sense which lends itself to the sound does not merge with it, meaning that we can never say the proposition and the sense simultaneously. The problem of contradiction arises precisely when we suppose the sense as merging with signification. Sense is the expressed of the proposition, not the expression itself. Its neutrality demonstrates that it is indifferent to the general, the personal, and the particular. "The Stoics said it all: neither word nor body, neither sensible representation nor rational representation."<sup>95</sup> Being neither one, the event is thought to make language possible precisely because it is the frontier that separates sounds from states of affairs. This means that sense frees sounds from other corporeal entities, thus, rendering them capable of becoming expressive.

However, as we saw through our study of the logic of expression, while that which is expressed does not exist outside of its expression, it is not the sense of the proposition itself, it is said of things. Deleuze writes that

the event subsists in language, but happens to things. Things and propositions are less in a situation of radical duality and more on the two sides of a frontier represented by sense. This frontier does not mingle or reunite them [...]; it is rather something along the line of an articulation of their difference: body/language.<sup>96</sup>

If the event is indeed said of things, how does it maintain its neutrality or autonomy? It would seem as though sense is the same as denotation. With the help of Brehier, we highlighted earlier that sense as the attribute is not a quality; it does not qualify a being. Instead, it is becoming (a way of being) best articulated by the verb. Rather than reflecting the actual object, the ideal stratum of sense is like its other side reflected in a mirror. It is the virtual half which consists of the effects of relations of beings. Sense is neither intrinsic signification, nor does it relate to an extrinsic denotatum, or an already constituted object.<sup>97</sup> Later we will see how the verb, just as the event, has a double role to play once the event is determined and actualized in individuals. With respect to the actualization of the event in the present, the verb becomes conjugated in relation to the other dimensions of the proposition; it inheres in the proposition as verb.<sup>98</sup> In contrast, in its infinitive mood, it is that which escapes the present, carrying off becoming without division.

Deleuze writes that:

in light of the relations and complex connections between the expression and the expressed, between the interiority of the expressor (l'exprimant) and the exteriority of the expressed, between the verb as it appears in language and the verb as it subsists in Being, we must conceive of an infinitive which is not yet caught up in the play of grammatical determinations [...]. This would be a neutral infinitive for the pure event, [...] representing [its] extra-propositional aspect.<sup>99</sup>

Once the infinitive becomes determined, it is expressed in the two series, meaning that it is conjugated in light of persons, individuals and cases. But before we can consider the relation of

sense to these other dimensions of the proposition, we must consider the relation of the expression to the expressed; the “region where language no longer has any relation to that which it denotes, but only to that which it expresses, that is, to sense.”<sup>100</sup> Stated otherwise, “in order that there be language, together with the full use of speech conforming to the three dimensions of language, it [is] necessary to pass through the verb and its silence, and through the entire organization of sense and nonsense.”<sup>101</sup> We will now turn to this organization.

### **The Virtual Structure of Language: Sense and Nonsense**

Always extraordinary are those moments  
in which philosophy makes the Abyss speak.<sup>102</sup>

In many respects, *The Logic of Sense* is a product of its time. It can be thought of as a result of French structuralism. We see this when Deleuze conceptualises language as a virtual structure, not unlike Jacques Lacan’s formulation of the unconscious as structured like a language. Written in 1967, the shorter piece, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?” is the basis of a more extensive exposition of non-verbal language as structure in *The Logic of Sense*. The criteria by which we recognize structuralism are to a large extent repeated in *The Logic of Sense*, except that in the latter, they are considered from the perspective of the Stoic framework. It seems as though the former is a sort of preparatory work. Deleuze may have been interested in structuralism because he found that it had affinities with Stoic thought.<sup>103</sup> Take the determining criteria of any structure as Claude Lévi-Strauss conceived of it, or consider Lacan’s presentation of meaning as effect in light of the Stoic topography in *Encore*. Two series are necessary in order for a structure to become productive, one signifying and the other signified. The signifier is a sign which presents an aspect of sense, while the signified is an ideal logical attribute that

distinguishes itself from the expression.<sup>104</sup> It is clear that this elementary starting point of any structure echoes the Stoic relation of the sound which signifies, and the signified, which lends itself to the sound as the attribute of states of affairs.

The most pressing question for us is, by what process does sense lend itself to the expression of the proposition, if it is not to be identified with the proposition itself? While Deleuze has already responded to this question in *Difference and Repetition* and other works, in *The Logic of Sense* he appeals to contemporary perspectives with which he has affinities. A particularly useful starting point is Lévi-Strauss' idea of the void of sense. The void is defined by him as the "symbolic value zero, that is, a sign marking the necessity of a symbolic content supplementary to that which already charges the signified, but able to take any value whatsoever, on the condition that it belong to the available reserve."<sup>105</sup> For Lévi-Strauss, the void plays the essential role of producing the relation of the two elementary series. It subsists in the signifier as a perpetually displaced place without an occupant, and inheres in the signified as the supplementary content that displaces its realization.<sup>106</sup> In Deleuze's reading, the void conjoins the two elementary series, leading them towards a converging point, while also continuously ramifying them, thereby producing new events. Because the void has an enigmatic role, circulating through the series while belonging to neither one, Deleuze refers to it as the paradoxical element or instant of nonsense. This element, he writes, "has the function of bringing about the distribution of singular points; of determining as signifying the series in which it appears as excess, and, as signified, the series in which it appears correlatively as lacking, and above all, of assuring the bestowal of sense in both signifying and signified series."<sup>107</sup> Before we explore all that is implied in this line of argument, it might prove helpful to frame the problematic to which the tripartite relation serves as a response. This tripartite relation is meant

to articulate the two distinct terms of a relation in which sense is expressed as product, without splitting this product from the process of production. The paradoxical instant must explain how a part of the event which is becoming actualized in the present, and another aspect of the event which never ceases to become otherwise, are two directions of one and the same entity consistent and continuous with one another, even while the series that it develops are not. For Deleuze, “the distinction [...] is not between two sorts of events; rather, it is between the event, which is ideal by nature, and its spatiotemporal realization in a state of affairs.”<sup>108</sup> We intend to discuss this distinction in more detail later. For now, it suffices to say that the doubling of the event is meant to explain how language is endlessly born by virtue of this virtual structure.

We highlighted that the paradoxical element of nonsense has the function of bringing about a distribution of singular events.<sup>109</sup> The concept of singularity is not foreign to us, since we have been exploring it all along as event-effect. Here, we are considering the bond of effects among themselves. Deleuze uses the term singularity so as to point to the constellation populated by events, which, as we saw in the first section, doubles itself by reversing, hence, the idea that the line of the Aion moves in two directions instantaneously: one pathway giving way to the expressed in the domain of solutions, and the other capturing that which displaces the said as soon as it comes to exist in the proposition. Together, they make sense that which either arrives too early or too late, but never on time. Even so, how does Deleuze define singularity in *The Logic of Sense*? Singularities are indifferent to the three dimensions of the proposition. They are a-personal, pre-individual and a-conceptual entities that mark points of differentiation in a constellation or a complex of sense. Thus far, we have understood that a singularity results from the relations of things, but cannot be reduced to an actual relation, since it likewise depends upon another operation; the bond of event-effects. As “veritable events, [singularities] communicate in



one and the same Event which endlessly redistributes them, while their transformations form” a becoming.<sup>110</sup> Earlier, we discussed Deleuze’s displacement of the verb “to be” in light of Nietzsche’s eternal return. When he argues that singularities communicate in one and the same Event or that they form the same complex theme, we must think of this Event as interchangeable with the paradoxical instance of the eternal return, not as the One, as is sometimes done.<sup>111</sup> In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze introduces a peculiar topology so as to show how singularities communicate in one and the same Event. The whole organization of the virtual structure is summed up in three moments: “the [chance or *aleatory*] point which traces the line; the line which forms the frontier; and the surface which is developed and unfolded from both sides.”<sup>112</sup> To fully appreciate this topology, one requires a working knowledge of the three syntheses of time that Deleuze puts forth in *Difference and Repetition*. Since we explore the intricacies of Deleuze’s philosophy of time in the next chapter, we will only sketch out this topology here as it reflects the virtual structure of language.

The most elusive of these three abstract moments is the instant on which the entire structure depends. As one might expect, the duality between effect and cause is itself an artificial one, while the instant as unlocalizable starting point is not. As Deleuze points out in *Bergsonism*, the division is made between two multiplicities that are different in kind, so that we may be oriented beyond the state of experience towards the condition of experience itself.<sup>113</sup> The beginning point is what he refers to in that text as the turn of the line of articulation beyond experience, beyond the line of solutions or actualized states of affairs, with which it diverges. This turn is “an extraordinary broadening out which forces us to think a pure perception (percepts) identical to the whole of matter, a pure memory identical to the totality of the past.”<sup>114</sup> When studying the organization of the virtual structure that underpins language in *The Logic of*

*Sense*, we are thinking of this same domain, the same turn of the line of articulation that subsists in the present. In the latter text, Deleuze presents this instant as a chance point that gathers a complex of singular points upon a straight line, the line of the Aion. The line of the Aion is a perpetually differentiating line that simultaneously subdivides the present in two directions. It subsists in the present because the chance point extracts effects from it, or better yet, it refracts them (the turn) in two directions, in this way, completely ramifying the condition. One of the tricky aspects of the text is Deleuze's argument that this paradoxical instant extracts events, all the while emitting them. The paradoxical instant does not simply refract an effect in two directions, as though being a condition of possibility. Through this process of refraction, it is itself productive of a singularity that is actualized in states of affairs. The virtual structure must be the condition of real experience. We must take great care in articulating this extremely delicate aspect of refraction in which so much is implied, since singular effects are not severed from the present completely determined. It is in the process of refraction that they are so determined. For Deleuze, the paradoxical instant must distribute the line of Aion, the proximate past, in order for a singularity to come about, which would be the direction of the future. While the direction of the past is, indeed, that which makes the present pass, the direction of the future marks the coming about of another present, in which a singularity is actualized. The entire process of emitting a singularity consists of the tracing of the proximate past, a past that is relative to the instant because of which it is summoned as the complex theme of a repetition. Alternatively, the line of the Aion simultaneously moves in the direction of the future since the instant is already enveloped in each singular point that forms a constellation. It is already enveloped in them as they are emitted with respect to it. Each unique distribution of the constellation of singular points is, for Deleuze, like an ideal dice game played from the

perspective of the chance point.<sup>115</sup> Each throw of the dice ramifies the entire constellation of singularities that the instant selects by introducing a differentiation, with the entire operation being a singularity—the form and abyss, or ground and groundlessness at once. The paradoxical instant is a chance point because it forms a unique constellation each time, meaning that the specific distribution will never be the virtual object of another repetition, even while the theme it selects might be the object of another repetition. The ideational surface of sense is progressively determined meaning that the complex theme of singularities is indeed repeated, only differently. This is because each singularity is itself constituted by virtue of what is repeated in it, the future. Although the instant cannot be said to exist apart from the present, since it subsists in it as that which forms its condition, it perpetually subverts this present by turning the line of articulation in two directions instantaneously. It is a mirror, or as Deleuze also refers to it, a crystal, that marks the shifting frontier between two sides of a surface which unfold with respect to it.<sup>116</sup> “Everything happens at the surface in a crystal which develops only on the edges.”<sup>117</sup>

Deleuze employs the ideal game of dice throw in order to show how the game is the “unconscious of pure thought,” a thought that is intertwined with the emission of singularities each time.<sup>118</sup> Each throw of the dice, or the emission of a singularity, is thought to transform the two elementary series that are determined on each side of the surface. By each side of the surface we mean utterances and states of affairs which are determined in relation to it. Deleuze argues that, as the absolute frontier which introduces a differentiation in the whole of the structure, nonsense “belongs simultaneously to both series, it has two sides. But the sides are never balanced, joined together, or paired off, because the paradoxical element is always in disequilibrium in relation to itself. [...] We are faced with two dissymmetrical halves of an ultimate instance.”<sup>119</sup> As we have stressed, in one direction, the singularities constitutive of the

proximate past together form the relative limit of the line of the *Aion*. Because the singular points form a constellation that repeats a theme, or they themselves make sense only in relation to one another, it could be said that they produce sense. This is a valid (in that sense is a world expressing itself), but only if we remember that the theme that they repeat depends upon the absolute position of the instant that selects them. The cut in the continuum of singular points is the relative limit that produces a product, that aspect of the event which is actualized in the present. On one side of the frontier unfolds the surface of the signifying series. Nonsense can be said to be the word= $x$  of the signifying series, or in Lévi-Strauss' terms, it is the empty place without an occupant. On the other side unfolds the surface of the signified. Nonsense is understood in this series as the object= $x$ , or the supernumerary object which does not observe a position.<sup>120</sup> For its part, nonsense is not Russell's absurd. Although it has no sense, for Deleuze, nonsense is that which "enacts the donation of sense, [being] opposed to the absence of sense."<sup>121</sup> If anything, there is always an excess of sense, rather than a lack. The pivotal role of the paradoxical instant intervening as nonsense is to produce sense by transforming the series, meaning that sense is not something originary, it is always a produced effect. As Deleuze notes:

Sense is actually produced by the circulation of nonsense which affects both the signifier and the signified. In short, sense is always an *effect*. It is not an effect merely in the causal sense; it is an effect in the sense of an 'optical effect' or a 'sound effect' or even better, a surface effect, a position effect, and a language effect. [...] [Sense] is a product which spreads out over, or extends itself the length of the surface; it is strictly co-present to, and coextensive with its own cause, and determines this cause as an imminent cause.<sup>122</sup>

We have already noted that as product, sense lends itself to the series of the signifier, but does not merge with the expression. It "crops up suddenly in the other series (of states of affairs)" as it is its attribute; the expression becomes indicative of the actual object itself.<sup>123</sup> But, as Deleuze points out, sense does not merge with the actual object either. This is because the two series are

determined in relation to nonsense. Nonsense, being the locus of the ever-present, yet perpetually, displaced question “What is it (x)?” does not permit the two sides of the surface to merge, even while they tend towards the absolute point, as though to converge.

That nonsense displaces the merging of the product with either series, captures the idea that what is said of the object, what is predicated of it in the domain of signification, never quite manages to make it coincide with the expression, but also that, that which is attributed to the actual object, is not its essence as such. The actual object does not coincide with its supposed identity. These dissymmetrical series correspond to an aspect of the fundamental problem we formulated earlier. When identified with the expression, the simulated sense (the product) always gives way to a contradiction. The actual states of affairs do not conform to the expression. Here, we come to understand why this is the case for Deleuze. The series of the signifier to which sense lends itself, expresses this sense as the past of the states of affairs, meaning that the sense has already taken flight in the other direction. The event, being that which is attributed to a state of affairs, does not cease becoming differentiated in the other direction of the *Aion*, implying that the object itself remains determined through an intrinsic genesis which is its sufficient reason. A purely actual object does not exist as such; it does not have some sort of a final resting place. It would be erroneous to cut it off from the process of its individuation. The continuous becoming of the event shows that language is “endlessly born, in the future directions of the *Aion* where it is established and, somehow, anticipated; and although *it must also say the past*, it says it as the past of states of affairs which go on appearing and disappearing in the other direction.”<sup>124</sup> The expression is a kind of utterance that always already says the past of states of affairs. Earlier, we emphasized that Deleuze argues, alongside the Stoics, that the expression does not say itself and its sense simultaneously; there is always a sort of deferral between the two that opens up the

infinite proliferation of language. If we were to attempt to express the sense of an expression, we would have to multiply the series indefinitely. Here, sense would be the denoted object of the proposition that follows the first, while the denoted object of the proposition that follows would be the sense of the proposition that comes next. It is perhaps possible to utter it, the sense, but only as a nonsensical entity, like those invented by Lewis Carroll, which utter the perplexing compounds of things. The indefinite proliferation of the signifying series is now explained from the perspective of the ideational stratum of sense. The becoming of the event in the future direction of the *Aion* creates the asymmetry between the saying and the said in the form of the verbal expression, by rendering states of affairs and expressions divergent.

### **The Genesis of Sense: Transcendental and Formal Logic**

In the previous section, we showed that the transcendental field is itself varied in connection with the quasi-cause, the quasi-cause being that which distributes the combinatory of singularities or events. The frontier of the transcendental field acts as the point of articulation of sense. It distributes sense in two series as that which happens to bodies and that which subsists in propositions. It is because of this quasi-cause that sense inherits a genetic power with respect to the two series without losing its autonomy or neutrality. Deleuze argues that “as soon as sense is grasped in its relation to the quasi-cause which produces and distributes it at the surface, it inherits, participates in, and even envelops and possesses the force of its ideational cause. [...] The cause is nothing outside of its effect, that it haunts this effect, and that it maintains with the effect an immanent relation which turns the product, the moment that it is produced, into something productive.”<sup>125</sup> Here we have the two aspects of sense being expressed. Sense does not merely double up with respect to the series, in this way maintaining its autonomy, its

incessant becoming, but it is also that which envelops the genetic power of the quasi-cause by being produced with respect to it. It itself becomes productive. The difficulty is precisely in maintaining these two positions simultaneously. Sense must be synonymous with the transcendental field as it has an immanent relation with its cause, meanwhile having the power of genesis with respect to that which is conditioned. This is its passage from sterility to genesis. This problem, the passage from sense as a mere product to it itself becoming productive, is, as Deleuze notes, at the heart of the logic of sense, since it forms the juncture at which the transcendental field and propositional knowledge cross paths.<sup>126</sup> The inquiry into passage from sterility to genesis returns Deleuze to Husserl's well established theory of sense. Although Husserl is only mentioned in a few series of *The Logic of Sense*, he is, nevertheless, a constant presence. Deleuze has an ambivalent relationship with Husserl, and the phenomenological tradition as a whole. If we broadly survey Husserl's theory of sense, we might even say that the two philosophies share something intimate, that their perspectives are oriented towards the same thing. It is only once we closely consider the two approaches, however, that we see the stark contrast. Deleuze does not simply engage with Husserl in order to point to a predecessor, but to differentiate himself from that project. By outlining the fundamentals of Husserl's position, we intend to show on what points the two part ways. This distinction will create the context in which we can posit the passage from sterility to genesis in Deleuze's philosophy.

Husserl's vision is clear. He sets out to constitute a pure science, that of phenomenology, capable of grounding all other sciences. This science has two areas of concern. It delves into the genesis of all activities in the actual, while also studying the products of such activities. It would be able to take the products or results of the genesis as identical forms that are in essence repeatable in new acts of judgements, or concepts, and extendable to other actualities.<sup>127</sup> Because

of this twofold area of concern, there are also two ways in which we can approach sense in Husserl's work. While both of these refer to one and the same ideal stratum of sense, the sense-bestowing acts or, the act-species as Husserl calls them, differ in each one. Here, we will distinguish the two acts as Husserl has done, in order to eventually show how they cross paths. In "Expression and Meaning," Husserl's exploration of sense mirrors Frege's. He distinguishes between the expression itself which is the physical or written sign, and the mental state expressed in it; that which is expressed means something, or relates the expression to something that is meant.<sup>128</sup> The expression in which the sense subsists is called the sense-bestowing expression, or expressions themselves are, in general, grasped as meaning-conferring acts. The expression allows us to distinguish that which is expressed in it as the objective mental state, and, the object of the presentation, that which is referred to. On the one hand, we have the meaning-intention, and, on the other, the meaning-fulfilment of the expression. In actual experience we never think of the sense-bestowing act itself, but only refer to the object. Actual experience manifests the asymmetry between two. We always miss the sense of what we are saying. One merely intends the object, not the sense. As Husserl notes, "we do not live in the presentation" of the sense, we merely enact it.<sup>129</sup> The asymmetry between these two was also a basic problem for Frege. As with Frege, Husserl seeks to reconcile them, all the while arguing that the sense-intention need not be fulfilled as such, since it must remain the domain of pure possibility of manifold of acts of fulfilment; the sense-intention must remain indeterminate so that it can become fulfilled in actual experience. This is indeed the case with pure logic, in which the ideal fabric of meanings or objectivities is only necessary, not the sense-fulfilment.

One of Husserl's basic questions in that piece is how are these ideal unities themselves constituted in experience? How do the meaning-intention and the meaning-fulfilment meet up?



Husserl's argument is that in experience, the fulfilling content and the intended content form a unity of coincidence; the intended and the given are one and the same thing. He proposes that

wherever the meaning-intention is fulfilled in a corresponding intuition i.e., wherever the expression actually serves to name a given object, there the object is constituted as 'given' in certain acts, and, to the extent that our expression really measures up to the intuitive data, as given in the same manner in which the expression means it. In this unity of coincidence between meaning and meaning fulfillment, the essence of the meaning-fulfilment is the fulfilling sense of the expression, or, as one may also call it, the sense expressed by the expression.<sup>130</sup>

While such an argument seems to reiterate that the two simply go together, there is something significant being said here. Husserl thinks that the meaning-intention 'fits' the intuitive content like a glove, or it could also be said that the intuitive content *finds* the sense that is naturally suited to it; the sense which is, as it were, already there as a pure possibility. The question, however, is by virtue of what sort of act are these two contents identical? It is not enough that we merely say that they are. Husserl claims that the

answer seems clear. The relation, as one of naming, is mediated, not merely by acts of meaning, but by acts of recognition, which are here also acts of classification. The perceived object is recognized [...], known as one, and insofar as the act of meaning is most intimately one with the act of classification, and this latter, as recognition of the perceived object, is again intimately one with the act of perception, the expression seems to be applied to the thing and to clothe it like a garment. But there is no classification in experience so the recognitive act in the experience must accordingly base itself on the act of perception.<sup>131</sup>

For Husserl, the belonging of the word and the perception itself of a thing in the actual is mediated by the act of recognition, which has the role of synthesizing the two contents. The role of recognition is not merely found in the natural attitude itself, but is, in fact, the intentional bond that is phenomenological in character. Recognition intervenes not merely as that which mediates between the two, but also that which makes it possible that others refer to this sense in an objective way. According to Husserl, then, the two acts, the word itself, and the thing, are "combined in a single unity of act," or, rather, the naming and the recognition are one and the

same thing.<sup>132</sup> He writes that the “recognitive character of certain acts, which gives them their significant relation to objects of intuition, does not pertain to words as noises, but to words in their meaningful, their semantic essence.”<sup>133</sup> This semantic essence which fits the individual intuitive datum as such, remains the general act of signification that enters into a relation with the act of intuition; in short, for Husserl, the “object of intuition is known through the concept.”<sup>134</sup> In this respect, Husserl’s sense-bestowal reminds us of Hegel’s, both are, in a sense, revisiting the problem that was set out by Plato in the *Cratylus*.

The above comprehension of sense is understood as the static act of fulfillment or recognition. The other type of sense-bestowing act to which we turn to now, involves what Husserl calls the dynamic form of recognition. While the static act merely presents the result, the consciousness of the coincidence of the intuitive content and the meaning-intention, in the dynamic form of recognition, the two are presented for themselves and weaved into another.<sup>135</sup> The difference between the two act-species of sense-bestowal is likewise demonstrated by Husserl, when he distinguishes pure logic from the phenomenological attitude:

pure logic is interested in the noema (sense), but not with respect to its components, but only in so far as it is conceived as exclusively determined by a narrower essence, to the more precise definition. If we wish to obtain the full noema of a determinate judgement process we must take the judgement precisely as it is intended to in just that process; whereas for formal logic the identity of the judgement extends much further.<sup>136</sup>

According to Husserl, the noema intended is identical in both cases, even while the act differs in transcendental philosophy. How does the act differ? The inquiry into the pure stream of consciousness, along with the components of the noema which are its correlates, is an inquiry into the phenomenological structure of experience. Husserl tells us that this phenomenological structure is there implicitly, subsisting in the natural attitude, yet, we seldom set out to inquire into it. The defining way in which Husserl proposes we may perform, what he calls eidetic

research, is by bracketing the actual. By putting the actual out of action, we suspend the natural attitude itself, along with the judgement acts which it implies. We take on an intellectual attitude. This placing in parenthesis of the natural attitude should tell us straight away what belongs to the stream of consciousness. Once we bracket the natural attitude, what we have is the phenomenological residuum, a region of being distinct from the actual. “Consciousness considered in its ‘purity’” he writes,

must be held to be a self-contained complex of being, a complex of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip, to which nothing is spatiotemporally external and which cannot be within any spatiotemporal complex, which cannot be affected by any physical thing and cannot exercise causation upon any physical thing.<sup>137</sup>

While the region of being that is open to eidetic research is distinct from the actual, we do not merely bracket the natural attitude in order to do away with it altogether. For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is performed so that we enter into that field of consciousness which implicitly persists in the actual, as the reason behind the given as it is given. We always return to the actual, albeit with a different eye. According to Husserl, the continuously productive field of consciousness which “yields an infinite wealth of cogitations,” is always open to us if we turn our mental regard towards it.<sup>138</sup> This turning is a putting into action of consciousness itself, in which the mental process acquires a ‘directedness to’ that objective something, which usually remains implicit in sense-bestowing acts. When we direct our attentiveness towards the phenomenological realm, we change gears from the mode of non-actionality to actionality itself, whereby the objective something in consciousness is no longer merely potential, or posited implicitly.<sup>139</sup> The objective something is now given absolutely, it is the ‘it itself’, to which consciousness becomes immanent.

Let us turn to this transcendental stream of consciousness. If we focus in on Deleuze's direct reference to Husserl's *Ideas*, we notice that he seems to disregard the comprehension of sense in the static act of fulfilment entirely. He, instead, praises Husserl for having uncovered the noema as the neutralized double of the expression. In placing the accent on the noematic complex itself, he has not only provisionally left behind Husserl's study of formal logic, but he has also intentionally accentuated one feature of the latter's transcendental philosophy. This partial focus is evident when he writes that in Husserl's philosophy, the

noema possesses a nucleus quite independent of the modalities of consciousness and thethetic character of the propositions, and also quite distinct from the physical qualities of the object posited as real. In the nucleus of noematic sense, there appears something even more intimate, a supremely or transcendently intimate center which is nothing other than the relation between sense itself and its object in its reality.<sup>140</sup>

Readers of Husserl will find this accentuation of the noematic complex alone rather peculiar, especially because, for Husserl, the noema is that which gives itself to a mental process. It is composed of a multiplicity of presentations giving directedness to the stream of consciousness. Yet, Deleuze's partial focus is not an oversight. Neither does it involve a flawed reading of Husserl. Husserl clearly states that even while the noema and the noises correlate, they involve different types of components. However, although these are distinguished by him, Husserl rarely approached the noema for itself, or when he does discuss the core of the noematic sense, it is only in order to demonstrate how the objective thought is already inherent in it as a common or inter-subjective form.

In the *Ideas*, Husserl's basic argument is that every mental process or stream of consciousness has an essence that is seized upon as its own intuitive content.<sup>141</sup> In bracketing the actual, we delimit ourselves to that stream of consciousness to which corresponds its own essence in its specificity, that is to say, "we exclude everything which does not lie in the

cogitation with respect to what the cogitation is in itself.”<sup>142</sup> The pure ego is an intentional one, meaning that it is a consciousness of something. Its essence is precisely that something *whereof* it is consciousness. It is a grasping or a seizing of something given to it as its own. If the ego is thought to reflect upon this something, it is because this something is that which directs the flow of the grasping, without merging with the flow of the mental process. It is the perceiving as such, or the flux of presentations of the perceiving, which not only alter from presented to no longer presented, but are each, by themselves, reproductive modifications of a theme, moving from determinate to indeterminate potential, which is the horizon of the seeing. As we have noted, to this perceiving, for Husserl, there corresponds a mental regard or attentiveness, which is the perceived. He writes that “no mental process is presented. That means that the perception of a mental process is a simple seeing of something which is (or can become) *perceptually given as something absolute* and not as something identical in modes of appearance by adumbration.”<sup>143</sup> Here, we do not have a strict separation between the perceiving and the perceived; the two streams, that of the noesis and the noema, are immanent to one another. How does Husserl demonstrate that the mental process is already inherent in the components of the noema? While the two streams are disjointed, the noetic moments have as their correlate the noematic moments. According to Husserl, there are no noetic moments without these noematic moments which give themselves for the seizing in thought. But the object of the noetic moments is distinct from the object of the noematic moments. The noetic moments are the directions of the pure ego with respect to the bestowal of sense upon the object of the noema. While the stream of consciousness is not composed of identical moments, especially because the noetic moments are correlated to the noema, they, nevertheless, progressively seize one and the same object, which is unified in the sense bestowal act. Husserl writes that the “object found in the noema is intended to as an

identical object in the literal sense, but the consciousness of it is non-identical only combined continuously united consciousness in the different segments of its immanent duration.”<sup>144</sup> On the side of the mental process, we have the ‘*What*’ that is reflected in the core of the noema, but weaved independently of its complex. In other words, while the pure intuitions are given to the mental process, they belong to the mental process in a different way than in the way in which they are given for the seizing.<sup>145</sup> We will show what this ‘*What*’ intended in consciousness produces in a moment, for now, let us shift over to the noema.

The mental process inheres in the perception-noema, because the noematic core itself has a relation to its own object, the object in reality, to which the sense-bestowal act will eventually become directed. The mental process arrives at an objective determination of the object, which in this case is the content of the noema, precisely because the noema in itself has its own object. On this side of the noema, we have the ‘*How*’ of “its mode of givenness in so far as this mode of givenness is found as a characteristic belonging to it.”<sup>146</sup> This how of its mode of giving, points to the distinct content of the noema itself, which is not itself a unity performed by the mental process, but a multiplicity. Or it is the multiplicity which raises the ‘*How*’ of its mode of giving. Every noema has its own content, which is the sense (the meant as meant), by virtue of which it is itself related to ‘its’ object.<sup>147</sup> As we have noted, the noema consists of separate segments which themselves have what is called a noematic core. Husserl argues that the content of the core of the noema is the mode in which it is an object of consciousness; it is that which is intended to in the mental process. The core is understood to have an objective something, what Husserl calls a determinable x, which implies the substrate in the “how of its determinations.”<sup>148</sup> The how in the noema is the bearer of predicates, which is intended to as the identical predicate in the noesis. The determinable x, being the bearer of predicates, is separable from the noema as the object

continuously intended to in consciousness. Because it is the thing intended by all consciousness as such, Husserl argues that it is the same object despite being presented differently in the noema. As it becomes more closely determined in consciousness with the flow of the noematic moments, it is recognized as identical, or abstracted from the noema. This determinable  $x$  permits Husserl to say that it is the same object which is continuously intended in consciousness, even while it is presented differently in the determination-content. In the noema, “it shows itself only from different sides, whereby the predicates which remained undetermined would have become more closely determined.”<sup>149</sup> In the mental act, we separate the intentional object from the fluctuating predicates. Or as Husserl writes, this  $x$  is “separated as central noematic moment [...] the pure  $x$  in abstraction from all predicates [...] and it becomes separated from these predicates, or more precisely, from the predicate noemas.”<sup>150</sup> The separation of the pure  $x$  from the predicate noemas is, according to Husserl, permitted by the noema itself, since its moments include an object of unity. This object of unity is shown in the reproduction of each of the moments with respect to each other. The noematic complex replays a similar theme.

Now, let us turn to the last moment of Husserl’s stream of consciousness, “the two-membered nature of the predicative process,” the explication and the apprehension of the content of the noema.<sup>151</sup> This two-membered process is of special importance to us, since our problem is precisely this double articulation of sense. According to Husserl, the explicative process in the noesis, produces the simplest predicative determination *S is p*, in light of the horizon of the noema. The noema presents this horizon, since it is that which exchanges the indeterminate for the determinations of the object, with the horizon leaving open the entirety of the genesis. In other words, the flux of the noema implies reproductive modifications in which the horizon is constantly displaced, and does not cease to be displaced with explication. Conversely, on the side

of the noemata, we have the retaining in consciousness of the substrate *S*, which is explicated as the objective determination *p*, the sense bestowed on *S*. Husserl refers to this explication, the coincidence of *S* with *p*, as *copulative spontaneity*; the *first level* of the predicative process which is essentially passive in nature. He then turns around on this copulative spontaneity produced in consciousness, when writing:

But when, retaining *S* in grasp, we pass to its moment *p*, therefore when we witness this coincidence this ‘contraction’ of *S is p*, we have not yet, for all that, posited *S* as subject in a predictive judgement, and we have not yet determined it as having the moment *p* in the manner *S is p*. This, rather, is the achievement of a new kind of activity.<sup>152</sup>

What does Husserl mean when he says that the contraction *S is p* does not yet reflect *S* as subject on the first level of predication? This shift is reminiscent of our awkward question: Which one is the being? In the stream of pure immanence, the *S is p* arrives as the primary explication in accordance with the moments of the noema. The coincidence of *S* with *p*, the predicate, arises passively at the horizon of determinations. The mental grasp has not yet turned to *S* as subject, but has stayed with the flow of the noematic moments. For Husserl, it is the copulative spontaneity, the passive coincidence *S is p*, that turns the ego now to *S*. Or, as he puts it, “when the transition from *S to p* has taken place in this way, there then develops on the basis of active contemplation an interest of higher level in the object-substrate.”<sup>153</sup>

In the first place, Husserl conceives of the running-through of the multiplicity as having its origin in passivity, rather than the active intension on the part of the ego. Once the multiplicity is explicated, it can be actively reflected upon. “If, when a plurality is run through, it is also actively taken together, then matters evidently stand otherwise. But then the uniting activity is obviously completely other than that which gives unity to an explication.”<sup>154</sup> So, how does the uniting activity change once we have shed light on *S*? Husserl argues that once we have shed



light on  $S'$ ,  $S'$  must likewise be predicatively determined by  $p$  in much the same way that  $S$  had been determined by it. He writes that the “passive synthesis of coincidence between  $S$  and  $S'$ , which was the ground of the common affection, can now be actively apprehended; we say that  $S$  and  $S'$  are the same—are  $p$ ; although  $S$  still has its moment  $p$ , and  $S'$ , in turn, has its moment in  $p$ .”<sup>155</sup> What could Husserl mean that there is a coincidence of  $S$  and  $S'$ ? Well,  $S'$  is already reflected in the substrate of the noematic complex, precisely because the noematic complex has its own object which it determines. This means that, for Husserl, at the least, the two must be one and the same in the activity of identification, even though, in the consciousness which directs itself to them, they are not two identical moments. The consciousness must reach activity in the change of levels from explication to apprehension. According to Husserl, explication is a partial identification, while the latter is the total identification in which the object is actively grasped in the predicate. There are two ways that this new mode of judgement is viewed thereafter. It can be grasped with respect to the substrate as its own individual point of predication, or with respect to the predicate as the identical one in a series of substrates. In other words, we can either focus in on the substrate or the predicate in the equation  $S$  is  $p$ . For Husserl, this identification of  $p$  in a series of substrates

means that the unity is pre-constituted in the passive coincidence of likeness of the moments  $p'$ ,  $p''$ , and so on, *as the unity of the species  $p$* : on the strength of this, an act of judgement oriented in a new direction is possible, in which, if we return to  $S'$  and re-effect the identification, we no longer determine  $S'$  by  $p'$  as its individual moment but by  $p$  as *identically the same* in  $S$ ,  $S'$ , and so on.<sup>156</sup>

The discovery of the identical predicate in the series of substrates allows for the possibility of extending the predicative core, belonging on the side of the noetic moments, to other substrates as their common form. This means that “the judgement  $s$  is  $p^*$  in which  $p$  designates the individual moment in the individual object  $S$  is completely different from the judgement  $S$  is  $p$  in

which *p* designates the *universal*, the *eidos*.”<sup>157</sup> With the new form of judgement, this same universal, *p*, can be infinitely particularized according to Husserl. It gives itself this infinite possibility, because, for Husserl, the horizon of determinations allows the abstraction of the predicate from the individual judgment.<sup>158</sup> In other words, he interprets the open horizon as the possibility of extending the predicate itself to other actual objects. In the last instance, Husserl places the emphasis on his universal judgement as the crowning achievement of his eidetic research.

The potentials of Husserl’s philosophy are undeniable. His thinking through of the structure of intentionality is a substantial contribution. But Husserl essentially betrays its novelty when positing the sense as a predicate that is identically repeatable in the empirical. According to Deleuze, Husserl’s genesis is a “rationalized caricature of a true genesis.”<sup>159</sup> Husserl must reduce sense to predictive generality in order to show how the sense is the same objective something intended to in consciousness by every ego; indeed, that it is the common form implicit in every act of judgment. In order to show how this inter-subjective form is implicit in acts of judgment, he must render the something-*x* in the noema capable of supporting the unification in the noesis.<sup>160</sup> In line with this, Husserl’s task is to make transcendental logic affirm formal logic; all that transcendental logic manages to do here is to give a nod to formal logic. For us, the gravest error made by Husserl is when he identically repeats the copulative spontaneity in the so-called higher level of active apprehension. Rather than perceiving the indeterminate as a paradoxical instance that essentially displaces the explication of the predicate on the basis of the noema, Husserl interprets the indeterminate as lending its weight to the general predicate. This is an analogy. We might go so far as to say that it is a ruse; a retrospective resolution of the problem that suits the natural attitude. This predicative generality tells Deleuze that “Husserl

does not think about genesis on the basis of a paradoxical instance, which properly speaking would be non-identifiable.”<sup>161</sup> According to him, before this paradoxical instance is covered over in the actual, it makes possible a critique of good sense and common sense. We will return to his critique of *doxa* in the closing remarks of this chapter. Here, it is important for us to stress that there is a dividing line in philosophy between those who interpret sense as a general predicate with infinite extension, and those who determine sense as co-present to paradox. In the former case, the search is defined by the effort to reconcile formal logic with the transcendental. It finds in the transcendental mere forms of recognition. It actively affirms, for the second time, the predicate involved in the expression. It merely generalizes the predicate, takes it to be the final word; extends it to the world as a whole as a possibility. While this abstraction appears to be derived from a mental process immanent to the noema, thinking itself can only arise when it is appropriated to paradox, when it is an abiding attentiveness to a problem, from which thinking qua thinking could not sever itself. Husserl simply explicates too much when in a retrospective act he eliminates the paradox so as to reinstall the form of recognition. But, then, the question is precisely: “What is the fate of philosophy which knows well that it would not be philosophy if did not, at least provisionally, break with the particular contents and modalities of *doxa*?”<sup>162</sup> The critique of knowledge or the dogmatic image of thought, on the basis of the paradoxical instance is, by far, the greatest contribution of Deleuze’s theory of sense. It is the greatest contribution precisely because it requires a different idea of sense so as to be carried out.

Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1937 essay “The Transcendence of the Ego” had a profound influence on Deleuze. Deleuze’s claim in *The Logic of Sense* is that only an impersonal transcendental field can produce a sense co-present to a paradoxical element, while also giving way to the other dimensions of the proposition. His critique of sense posited as a general predicate in Husserl’s

philosophy has its roots in Sartre's essay. For Deleuze, the reduction of sense to a general predicate does three things: it reduces the sense to an already given signification, it relates to the denoted object as an already constituted one, and it presupposes a dimension of manifestation, "in the position of the transcendental subject, which retains the form of the person, of personal consciousness, and of subjective identity, and which is satisfied with creating the transcendental out of the characteristics of the empirical."<sup>163</sup> The problem is precisely that, on both sides of the transcendental structure, the product is external to the genesis, or the sense is an extrinsic one, as it transcends the field of immanence in order to posit the already determined. Such a critique of Husserl is, in large part, found in Sartre's paper. In that piece, Sartre argues that Husserl unnecessarily doubles consciousness with the ego, which, according to him, transcends the operation of the consciousness which unfolds and unifies itself in time. This ego that says I think, for him, "is precisely not the consciousness that thinks."<sup>164</sup> A consciousness that unifies itself is already there in Husserl's philosophy, so, according to Sartre, Husserl should not have allowed for there to be such a thing as the ego which reflects itself in the operation of consciousness. He writes that, if the ego indeed existed, "it would violently separate consciousness from itself, it would divide it, slicing through each consciousness like an opaque blade."<sup>165</sup> Consciousness must be a consciousness of its object, nothing more. It cannot in any sense be an object for itself in the ego, which would somehow underlie it. On the whole, the problem with the ego is that it is a product of a retrospective look that has moved away from the instantaneity of consciousness, the spontaneity of thought. This is why Sartre insists that Husserl's ego "affirms more than it knows."<sup>166</sup> Conversely, the ego can be posited, but only once the consciousness has been run-through. Sartre argues that the "I think can accompany our representations because it appears against a background of a unity that it has not contributed to

creating, and it is this pre-existing unity which, on the contrary, makes it possible.”<sup>167</sup> On what basis are such arguments made convincing, however? Just like the actual object on the side of the noema transcends it, the ego as the double of consciousness, transcends the transcendental field. For Sartre, then, this transcendental field, being the condition of experience, must involve an impersonal, or an anonymous, consciousness. If the ego were presumed in it, if this consciousness was conceived of as my life, then, this consciousness would be closed in upon itself. The ego, he writes, “does not have any outside, it can be conceived only through itself and this is why we cannot grasp the consciousness of another.”<sup>168</sup> Being distinct from the ego, the impersonal consciousness is the outside of the ego, that which cannot be experienced by the ego as ego, or better yet, that which displaces the ego. By putting the ego out of the play in the transcendental, Sartre seems to have completed Husserl’s bracketing of the actual.

If the transcendental field is an impersonal one, meaning that the ideal stratum of sense is no longer identified by an ego as being the same thing as the predicate, but is, rather, the infinitive co-present with nonsense that continually displaces the subject-copula-predicate formulation, Deleuze has the difficulty of demonstrating its relationship with the other dimensions of the proposition. Even if the idea is flawed, as it implies an account of the predicate from the perspective of the empirical, the act of recognition mediating in the sense bestowal makes for an easier resolution to the problem. Once we have gotten rid of it and moved away from mere possibility, it is much more challenging to show how sense moves from sterility to genesis, and how the transcendental field would serve as the ground of propositional knowledge. Sean Bowden highlights the difficulty involved in this endeavour, when asking: “How are individuals, persons, general concepts, and the relations between them, to be generated by the event without reference to any underlying, substantial unity?”<sup>169</sup> According to Deleuze, there are

two sorts of genesis that are derived from the impersonal transcendental field of singularities or events: the static ontological genesis, and, the logical genesis. As with Husserl, the first stage of the genesis consists of the individual which is derived from the transcendental field. We already expressed this idea, when we outlined in the introduction to this chapter Deleuze's argument that the actualization of the virtual gives way to lines of solutions. The relation of the line of singularities with the lines of solutions encapsulates the actualization of the transcendental field in the actual individual. The individual essentially expresses a world by virtue of the relations it forms with itself or other individuals, and a world, expressed by the individual, consists of a series of singularities that are convergent.<sup>170</sup> But we have seen that singularities are continuously displaced with respect to the caesura, how could singular events compose a world expressed by the individual? Deleuze argues that, "a singularity may be grasped in two ways: in its existence and distribution, but also [as it] extends and spreads itself out in a determined direction over a line of ordinary points. This second aspect already represents [the] stabilization and a beginning of the actualization of singularities."<sup>171</sup> The extension of singularities over a line of ordinary or actualized points is meant to delineate the actualization of the individual, or what it means to become actualized. Deleuze tells us that if singularities extend themselves over a line of actualized points, then, this means that the singularities actualized by the individual are selected in accordance with the rule of convergence.<sup>172</sup> We could also say that the actualized singularities in the ordinary points are predicates in which the world is expressed. If the world expressed generates one and the same individual, this means that the world itself is configured by the continuation of singularities which are essentially compossible with respect to each other. By drawing from Leibniz, Deleuze argues that

compossibility is thus defined as a *continuum* of singularities, whereby continuity has the convergence of series as its ideational criterion. [...] In each world, the individual

monads express all the singularities of this world, [...] but each monad envelops or expresses 'clearly' a certain number of singularities only.<sup>173</sup>

It is, indeed, difficult to grasp the idea of convergence, since convergence gives us a glimpse of actualization from the perspective of the past. It merely means that the world expressed by individuals renews itself in them; it is itself continued as this world as it inheres in the individual as a series of predicates. Since the world renews itself in them, the individual monads together express all of the singularities of this world, while each envelops a select number of singular events.

While the world is expressed in the individual, it is nevertheless not the same thing as the individual. By arguing that the singular points are actualized in a line of ordinary points, Deleuze wants to emphasize that the world itself subsists in the individual as event or verb, even while it is actualized by the individual as a predicate. In this case, we do not attribute a predicate to Alice, but define the world within which Alice becomes large or small.<sup>174</sup> Since the predicates that inhere in the individual are approached by Deleuze from the perspective of the event, the predicate also thereby changes. From the perspective of the transcendental we say that the event subsists in the individual as the expressed, while from the perspective of the actual, we say that the individual is the expression of the predicate. So as to demonstrate this, Deleuze writes that

to the extent that what is expressed does not exist outside of its expressions, that is, outside of the individuals which express it, the world is really the 'appurtenance' of the subject and the event has really become an analytic predicate of a subject. '*To green*' indicates a singularity-event in the vicinity of which the tree is constituted. [...] But '*to be green*' or '*to be a sinner*' are now the analytic predicates of constituted subjects.<sup>175</sup>

If individuals are these analytic predicates that pertain immediately to them without any generalization, then in what way is Deleuze's theory of sense distinct from what came before it? The difference in Deleuze's philosophy is that a world is neither composed of predicate noemas,

nor infinite forms, that would be explicated in or by the individual. If the individual is said to be composed of analytic predicates, this is only because, in expressing a world, it actualizes the event to begin with, which, in the course of actualization, becomes this predicate. Or better yet, the predicate is this becoming on the part of the individual, its manner of being, in the process of actualizing the event. As we saw in Chapter 1, the individual monad actualizes the event in accordance with its capacity or power. While the predicate is indeed actualized in the present (to be green), the continued becoming of the event in the transcendental field perpetually suspends its finality, the limit of actualization, thereby continuously modifying the becoming of the individual (to green). The continuous becoming of the event in the transcendental field, then, subsists in the becoming of the individual as the reason behind its becoming. This idea is articulated from another viewpoint in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, where Deleuze claims that Leibniz is the second philosopher of the event after the Stoics. Leibniz is considered a philosopher of the event, because he conceived of the event as a verb “irreducible to the copula and to the attribute.”<sup>176</sup> The unique perspective that Leibniz brings to Deleuze, is that, with him, it becomes possible to define the event as a relation: “relations themselves are types of events. [...] Events in their turn are types of relations; they are relations to existence and to time.”<sup>177</sup> This conception of the event as relation opens up another perspective on the analytic predicates actualized in the individual. In the first place, events are types of relations, they are the pre-individual mood of a relation; that by which the relation qua relation is renewed as such. We will discuss the differential relation in greater depth in the fourth chapter. This differential relation is actualized in the individual, meaning that the predicate always points back to the relation as that from which it derives. Now, this idea of event as relation makes the above interpretation of the relationship of the event and predicate much more consistent, while also explaining why, in fact,



the schema subject-copula-attribute becomes displaced with the continued variation of the transcendental. It demonstrates why the sense cannot be mistaken as one and the same thing as the analytic predicate. In effect, the predicate, as that in which the sense inheres, points back to the transcendental in which the event continues. The back and forth movement of actualization that we have been emphasizing is meant to capture the becoming of the individual in the becoming of the event. The events that compose a world bring their potential to the predicates in the course of actualization, while this same actualization envelops the individual in the world in which a relation is continued. As Deleuze notes, “the power of renewal is conceded only to individuals in the world, and only for a time—the time of their living present,” while the event suspends the stabilization of the predicate, by subdividing the present in the direction of the past and the future.<sup>178</sup>

By exploring Husserl’s predicative process, we saw that the predicate was intended as the identical predicate in the explications of the noesis, because the noematic core had this something-x that permitted it to be recognized as the same one. For Husserl, this identical predicate allowed the ego to transcend the individual monad in order to attain the second level of the sense-bestowing act common to all egos. This is precisely where Deleuze is in disagreement with Husserl:

We cannot therefore follow Husserl when he puts into play the highest synthesis of signification inside a *continuum*, all the lines of which converge or concord. This is not the way to transcend the first level. Only when something [x] is identified between divergent series [...], an object=x appears transcending individuated worlds.<sup>179</sup>

We have already mentioned that there is no underlying unity in Deleuze theory of sense. What, then, could this object=x be that transcends the individual worlds? In order to demonstrate this object=x, Deleuze reiterates that the singularities are inseparable from the paradoxical instance

of indetermination that underpins every determination. He writes that “it behooves the problem [the complex theme of sense] to refer to conditions which constitute this superior and positive indetermination; it behooves the event to be subdivided endlessly, and also to be reassembled in one in the same Event.”<sup>180</sup> We have seen thus far that each field of singularities is distributed with respect to the paradoxical instance. Each singularity as such bears the paradoxical instance, which makes the distribution. The entire complex forms a problem that each time gives way to a different solution in the actual. Despite this, there is something common to the different solutions:

We must therefore understand that impossible worlds, despite their impossibility, have something in common—something objectively in common—which represents the ambiguous sign of the genetic element in relation to which several worlds appear as instances of solution for one and the same problem.<sup>181</sup>

Now, this object= $x$  are persons, or synthetic predicates. By synthetic predicates, Deleuze means that individuals are no longer defined as analytic predicates, but are opened unto divergent worlds, or different possibilities. In the first chapter, we saw how the sense was approached from the perspective of the transcendental field, and from the perspective of the being. Beings are not delimited to this one relation, but are opened onto a variety of relations that necessarily produce what would be called impossible worlds; a being is a complex entity with diverse characteristics which appear to be in opposition with one another. Nevertheless, it is always the same person or object= $x$  that is replayed in these worlds. But Deleuze’s point here is that, persons are opened onto these diverging worlds because of the common something to all worlds, not on the side of the person, but on the side of the transcendental field. This common something= $x$  is the genetic element, or the paradoxical Event as the return of difference. It is only in relation to the Event as the return of difference, that Deleuze permits anything common to subsist in divergent or impossible worlds. This paradoxical instance, however, does not

prevent us from generalizing the synthetic predicates implied by persons. Since the synthetic predicates in connection with the paradoxical  $x$  imply the different worlds as possibilities, we can now treat the person as a class of its own to which the predicates correspond as variables. “Properties and classes are grounded in the order of the person. This is because persons themselves are primarily classes having one single member, and their predicates are properties having one constant. Each person is the sole member of his or her class,” a class which includes the properties as variables of it.<sup>182</sup> Deleuze argues that from this point it becomes possible to generalize the structure, so as to claim that the universal Ego or person corresponds to the something  $x$  in all worlds, while each particular ego is the object= $x$  common to the worlds it envelops.<sup>183</sup> In the last instance, the person is taken as the universal something  $x$  to which various properties would correspond. Deleuze thereafter wraps up the discussion of the static ontological genesis, by proposing that the eventual covering over of the paradoxical instance produces good sense and common sense. The critique of knowledge, however, remains somewhat vague since Deleuze does not respond to one fundamental idea proposed by Husserl, the correlation of the noesis with the noema. Earlier we mentioned that, for Deleuze, the ideal game is the “unconscious of pure thought,” that it is intimately involved in the emission of singularities.<sup>184</sup> But now that we have displaced the ego, how would such thinking address itself to the noematic complex? We will return to this question in chapters three and four of this dissertation.

The third aspect of the static ontological genesis leads to the static logical genesis. The level defined by classes along with the variable properties that imply persons as synthetic predicates, gives way to the logical proposition.<sup>185</sup> Deleuze argues that in the logical genesis the other aspects of the ontological genesis

act now as material instances which realize the possibility and determine within the logical proposition the relations necessary to the existence of the conditioned: the relation of denotation as the relation to the individual [...]; the relation of manifestation as the relation to the personal; and the relation of signification defined by the form of possibility.<sup>186</sup>

The question again becomes, which one of these dimensions of the logical proposition is the primary one? By putting forth the static ontological genesis on which the logical genesis depends, Deleuze wants to elaborate on the claim made earlier that none of the dimensions of the logical proposition can act as the ground. Each one points to the other, none being able to act as the primary dimension. Deleuze argues that the circle of the logical proposition can only be explained from the perspective of the fourth dimension of the proposition, that of sense, since sense produces the ontological order on which the logical order depends. “Precisely because [the tertiary structure of language] is produced by the ontological and logical genesis, it is contingent upon sense, that is, upon that which constitutes by itself a secondary organization which is very different and also distributed in an entirely different manner.”<sup>187</sup> The secondary organization of language is the transcendental structure of language, which, as we saw, is produced with respect to the paradoxical element *x* that perpetually displaces its own identity, while in the tertiary structure, that of the logical proposition, *x* serves as the object with which we attempt to reinstall identity. With respect to this different *x*, sense would be the dimension of the proposition that displaces the circle of the proposition, but also that which is necessarily implied by it as the object=*x* and the word=*x*, through which language acquires infinite extension or reproduction. If we should unfold the circle of the logical proposition as we have done, we find the secondary organization of language; that of the production of sense co-present with nonsense. Thereafter, Deleuze discusses sense as a problem to which propositions serve as responses. The workings of the logical proposition are, in a way, left to function as they do; common sense and good sense

are reinstalled. The form of recognition works as it did before, but Deleuze has now shown how it stems from the transcendental field of sense, or how the stratum of sense works from within to, both, displace it, and to render it possible. The line of singularities, he writes, “opens and unfolds the ring of the proposition, the latter closes it up, and between the two, all the vocalizations, modalizations, temporalizations, and personalizations are deployed.”<sup>188</sup>

### **Conclusion: Para/doxa**

We began this chapter by framing the two pathways of articulation, one pathway leading from the virtual to the actual object, the other pathway following the thread of the virtual. In this chapter, we have largely followed the first pathway of articulation, the point of intersection of the object of science and that of philosophy. We began with the idea that the genesis of the act of thought is missed whenever sense is made out to be a form of recognition. When sense is the same as signification, it merely works to justify traditional ways of thinking. In contrast, in Deleuze’s theory of sense, sense as the expressed or the saying (the essence of speaking) is produced with respect to the paradoxical instance. Paradox as the center of the entire development captures something fundamental which we do not get in theories of sense, where sense is the same thing as signification. We have already noted that, for him, paradox is “opposed to *doxa*, in both aspects of *doxa*, namely good sense and common sense.”<sup>189</sup> The idea that paradox is opposed to *doxa* is implicit in the double directionality of sense, because of which, sense “renders identification impossible.”<sup>190</sup> By outlining the virtual structure of language, we demonstrated that sense is like an unconscious surface that distinguishes propositions, or expressions, and states of affairs. In effect, sense as event points to two distinct environs, because it moves in two directions simultaneously; it is actualized in the present, and it

is continuously reborn in the transcendental field of singularities, thereby giving way to another actualization. With respect to the present, sense always arrives too early or too late, but never on time. As the condition of real experience, the transcendental field of events give way to the expression, while continuously displacing the actualization of the virtual in the object. On both sides of the equation, *subject-verb-object*, sense co-present to nonsense, displaces the identity of the subject, and the coincidence of the object with the expression.<sup>191</sup>

While sense is the effect of the transcendental field, it, in turn, becomes productive by inheriting the field's ideational cause. This is what Deleuze understands as the movement from sterility to genesis; sense becoming productive. In the last section, we traced how the transcendental field of sense constitutes the static ontological genesis, and, moreover, how the static logical genesis is derived from it. In the movement from one genesis to the other, it became apparent that good sense and common sense are reinstalled in the actual, even while sense with respect to paradox perpetually uproots the conditioned. Deleuze best demonstrates *doxa* with respect to Husserl's system, even though the critique of the dogmatic image of thought is directed at philosophy in general. In our study of Husserl, the argument was that he reduces the event to a form of recognition, to the ready-made, to established values. Despite the highly rigorous way in which the transcendental field is presented in his philosophy, Husserl gives up paradox in order to reconcile transcendental and formal logic. This is erroneously done, however, from the perspective of the latter. In Husserl's system, sense moves from the most differentiated to the least differentiated in the universal predicate. He is able to affirm the universal predicative judgement by supposing the identical nature of the object; the object itself being constituted in an identical way or in accordance with the predicate. This is precisely what Deleuze understands as good sense. He writes that the

systematic characteristics of good sense are thus the following: it affirms a singular direction to go from most to least differentiated, from the singular to the regular, and from the remarkable to the ordinary. [...] It assigns the present a directing role of distribution in which all of the preceding characteristics are brought together. Good sense plays a capital role in the determination of signification, but plays no role in the donation of sense.<sup>192</sup>

In other words, when we assert that sense is identical to the act of judgement to which it lends itself (*S is p*), we only follow one of the directions of sense, its actualization in the present. But, as we have seen, sense takes flight as soon as it is appropriated in the expression, meaning that, for Deleuze, Husserl eliminates the paradox at the center of the production of sense, in order to reassert the predicative judgment. This suggests that good sense, the movement of sense in one direction, gives way to common sense. Common sense is the organ or faculty of identification, that

brings diversity to bear upon the form of the Same. [...] Subjectively, common sense subsumes under itself the various faculties of the soul [...], and brings them to bear upon a unity which is capable of saying I. Objectively, common sense subsumes under itself the given diversity and relates it to the unity of a particular form of object.<sup>193</sup>

The permanence of the object has as its compliment the self-identical subject, capable of unifying all of its intuitions. It also pertains to dynamic forms of recognition, where what is affirmed in thought is the identical with respect to its content. In the next two chapters, it will become even more evident how paradox working from within, continuously placing the identity of the subject, and, the object, into question.

### *The Theatre of Events and the Dividing Line of Time*

Theatre is valuable only as a search for an art of living.<sup>1</sup>

The art of living, a way of being in which the sense of a life is created, is the pivotal theme around which Deleuze's philosophy revolves. In the opening pages of the second chapter we noted that, for him, the plane of immanence is "a *singular essence (or Event), a life*," which consists of virtualities, singularities, events.<sup>2</sup> We emphasized this conception of the plane of immanence in order to formulate the doubling of the pathway of articulation as the turn towards the virtual. The doubling of the pathway is the counter-actualization of the event, in which speaking the event so as to "give a new event" to beings arises as a problem. In his emphasis on the new, Deleuze gravitated towards thinkers like Nietzsche, Bergson, and Whitehead. All of these thinkers, in one way or another, affirmed life as the unceasing creation of the new. An excerpt from Bergson's *Creative Evolution* will show us how this shift towards the philosophy of life changes the landscape of something like Husserl's world of transcendental egos:

The line of evolution that ends in man is not the only one. On the other paths, divergent from it, other forms of consciousness have been developed, which have not been able to free themselves from external constraints or to regain control over themselves, as the human intellect has done. [...] Suppose these forms of consciousness brought together and amalgamated with the intellect: would not the result be a consciousness as wide as life? And such a consciousness, turning around suddenly against the push of life which it feels behind, would have a vision of life complete—would it not?—even though the vision were fleeting.<sup>3</sup>

How can we become capable of experiencing a consciousness as wide as life? Since a life itself unfolds in time, it is only in time that we can enter into the stream of becoming where things are.

Life always presents us with imperceptible threads, that if we follow through to the end, we



manage to think something, giving back to life a new beginning. It is by managing to think something other than ourselves that the intellect is itself born. This is why a theory of knowledge cannot be separated from a philosophy of life.

A theory of life that is not accompanied by a criticism of knowledge is obliged to accept, as they stand, the concepts which the understanding put at its disposal [...]. A theory of knowledge which does not replace the intellect in the general evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames of knowledge have been constructed, nor how we can enlarge or go beyond them. It is necessary that these two inquiries, theory of knowledge and theory of life, should join each other, and, by a circular process, push each other on unceasingly.<sup>4</sup>

The philosophy of life that Deleuze has in mind after Bergson<sup>5</sup> tailors a singular sense attributable to “this” thing in its specificity. Such tailoring is an essential aspect of what he calls transcendental empiricism or experience.<sup>6</sup> It opens up the way for a critique of knowledge, particularly the two aspects of *doxa*, good sense and common sense.

In the conclusion to the previous chapter, we outlined the way in which Deleuze tries to destabilize the permanence of *savoir* in *The Logic of Sense*. In that text, he distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, one that is external to the object, the other “seeking its object wherever it is.”<sup>7</sup> This distinction is already found in Bergson’s “Introduction to Metaphysics,” where he proposes that one form of knowledge seeks to extract from things their usefulness, while the other type, which he calls intuition, involves entering into things by the thread of time.<sup>8</sup> In this chapter, we intend to follow the thread of time that Deleuze lays out in *Difference and Repetition*. This thread is followed in reverse, because Deleuze distinguishes three syntheses of time that he traces from the present to the future. Although the three syntheses have their own regions of operation, we cannot, in fact, sever them. They all culminate in one and the same Event: “In a certain sense, the ultimate repetition, the ultimate theatre, therefore encompasses everything; while in another sense it destroys everything; and in yet another sense selects among

everything.”<sup>9</sup> This is why the two readings of time outlined in *The Logic of Sense* are consistent with the three syntheses. While the present can only be said to exist, the other two syntheses subsist in it, and subdivide it in the direction of the past and the future, each presenting a distinct operation. Our effort to outline Deleuze’s theory of time is dedicated to exploring how someone could enter into the becoming of beings, since it is only by entering into this stream of becoming that we manage to think and articulate something new. While this chapter focuses on the becoming of beings, in the fourth chapter we will revisit the theory of time from the perspective of learning. This is all in an effort to propose what *saying the Event* consists of; how it is that the theory of life and the theory of knowledge push each other along.

***The Living Present:  
Contemplative Souls and Rhythms of Contraction***

Deleuze’s study of time in *Difference and Repetition* is recognized as one of the more substantial aspects of his philosophy. The first synthesis of time, that of the living present, however, has not been developed and given as much attention as the other two syntheses. The fact that Deleuze lays out the living present in a few pages seems to reinforce the idea that it is not as relevant as the rest of his philosophy of time. This is an oversight, as much of what precedes the chapter, “Repetition for Itself,” paves the way for the short section on the first synthesis. In the very first pages of the text, Deleuze clearly articulates his central problem, which is to distinguish genuine from discrete repetition. A significant dimension of the text would be missed if we did not stress the affinity of such a distinction with Bergson’s effort to differentiate two types of multiplicities. These two types of multiplicities are explored by Deleuze in *Bergsonism* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. By evoking the idea of repetition, Deleuze seeks to make, at the least, two substantial statements. To begin with, the sufficient

reason of any living organism will never be uncovered from the perspective of the repetition of the same. An organism neither experiences its world, nor itself, in an identical sense every instance. In line with Deleuze's radical reconceptualization of repetition, a repetition can only be said to have taken place once a difference has been included in the repetition itself.<sup>10</sup> The paradox of repetition is, then, that it is always a singular and unique occurrence, having no equivalent before or after it. The idea that we can capture singular modes of being in the general concepts we have created for them, nevertheless, finds its compliment in the everyday attitude. It is instrumental for human beings to set up a strict horizon of objects in order that they may act upon them in a predictable fashion. By turning to the everyday attitude, we see that the problem is not delimited to the generalities of the concept, but, more broadly, encompasses habit. If unexplained from perspective of genuine repetition, habit runs the risk of diminishing all experience to the repetition of the identical. In order to counter this possibility, Deleuze notes that this "bare, material repetition (repetition of the same) appears only in the sense that another repetition is disguised within it, constituting it and constituting itself in disguising itself."<sup>11</sup> As we will see, habit cannot be attributed to the repetition of the identical. Contracting a habit instead relies upon something new being introduced in repetition.

The distinction between the two repetitions is already implied in the first few lines of "Repetition for Itself," where Deleuze argues that repetition is not a counting of separate instants, but a continuity that changes something in the mind that contemplates it.<sup>12</sup> So that we may better grasp why it is that repetition is not a counting of discontinuous instants, we will first refer to some of Bergson's writings on the matter. Bergson returns to this distinction in most of his works, carefully demarcating the region of duration from that of space, particularly the confused projection of time in space as its fourth dimension. In one of his lectures published in *The*

*Creative Mind*, the distinction between what he calls difference in degree and difference in kind is captured quite succinctly:

Let us begin with movement. I have my hand at point A. I move it over to point B, traversing the interval AB [...]. But of this each one of us has the immediate sensation. No doubt while we are moving our hand from A to B we say to ourselves that we could stop it at an intermediary point, but in that case we should not have to do with the same movement. There would no longer be a single movement from A to B; there would be, by hypothesis, two movements, with an interval. Neither from within, through the muscular sense, nor from without through sight, should we still have the same perception. If I leave my movement from A to B as it is, I feel it undivided and must declare it to be indivisible.<sup>13</sup>

This simple exercise demonstrates that while a movement in space may be infinitely divisible, if we should divide it, the nature of the movement itself changes from the perspective of the living organism itself. In essence, it is no longer the same movement. It differs in kind. This is precisely because the movement AB operates by another logic that is irreducible to the immobile instants with which we may map it out in space. In itself, a movement is a single passage, a continuous or qualitative multiplicity, indivisible in nature.<sup>14</sup> While it may be broken down into numerical multiplicities thereby signifying differences in degree, the immobile instants that we subdivide it into cannot themselves produce the movement itself.

Let us consider another example taken from Bergson's *Time and Free Will*, that of the successive sounds of a bell:

The sounds of the bell certainly reach me one after the other; but one of two alternatives must be true. Either I retain each of these successive sensations in order to combine it with the others and form a group which reminds me of an air or rhythm which I know: in that case I do not *count* the sounds, I limit myself to *gathering*, so to speak, the qualitative impression produced by the whole series. Or else I intend explicitly to count them, and then I shall have to *separate* them, and this separation must take place within some homogeneous medium in which the sounds, stripped of their qualities, and in a manner emptied, leave traces of their presence which are absolutely alike.<sup>15</sup>

In the latter case, one externalizes the instants in relation to one another, while, in the former case, the instants are gathered and contracted states of consciousness, which cannot be considered separately. Here, one passes from one state to the other without a break in the continuity, meaning that the former state is not taken to be separate from the current state; they are not separate units external to one another. Such qualitative repetitions or successions differ from discrete ones precisely because the organism “does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another.”<sup>16</sup> Bergson has an ingenious way of transforming the strokes of bells, notes, and steps, bound to homogeneous time, into rhythms, melodies, and artistic compositions, in order to demonstrate the distinction of the two multiplicities. In the latter case, he asks, “might it not be said that, even if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and that their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another”?<sup>17</sup> A qualitative multiplicity is continuous because the moments permeate one another. The before, during, and what comes after, are contracted without a break being imposed on them. Because one permeates the other, a qualitative multiplicity “is constantly on the point of ending and constantly altered in its totality by the addition of a new note.”<sup>18</sup> This rhythmic organization of qualitative multiplicities is the duration of living present considered from the perspective of the living organism itself; it is a duration defined by the states of consciousness that permeate one another, as the organism absorbs affects or sensations. In turn, its capacity to absorb affects determines the organism’s duration, its state of becoming. For Bergson, an organism develops as it absorbs such sensations. It is these multiplicities which are responsible for its development, not the lifeless states of the discrete multiplicities extracted from genuine movement. Once discrete

repetition is displaced as an explanation of how organisms are constituted in the present, the question is how does the organism, nevertheless, make cuts in the stream of becoming thereby experiencing a lived present. The same question can be directed at Hume, who is also a point of reference for Deleuze. Deleuze's effort is geared towards showing how we return to discrete repetition by way of genuine repetition, once a cut, a selection, a difference, has been made in genuine repetition. The question is how this selection is made.

Although Deleuze proceeds in a similar fashion as Bergson when laying out the synthesis of the present in *Difference and Repetition*, he does not only involve Bergson, whose work *Matter and Memory* develops the entire process of the constitution of the living present quite convincingly, he also appeals to Hume in his analysis. It seems as though, for Deleuze, Hume and Bergson are approaching the same problem, that of the contraction of discrete instants or cases, for a similar purpose, which is to displace any claims to a transcendent principle that would guide such a process. Deleuze's study of Hume in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, centers on the notion that "the given is no longer given to a subject; rather, the subject constitutes itself in the given."<sup>19</sup> Since the subject performs the active synthesis in the present, meaning that it somehow transcends the given, the principal question in that text becomes what is this given. Deleuze argues that, for Hume, the given is the "flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or a set of perceptions," in short the mind or imagination, that provides a change or movement without any claims to a principle of organization.<sup>20</sup> In other words, the mind is not considered a faculty that organizes the collection, but is this specific collection. If we inquire, then, as to why Deleuze begins with instants when studying the synthesis of the living present in *Difference and Repetition*, this is because the empiricist begins with this "experience of a collection, or from an animated succession of distinct perceptions. It begins with them, insofar as

they are distinct and independent.”<sup>21</sup> The rationale behind their distinction is not given from the outside, but rather it is from within the given as this experience. Deleuze notes that, according to Hume, “everything separable is distinguishable and everything distinguishable is different.”<sup>22</sup> In other words, it is the set or collection itself that makes the difference. Experience is succession, or each experience is separable or distinguishable, on the basis of the difference made. We are now on a better footing when approaching Deleuze’s first synthesis in *Difference and Repetition*. Having begun his study with the repetition of instants as the empiricist would, Deleuze seeks to find out if repetition makes any change whatsoever. Given that discrete repetition has no in itself, one instant always replaces another without retaining the one that preceded it. As with Bergson who argues that space nowhere retains these separate instants, since the former one disappears once a new instant appears, Deleuze proposes that the repetitions of instants cannot in any sense constitute time. The repetition of instants only present us with the perpetually “aborted moment of [its] birth.”<sup>23</sup> If the cases or repetitions of instants do not make a difference, how could any change take place? By referring to Hume, Deleuze argues that, while discrete repetitions do not introduce a modification in the object or states of affairs, they do introduce a change of the mind that contemplates them.<sup>24</sup> In *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, he notes that “the given is not in space; the space is in the given,” meaning that extension itself will be formed in accordance with the collections of impressions in the mind.<sup>25</sup> As we have already noted, it is not the active mind that reflects upon the separate instants to extract a qualitative impression. Instead, the contractions are passive syntheses that “occur *in* the mind.”<sup>26</sup> The constitution of the time of the living present, then, must be considered from this perspective. It essentially refers to the contractile power of the living organism, which by being performed on the distinct instants, configures the duration of its living present. The time of the living present, Deleuze writes, is “constituted only

in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants. This synthesis contracts the successive independent instants into one another thereby constituting the lived, or living, present.”<sup>27</sup> The contractions of the living present mirror Bergson’s gathering of instants, one permeating the other, without a separation being imposed on them. To the present belongs the past, as the former instant that is retained in it, and the future, which is a state of expectation. “The past and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present instant, but rather the dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a contraction of instants.”<sup>28</sup> In other words, for Deleuze, the three instants do not constitute separate times, but are synthesized into one instant with two dimensions. The synthesis of the living present is an asymmetrical one, as it follows the arrow of time from the particular to the general. We move, as it were, from the particular impressions which become the past enveloped in the present, toward the generality of the future, which involves an anticipation born of the difference erected in the mind.<sup>29</sup>

As we have noted, Deleuze’s principal argument is that repetition does not transform anything in the states of affairs AB; instead, it produces a modification in the mind that contracts. This modification transforms the nature of repetition. We are now given a paradoxical image of repetition. Repetition is no longer identified with the succession of homogeneous instants. It is said to be produced wherever the mind contemplates something new, or whenever a difference is erected in the mind.

Whenever A appears, I expect the appearance of B. Is this the for-itself of repetition, an originary subjectivity which necessarily enters into its constitution? Does not the paradox of repetition lie in the fact that one can speak of repetition only by virtue of a change [...] By virtue of a difference that the mind *draws from* repetition?<sup>30</sup>

After Hume, Deleuze argues that the contractions, the repetitions synthesized, are performed in the imagination or mind. The imagination is thought to have a “contractile power: it contracts these cases, elements, agitations or homogeneous instants and grounds these in internal



*qualitative impressions* endowed with a certain weight.”<sup>31</sup> The function of the imagination is, then, to contract the multiplicity of elementary excitations in order to draw a difference from repetition. It is as though the repetitions contracted in the imagination allow us to transition from cases of discrete repetition, which are external to one another, to the for-itself of repetition, or the internal repetitions performed by the organism. What enables Deleuze to move away from discrete or bare repetition, towards genuine repetition, is difference. The argument for difference can be slightly confusing because Deleuze begins with discrete repetition.<sup>32</sup> It is made in two ways. In the first place, there is a difference in kind between the two repetitions, as genuine repetition introduces a qualitative change. Moreover, once difference is itself introduced into the system, or becomes internal to repetition for itself, difference allows the organism to move from one repetition to another, without such repetitions being *perceived* as discrete. Deleuze writes that

in every way, material or bare repetition, so-called repetition of the same is like a skin which unravels the external husk of a kernel of difference and more complicated internal repetitions. [In internal repetition] *difference lies between the repetitions*. Is this not also to say, conversely, that repetition lies between two differences, that it allows us to pass from one order of difference to another?<sup>33</sup>

The passive syntheses in which difference is drawn from repetition constitutes repetition for-itself, while repetition between two differences gives us, a comprehension of the in-itself of repetition; how it is that one instant vanishes when another one has appeared. But it appears as though Deleuze needs to begin his study of the living present with discrete repetition so as to demonstrate how it is that action in the present, which is conceived of as a repetition of the same, in no way constitutes repetition. We are moving from the simple repetition of instants to the depths of repetition, in order to resurface with a new comprehension of the living present. His entire effort is directed at showing how the agent of the present doubles the contemplative soul,

the passive self, which is disguised in bare repetition. From this perspective, we see that difference does not merely allow us to pass from discrete repetition to genuine repetition, it also permits the reverse. Deleuze writes that in the other direction we move “from the instantaneous repetition which unravels itself to the *actively represented repetition* through the *intermediary* of passive synthesis.”<sup>34</sup> In a sense, he must begin with bare repetitions in order to demonstrate how the doubling of the passive syntheses by an agent, makes it possible that it turn around on itself in order to reflect upon and represent the moments. The active syntheses are distinct from the passive syntheses of the living present in that “the past is then no longer the immediate past of retention but the reflexive past of representation, of reflected and reproduced particularity. Conversely, the future also ceases to be the immediate future of anticipation in order to become the reflexive future of prediction.”<sup>35</sup> These active syntheses, performed in voluntary memory and the understanding, can only take place once the passive syntheses have been covered over, or doubled by the agent. We will return to discrete repetition once we have outlined the process by way of which the passive synthesis is itself constituted as the cut in the becoming, since it is its future mode that seems to allow the separation of instants in accordance with discrete repetition to be re-installed.

The question here is what are these passive synthesis composed of? What are the contemplative selves that Deleuze is referring to? Deleuze’s arguments on the syntheses of the living present are hard to follow, because they do not unfold the way that the present does. Since the present follows the arrow of time, contractions already imply sensations that have become perceptible by the living organism. They are imagined or sensed affects that await their extension into action. Here, Deleuze does a turnaround, noting that, “in the order of constituent passivity, perceptual syntheses refer back to organic syntheses which are like the sensibility of the senses;

they refer back to a primary sensibility that we *are*.”<sup>36</sup> According to him, the perceptual syntheses refer to organic syntheses, which already constitute the sensed. The organic syntheses are central in Deleuze’s study because they shed light on the problem of habit. When he argues that the repeater repeats precisely because they draw something new, a difference from a causal sequence, we have an entirely novel conception of habit. Deleuze puts into question whether the commonsensical notion of habit as repetitious action can capture the concrete processes involved in it. For him, the question is whether “it is through acting that we acquire habits [...] or whether, on the contrary, it is through contemplating?” He continues this course of inquiry when noting that the “question is whether or not the self is a contemplation, whether it is not in itself a contemplation, and whether we can learn, form behaviour and form ourselves other than through contemplation.”<sup>37</sup> A habit is not acquired with the repetition of an act, but through that which the organism contemplates, so as to draw it into itself in accordance with its capacity. Habit would, then, be produced by way of contemplation, or with the formation of a contemplative soul, self, or mind. A soul, he writes,

must be attributed to the heart, to the muscles, nerves and cells, but a contemplative soul whose entire function is to contract a habit. [...] Habit here manifests its full generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive syntheses of which we are organically composed. *It is simultaneously through contraction that we are habits, but through contemplation that we contract.*<sup>38</sup>

Contraction points to the processes where something new is extracted by the living organism, while contemplation displaces the artificial separation of the organism from other matter in the world, allowing it to draw a difference. In other words, contemplation presupposes a world from which the organism comes. In contemplating, the boundaries of the organism are not strictly defined. The living organism contemplates a world by being implicated in it, or in the midst of it.

Or as Bergson notes in *Matter and Memory*, my body is but one image amongst the other images in the material world, while the brain, not being different in kind from the body, does not give birth to images, does not produce such images, but is also part of the image. The material world is not part of the brain; the brain is in the world. Being one image among others, the body mirrors the interaction of organisms in which it is implied. Deleuze's conception of contemplation is best approached through Bergson's conception of the image. For him, in contemplation "we do not contemplate ourselves, but we exist only in contemplating—that is to say, in contracting that from which come."<sup>39</sup> Accordingly, every organism lives in contemplating a world, and is derived from the world that it contemplates; it exists in contemplating the elements from which it originates. "What organism," he asks,

is not made of elements and cases of repetition, of contemplated and contracted water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby intertwining all the habits of which it is composed? Organisms awake to the sublime word of the third Ennead: all is contemplation [...] even rocks and woods, animals and men, even Actaeon and the stag, Narcissus and the flower, even our actions and our needs.<sup>40</sup>

All organisms contemplate; they draw something from the world by being in the world. The passive self of the perceptual syntheses is itself constituted by the thousands of contemplative selves that contract matter. Contemplation, then, does not refer to a subject that performs the contractions, but refers to a "system of a dissolved self"; the myriad of primary sensibilities and larval selves that we are.<sup>41</sup> These contemplative selves are found everywhere in matter, or wherever matter is able to contract a difference from repetition; a theme that is revisited by Deleuze in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* many years later. Comparable to Whitehead's conception of the organism in *Process and Reality*, Deleuze claims that every contraction is itself an auto-satisfaction, an elementary enjoyment or pleasure, in having contracted a particular contemplation. Its enjoyment is its ability to contemplate that from which it comes, because it is

in contemplating that it exercises its own vitality, its capacity to contract a habit, to make a claim, to draw something from, or as Bergson would put it, to extend the image, the affection on the body, into action. As Deleuze says after Plotinus, it is only by contemplating what it originates from, that the organism is “filled with an image of itself.”<sup>42</sup> The image with which it is filled is a sensation that it contracts by contemplating. This is the principal way in which the organism affects itself, mirrors the interaction of bodies, by drawing something new from repetition. This image, once perceived by the organism, allows it to extend the passive syntheses into action; it is the bridge that joins a contraction and the anticipatory dimension. The movement from one to the other is the perpetual present with its two dimensions.

In the syntheses of the living present, we are delimited to a specific form of contraction of the past and the future. This contraction is conceived from the perspective of the living organism itself. It is basically the *needs* of the organism that determine its rhythms of contraction, or the limit of the synthesis of the present itself. The duration of contemplations, the elementary claims of the contemplative selves, must be defined with respect to the needs of the organism and its capacity to contract.<sup>43</sup> Let us briefly return to contraction. The living present has a different duration depending on the cases that the organism is capable of contracting, meaning that, in the present, there are multiplicities of different rhythms of contractions. Each living present has a different duration depending on the contractions of contemplations. Or, as Deleuze writes, “the duration of an organisms present, or its various presents, will vary according to the natural contractile range of its contemplative souls.”<sup>44</sup> This contractile range defines the capacity of the organism to satisfy a need, which means that fatigue, conversely, marks the inability of the organism to contract contemplations. According to Deleuze, need, defines the limit of the present. He argues that the present

extends between two eruptions of need, and coincides with the duration of contemplation. [...] Repetition is essentially inscribed in need, since need rests upon an instance which essentially involves repetition: which forms the for-itself of repetition and the for-itself of a certain duration. [...] The rule is that one cannot go faster than one's present—or rather, one's presents.<sup>45</sup>

If the repetition is inscribed in need, or if the present itself extends between two repetitions, then, need in the first instance must be conceived in relation to a sign, an excitation, in relation to which contemplations arise. But a sign, for instance, the presence of water, does not suggest a lack such as thirst on the part of the organism.<sup>46</sup> So what now? Deleuze argues that need is already there in form of a question, it “expresses the openness of a question.”<sup>47</sup> This instance of questioning is best understood from a Bergsonian perspective. In *Matter and Memory* Bergson writes that

the nervous system, interposed between the objects which affect my body and those which I can influence, is a mere conductor, transmitting, sending back or inhibiting movement. This conductor is composed of an enormous number of threads which stretch from the periphery to the centre and from the centre to the periphery. As many threads as pass from the periphery to the centre, so many points of space are there able to make an appeal to my will and to put, so to speak, an elementary question to my motor activity. Every such question is what is termed a perception. Thus perception is diminished by one of its elements each time one of the threads termed sensory is cut.<sup>48</sup>

The continuity in the stream of becoming is, then, broken by needs according to Bergson. While contemplation refers to the capacity of the body to absorb affections, perception itself is our possible actions on things.<sup>49</sup> Possible actions are defined by the capacity of the organism to absorb affections, meaning that the aggregates or collections of impressions are selected in accordance with need or usefulness. For Deleuze, need coincides with the contemplative soul which persistently poses the question, what difference is there, while the contractions that it performs serve as responses.<sup>50</sup> The sign is, as it were, already picked out on the basis of the elementary questioning on the part of the organism, so that the presence of water does not signify

a lack, on the contrary, it relates to capacity of the organism to sense its presence. In order for the organism to sense its presence, there must be a modification in the organism. As we saw, “the self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification—this term designating precisely the difference drawn.”<sup>51</sup> Along with this modification, we have the other aspect of need appear, an expectation made on the basis of a contraction. Deleuze elaborates that “every contraction is a presumption, a claim, that is to say, it gives rise to an expectation or a right in regard to that which it contracts, and comes undone once its object escapes.”<sup>52</sup> These two moments, the excitations which correspond to the openness of the organism to draw a difference, and the anticipations that contemplations give rise to, encompass the entirety of the passive syntheses of the living present. This duration, as Deleuze notes, is undone once the anticipation is doubled by an agent, or, better yet, the anticipation itself ushers in an action. Bergson captures this transition when writing that, “that which I call my present is my attitude with regard to the immediate future; it is my impending action. [...] Of my past, that alone becomes image and consequently sensation, at least nascent, which can collaborate in that action, insert itself in that attitude, in a word makes itself useful.”<sup>53</sup> Deleuze’s conception of action in the living present resembles Bergson’s present, with the image being extended into action once a habit has been contracted. Such habits are the multitude of passive selves in which a difference is contracted. In other words, habit is that which “inciting us to move from one object to a second [one] which follows it”; it is as it were the thing that organizes the synthesis of time or that which makes the present a perpetual present.<sup>54</sup> By giving rise to an action, these larval selves which define the habits that we are in contemplating, are covered over or disguised by it.

Given that contemplation never appears at any moment during the action—since it is always hidden, and since it ‘does’ nothing (even though something is done through it, something completely novel)—it is easy to forget it and to interpret the entire process of excitation and reaction without any reference to repetition.<sup>55</sup>

Once a sensation is perceived, these contemplative selves are doubled by an agent, thereby becoming disguised in the action, as well as the active syntheses performed by the subject. This doubling which follows from the impending action, allows the subject to do a turn around and interpret the synthesis as consisting of discrete instances. As Deleuze puts it while referring to Hume, “the imagination, under the influence of the principle of habit, is also the mind which reflects time as a determined future filled with its anticipation” while, “the understanding is [instead] the mind itself, which under the influence of experience, reflects time in the form of past entity subject to its observation.”<sup>56</sup> The active synthesis pertains to the subject that presents the two dimensions of the present, past and future, as distinct instants forming a case that is essentially repeatable in the same sense. The past becomes a reflexive past, a reproduced particularity which is now “behind us,” rather than remaining the origin from which the subject emerges. In the other direction, the future instant enables the subject to predict that the cases of repetition will resemble one another; when I do p, S will result, or when I encounter Paul, the idea of fidelity will come to mind. This is, as it were, a second look at the states of affairs in which nothing seems to have changed from the view of activity, the sign I encounter produces the same effect, even while there is a difference made from the point of view of the passive syntheses themselves in which the effect originates. According to Deleuze, the entirety of the tracing of the directionality from the particular past to the generalities of the future in the present is the arrow of time in accordance with which difference is eventually cancelled.<sup>57</sup>

### ***The Being of the Past, or the Time of Beings***

Turning from the living present to the being of the past not only requires, in the first place, a dilation of our point of departure, but an entire recalibration of our instrument of perception. If



the living present is studied under a microscope, the being of the past requires a telescope for its viewing. We need another instrument of perception because, as Bergson claims, the past operates in two different ways, it passes into the actual, which would be our attention to life, or it is the plane of pure memory in which past reproduces itself in its own domain as an ever expanding whole indicative of a spiritual existence. By installing ourselves in the past, we no longer inquire into the durations of living beings delimited to the syntheses of the present, but place ourselves directly in a time shared by them, or parted by them. Or, as Deleuze puts it, we must

detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then in a certain region of the past—a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a camera. [...] We place ourselves at once in the past; we leap into the past as into a proper element. In the same way that we do not perceive things in ourselves, but at the place where they are, we only grasp the past at the place where it is in itself, and not in ourselves, in our present.<sup>58</sup>

For us, the being of the past, the theatre of events, has special importance if we can focus in on what it is that we are searching for when we install ourselves in it. This amounts to inquiring as to how it is that we pass from the living present in which the organism experiences the past with a view to utilizing it in the present, towards a time shared by beings, a singular time with a view to spiritual existence. Since the living present embraces a multiplicity of rhythms of contractions, is it possible to conceive of a single time that gives way to divergent durations? If the being of the past is to be the ground the given, then, as Deleuze proposes, what is of importance when we install ourselves in the being of the past, is not only how the present is explained now from this new perspective, but also how it is that one and the same past is internal to multiple beings with divergent durations. Deleuze's inquiry in *Bergsonism* if there is one or if there are many durations, can be directed at the very same problematic. The concept of centers of convergence that imply divergent series, discussed in *Difference and Repetition*, grapples with the same idea. Approaching the past from the perspective of this problematic not only places Deleuze's outline

of the constituent aspects of the past in a new light, it gives us a sense of why it is that we search the past to begin with, even if this search is unconscious. Beyond the philosophical curiosity that propels us to inquire as to why the presents vanishes or passes, there is the searching of the past in which we are installed immediately. In order to understand how it is that we return to the present with a new set of eyes after having searched the past, we must, nevertheless, grasp why it is that we leave it.

When discussing the first synthesis of the present, we inquired as to how a change takes place in the present that could account for it being *this* instant, rather than the former one that was. We approached the passing of the present from the perspective of the contraction of instants by the organism, which, as we saw, involve varying rhythms in which the intra-temporality of the present is implied; the different dimensions belonging to it. By studying the duration of the present, we showed how time passes in the time that it constitutes. It passes in accordance with the capacity of the organism to contract contemplations, or the passing appeared to be equivalent to its contractile range. This is what Deleuze refers to as the paradox of present, “to constitute time while passing in the time constituted.”<sup>59</sup> But how could the present simultaneously constitute the time in which it passes? Wouldn’t this mean that the present passes because it constitutes the past after it has been present, essentially annulling there being a past in which *this* present passes? Even if we were to conceive of the past of the next present as this present, we would still be unable to explain how this present passes to begin with. The active synthesis of memory is responsible for this type of analysis of the past. In accordance with it, the former present is only constituted once we have reflected upon it in the present. For Deleuze, this suggests that, in the present, we not only represent the former present, but include the representation of the present in the representation of the former one. Or stated otherwise, the

present “reflects itself at the same time as it forms the memory of the former present,” meaning that the past is constituted after being reflected upon in the present.<sup>60</sup> The error lies in the notion that “the past as such is only constituted *after* having been present; on the other hand, that it is in some way reconstituted by the new present whose past it now is.”<sup>61</sup> If we focus in on the passive syntheses instead, the contractile power of the organism is exhausted in the finite present, meaning that it also cannot tell us how a past in which this present was already set to pass is constituted, or, conversely, how it is that a present becomes a former one that can be experienced by the organism as already past. The past is nowhere retained in the present. It is annulled after it is experienced, thereby giving way to the illusion perpetuated in the active synthesis that the present constitutes the past. This is why Deleuze argues that the living present can only show us the effect of the passing, not its cause: “We have by no means shown why the present passes, or what prevents it from being coextensive with time. [...] The claim of the present is precisely that it passes. However, what causes the present to pass, that to which the present and habit belong, which must be considered the ground of time,” is memory.<sup>62</sup> Since the present does indeed pass in order for a new present to come about, Deleuze proposes that there must be another synthesis in which the first synthesis is enfolded. This second synthesis is the being of the past or the passive synthesis of memory, as the ground of time. The ground of time is initially distinguished from the foundation of time in the following way: “The foundation concerns the soil: it shows how something is established, how it occupies and possesses it, whereas the ground comes rather from the sky, it goes from the summit to the foundations, and measures the possessor and the soil against one another according to the title of ownership.”<sup>63</sup> As the foundation of time, habit shows us how beings occupy the soil of time. How it is that contemplations are elementary claims that carve out a specific duration in a stream of becoming. In this sense, Deleuze is correct to

recognize that “everything depends upon a foundation,” since time can only be experienced by living beings.<sup>64</sup> This idea is revisited in *The Logic of Sense* when he argues that the second reading of time, including the ground, does not *subsist* anywhere else than in the present. Nevertheless, what we are after here is how this time is constituted to begin with. It is true that we get the active synthesis of memory by virtue of the passive synthesis of habit; the former present represented in the representation of this present once the passive synthesis is doubled by an agent. But it is because of the transcendental passive synthesis of memory which serves as ground that such reflection becomes possible. The past in general is, then, constituted *prior* to the synthesis of the living present, or it makes the difference between two presents, making the previous one pass in it and calling forth the next one. By being *a priori*, it allows us to experience the former and current present as two asymmetrical elements *of the past*; the two presents marking the shifting relation of the ground with respect to the soil.<sup>65</sup> As Deleuze notes, since every present coexists with its past, it is erroneous to interpret the past in the active synthesis as a former present, when in fact, the past was, properly speaking, never present. The former present, instead, has a past which coexists with it, due to which we can reflect upon it as having been.

Why is the past in general conceived by Deleuze as *a priori*, however? A number of paradoxes define the being of the past, the primary one being the paradox of contemporaneity of the past with the present that was.<sup>66</sup> The first paradox is meant to provide the reason behind the passing of the present. Deleuze’s argument is that the past is not a present that *was*, nor is it constituted after it has been present. *The past has never been present*. The “past would never be constituted if it had not been constituted first of all, at the same time as it was present. [...] If the past had to wait in order to be no longer, if it was not immediately and now that it had passed ‘past in general’ it could never become what it is, it would never be the past.”<sup>67</sup> If we were to

presuppose that the past is constituted after it has been present, a view just explored, then, we would be unable to explain how the previous present passed in order for new one to come about. In effect, we would have to wait for the new present in order for the past to be constituted, which would, in turn, mean that the passing of the former present goes unexplained. For Deleuze, in order for the new present to come about, the past must be contemporaneous with the present that was. Or, in general, so as to pass, the present must be past at the same time as it is present.<sup>68</sup> “No present would ever pass were it not past ‘at the same time’ as it is present; no past would ever be constituted unless it was first constituted at the same time as it was present.”<sup>69</sup> The awkward saying that the past is *first constituted at the same time as it was present*, gives us a glimpse as to why the being of the past is paradoxical. In the first place, we must insist that the past as the ground of the passage of time is, in general, prior to the present, as it does not depend on it. On the other hand, the past is the ground of the passage of the present that was, meaning that the past is indeed constituted, even if it does not retain the content of the present. The contemporaneity of the past with the present does not place into doubt that the past cannot be formed after it has been present; it is not one and the same thing as what we refer to as a former present, since it is merely the reason for its passage. But it does tell us that something that insists in the previous present, *namely its passage*, is preserved in the past. In other words, the contemporaneity of the past with the present that it makes pass, at the same time transforms the past as well. This transformation, the ground of time reconstituting itself with the constitution of the passing of the previous present, gives way to the new present. Deleuze, thus, writes that, “if each past is contemporaneous with the present that was, then all of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past. [...] The past does not cause one present to pass without calling forth another, but itself neither passes nor comes forth” in the present.<sup>70</sup> The past makes the

previous present pass, while constituting the past of the present that is to come. The present to come would be the future dimension of the past. In preserving the passing of the previous present, however, the past does not itself pass in any way. Again, what is preserved in it is the passage of the present, or stated otherwise, the past preserves itself in itself. This is essentially why it pre-exists the present, despite being the past of this present.

The contraction of the past in itself demonstrates that the past itself does not pass. One of the difficult aspects of the past is precisely that in preserving itself in itself, it pre-exists the present, never itself being present as such. Since we are prone to search for the past in the present, in the brain, or to trace it in space, it is challenging to, as it were, leap into it or install ourselves directly in the past. Bergson shows in *Matter and Memory* that our tendency is to inquire as to where such memories are in fact stored up. Yet, it is not so much that we actively install ourselves in the past, we passively make our way into the pure recollections of the past prior to the constitution of the present. As we saw, one of the paradoxes of the past is that it is already-there; “it does not exist, but insists, it consists, it *is*.”<sup>71</sup> As Deleuze argues after Bergson, the essence of the past is to perpetuate itself, to continually bring itself to bear upon a new present. In *Bergsonism*, he recognizes that the past preserving and continuously perpetuating itself is difficult to think through, when writing:

We have the difficulty of understanding the survival of the past itself because we believe that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. We confuse Being with being-present. Nevertheless, the present is not rather it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its proper element, that of the present is not being but the active or to be useful, while the past ceased to be useful—but has not ceased to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: it is identical with being in itself. It should not be said that it ‘was,’ since it is the in-itself of being, and the form under which being is preserved in itself. [...] At the limit, the ordinary determinations are reversed: of the present, we must say at every instant that it ‘was’, and of the past, that it ‘is’.<sup>72</sup>

It is counterintuitive to conceive of the past as being, while referring to the present as that which *was*, but it is precisely that in the second synthesis of time. The present is continuously passing, this passing being preserved in the pure past, while the past is perpetually launching itself towards its future dimension, so as to bring about the new present. Since the past does not exist anywhere in the present, the present being a time of action, while the past is itself an impassive ground of the passage of time, that only becomes useful when expressed or actualized in the present as its passing, it is virtual and not actual.<sup>73</sup> We opened up chapter 2 by discussing the way in which our existence is doubled, that, as it unfolds in time, the actual “duplicates itself along with the virtual existence, a mirror image.”<sup>74</sup> Just as the actual image has its virtual half, the virtual duplicates itself or, as we have seen, it has two dimensions, one being the pure recollection of the virtual, which perpetuates itself in the direction of the future, the other being a recollected image, which is actualized in the present. As the virtual, the past is pure recollection. It differentiates itself by being a “recollection of the present.”<sup>75</sup> However, in being a recollection of the present, it is not a past that *was* since it has never been present, or we have never had to wait for the passing of the present for it to be formed. As we noted by quoting Deleuze, the being of the past is *what is*.<sup>76</sup> In being the condition of real experience, the essence of the pure past is precisely to be actualized as it differentiates itself. In differentiating itself, according to Deleuze, the past “ceases to be in itself;” it is becoming a recollection image that prepares the actualization of a past event in the present. As Lampert writes, “once [the past] gets retrieved in the present, it is no longer strictly speaking a ‘pure memory’, but a present experience image that refers to a past event. [...] The status of a memory is that *if* it should get expressed in a present, then it will reveal the past, but until it does, it exists in a virtual status of its own.”<sup>77</sup> The whole of the past exists virtually in itself, and becomes expressed when a selected series of events prepare

its actualization in the present. The series of events recollected in the form of virtual images, as though animated postcards or photos sent from the past, constitute the ground of the passage of time of the present, the relative limit at which point the past meets experience.

Earlier we took note of Deleuze's argument that *all* of the past coexists with the present that is to come. This means that the actualization of a level of the past in the present, is the most contracted degree of the whole of the past; the limit at which point the past reaches its greatest contraction with respect to the present that it makes pass. The Bergsonian idea of the contraction of the past is, of course, reminiscent of the contractions of the living present. Would such contractions be equivalent to the contractions of the first synthesis? According to Deleuze, these two contractions refer to different dimensions, or they do not contract the same thing. "In one case, the present is the most contracted state of successive elements or instance which are in themselves independent of one another. In the other case, the present designates the most contracted degree of the past, which is itself like a coexisting totality [or a whole]." <sup>78</sup> We might say that in the former case we contract our inner duration by contemplating that from which we come, while in the latter case we contract something by leaving ourselves. In light of Bergson's metaphor of the cone, Deleuze argues that the present is the maximal contraction of the past every time, even while the past coexists with itself in infinity of degrees. This is why coexistence is also considered to be paradoxical. This maximal contraction is what we have been referring to as the relative limit of the past from the perspective of the future, the point at which the potentials of the past can go no further with respect to the present. In the second synthesis, however, this limit is the extreme limit of the past, since each passive synthesis of memory is the maximal contraction which prepares the actualization of the present. Even though it is a contraction of a certain level of the past, we therefore say that the present is a maximal



contraction of the past, because the past is not the condition of possibility, but a condition of real experience. This present is all it is ever going to be. The past of this present could not be otherwise. It is adequate to it as that which makes it pass. The idea, however, that the present is a contraction of a certain level of the past, means that the present always produces something novel. No two presents are identical, as each present is the maximal contraction of a different level of the past. The contractions of different levels explain why the instants of the first synthesis themselves differ. "What we live empirically as a succession of different presents from the point of view of active synthesis is also the ever-increasing coexistence of levels of the past within passive synthesis. Each present contracts a level of the whole."<sup>79</sup> The difference between the instants, then, manifests the coexistence of the different levels of the past actualized in the present. We can only reflect upon them as different in degree on the basis of this more profound difference of contractions, or repetitions, that take place in the being of the past as a whole. Conversely, if we install ourselves in the being of the past, the past "appears as the coexistence of circles which are more or less dilated or contracted, each one of which contains everything at the same time and the present of which it is the extreme limit."<sup>80</sup> Leaving aside the coexistence of circles for the moment, we notice that the past plays itself out at different levels. In fact, these different levels are already implied in the contraction of the past in the present, but the first repetition and the second repetition do not have the same relation to difference.<sup>81</sup> In the second repetition, difference is no longer traced from one instant to the next. It is, instead, there between the different levels of the past, along with the lines of actualization that the past has given way to (that which is actualized by beings as their personal past). Indeed, the present is a contraction of the extreme limit of the past, but the ground of the past is itself composed of different levels that replay the same story, theme, or most appropriately, a life, in varying degrees. The contraction of

the past therefore consists of the tracing of the whole of the past which coexists with itself at varying levels. As Deleuze claims, to be installed in the past means repeating the same spiritual life at varying levels, from the most relaxed to most contracted *degree of difference*. By being installed in it, we do not actualize a maximal level straight away. There is a sort of presentation of the series of levels that are selected to form the maximal level. To say that the past is presented is in a sense correct, since the ground of the past is populated by virtual images, events of sorts, which demonstrate the continuous variation of the past. The past preserving itself in itself, or repeated at different levels, shows us how the “manner in which each [past event] continues the whole life, but at a different level or degree on the basis of a past which was never present.”<sup>82</sup> Or, as Deleuze also writes, “everything happens as if our memories were repeated an indefinite number of times in these thousands and thousands of possible reduction of our past life.”<sup>83</sup> The repetition of the whole of the past in every contraction, the repetition of a life at difference levels, is referred to by Deleuze as destiny, while the selection of the level played out defines our freedom.<sup>84</sup> As we will soon see, however, the choice of the level is not exactly decided from the perspective of the past. We are thrown into the past with respect to the future.

Now that we have an understanding of the passive synthesis of memory, the continuous contractions of the levels of the past, we must again ask ourselves where this past is preserved. We highlighted that the past is *what is* and that it replays *a* life, but what is this *being* of the past? We already said that the actual image has a virtual double, but is this virtual double one and the same thing as my personal past, my life? It would be a mistake for us to assume that the being of the past is my personal memory, as this would reduce ontological duration to psychological duration, the virtual being part of the brain, or the duration of a single being. In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze proposes that because there are indeed durations that exist outside of us simultaneously

as our own, our consciousness cannot account for the way in which things experience duration.<sup>85</sup> Bergson's intuition is that "there is some *inexpressible reason in them* which accounts for our inability to examine them at successive moments of our own duration."<sup>86</sup> But the idea that there are diverse durations at the same time as my own, does not in any way tell us that beings are merely closed in on themselves. If duration belongs to things as much as it is attributed to my consciousness, then, for Deleuze, psychological duration must open onto an ontological duration in which all beings would participate.<sup>87</sup> In the place of several durations, we now have the single time of an ontological duration. The problem with ontological duration, however, is that beings continue to experience time in divergent ways. Deleuze, therefore, asks: "In what sense can one get beyond the ontological alternative of one/several?"<sup>88</sup> Since the being of the past is the condition of experience, we must show how there is a single time in which things participate all the while giving way to divergent durations. Unravelling this complexity is a great challenge. In the previous chapters we argued that an illusion arises when the plane of immanence is conceived of as immanent to the subject, the ego, or the self. Here is where most of the wrong turns are taken. Our primary question whether this past is my personal past demonstrates one of the illusions of the ground, a projection of my duration onto it. Such an interpretation appears to be plausible, especially because the ground gives way to divergent durations, one of which is my own. Deleuze seems to have resolved the problem of the one or several durations in *Difference and Repetition*. In *Bergsonism*, however, the problem is evident when Deleuze expresses the following reservation: "insofar as we are dealing with qualitative distinct fluxes, it may in fact be difficult to know whether or not the two subjects live and perceive the same time: We support unity, but only as the most 'plausible' idea."<sup>89</sup> Now this reservation is entirely legitimate, particularly because once we have installed the qualitatively distinct fluxes, it is indeed difficult

to argue that beings perceive the same time. In addition to this, even if we say that the brain is part of the image, rather than constituting the virtual images themselves, it is still not clear how this being of the past is not my personal past. Deleuze's apprehension is telling us that he is carefully thinking through the relationship of the virtual and its diverging lines of actualization. Does actualization imply one and the same virtual for divergent beings? In what follows, we will outline how the dualism of the one/several is overturned.

Let us briefly return to the multiple durations disclosed in the present. For Deleuze, these durations only appear to me because my duration is among others: "the flowing of the water, the flight of the bird, the murmur of my life form three fluxes; but only because my duration is one of them, and also the element that contains the two others. Why not make do with two fluxes, my duration and the flight of the bird, for example?"<sup>90</sup> We cannot say that there are only two fluxes because their simultaneous existence implies that they are contained in a third duration. My duration makes it possible that I reflect on another that is reflected in my own. Their simultaneity is made possible by a third, meaning that my duration is reflected in another one that likewise contains the duration of the flight of the bird. "It is in this sense that my duration essentially has the power to disclose other durations, to encompass the others, and to encompass itself ad infinitum."<sup>91</sup> But these coexisting durations in the present only gives us the outer envelope of this third duration, after its division has been actualized. According to Deleuze, if we install ourselves directly in the virtual, there is only a single time, the third, in which there are no longer distinct durations. There is a convergence upon the same one. The time of the virtual, then, as the condition of experience, is not my personal memory or the memory belonging to another being, but an impersonal time in which *a* life unfolds—a life expressed in the infinitive, to love, to play, to learn. Deleuze noted that the ground in which beings participate, "no longer simply signifies

my relationship with being, but the relationship of all things with being.”<sup>92</sup> But what is this relationship with being exactly? The virtual events that play out different levels of the past give us what is impersonal of a relation, or better yet, being is itself the relation. What the repetitions of the past shows us, are the continuous variations of a relation; the relation varying with respect to itself. The being of the past is a time shared in which beings are enveloped; the virtual is our other half, which cannot be in any sense actual or lived.<sup>93</sup> This other half which implicates us does not exist as such. We discussed this theme in the first chapter, particularly with respect to Deleuze’s Spinoza. Deleuze’s argument was that “all that Spinozism needed to do for the univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was to make substance turn around the modes.”<sup>94</sup> This is precisely what the being of the past must be; it must form itself as that which is *in-between*. Only in this sense could we experience another being, in relation to being. Of course, we do not experience the duration of another being, but experience another only by participating in that which is internal to both durations, as their condition.

Earlier we noted that by differentiating, the virtual gives way to actualizations. In the being of the past, every repetition itself produces and has produced divergent lines of actualizations that are asymmetrical in nature.<sup>95</sup> We saw that the ground is composed of various levels of the past, which culminate in its maximal contraction. The entirety of the ground prepares the dissection, the splitting of the past, into divergent lines of actualization, with the maximal contraction being actualized in the present. But the lines of divergence move back and forth from the ground to the periphery, reflecting each level of the past, or the way in which the differentiation is developed in actualizations.<sup>96</sup> The latest actualization reflects the maximal contraction itself, while previous lines of actualizations give us what might be called my personal past. What is so fascinating about Deleuze’s past is precisely that each repetition is a cut

in the fabric of the ground, at which point the past splits into two movements. In one direction these divergent lines are further developed in accordance with the capacity of the organism, and give way to the actual in the present; an actual which does not resemble the virtual. In the other direction, these diverging lines can be traced back to the centers of convergence of the past once the actualization has been made.<sup>97</sup> “In both cases,” Deleuze writes, “the pathways are the same; what matters is the direction one takes them in, towards divergence or convergence.”<sup>98</sup> In following one line towards divergence in order to shed light on the actual being, we see that this being is constantly displaced and differentiated with respect to itself. The diverging lines “show us the thing itself identical to its difference, internal difference identical to something.”<sup>99</sup> If we move in the direction of the virtual, away from the actualizations of living beings, these lines, now being three, converge or intersect upon the same event. Deleuze notes that, it is as though the

articulations of the real and [diverging] lines were relayed back and forth: the articulations of the real and [diverging] lines which at least reveal internal differences at the limit of their convergence, and conversely, [diverging] lines give us articulations of the real, e.g. the convergence of the three diverse lines, leading to the true distribution of what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the object.<sup>100</sup>

In the course of actualization, the being of the past appears to produce the difference that is developed on each side of the divergent lines, in the object and in the subject, but it also simultaneously turns in on itself, so as to reflect the divergence as though in a mirror. The tracing of the past in the direction of the virtual, therefore, presents us with the continuity or becoming of the past, the way in which it calls forth a new present in the direction of the future. As we mentioned earlier, the being of the past is a passive synthesis of two dimensions: “it spits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves the past,” or the passing of the present.<sup>101</sup> In the process of tracing the ground, we have not only seen

how it is that the present passes with the development of the lines of actualizations, but the formation of the past on its own terrain as a singular time in which divergent lines converge. With respect to the former, the passing of the present pertains to that part of the event actualized in it; what Deleuze also refers to as an effect in the present, which is preserved in the past. Why speak about the being of the past as a single time of convergence? The being of the past, itself being that *which is*, or the repetition of a life on different levels, is a constitution of a world. We saw earlier that convergence essentially implies a world. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze discusses the other as a possible world, for instance, the terrified face of the other enveloping a terrifying world. Here, the face would be a sign that is unfolded from the perspective of the being of the past, indeed it is the repetition of virtual events that give us the sense of this terrifying world, or it is these virtual images that express this world as a terrifying one. The sense of the world from the perspective of the past would be the terrifying world constituted, which actual beings individuate in the present. Actual beings individuate the sense of this terrifying world in distinct ways, by manifesting aggression, fear, loathing, and so on, while the divergent ways in which the world is expressed by them points to the differentiation that underlies this terrifying world, its perpetuation as it were. Deleuze often equates the past, which, as was noted, is that what is, with sense itself. The being of the past which expresses itself is the sense expressed in actual states of affairs. But this is sense only considered from the perspective of the past.

The way in which we have dealt with the being of the past reflects its nature. We have moved in circular fashion, in order to demonstrate a different aspect or level of the past. But the problem is precisely that in the second synthesis of time, the past and the present dance in ever expanding circles. These ever expanding circles give way to a various ambiguities with respect to the ground.<sup>102</sup> Even while the past is actualized in divergent lines, we cannot explain how the

divergent members are affirmed as different in their divergence. The ground moving in a circle with the grounded is especially susceptible to reintroducing the idea that what is continued in the being of the past is the same or the identical, while what is actualized in the present is the similar.<sup>103</sup> As we saw in the second chapter, from here on in, it becomes possible to isolate the identical, to eliminate the ground, so as to establish the world of representation. By eliminating the ground, “the identical has become the internal character of representation itself, while resemblance has become its external relation with the thing.”<sup>104</sup> In other words, the ground begins to be formed in the form of the grounded, and the grounded in the image of the similar. If we continue the course in the direction of the virtual, however, the event is continued in another time; it is unfolded with respect to the third synthesis of time. In order to transition to the last synthesis, Deleuze inquires if it is possible to penetrate the past, “whether we can in some sense live the being in itself of the past in the same way that we live the passive synthesis of habit.”<sup>105</sup> The response comes from the repetition of the future, just as the circle of the second synthesis is unravelled in it. In one respect, then, the ground “falls into the grounded,” in another, as we intend to show, it is “engulfed in groundlessness.”<sup>106</sup> Here, the difference made is conceived of from the perspective of groundlessness, meaning that sense is thought in relation to paradox.

### *Éclat<sup>107</sup> or on the Bursting Forth of the Pure Event*

The second synthesis of time is posited *a priori* as the ground of experience. While it comes close to explaining how the virtual is actualized, it does not do away with the problems that the being of the past itself poses. Since the being of the past is *a priori*, we must assume that it is already there. However, seeing that the being of the past is the past of *this* singular life,<sup>108</sup> we must ask how the ground is itself selected. This question is of great relevance because the



singular sense, the complex theme, that the being of the past implies, is not some originary form that awaits us. It itself constitutes itself as the ground of this experience from the perspective of the future. This future, the third synthesis of time, involves an essential splintering of time to which thinking, in the form of the question, addresses itself. As we will see, this disjoining is the instance of determination, the selection of the ground, and the indeterminate, thought together. Deleuze explores this relation of the indeterminate and determination as it is posited in the work of Kant. He opens the discussion of the third synthesis by referring to the fundamental shift in thought that Kant had inaugurated when reformulating Descartes' famous formulation, '*I think therefore I am.*' The Kantian critique, he writes, "amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. The determination ('I think') obviously implies something undetermined ('I am'), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undetermined is determinable by the '*I think*'."<sup>109</sup> Kant transforms this equation by inserting a third value, that of the determinable, or the way in which the undetermined becomes determinable as such. It is well known that, for Kant, the undetermined becomes determinable by the 'I think' in time.<sup>110</sup> According to Deleuze, this reformulation is a remarkable shift as Difference is no longer approached as an external difference of empirical instances, as though being a change traced from one empirical moment to the next. Rather, Difference is now comprehended internally "in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines."<sup>111</sup> Alternatively, internal difference requires the introduction of that which becomes determinable by the cogito in time, with the determinable being that which raises the determination by releasing thought from its torpor. Now, as Deleuze notes, "my undetermined existence can be determined only *within time* as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject *appearing within time*."<sup>112</sup> In turn, this passivity, the

double of the cogito, addresses itself to thought, or thought is experienced as the affection of the passive self upon itself.

Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it, which experiences its effects rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself.<sup>113</sup>

The essential passivity of the self, presented by Kant as intuition, indicates to us that the 'I' experiences itself in time through an essential fracturing. This fracturing of the I, which is experienced as the affection of the self by self, is the introduction of time into thought, more specifically, it is the influence upon thought by, what Deleuze calls, the empty form of time. It is indeed the case that such passivity is already there in the being of the past. The fracturing of the 'I', however, can only be grasped from the perspective of the third synthesis of time. While Kant fills this fracture by arguing for the identity of the 'I,' in Deleuze's philosophy, this fracture refers to an unbridgeable disjoining of time in which before and after no longer rhyme, meaning that one never ceases becoming-different.<sup>114</sup> In accordance with this formulation, then, the essential transcendental experience of beings is that of perpetually perishing, a becoming-other.

In addition to emphasizing Kant's discovery of the transcendental in the exploration of the third synthesis of time, Deleuze evokes Plato's introduction of movement into the soul. For Plato, the movement of the soul or *learning* "implies the distinction within the soul between a 'before' and an 'after'; in other words, it implies the introduction of a first time, in which we forget what we knew, since there is a second time in which we recover what we have forgotten."<sup>115</sup> Between the first and the second time, there is an introjection of the whole of the pure past that is being retrieved by the apprentice. Similar to his study of Kant, Deleuze wants to emphasize the transformation of the soul in Plato's philosophy. But his affinity with Plato is superficial, since, for Plato, it is the pure past of the Ideas or forms which are recollected by the

soul. Here we might ask what relevancy Plato has in Deleuze's development of the third synthesis of time. Deleuze's references are always strategic. He simultaneously seeks to extract something from them, while also carving out a space for a problematic that is his own. By evoking Plato, he is not simply seeking to critique him, but proposes the illusions that the ground or the being of the past is susceptible to if conceived of as operating by itself; by operating by itself, we mean that it constitutes the entirety of time. While Plato is the figure with whom the circular movement of the ground (model) and that which is grounded (the copies) is inaugurated, such illusions are not delimited to Plato's pure past. They apply to the workings of the past in general. We will discuss Plato's pure past in the fourth chapter. Here, it is worthwhile noting that the circular relationship of the ground to that which is grounded installed from Plato onward, "elevates the principle of representation—namely, identity, which it treats as an immemorial model, and resemblance, which it treats as a present image: the Same and the Similar."<sup>116</sup> In this case, the pure past as the model merely offers the image in accordance with which the resemblance of the copies becomes measurable; their difference or identity with respect to it. If we were to follow this formulation of the pure past, we could not make the claim that the living organism creates anything new, only that it distributes the model to different degrees. Again, the problem of circularity is not delimited to this vision of the past.

Transcendental philosophy likewise encounters it when it posits the being of the past as ground in relation to the present, or that which is grounded in it. This sort of illusion appears to be permitted by the "ambiguities of Mnemosyne, [or] was already implicit in the second synthesis of time," precisely because the events of the being of the past mark the centers of convergence of series; the centers around which two terms converge in a third, are the same centers which appear to be prolonged in lines of actualization.<sup>117</sup> The second repetition reinforces

the idea that the past moves in a circular fashion with respect to the present, and that the ground falls into what it grounds, because it appears as though its being is conditional upon the terms which implicate it. As Deleuze tells us, these repetitions

include difference, but include it only between the degrees or levels. [The second repetition] appears first in the form of the circle of the past coexistent in themselves [convergences]; then in the form of the circle of coexistence of the past and the present [convergence and division]; and finally in the form of a circle of the presents which pass and which coexist in relation to the object=x,

or the complex theme of the past [participation].<sup>118</sup> But, it is not as though the past and the present truly move in a closed circle. On one hand, to conceive them as moving in a closed circle is a philosophical error. On the other hand, the circle is dependent upon an affirmation; whether enough chance is affirmed in the organization of time in its entirety. It is this affirmation which is imperceptible in the circle, but is already everywhere dispersed in it because there is nothing like the Identity of the past, neither does the conditioned itself resemble what conditions it, or that which it is in relation to so as to become conditioned as such. Deleuze is capable of making such arguments convincing only from the third synthesis of time. In order to transition away from the past, which is not primary in the order of time, we must remember that to ground is to determine the indeterminate, with the indeterminate already installing itself imperceptibly in the second repetition. As we have shown elsewhere, the continuum of the ground is “bent and must lead us toward a beyond, so the second synthesis of time points beyond itself in the direction of a third which denounces the illusion of the in-itself as still a correlate of representation.”<sup>119</sup> In the previous chapters, we emphasized that the past points beyond itself. When laying out the pathways of articulation in the introduction to the second chapter, we noted that one pathway is towards the actualization of the virtual, while the other, pertaining to that which is excessive in the Event, cannot be actualized. Here, we are retracing the whole of the past in order to show that

one of tendencies leaves what Deleuze refers to as the crystal. It is the turning towards the virtual which splits the image in two. Now, this turning towards the virtual is precisely the moment when the sense expressed or attributed to the states of affairs as the verb in the proposition is thrown into relief. We take the direction of the future by way of the question (what is x becomes what difference is there). In the direction of the future, the determined infinitive cannot be appropriated by representation, it cannot be conceived of as the becoming of the concept, but is instead infused with paradox. From the perspective of third repetition, we no longer trace the ground in relation to the grounded, but groundlessness as now infusing the ground as the reason behind the differentiation of beings.

We already mentioned that the third repetition splits the image of time in two. It is essentially a spectacular bursting of the whole of the image in two unequal halves. Nevertheless, it is considered as a synthesis of time by Deleuze, because the function of the instant is to draw them together without necessarily making them coincide. He presents this time as out of joint because the before of the being of the past along with the conditioned, and what comes after, do not coincide. There is something unequal introduced in the second repetition which cannot be made in conformity with it. The ground strangely bending in another direction after it culminates in a freeze-frame or a frozen image, is the opening up of the freedom of the future; the beginning of time as such. Deleuze, hence, writes that,

time out of joint means demented time or time outside of the curve which gave it a god, liberated from its overly simple circular figure, freed from the events which made up its content, its relation to movement overturned; in short, time presenting itself as an empty and pure form. Time itself unfolds (that is, apparently ceases to be a circle) *instead of things unfolding within it* (following the overly simple circular figure).<sup>120</sup>

We have already shown in chapter one, how this image is split in two, by discussing the continuity of becoming in relation to the moment of the caesura. The articulation of the third

repetition as a pure order of time is a precise one, because, with it, we no longer have the virtual events along with the series unfolding in time, but time itself unfolding as a function of the caesura. The caesura is the instant that disjoints time, or distributes the before and the after of time. By borrowing Holderlin's aphorism that time no longer rhymes, Deleuze wants to demonstrate that there is something unequal to the ground, which nevertheless configures it, all the while dissolving it.

Overturning its own ground, time is defined not only by a formal and empty order but also by a totality and a series. In the first place, the idea of a totality of time must be understood as follows: the caesura, of whatever kind, must be determined in the image of a unique and *tremendous event*, an act which is adequate to time as a whole.<sup>121</sup>

For Deleuze, this pure event of the third repetition draws together the other syntheses of time, which are conceived now from the perspective of its caesura. It draws them together, however, without necessarily doing away with their distinct operations. It is better to say, then, that the other syntheses are explained from the perspective of the third, because the third is that which 'makes' the difference. This is what Deleuze means when he argues that, "in a certain sense, the ultimate repetition, the ultimate theatre, therefore encompasses everything; while in another sense it destroys everything; and in yet another sense selects among everything."<sup>122</sup> Along with the repeater of the present and the repetition of the past, there is that which is repeated in them; the eternal return of the future. The eternal return unfolds the circle so as to form a straight line, or raises the ground never to see the same return, by rendering repetition for itself adequate to difference in-itself. Since the third repetition distributes difference, the other repetitions arise in relation to it, while also being displaced by it. Only difference in-itself returns in the empty form of time. The other syntheses can be displaced by it because the eternal return introduces a differentiation that *each time* distributes the being of the past anew, giving way to the creation of

the novel in the present. This each time means that the other repetitions do not return, only the differentiation that disjoins time returns. It returns as that which dissolves the ground into groundlessness. It is the essential formlessness which insinuates itself in every form, thereby, resisting the appropriation of the event in representational models towards which it tended.

In the first chapter, we showed that the eternal return displaces the being of the past, because it is already involved in it. With the culmination of the virtual events of the past, the line reverses itself, illuminating the pathway anew, in reverse, showing the third repetition to have been there all along, configuring the past itself. This is the point at which time is thrown out of joint. To begin with, the third repetition is disguised in the events of the being of the past, which, in accordance with the operation of the past, have become centers of convergence. But these centers of convergence bear the differentiation, since the being of the past does not itself resemble, it is not the same, as the divergent series of actualizations, neither do the events that configure it, the levels of the past, bear the same intensity, even though they replay a complex theme, a life, a rhythm.<sup>123</sup> This is our first hint of differentiation. Deleuze refers to such a disguise of the third in the second repetition as the dark precursor. The dark precursor is the disguised differentiation, or that which makes the difference, in the second synthesis of time. The concept of the dark precursor can appear mysterious if we do not grasp the simplicity of the eternal return, or more importantly, if we do allow that time unfolds as a function of the caesura, because of which every determination carries along with it indetermination. So why is the precursor dark in the second repetition? The precursor is dark in the second repetition, because it is “covered by the phenomena *it induces* within the system”; it is covered over primarily by the centers of convergence that compose the past, around which worlds are created.<sup>124</sup> But the point is that the second repetition is induced or selected from the perspective of the caesura of the third

repetition which introduces the difference, even if this is not apparent to begin with. In reverse, each center of convergence will be shown as bearing a differentiation that leads to a divergence. Each repetition will become disjointed, showing now only difference in-itself. When traversing the entirety of the transcendental field, the difficult question is always whether it is divergence or convergence that is primary. It arises only because time does not unfold in a linear fashion. Deleuze's most radical argument is that divergence instigated by differentiation is primary in the order of time. It is, as we have noted, that which gives birth to time—not only in raising the ground, but in dissolving the ground with the difference made. In *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, he writes that, in the being of the past, “the dividing in two, this differentiation, did not reach completion [...] because time rolled itself up, and its two aspects relaunched themselves into the circuit whose poles they recharged while blocking up the future.”<sup>125</sup> When tracing the theatre of the virtual, we do not simply move through the different levels which unfold in time. We move back and forth, from the centers of convergence, the virtual images, along the lines of actualization, and back again, until the entirety of the circuit (of the virtual and the actual) plays itself out or plays out a becoming.

Now, in contrast, the dividing in two [of the virtual and the actual] can come to completion, but precisely on the condition that one of the two tendencies leaves the crystal, through the point of flight. [...] Everything that has happened falls back into the crystal and stays there: this is all the frozen, fixed, finished-with and over-conforming roles that the characters have tried in turn.<sup>126</sup>

What exits this crystal, thereby shattering or fracturing the point of view, is the differentiation of the virtual, since it is in itself unequal to the images on the whole. It is released from being imprisoned in the other repetitions, reverses itself, and in the process dissolves them, never to see them return in the same configuration. Difference in itself posits itself for itself. The unequal emerges from the theatre in which the combination of the past is configured, in order to give way



to the future: “It creates this future as a bursting forth of life. [...] One leaves the theatre to get to life, but one leaves imperceptibly, on the thread of the stream, that is, of time. It is by leaving it that time gives itself a future.”<sup>127</sup> The thread traced imperceptibly by the dark precursor, linking difference with difference, is the ultimate differentiation that opens onto a future. The eternal return of difference is the highest object of affirmation, because therein lies our unbound joy together with the greatest freedom: to begin the story of time anew with the dissolution of time. Holderlin captures the dissolution of time and the birth of a life anew, when writing the following:

Thus dissolution as necessity, from the viewpoint of ideal memory, becomes as such the ideal object of a newly unfolded life, a look back at the path that had to be traversed from the beginning of the dissolution up to where out of this new life a memory occurs of what was dissolved, and out of that, as explanation and unification of the gap and the contrast that occurs between what is new and the past, the memory of the dissolution can follow. The ideal dissolution is fearless. The beginning—and endpoint are already posited, found, secured; therefore this dissolution is also more certain, more irresistible, bolder; and thus it presents itself as what it actually is, as a reproductive act whereby life runs through all of its points and, to acquire the sum total, lingers over none, dissolves itself in each, to produce itself in the next.<sup>128</sup>

What is this difference in itself, however, in which difference is linked with difference giving the sense of a life run through all the ‘points’? In what way does this differentiation give way to divergence which happens prior to a convergence, even if imperceptibly? Unlike the being of the past in which the difference is made between the levels, repetition in the eternal return involves the linking of difference with difference without any intermediary.<sup>129</sup> Deleuze writes that

according to this other formula, difference must immediately relate the different terms to one another. In accordance with Heidegger’s ontological intuition, difference must be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to different without any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed. There must be a differentiation of difference, an in-itself which is like a differentiator, a *Sich-unterscheidende*, by virtue of which the

different is gathered all at once rather than represented on condition of a prior resemblance.<sup>130</sup>

By installing ourselves in memory, we become-equal to the whole of the past, while in the repetition of the future, in which difference is linked with difference, there is always a remainder, the unequal itself, that cannot be subsumed in the second repetition. In the third repetition, we have the repetition itself equal to difference in-itself. In other words, the repetition of the future is adequate to differentiation. The entire question, however, is how could difference act as differentiator linking difference to difference without there being an intermediary, or an identical concept in which the differences are subsumed.<sup>131</sup> To begin with, the divergence of two or more beings is not identical to the being of the past which they go on to actualize. The divergence implies a differentiation around which they are capable of becoming divergent as such, since it is through this differentiation that they are brought into a relation with one another. The differentiation itself is primary as that which creates the *relation* that they go on to actualize in accordance with their capacities. Deleuze, hence, writes that in order for us to conceive of this linking of difference to difference,

a system must be constituted on the basis of two or more series [or terms], each series being defined by the difference between the terms which compose it. If we suppose that the series communicate under the impulse of a force of some kind, then it is apparent that this communication relates difference to other difference.<sup>132</sup>

The force that Deleuze is referring to is the power of dark precursor to bring different beings or terms into relation through a differentiation. It would be incorrect to say that the divergent terms are related directly, but that they are brought into a relation with the event of their differentiation. Such an event of differentiation allows divergence itself to become an *object of affirmation*. In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze asks what it means to render divergence into an object of affirmation. He argues that,

as a general rule, two things are simultaneously affirmed only to the extent that their difference is denied, suppressed from within [...]. We speak, on the contrary, of an operation according to which two things or two determinations are affirmed *through* their difference, that is to say, that they are the objects of simultaneous affirmation only insofar as their difference is itself affirmed and is itself affirmative. [...] We are rather faced with a positive distance of differential elements: no longer to identity two contraries with the same, but to affirm their distance as that which relates one to the other insofar as they are 'different.'<sup>133</sup>

We will have more to say on the ethic involved in the argument that divergence is an object of *simultaneous* affirmation. Here, we want to stress that differentiation, being that which is affirmed of a relation, as it renews this relation, differentiates the terms that are brought into communication. This means that we do not affirm two things through their identity, neither do we presume in any sense that they resemble one another, but, rather, that they participate in the differentiation through which they are simultaneously affirmed as different. The third synthesis involves making something new of repetition, what Deleuze understands as freedom, in part because the difference affirmed in it is also the affirmation of the differentiation of beings; their freedom to create something novel.

We now have a sense of how differentiation relates to divergence. We do not understand, however, what this differentiation is. We mentioned that the dark precursor has the power to bring different things in relation through a difference; it can be thought of as an event of falling in love which may be imperceptible in a circumstance, or the event of revolution which might not have been apparent in the actual, but only becomes grasped in retrospect. But the precursor is dark precisely because it operates in the second repetition, meaning that the divergence is itself displaced in the series in question, since the lines of actualization traced in the second synthesis lead to the actualized; what are understood as qualities. In order to grasp divergence, we have to follow the stream of differentiation to its end. The precursor is imperceptible in the second repetition because it traces the singular events of the past in order to make the difference. In

other words, in order to show that which is unequal to the past. We must keep in mind that such an operation is only possible because a differentiation is introduced into the system. Or, as we have argued, it is the return of difference that raises the ground of the past to begin with in accordance with chance. As we have already said, the difference in-itself that the dark precursor traces, is not the difference between the levels or sheets of the past, it is the difference in-itself of the repetitions themselves, or that which is repeated in the repetitions. One of the greatest innovations on the part of Deleuze is to conceive of the differences that compose the abstract line as degrees of difference of quantitative intensities. These differences of intensity were already discussed in the first chapter. Here, we are going to briefly revisit such difference in light of the arguments that Deleuze presents in *Difference and Repetition*. There he defines intensity as the “form of difference in so far as this is the reason (or being) of the sensible. Every intensity is differential by itself difference [...] each intensity is already a coupling (in which each element of the couple refers in turn to couples of elements of another order).”<sup>134</sup> Each difference of the level or repetition in a system is a difference in intensity. Being itself coupled, intensity is doubled in another order, in the heterogeneous series or terms that diverge, while these elements, in turn, refer to the intensity of another differential which is itself coupled. The dark precursor moves from the lowest to the greatest intensity in a system by doubling difference, meaning that the difference is differentiated from one intensity to another all the way up to the unequal. It is the disparity of intensive differences that creates the inequality in the field as whole. As Deleuze notes, on one hand, intensity is implicated in itself as difference, meaning that it is indivisible or uncancellable in the element of the couple, while on the other, it is enveloped distance, thereby being, in a way, divisible in the couples of elements; this indivisibility and divisibility is linked to the question one or many durations. According to him, quantitative intensity differs from

quality precisely because “division can therefore take place and be continued without any change in the nature of what is being divided.”<sup>135</sup> This aspect of division, or rather indivisibility, refers to the singular events of differentials that spin off into different directions. Conversely, from the standpoint of the couples of elements in which it is enveloped, it can be divided but not without transforming its nature. Differences of intensity are not like either extensive quantities or qualities. Surely, in the direction in which they are enveloped these intensity quantities become qualities, but in another, the intensive differences continue to unfold, linking difference with difference, all the way up to the unequal. Deleuze, hence, concludes that “intensive quantities are therefore defined by the enveloping difference, the enveloped distance, and the unequal in itself which testified to the existence of a natural ‘remainder,’ which provides the material for a change of nature.”<sup>136</sup> The unequal, being that which makes the difference, marks the limit of that which can be sensed from the transcendental point of view; it is, however, also that aspect of the event which perpetually escapes its own accomplishment. This is the moment at which the straight line reverses itself, making visible the difference in intensity as already being there in the events of the being of the past. In the next chapter we will show how the being of the past, Mnemosyne, is awakened with the chance encounter with a sign in which the intensive is at once “the object of encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility.”

The idea of intensive difference is the most difficult aspect of Deleuze’s thought. It is most difficult to conceive of difference because of the nature in which it presents itself. It is like a flowing river of lava that increases in rapidity, coming to a sort of boiling point, smashing the virtual images to pieces, and burying the surface on the whole. The unequal is like a volcanic eruption that shatters the crystal in which the actual and the virtual are mirrored. It is the ever increasing speed with which it unfolds, that renders it impossible to find one’s bearings in any

memory. Now, our question is, what sort of effect does this inequality of intensity have? What is its relationship to the eternal return? Earlier we discussed Kant's contribution to Deleuze's idea that the 'I' is fractured by time. The inequality in intensity fractures the self by making the difference. In other words, it repudiates all that came before, including the roles already played, in order to bring the new to beings. Deleuze, therefore, writes that "things must be dispersed within difference, and their identity must be dissolved before they become subject to the eternal return and to the identity of the eternal return."<sup>137</sup> In chapter 1, we stressed the ethics of the being of becoming. We argued that the object of affirmation is itself the becoming of beings, their capacity to become-different. This becoming-different was inextricably tied to the eternal return of difference, or it was nothing else than the return of the future. If the eternal return has this effect, it is because, for Deleuze, it presents us with a point of decision, with the problem of life, in which the affirmation is made. In order for such an affirmation to take place, the identity of beings must be dissolved by the empty form of time. All that remains once individuals, persons, and the world, are dissolved, is the pure Event of the eternal return. It is not only the subject that becomes fractured, but the other element of the couple, with which it creates a world, that is becomes fractured. This is essentially what it means to make divergence an object of simultaneous affirmation. We have already visited some of the arguments that Deleuze makes in *The Logic of Sense* on the ethics of the event. There he argues that the individual must grasp herself as event, and all other individuals, in turn, as events. Making a similar argument as the one he presents in his text on Spinoza, he goes on to note that:

as the individual affirms the distance, she follows and joins it, passing through all the other individuals implied by the other events, and extracts from it a unique Event, which is once again herself, or rather the universal freedom. [...] Counter-actualizing each event, the actor-dancer extracts the pure event which communicates with all the others and returns to itself through all the others, and with all the others. Each series returns to itself.<sup>138</sup>

The third repetition is an exploration of a distance in which the difference is made. The individuals return to themselves only by exploring this distance, and experiencing themselves as different. The return to oneself is not a return to the identical, but a return of difference which is the sufficient reason of any being as such. Each returns to itself, by becoming different. We must conclude, then, that the becoming different is the being of beings. Their freedom, which is always to remake a life anew, is essentially tied to the repetition of the future, in which they are the object of simultaneous affirmation. This simultaneous affirmation again being that each is affirmed in its becoming, each is given the freedom of the future. As we pointed out in the first chapter with respect to Spinoza, the freedom of the future involves affirming others as events precisely because in the highest affirmation we affirm their capacity to become other, a capacity that is adequate to their power of existing.

There is another aspect, however, of this fracturing of the self with the eternal return of the unequal. The eternal return, for Deleuze, presents us with the highest form of thought. The fracturing of the 'I,' enables thinking to emerge. It is the unequal itself which addresses itself to it, not the identical. One never thinks the identical as such, or in terms of a pre-existing model; thought is only awakened by the return of difference. In *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, Deleuze manages to delineate the relationship of intensity and thought in a more accessible way when writing that, in the past, the being of the sensible

is a feeling that stretches out on a sheet [levels of the past] and is modified according to its fragmentation. [...] Feeling is that which is in continual exchange, circulating from one sheet to another according to what transformations occur. But when transformations themselves form a sheet which crosses all the others it is *as if feelings set free* the consciousness or thought with which they were loaded: a becoming conscious according to which shadows are the living realities of a mental theatre and feelings the true figures of a cerebral game which is very concrete.<sup>139</sup>

It is the feeling, what we previously referred to as a primitive affection, which, according to Deleuze, prevents differentiation from being one and the same with the past as the latter approaches a fixed point. The limit of the being of the sensible gives way to thinking by opening up the transition from the second to the third repetition. At its limit, inequality is the indeterminate, the abyss or groundlessness, to which thinking is coupled, or thinking becomes the most powerful affect. This groundlessness is, as Deleuze argues, the animality of thought, the outside of thought, which does not think, but gives itself to be thought. It is the animality of thought because as it traverses the field at an infinitive speed, there is nothing there to reveal it as the thought belonging to this or that subject. The outside of the thought that the time out of joint produces,

introduces and constitutes Difference in thought, on the basis of which it thinks, in the form of the difference between the indeterminate and determination. It is the form of time which distributes throughout itself an 'I' fractured by the abstract line, a passive self produced by a groundlessness that it contemplates. It is this which engenders thought within thinking, for thought thinks only by means of difference, around this point of ungrounding.<sup>140</sup>

The emergence of the event of thought will be the focus of our next chapter. Our aim will be to explore the relationship of this Event of thought and the object of simultaneous affirmation, by firstly discussing what Deleuze calls learning. This is all in an effort to grasp how one can articulate the event itself, or what is implied in such a saying. As is evident in *The Logic of Sense*, the pure Event itself must be somehow realized. The future implies a kind of actor that ushers in a third or ideal present in which we attempt to become adequate to the event.

### ***Conclusion: Becoming What One Is***

To our knowledge, after Nietzsche's *ecce homo*, or, how one becomes what one is, no other thinker, except for Whitehead, has been able to capture the saying with the same precision:



“*How* an actual entity becomes constitutes *what* that actual entity *is*.”<sup>141</sup> The simplicity of this saying sheds a light on what appears to be a highly complex philosophy of time. Indeed, what we have attempted to show is *how* an actual entity becomes, how we can approach it in a relation with it. But, of course, it cannot be said that time is internal to beings, but that beings are internal to time. It is the flow of time that determines what an actual entity is. With Deleuze, we get a distinct answer. A being endures in becoming; it is always in the process of becoming different. With the third synthesis of time, we not only begin to understand how a determination comes about, but also how beings are incessantly plunged into a becoming. Every instant, prior to the actualization of the past, we are presented with a fortuitous event of the future, which allows us to replay the potentials of the past, while also charting a new course for the present. As such, the groundlessness of the future always comes first. To ground or determine, as Deleuze notes, implies the indeterminate. This is where the highest affirmation lies; the greatest joy joined by a freedom that releases from purpose, as we manage to think how one becomes what one is. In the following chapter, we will explore another aspect of the saying by laying out Deleuze theory of learning. According to him, learning is becoming, so that the whole of experience is revisited from that perspective. While in the second chapter, we discussed how sense serves as the ground for formal logic, in chapter four, we will continue turning in the other direction so as to show another point of articulation, that of the Event. As we have seen by outlining Deleuze’s philosophy of time, the points of articulation cannot be severed. The ground unfolds “between” two presents, one of which presents the first point of articulation, the other puts the present out of play, thrusting the event in the direction of the future, thus, giving us another point of articulation. Together they form the entirety of the problem that we are trying to think through.

***Deleuze's New Meno:  
Learning, Time, and the Event of Thought***

In this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibit coming-to-be and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any moral additive, in forever equal innocence. [...] Such is the game that the *aeon* plays with itself.<sup>1</sup>

A new Meno would say: it is knowledge that is nothing more than an empirical figure, a simple result which continually falls back into experience; whereas learning is the true transcendental structure which unites difference to difference, dissimilarity to dissimilarity, without mediating between them—not in the form of a mythical past or former present, but in the pure form of an empty time in general.<sup>2</sup>

Earlier we highlighted that the fracturing of the subject in which before and after do not coincide, opens up the way for learning. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze calls for a new Meno, *Meno* being one of the Platonic dialogues in which Socrates asserts that learning is recollection. In recent years, the study of Deleuze's theory of learning has flourished, with works, such as, *Nomadic Education* (2008), and, *Educational Life-Forms: Deleuzian Teaching and Learning Practice* (2011), published. Aside from Alberto Toscano's brief mention of the *Meno* in his introduction to Eric Alliez's text, *The Signature of the World* (2005), and, Claire Colebrook's chapter "Leading Out, Leading On: The Soul of Education," which deals with the central idea that learning is not a learning from, the idea of a new Meno has not been explored in great detail. Many commentators rely on the pedagogy of the concept to develop Deleuze's theory of learning. This is legitimate, since the concept, for Deleuze and Guattari, is itself a becoming. But, by doing so, we overlook the core problematic of the theory of learning, which is that learning is oriented towards the future. It gives way to the invention of concepts, the articulation of a problem.

Because of this, one might say that we have become friends of the concept, but not lovers of learning. By briefly reviewing Plato's *Meno*, we intend to frame the discussion that follows: Is learning essentially recollecting or is it the invention of the new? After reviewing Plato's piece, we will turn to Deleuze's study of learning in *Proust and Signs* where he argues that learning is not oriented towards the past, but the future. If it is indeed oriented towards the future as is proposed, what does such learning involve? For Deleuze, learning is an apprenticeship to signs that constitutes a problematic field or an Idea. This problematic field will be further developed with respect to his *Difference and Repetition*.

Learning, being the unfolding of a problematic field as a function of the empty form of time, puts us on the path of thinking. It radically transforms what it means to think. In accordance with it, thinking, for Deleuze, can no longer be conceived as a possibility, neither can it be something innate, but rather emerges in the encounter with a sign. Learning renders this thought a thought without an image, model, or presuppositions; if it presupposes someone it would be the stupid person that questions or does not take things for granted. Thinking is essentially naïve; it is immanent to the problematic field that it thinks through at an absolute or infinite speed, without there being anything supplementary to reveal it.<sup>3</sup> Even the affirmation of becoming itself which conditions the articulation of sense does not secure the form of recognition. By giving rise to the question of difference, paradox disguised in the second repetition, addresses itself to thought. It will show itself as already coupled to thought, in the form of the unfolding of the problematic field in the encounter with a sign. The genesis of the act of thinking emerges with something outside of thought, the never seen or unthinkable, that thought must think through. This is what we will be discussing as the Event of thought in Deleuze's philosophy. The Event of thought is the immediate positing of a problematic which gives way to the articulation of the Event, together

with all of the complexities that this implies. In the first chapter, we discussed how becoming gives way to a *working thought*, and that the being of becoming in the eternal return produces a *contemplative thought* on account of the caesura. We refer to the primary pathway of articulation as forming a working thought, since this thought is part of the virtual events that compose a complex theme. It is as it were the unconscious aspect of thought, what this thought has been addressed to. The thought continued in light of a difference made is what we are referring to as a contemplative thought. Michel Foucault frames such thinking adequately in his commentary on *The Logic of Sense*, when writing:

Thought has to think through what forms it, and is formed out of what it thinks through. [...] The fissure of the I and the series of signifying points do not form a unity that permits thought to be both subject and object, but they are themselves the event of thought and the incorporeality of what is thought, the object of thought as a problem (a multiplicity of dispersed points) and thought as mime (repetition without a model).<sup>4</sup>

Events themselves are events of thought or differentials of thought, not only in the sense that they compose a problem that thought thinks through, but in the sense that the every event involves a fissure with respect to which thought emerges without a model that would serve as the response.

What is at stake with the repetition of thought in Deleuze philosophy is not the two leveled predicative process as in Husserl's thought, but the problematization of the art of living. If learning is the weaving of a singular way of living in which another is affirmed as event, then, the Event of thought, bearing the highest object of affirmation, opens up the future of action in which the new is brought to beings. A new Meno would, thus, involve "the unlimited power to learn without damage to the will to act."<sup>5</sup> Learning would no longer be concerned with death, but with the art of living. Jacques Derrida adequately formulated this inquiry into the art of living when asking: "Is living something that can be learned? Or taught? Can one learn, through discipline or apprenticeship, through experience or experimentation, to accept or, better, to affirm life?" he

asks. One does not simply learn to live, instead, learning to live “should mean learning to die” according to Derrida.<sup>6</sup> If learning involves learning to die, it would only be for the sake of learning how to live. Learning to die has nothing else to teach than learning how to live, a life that would be against death. To die only has importance from the perspective of life.

### ***Meno's Paradox***

*Meno* is considered the earliest dialogue in which Plato asserts that learning is recollection. Its themes are reiterated in *Phaedo* and *Theaetetus*. As is typical of the Platonic dialogues, *Meno* opens up with an inquiry into what is x. The initial question is whether being good is something that can be taught. This question, however, is not Socrates', it is posed by Meno, a young aristocrat influenced by the teachings of the sophist Gorgias. This detail is relevant in the study, as Meno has gotten into the habit of acquiring knowledge and, hence, takes the same approach when conversing with Socrates. In contrast to Meno's arrogance, Socrates pleads ignorance of the matter when stating: “so far from knowing whether or not it's teachable, I haven't the faintest idea what being good is!”<sup>7</sup> Socrates claims that he cannot know if virtue is teachable if he does not know what it is to begin with. Foreshadowing what will later become the theory of recollection, Socrates returns the favor by asking Meno to remember what his teacher Gorgias has taught him on the subject. Meno appears to have forgotten what he has been taught, despite having given public lectures on the matter. Once this is demonstrated by Plato, the two characters go on to inquire into what virtue is in order to decide if it is indeed teachable. The inquiry is itself meant to be an answer to the question. Nevertheless, because Meno is searching for the kind of answer he is accustomed to receiving, the question of whether virtue is teachable appears unresolved. The problem likewise endures with the reader, which is most likely what Plato intended. By remaining

pious to the idea that he only knows that he does not know, Socrates behaves like an exemplary teacher. He teaches nothing while repeating the question in the three segments that compose the dialogue. The first segment of the *Meno* (70a-79d) consists of a refutation of the argument that one knows what being good is, if one has acquaintance with its parts or properties (for example, being able to rule). The parts of being good refer to the good without us having any knowledge of it. Socrates insists that to know what being good is, one must have knowledge of the whole (the form of the good), or what it is in itself.<sup>8</sup> Meno and Socrates arrive at an agreement—for different reasons, as we will soon see,—that the question cannot be answered with reference to different parts or instances of virtue, since the parts themselves refer to a whole that we know nothing of. This agreement signals an impasse in the inquiry, yet the dialogue does not end there. Once the nature of knowledge is emphasized as an essential component of the problematic, the initial question is restated by Socrates, marking a transition to the second segment of the study.

The second segment is most relevant for our purposes (80a-86c). It begins with Meno's shameful confession that even though he has taught others what being good is countless times, he himself does not know the answer to the question.<sup>9</sup> Contrary to a state of puzzlement that would incite a discussant to engage in further dialogue, Meno attributes his bafflement entirely to Socrates' doing, who, in turn, once again professes not to know that which they are seeking. It is at this critical juncture of the exchange that Meno raises an objection to Socrates' way of proceeding by posing the following paradox:

But how can you try to find out about something, Socrates, if you haven't got the faintest idea what it is? I mean, how can you put before your mind a thing *that you have no knowledge of*, in order to try to find out about it? And even supposing you did come across it, how would you know that *that* was *it*, if you didn't know what it was to begin with?<sup>10</sup>

Socrates recognizes Meno's paradox as the "famous quibbler's argument," which in general renders any search for knowledge futile, and more specifically, targets and unsettles his mode of inquiry in the absence of knowledge.<sup>11</sup> He rearticulates the paradox by adding a fragment to it that equally endangers the sophists' method of acquiring knowledge:

you can't try to find out about something you know about, because you know about it, in which case there's *no point in trying to find out about it*; and you can't try to find out about something you don't know about, either, because then you don't even know what it is you're trying to find out about.<sup>12</sup>

While Plato's mouthpiece Socrates appears unaffected by the deadlock he has reached with Meno, in his willingness to address the paradox, Plato himself must have deemed it a potential threat to his epistemology. In addition to this, despite Socrates' polemical response to Meno's formulation of the paradox, it is insufficient in discrediting the latter's claim that one cannot inquire into what one does not know. Socrates must, therefore, defuse the paradox by offering a reply that preserves the consistency of his approach. He begins his argument by reminding Meno of the true belief held by poets and priests that the soul endures after death. With the aid of this premise, he goes on to assert that,

since the soul can never die, and has been born over and over again, and has already seen what there is in this world, and what there is in the world beyond [...] there's nothing it hasn't already learned about. So it wouldn't be surprising if it managed to remember things, the things it used to know.<sup>13</sup>

For Socrates, one cannot learn from others, one can only recollect the things that the soul already knows. If the soul has previous knowledge of the whole, then recollection by inquiry cannot be understood as teaching or 'putting something into' the soul.<sup>14</sup> The search for knowledge that provokes recollection or learning is distinguished from beliefs and habits acquired through an engagement with the empirical world. This assertion is repeated in the *Phaedo*, in which Plato writes: "Learning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time

have learned what we now recollect [...]. We surely agree that if anyone recollects anything he must have known it before,” but has forgotten it.<sup>15</sup>

Meno is enticed by Socrates’ theory, since the notion that we already have knowledge of the whole appears to lend weight to his argument that one cannot inquire in the absence of knowledge. In the typical style of the sophist, he states that he would “like to learn a bit more about” the idea that learning is remembering.<sup>16</sup> Though Socrates recognizes Meno’s request as a ruse, he agrees to demonstrate the theory by leading one of Meno’s slaves through a series of questions on geometry. While the slave has no previous knowledge of geometry, by becoming immersed in a problem, with its corresponding state of puzzlement and desire to know, he begins to recall the solution without being taught anything at all. Socrates reiterates that inquiry does not teach anything, it only “leads out” what the slave implicitly has access to. Because Socrates is able to show that the slave is “retrieving the knowledge from within himself,” he satisfies the argument that one can inquire into things that one does not know, and that the absence of knowledge entices one to learn.<sup>17</sup> Has Socrates effectively defused the paradox, however? The reply preserves the consistency of Plato’s epistemology, but it does not explicitly unravel two states that appear at odds with one another: knowing and unknowing. Plato must maintain the two contrary states in order to uphold the importance of inquiry and the continual search for knowledge in spite of ignorance. The simultaneity of the two states complicates the theory of learning, because Plato must call knowledge that which has already been learned by the soul, all the while referring to recollection as true belief *on the way to knowledge*. The distinction between the two different times of having learned and learning—along with the transitional phase of forgetting—preserve the problematic status of the search. However, once we assume that recollection is true belief on the way to knowledge, questioning itself also becomes problematic.



How does someone with true beliefs begin to inquire into that which one does not know?<sup>18</sup> Remaining within Plato's philosophy, with this sort of question we have effectively come full circle, and returned to Meno's objection. Nevertheless, if the reply is steeped in contradiction and not definitive enough to satisfy the reader, Plato's response might be that the reader has not recollected anything and that his or her search for knowledge resembles Meno's. The third segment of the dialogue shows that a definitive answer to Meno's question in a style that he is accustomed to is likewise impossible.

Despite Socrates' display of recollection, we are shown in the third segment of the dialogue (86d-100c) that, not only has Meno learned nothing in the course of the inquiry, he has regressed to his initial position. It appears as though Socrates is looking to put Meno's mind at ease as he delineates a hypothesis that would resolve the matter once and for all. His argument that if being good is "a kind of knowledge, then it can be taught; and if it isn't then it can't," seems to resonate with Meno.<sup>19</sup> Socrates searches in vain for examples of virtuous people that not only know what virtue is, but have taught it to others. Anytus, an Athenian politician who has acquaintance with various decent people residing in the city, cannot answer how anyone learned to be virtuous in the first place. In light of this, Socrates arrives at the conclusion that virtue is "something that can't be passed on or handed over from one person to another."<sup>20</sup> In accordance with the stated hypothesis, he must also then infer that being good is not a kind of knowledge after all. This claim does not contradict Socrates stance that virtue is knowledge, it instead illustrates that propositional results fall short of defining what being good is.<sup>21</sup> The search is aborted thereafter as Socrates mystifies Meno by claiming that virtue must be a "gift of the gods." He too reverts to his initial position when adding that, the only way to be certain is to inquire into what being good is in itself.<sup>22</sup> Notwithstanding the inconclusive way in which the dialogue wraps up, the reader does have an

indication of what virtue is for Plato. It is through the process of questioning that one cares for the soul, since the soul is improved only by recollecting the potential knowledge that it holds.<sup>23</sup> It becomes evident in the movement of the dialogue that in his willingness to inquire in the absence of knowledge, the slave is more virtuous than the man who rules over him. Because of his inability to inquire when confronted by a problem, and his dogmatic desire to satisfy his own conditions of knowledge so as to proceed to teach, Meno “leaves virtue an empty word.”<sup>24</sup> Meno is not a lover of the search.

### *A Lover of the Search: Learning is Future Oriented*

What is essential [in the Search] is not to remember, but to learn.<sup>25</sup>

The leitmotifs of the Search are: I did not yet know, I was to understand later; and also, I was no longer interested once I ceased to learn.<sup>26</sup>

Deleuze’s *Proust and Signs* is one of those rare texts in contemporary philosophy which cultivates a theory of learning as an apprenticeship to signs. This apprenticeship manages to capture the two sides of aesthetics, the making of a life as work of art, and the work of art as the creation of a life. This new conception of learning is developed in light of Proust’s literary work, *In Search of Lost Time (Remembrance of Things Past)*. The reader will quickly note that the search, as a kind of remembering, echoes Plato’s philosophy. In light of this, Deleuze establishes the tone of the search in the first few paragraphs of his study. He writes: “One might invoke Proust’s Platonism: to learn is still to remember. But however important its role [is], memory intervenes only as the means of an apprenticeship that transcends recollection both by its goals and by its principles. The Search is oriented to the future, not the past.”<sup>27</sup> Though the search for lost time is a search for the truth of things past, according to Deleuze, time regained cannot be

thought of as reminiscence, because it is an instance of the birth of a world that is irreducible to the past one. This subtle shift in orientation, towards the future rather than the past, has radical effects on the way in which Deleuze will go on to conceive of a new Meno in *Difference and Repetition*. A new paradox is already evident in *Proust and Signs*. It is only from the perspective of time regained, which is an event of an abrupt encounter with a sign that unhinges the faculties, that one ‘recollects’ having learned *all along*. “We [therefore] discover what we could not know at the start: that we were already apprenticed to signs when we supposed we were wasting our time.”<sup>28</sup> The idea that the continuous apprenticeship to signs becomes apparent in a final act of apprenticeship, however, does not signal that the search has a predetermined destination; what was there in the beginning is not simply recovered in the end.<sup>29</sup> Neither does Proust’s progressive apprenticeship necessarily constitute a linear search. Proust’s search is like no other, not only in the style of writing that it is expressed, but also because of the singular rhythm that structures his apprenticeship to signs. As Deleuze notes, the search for truth is riddled with episodes of delays, disenchantments, regressions, and wrong roads taken, which cannot be dismissed once the hero recovers lost time. They are instead essential fragments that configure a life of learning. Such a life of learning reveals that “we never know how someone learns” ahead of time, or what sort of encounters with signs make them a writer.<sup>30</sup>

Deleuze offers a clear conception of learning as an apprenticeship to signs in the first chapter of *Proust and Signs*. He writes that:

learning is essentially concerned with signs. Signs are the object of a *temporal* apprenticeship, not of an abstract knowledge. To learn is first of all to consider a substance, an object, a being as if it emitted signs to be deciphered [...]. *Vocation* is always predestination with regard to signs. Everything that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs.<sup>31</sup>

Thus far, we have discussed signs in a number of ways in this dissertation. We first introduced the idea of a sign when outlining the three types of knowledge in Spinoza as they are conceived by Deleuze. We noted that in “Spinoza and the Three ‘Ethics,’” Deleuze defines a sign as an effect: “An effect is first of all the trace of one body upon another, the state of a body insofar as it suffers the action of another body. It is an *affection*—for example, the effect of the sun on our body, which ‘indicates’ the nature of the body and merely ‘envelops’ the nature of the affecting body.”<sup>32</sup> The sign as an effect or affection is produced by the mixture of bodies. The notion that an actual being emits signs that call for interpretation was also discussed with respect to Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. In that work, he argues that “a phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition, but a *sign*, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force.”<sup>33</sup> If learning involves the apprenticeship to signs, this is because a purely actual object does not exist. It always has its other half, the virtual half, which is unfolded with respect to a sign. Deleuze’s preoccupation with the nature of signs does not end there, however. He explores them yet again in the two works on cinema. What matters for us is to have a working understanding of the sign as effect, remembering that the basic definition of sense is that it is an effect produced by the mixtures of bodies. It is indeed difficult to pinpoint the nature of a sign. While all signs involve the constitution of a transcendental field, not all encounters trigger the faculties in time to intervene in the search. In most of our encounters, the sign as that which “forces sensation and that which can only be *sensed* are [not] one and the same thing.”<sup>34</sup> To account for this, in *Proust and Signs* Deleuze conceives of various signs that define the singular search of the apprentice.

There are four kinds of signs that produce the texture of Proust’s search: signs of worldliness<sup>35</sup>; signs of love; sensuous signs; and signs of art. Each sign provokes a distinct address, precisely because it not only has a different relationship with its sense or meaning, but

also because each one corresponds to a different temporal structure.<sup>36</sup> It is appropriate to begin with worldly signs, because these signs, though most frequently encountered, do not *directly* instigate the apprentice to search for truth. Or rather, their address is more likely to stimulate the intelligence to search for logical or possible truths. The apprentice turns to such signs when trying to decipher how a social milieu is organized, what sort of codes admit, exclude, and distribute people in that milieu, and how the change of code transforms the value of signs emitted by people occupying that milieu. The problem with worldly signs according to Deleuze is that they are conventional gestures (for example, a sign of respect) made to produce a desired effect that is sufficient unto itself.<sup>37</sup> By sufficient unto itself, we mean that such signs do not point to some other content besides what they “stand for.” Deleuze, thus, writes that because this sort of sign “anticipates [a predicable type of] action as it does thought, annuls thought as it does action, and declares itself adequate” to its meaning, it is empty.<sup>38</sup> While worldly signs project a commonsensical reaction that falls short of forcing thought into action, they do have the effect of “nervous exaltation” or anxiety, not unlike the mood Meno experiences when conversing with Socrates. In the beginning of the search, this sort of mood propels the apprentice to search for possible truths of signs in the actual object.<sup>39</sup> He turns to the things themselves to point the way. “Struck by a place-name, by a person’s name,” the apprentice

dreams first of the landscapes and people these names designate. *Before he knows her*, Mme de Guermantes seems to him glamorous because she must possess, he believes, the secret of her name. He imagines her ‘bathing as in a sunset in the orange light that emanates from the final syllable—antes.’<sup>40</sup>

The inexperienced way in which the apprentice approaches things as objective entities that intentionally manifest their true content in the signs they emit, however, cannot be solely attributed to the sign. The sign has a subjective pole. Its vocation corresponds to the tendency of the intelligence to represent things or relate them to recognizable content. On this, Deleuze writes

that the “intelligence dreams of objective content, of explicit objective significations that it is able, of its own accord, to discover or to receive or to communicate.”<sup>41</sup> At this stage, the apprentice is disposed to things potentially manifesting their truth to him. He vigorously seeks to extract from them the valuable treasures that he thinks they possess. He sharpens his skills, observes things through a finely tuned microscope, in the hopes of receiving their essential meaning. This level of the search is not unlike the one of the logician.

This method of approaching the world, however, leads to dead end. Deleuze shows that the apprentice becomes uninspired by the truths that he acquires, because they “lack the mark of necessity and always give the impression that they ‘might have been’ different and differently expressed.”<sup>42</sup> In turn, as he feels alienated from what he is observing and describing, he begins to question his own adequacy as a writer. Perhaps he does not have the intelligence or resolve required to become a writer. This form of self-questioning makes him vulnerable to the subjectivist illusion that the truth of signs resides in his association of ideas. The apprentice no longer awaits the object to disclose its truth, but associates the sign with some quality that he recalls.<sup>43</sup> The chain of associations one can construct with the aid of voluntary memory is limitless, as it is arbitrary, no matter how elaborate and clever the linkages made. More will be said on voluntary memory, but for now, we want to stress that like the objectivist illusion, the subjective interpretation of signs, which attempts to offset the failures of the former, is equally inadequate in producing any truths that the writer deems necessary to express. All of the effort exerted in an attempt to decipher signs, by turning to the thing itself or to the association of ideas, produces little to nothing. The time spent on interpreting signs in this way is time wasted. It is no surprise then that the hero of Proust’s literature would become disenchanted with the search; he ceased to learn where he relied on such interpretations. We should not assume from what has been

said that the signs emitted ceased to teach us something, at the least indirectly. Deleuze reminds us that time wasted brings with it the awareness that we do not learn from others. Learning does not consist of the exchange of ideas amongst friends, the acquisition of information, or the imparting of knowledge onto another, which remains abstract unless the apprentice ‘arrives at it by other means.’ It is not, amongst other things, our habituation to a social milieu, our effective immersion in a discipline, or our ability to correctly respond to stimuli. This is why the apprentice learns far less from knowledgeable men who are far more enlightened than he is, than he does when engaging directly *with* his immediate world. As Deleuze writes, “we never learn by doing like someone, but by doing with someone, who bears no resemblance to what we are learning.”<sup>44</sup> We do not learn from another, we learn when unfolding the signs that are emitted in our relation to another. This is why signs cannot be conceived as synonymous with the actual object, but also that they do not coincide with the intelligence that the subject brings to bear on them. How, then, do signs become decipherable? We leave this question open for now and turn to signs of love.

Signs of love are of a different sort because we become more intimately entangled in the relation that produces their vocation. Deleuze writes that, “to fall in love is to individualize someone by the signs he bears or emits. It is to become sensitive to those signs,” in order to unravel a possible world that the beloved inhabit apart from us.<sup>45</sup> To learn is to become sensitive to signs, to not only individualize another while individuating oneself, but also to create a world of encounters with signs in the process. Becoming apprenticed to signs of love is becoming implicated in the signs that will trigger our suffering in the future. The search for truth in signs of love arises with the individualization of our beloved, since it is in distinguishing them from others, and creating a world in which we are sensitive to their signs, that the dual quality of these signs becomes apparent. Deleuze shows that signs of love are equally signs of deception and torment,

because each embrace, kiss, and word spoken by the beloved repeats others from which we are excluded, and points to an unknown world in which we may not be favoured.<sup>46</sup> In other words, we are prevented from comprehending the truth of these signs because we attribute them to the beloved, even though our past loves are equally implicated in the selection of the signs that the beloved emits. The search for truth in signs of amorous love is therefore motivated by jealousy. It is the intense feeling of jealousy that force the apprentice to survey memories of the beloved in order to decipher the earliest moments of their transgressions. When is it that we should have known that they did not love us? Proust writes of the apprentice: "Later, confronting the lie in so many words or seized by an anxious doubt, I would try to remember; it was no use, my memory had not been forwarded in time."<sup>47</sup> For Deleuze, memory in its voluntary form never prompts the intelligence in time to search for truth in signs of love. In retrospect, voluntary memory cannot assist us to discern what events should be highlighted or given significance, so that we may uncover the truth of things past. Signs of love therefore signal time lost. How, then, does the apprentice arrive at the sense of these signs if not by recollecting their truth? Deleuze argues that the apprenticeship to signs is unconscious, not only because we forget so that we can love (again) in the future, but also because signs of love encountered repeat episodes of past ones by introducing differences that we wrongfully attribute to the possible world of the beloved, or to our selection of them. Our suffering is turned into joy once it induces the intelligence to arrive at the general idea that the series of our loves transcend any particular one; hence, allowing us to recognize that our pain is not caused by the beloved.<sup>48</sup> Proust writes that: "Ideas are the substitutes for sorrows [...]. *Substitutes in the order of time* only, moreover, for it seems that the initial element is the idea, and the sorrow merely the mode according to which certain ideas first enter into us."<sup>49</sup> These general ideas are brought about by the dual nature of signs of love. They are



general according to Deleuze, because they are not essences of things past, but rather offer us a transpersonal or more impersonal overall theme of our former loves, in which the beloved is no longer distinguished. This sort of idea is a ‘substitute in the order of time,’ as it gives the apprentice temporary reprieve from sorrow, and allows him to love again by de-individualizing another. The idea propels us towards more encounters with signs of love. It does not retrieve time lost, but instead prepares us to waste time again. The sense of the signs of love, what it means *to love* in Proust’s search, is expressed in the search itself: “love unceasingly prepares its own disappearance, acts out its dissolution.”<sup>50</sup>

Although sensuous signs are not as predominant in *Proust and Signs* as signs of love, they are the most fundamental signs of apprenticeship because they “afford us a *means* of regaining time.”<sup>51</sup> Deleuze understands such signs as precursors to signs of art. We will return to these signs again when exploring the constitution of the problematic field in *Difference and Repetition*. At this stage of our discussion, we simply want to point out that the apprenticeship concerning sensuous signs is unconscious. These signs signal a qualitative difference, for instance, a change in the atmosphere of a room when a friend enters. According to Deleuze, they correspond to countless minute perceptions and contemplations that are seldom accounted for, hence, the tendency to interpret banal encounters with such signs as time lost. Having said this, a sensuous sign can trigger the faculty of memory in its involuntary form by signalling a difference in quality that becomes interpreted as two simultaneous impressions; the latter sounding quite proximal to Plato’s signs of contrary qualities in *The Republic* and elsewhere. Deleuze argues that the differentiation of a quality signalled by a sign arises as an encounter with two impressions, because this sort of sign remains coupled to matter, things, or people, past and present. “Leaning over to unbutton his boots, [the apprentice] feels something divine [or joyous]; but tears stream

from his eyes, involuntary memory brings him the lacerating recollection of his dead grandmother.”<sup>52</sup> Deleuze points to this example in Proust’s literature to demonstrate that the sensuous sign, which is tied to the boot in the present moment, forces involuntary memory to intervene and uncover its meaning. What the apprentice recollects with the help of involuntary memory is a past encounter with the same sensuous quality now associated with the death of the grandmother. Though the sign itself points to a common quality across the two events, it is associated with two different things: the boot and the grandmother. Commenting on these contrary qualities Deleuze writes: “Doubtless the two impressions, the present one and the past, have one and the same quality, but they are no less materially two.”<sup>53</sup> Although these signs, unlike the others we have examined, have the power to “restore us at least at the heart of lost time,” they continue to refer the apprentice to two distinct times along with two dissimilar objects that mislead him into seeking the truth of things past in their association.<sup>54</sup> At this juncture, Deleuze raises the question most relevant for us:

How [do we] explain the complex mechanism of reminiscences? At first sight, it is an associative mechanism: on the other hand, a resemblance between a present and a past sensation, on the other hand, a contiguity of the past sensation with a *whole* that we experienced then and that revives under the *effect* of the present sensation.<sup>55</sup>

More than this, how do we explain that an encounter with a sensuous sign recovers the past in a way that the apprentice has never experienced it before in reality? Why is it that we experience joy in reviving it? These questions signal the limitations and the potentials of sensuous signs. The apprentice of Proust’s search has reached an impasse. Deleuze himself must confront the first indicator of Platonist tendencies in Proust’s text.

To do this, Deleuze begins by arguing that the associative mechanism, or the relation of two objects, cannot explain the sensuous quality that transcends their temporal distance; neither can association explain why something is encountered for the first time. This assertion remains true to

Plato's philosophy who equally seeks to transcend empirical relations. Thereafter, however, Deleuze proposes a disjunction that challenges Plato's approach to recollection. Either the recollection of the whole of the past sensation and the effect of the present object are identical (indeed, this is how Plato goes on to explain how the parts participate in the whole), or, the past sensation is solicited by a sign that introduces an internal difference that is neither equal to the whole of the past, nor the present object. The latter claim could be misinterpreted as the recollection of a mythical past that the apprentice has learned previously. But this would mean ignoring that the sign itself activates the pure past by bringing some new element to it that is unequal to it. To lay out this new comprehension of the past, Deleuze once again refers to Bergson's virtual. He argues that the being of the past "does not represent something that has been [...], [it] does not have to preserve itself in anything but itself, because it is in itself."<sup>56</sup> On the one hand, involuntary memory gives us immediate access into what is, the *being* of the past, rather than involving various series of past presents linked to matter as is the case with voluntary memory. As we saw in the previous chapter, however, Bergson's idea of the virtual, though profound according to Deleuze, does not venture to ask the question that Proust does: "But what is a memory that one does not recall?"<sup>57</sup> With this question, it is not the being in itself of the past or memory which is emphasized by Proust, but the way in which the past is solicited by something other than itself. Rather than explaining the past from the perspective of the present, we have essentially reversed the search in order to unfold the being of the past from the perspective of the sign itself. It will become apparent in what follows that the sign comes from the future (as the lover had anticipated), just as the search is oriented towards it. How does the apprentice, however, arrive at this final revelation?

Before we proceed to the final signs of the search, we must stress that there is something fortuitous in learning which is explicated in greater detail by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*. The notion that learning has this fortuitous dimension is evident both, in the idea that we do not know how someone learns ahead of time, and when Deleuze claims that what has been learned will remain “buried in us if we do not make the necessary encounters.”<sup>58</sup> It is only by making the necessary encounters that the lover of the search is apprenticed to signs of art. Signs of art are immaterial signs that “find their meaning in an ideal essence.”<sup>59</sup> They yield an ideal essence or idea, which is the “unity of sign and meaning,” because they go one step further than sensuous signs, by forcing pure thought to intervene in the search.<sup>60</sup> Signs of art are, therefore, indicators of the reversal of the search in which memory is secondary to the involuntary workings of thought.<sup>61</sup> This reversal works when considered from either side of the aesthetic, in life tending towards artistic creation, and in art producing new possibilities of a life. With signs of art, Deleuze writes, “involuntary memory has found its spiritual equivalent, pure thought, both producing and produced.”<sup>62</sup> Only the faculty of thought can recover the essence of time in its pure state at the limits of the being of the past. This is because time regained in fortuitous encounters with signs of art is the birth of time, or the beginning of a new world, that cannot be explained by the past, but instead explains it. It is only with signs of art that the apprentice arrives at the joyful revelation of how something is experienced for the first time. This final stage of the search is itself learning in the making, not simply the recollection of something already learned. In our discussion, it is a precursor to how learning will become explicated later.

How are we to understand ideal essences, however, once time is recovered? Thus far, we have shown that by being in part enveloped by an object, the sign mislead the apprentice to decipher it in relation to something other than in the genesis of its effect. The apprentice had

sought the cause of the sign in matter emitting it. Worldly signs and signs of love are especially prone to promoting such interpretations, because they do not stimulate the faculties in time to intervene in the search. Even though involuntary memory is solicited in time to seek the meaning of sensuous signs, by pointing to an association between or among objects, the meaning of these signs is equally a material one. Sensuous signs, however, have much more potential than the others, because oftentimes the material sense of these signs is not sufficient enough to explain them away. This is why the apprentice continues to inquire into the sudden joy he experiences when encountering such signs. The only signs that do not tend towards a material meaning, or the search for the cause of the sign in matter itself, are signs of art. This is why Deleuze argues that in each of the worlds that precede signs of art, the sign and its spiritual or dematerialized meaning were not unified. He writes that in art, “meaning itself is identified with this development of the sign as the sign was identified with the involution of meaning. So that Essence is finally the third term that dominates the other two; that presides over their movement: essence complicates the sign and meaning.”<sup>63</sup> Considered by itself, this definition of signs of art is quite enigmatic. However, once we understand that an essence is adequate to the repetition of difference, we begin to grasp how the sign itself is implicated in a transcendental field that makes the essence. We will soon see that thought is the faculty of essences<sup>64</sup> because the differentials of the transcendental field are the differentials of thought; that to which thought as such is coupled or because of which it unfolds. The differentiation produces a dematerialized meaning that only becomes apparent with the development of the sign. The sign points back so as to point forward to an essential difference that pointed the way. The entirety of the process of unfolding and refolding the sign defines learning, or the idea of what it means to learn.

If signs of art are signs of an internalized difference, does this mean that the act of apprenticeship is subjective? Can the unity introduced by signs of art, including the revelation that the apprentice has been learning all along, be comprehended as a recollection of the whole? Does the unity of Proust's search risk reintroducing Platonic essences? In accordance with Deleuze's definition of learning, we have shown how apprenticeship to signs involves a corresponding subjective pole or vocation. Each sign has also served as an indicator of different kinds of metamorphosis that the apprentice undergoes in the course of the search. Despite discussing how the apprentice sheds certain illusions, and the way in which the four signs evoke different uses of the faculties, we have not been able to determine why it is that learning remains unconscious, or 'buried in us,' until it is revealed by signs of art. The idea of internalized difference moves us in that direction. For Deleuze, essence in Proust's text is "something like the presence of a final quality at the heart of a subject: an internal difference [...] 'in the way the world looks to us.'"<sup>65</sup> An internal difference determines the singular point of view of a subject, and this point of view expresses a world. In this respect, Proust's subject is like Leibniz's monad. For Proust, art is the 'final quality at the heart of a subject,' because art gives the apprentice access to a world that external reality failed to deliver. But because of this internal difference or essence revealed in signs of art, the apprentice has access to worlds beside his own. Signs of art reveal that all beings weave a life, or that life itself is an artistic creation. This is essentially what is revealed once time is regained. Proust, hence, writes that: "Only by art can we emerge from ourselves, can we know what another sees of this universe that is not the same as ours [...] Thanks to art, instead of seeing a single world, our own, *we see it multiply*, as many original artists as there are, so many worlds."<sup>66</sup> All sorts of worlds spring up once the apprentice learns that they find their sense in the

making. All of life's learning tends towards an "unconscious destination," which is that of art. "We realize that our idle life was indissociable from our work: 'My whole life [...] a vocation.'" <sup>67</sup>

Learning is continuous throughout the course of the search, even though the signs to which the lover of the search is apprenticed to do not form a coherent universe. The apprentice is unaware that he has been learning all along until the faculty of essences, that of involuntary thought, is awakened by signs of art. "Once they are manifested in the work of art," Deleuze writes, essences "react upon all the other realms; we learn that they already incarnated, that they were already there in all these kinds of signs, in all the types of apprenticeship." <sup>68</sup> Despite implying a kind of ascending dialectic followed by a descending reminiscent of Plato, the notion that essences react upon other signs by ascribing their place in the search according to their effectiveness, is not most problematic. <sup>69</sup> We will deal with the unity of the search in a moment. What remains paradoxical is that the essences of signs of art do not merely react on sensuous signs. They are progressively developed by apprenticeship to sensuous signs. This is why Deleuze argues that sensuous signs prepare us for signs of art. Time regained is itself the birth of time, but it equally recovers an essence that is progressively developed in past encounters. Each point of progressive development envelops, and is enveloped by, series of past individuations or viewpoints that have determined the apprentice. This is precisely why learning as recollection of things past, though secondary to the workings of the faculty of thought, remains significant from the perspective of time regained. Rather than concerning one structure of time, the act of learning involves different lines or fragments of time that cannot be coopted to form a cohesive whole. The paradoxical nature of learning instead has the potentials to further help us explain the workings of forgetting and memory at the heart of Deleuze's idea of apprenticeship.

Are we to conclude from what has been said that viewpoints participate in the essences? Deleuze argues that Proust's essences are akin to Platonic ones in that they have an "independent reality."<sup>70</sup> This independent reality, referred to Proust as the real, cannot be reduced to any particular viewpoint, even while the viewpoint itself envelops this essence. Deleuze writes that "essence does not exist outside the subject expressing it, but it is expressed as the essence not of the subject but of Being, or of the region of Being that is revealed to the subject."<sup>71</sup> Or stated otherwise, "it is not the subject that explains essence, rather it is essence that implicates, envelops, wraps itself up in the subject. [...] In coiling round itself, it is essence that constitutes subjectivity. [...] Essence is not only individual, it *individualizes*."<sup>72</sup> The notion that essences individualize the subject, relates back to our discussion in the second chapter on how sense is expressed by the individual in the predicate form. The same idea is present in *Proust and Signs* where Deleuze argues that essences "have imprisoned themselves" in us or are our hostages, but also that in some way essences keep us open to what is eternal in them.<sup>73</sup> Many of these notions, including, the movement of implication of a viewpoint, complication or development of essence, and explication of signs on the part of the apprentice, are themselves Neo-Platonic concepts that are given new grounding in Leibniz's philosophy. In addition to this, the idea that thinking itself becomes active when "forced to conceive essence" in the encounter with signs, is one that remains inspired by Plato.<sup>74</sup> What are we to make of these Platonic themes in Proust's search for lost time? Is the unity of the search from the perspective of time regained identical to Plato's recollection of the whole? We have delved into the distinction between Deleuze's Proust and Plato on the problem of recollection. But now it is this conception of essence, and its reaction on other spheres of the search, that risks reintroducing the idea that learning is the recollection of the whole. The parallels we have raised between the two thinkers, along with the questions that ensued, must be considered



in relation to what Deleuze calls style. The concern raised is a question of style, or one might even call it a question of pedagogy, because, according to Deleuze, style itself unifies or weaves together the multiple fragments that compose Proust's work of art. Style or pedagogy is just as relevant in Plato's dialogues as his dialectic is itself a type of production of essences in the course of learning.

In our study of the *Meno* we showed that Plato's dialectic is aimed at recovering essences that had been previously learned by the soul. These essences, such as the form of the good, must be known as a whole prior to inquiry. It is only through inquiry that we understand the way in which the parts themselves participate in the whole. In turn, a state of bewilderment does not permit an inquirer to discover something new, but rather by uncovering a part, to go onto recovering the whole.<sup>75</sup> Deleuze claims that the idea that the intelligence exists before inquiry, that the whole is already known, "this is the dialectical trick by which we discover what we have already given ourselves, by which we derive from things only what we have put there."<sup>76</sup> Even the state of bewilderment becomes ironic according to Deleuze, precisely because it is tolerated so long as the parts or fragments are restored to a stable essence by the intelligence itself.<sup>77</sup> Isn't the dialectic this attempt to harmonize the whole so that we may discern between true and false participants in the idea? In contrast, the act of thought which "comes after" for Proust, is not equal to the recollection of past events, it is itself producing. In turn, essence itself as time recovered does not form an organic unity; the different fragments are not unified in a whole even while they participate in the same Event of thought. Time as the essential weaver of the search "is not a whole, for the simple reason that it is itself the instance that prevents the whole."<sup>78</sup> It prevents the whole because it is an instance that opens up onto the future. Time regained is the ultimate healer, the greatest health, since from this perspective the apprentice no longer begrudges time wasted or

the wrong roads taken. He rejoices in having become an artist. Proust's essence according to Deleuze is not predetermined; it instead "signifies at once the birth of a world and the original character of a world. It is in this sense that the work of art always constitutes and reconstitutes the beginning of the world, but also forms a specific world absolutely different from others."<sup>79</sup> The difference in style, Proust's ability to put forth a kind of search in which something new is created, relies on his conception of time as fragmentary. "An essence," Deleuze writes, "is always a birth of the world, but style is that continuous and refracted birth, [...] that birth which has become the metamorphosis of objects. Style is not the man, style is essence itself."<sup>80</sup> Style manages to determine the essence of objects by showing them in their metamorphosis, by articulating the perpetual recreation of a world.

### **The Idea of Learning: Sign, Question, and Surface**

We have set out to explore Deleuze's theory of learning so that we may better understand his appeal for a new Meno in *Difference and Repetition*. Our discussion on the apprenticeship to signs has special relevancy, as it orients us within a key book of philosophy that does not explicitly present a systematic or exhaustive theory of learning. One might even entirely overlook the role of learning in Deleuze's philosophy, since his thoughts on the subject are scattered in a few chapters; at places they appear arbitrary as though having little to do with the central themes that compose the text. Having in mind the study of Proust, however, we notice that one of the fundamental ideas animating the text, what Deleuze calls the "theatre of the future," confronts the complex problem of learning through repetition. A more nuanced and multifaceted account of our latest working definition of learning as concerning differentiation is also fostered in the mentioned

work. Our aim in this section will be to build on two of the central arguments that Deleuze makes with respect to learning: learning is a temporal apprenticeship to signs, and this apprenticeship to signs involves the constitution of a problematic field. What we have gathered thus far is that, to learn is to unfold a problematic field, a surface, which inheres in the quality of a sign as that which allows it to be sensed<sup>81</sup> to begin with. We seemed to have argued two things that appear to be in contradiction with one another. On one hand, the apprenticeship to signs is an unfolding of the field, on the other hand, the problematic field is that which allows the apprentice to sense the sign. The problem does not lie with the sign itself, but with the structure of time in which the sign is unfolded. The sign indicates that which is disguised in it as its condition, that which allows us to grasp it as result in the empirical. Hence the principal definition of sign in *Difference and Repetition*: “the sign is indeed an effect, but an effect with two aspects: in one of these it expresses, *qua* sign, the productive dissymmetry [of disparate orders of repetition]; in the other [in the actual] it tends to cancel it.”<sup>82</sup>

The principal problem that Deleuze faces when laying out a theory of learning is how the repetitious encounters with a sign do not produce a repetition of the same. Or, in other words, how it is that beneath the “generalities of habit [...] we discover singular processes of learning,” or “the play of singularities.”<sup>83</sup> Deleuze does not dismiss the banal experiences of the everyday as time wasted. On the contrary, his claim is that underneath the stereotypical or mechanical repetitions that we interpret as the same, there are processes of learning that go unaccounted; in this sense, we have knowledge of the product or the result, but not of what we are learning. The first step to displacing the idea that learning involves the repetition of the same, or what might be understood as the acquisition of certain types of behaviours in which the representation and the action coincide to produce the result, is to distinguish the two types of repetition. As we saw in

third chapter, there is an “economic difference” between the mechanical or stereotypical repetition and ontological repetition. Stereotypical repetitions are generalities in which each one is made equivalent or resembles the others. Such repetitions essentially allow us to measure, replace, and exchange one thing, encounter, or term, for another. They are well captured by the scientific hypothesis that “given the same circumstances” x will ‘learn’ the following.<sup>84</sup> Deleuze writes that in the modern category of habit we

find the two major orders: that of resemblance, the variable conformity of the elements of action with a given model in so far as the habit has not been acquired; and that of equivalence, with the equality of the elements of action in different situations once the habit has been acquired.<sup>85</sup>

On the one hand, resemblance itself points to the representation of an object in accordance with which an action is to be realized or perfected. Conversely, habituation, as a form of integration of a certain action, allows us to represent its manifestation across different instances and contexts as being the same.<sup>86</sup> In either case, representation mediates between the desired outcome and actions. In contrast, to repeat in light of the ontological repetition “is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent.”<sup>87</sup> Repetition as something singular, a singular time with no equivalent in relation to which it could be measured, is in direct opposition to the idea that we learn by reproducing the same experience. With respect to this type of repetition, the apprentice does not “repeat because he has not yet learned the part.”<sup>88</sup> One does not repeat to learn, one learns in repeating differently. Any predetermined conceptions of what sort of learning one is engaged in are inadequate. One never simply learns that which they intentionally set out to grasp. Learning is an adventure with no predetermined destination; there is no aim to learning but learning itself. This sort of learning, Deleuze notes, “takes place not in the relation between a representation and an action (reproduction of the same), but in the relation between a sign and response (encounter with the other).”<sup>89</sup>

After having distinguished the two repetitions, Deleuze goes on to reiterate the idea that learning is an apprenticeship to signs. The apprenticeship to signs becomes much more complex in *Difference and Repetition*, with reference to the object, with respect to its development, as well as the vocation that corresponds to it:

Signs involve heterogeneity in three ways: first, in the object which bears or emits them, and is necessarily on a different level, as though there were two orders of sizes or disparate realities between which the sign flashes; secondly, in themselves, since a sign envelops another 'object' within the limits of the object which bears it, and incarnates a natural or spiritual power (an Idea); finally, in the response they elicit, since the movement of the response does not 'resemble' that of the sign.<sup>90</sup>

The principal aspect of a sign is that it is produced as an effect when there is a difference sensed in the repetition of an encounter. The sign introduces a dissymmetry between the past events with respect to the encounter with an object. But signs do much more than point to the object in its materiality, indeed, they are the effects of an encounter that for Deleuze split the present in two directions. In other words, the sign seems to allow us to leap away from the present and to install ourselves in the past so as to unfold it. The sign, then, is paradoxically both the sign of an actual object, and that which constitutes the encounter with another to begin with.

Plato conceives of this difference as a qualitative contrariety or an opposition that forces us to unfold the sign. According to Deleuze, however, in grasping the sensible in terms of qualitative opposition, Plato reduces the being of the sensible to a sensible being, to the empirical. "In defining the first instance by that form of qualitative opposition or contrariety," he asks, "does not Plato already confuse the being *of* the sensible with a simple sensible being, with a pure qualitative being?"<sup>91</sup> The whole notion of contrariety is important to grasping how two conceptions of apprenticeship to signs diverge. Deleuze's argument is that qualitative contrariety merely captures the empirical result of the difference, but not the difference in itself. It is therefore somewhat inadequate to say that there is a difference between the actual and the virtual, since it is

the differentiation that makes the difference or produces the effect which is unfolded. Secondly, Deleuze reiterates that a sign envelops another ‘object’ that incarnates a spiritual (dematerialized) power. By this he means the sign points to a repetitive field in which it is unfolded. The clearest example he provides of this repetitious encounter with signs is how one learns how to swim:

When a body combines some of its distinctive points with those of a wave, it espouses the principle of a repetition which is no longer that of the same, but involves the other—involves difference, from one wave and one gesture to another, and carries that difference through the repetitive space thereby constituted.

He goes on to conclude that: “To learn is indeed to constitute this space of an encounter with signs, in which the distinctive points renew themselves in each other, and repetition takes shape while *disguising itself*.”<sup>92</sup> Deleuze’s argument is that each encounter with a sign constitutes a repetitive field, in which the past events are renewed or differentiated. The sign splitting the present in two directions at once, involves the tracing of the past and the production of the novel, the perpetual constitution and displacement of this repetitive field, with each encounter. The notion that repetition disguises itself in each encounter with a sign is fundamental to this theory of learning. The disguising of the repetition of the field, in the repetitious actions of the individual, in part, prevents the individual from having an adequate idea of the learning. In other words, forgetting is part and parcel of learning. What we have an indication of is the learned, not the process itself which inheres in it as that which constitutes it.

While the encounter with a sign is always an encounter with the other or the different, it bears repeating that such signs are encountered in our relations with beings in the world, in the making of such relations. As discussed in previous chapters, Deleuze is seeking to understand effects as affections that are produced by the mixtures of bodies. It is as though the effect of the relations of bodies cannot be contained in the present, or is nowhere found in the living present which is an embodied one. Effects are actualized or expressed by bodies, or what bodies express

are such effects, but the effect itself flees the present.<sup>93</sup> Now, the deciphering of a sign in the encounter is not the acquisition of knowledge about this or that thing, but the way in which the relation as such is made or renewed. Learning is essentially the making of a life, the creation of a relation, within which one becomes what one is. The repetitious nature of the encounters with another, capture the differentiations of such a relation; how we continuously become another or ourselves, while the other becomes different in the same movement. To the encounter with a sign, there corresponds the essential question, the openness of the question, with respect to which this repetitive field unfolds, with respect to which the surface of sense is thought as thought arises with respect to this unfolding. The question is, for Deleuze, precisely the point of chance, the opening for the affirmation of the differentiation of a relation. It seeks after that which grounds the differential relation. As with Heidegger, Deleuze makes the question be the central point with respect to which the instance of learning unfolds. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger argues that “being able to learn presupposed being able to question.”<sup>94</sup> But what does it mean to question? For Heidegger questioning puts beings into question. The inquiry “why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” gets at the ground of beings: “Where and what is their ground?”<sup>95</sup> This initial question allows him to do a turn around, so as to claim that the question does not in any sense involve the nothing. Worse than this, the nothing makes the possibility of their not-Being. “Nothing is simply nothing. Questioning has nothing more to seek here. Above all, by bringing up Nothing we do not gain the slightest thing for the knowledge of beings.”<sup>96</sup> We have brought up Heidegger’s mode of questioning, not because it is the same as Deleuze’s, but because it gets at something that has importance in the theory of learning. What the questioning seeks after is the ground of beings, not the nothing. One can never uncover anything by inquiring after this nothing. Instead, to the questioning, in a blind and unconsciousness way, there corresponds the grounding

of beings. This questioning concerns learning, because the ground, the surface, defines that which we are appropriated to it in learning; whatever we are concerned with in our everyday encounters. In other words, the questioning addresses itself to that which is most proximal, yet distant, in the relation of beings.

The idea that questioning seeks after the ground of beings is not foreign to Deleuze's questioning instance, since in his philosophy questioning has a "problematizing and *searching force*."<sup>97</sup> According to Deleuze, the repetitious field of encounters with signs originates with the question, the chance or aleatory point. The questioning instance, conceived of as (non) or ?-being, infuses the indetermination in the genesis of the combinatory of problems.<sup>98</sup> In turn, the genesis of problems finds its origin in the question, since the always open question 'announces an ungrounding' that sets off the movement of apprenticeship. The question is itself the primary point of suspension (an unfolding of the problem or the crack of thought) that corresponds to a difference of intensity, or alternatively, an inequality between two *disparate* realities; the ground and the ungrounding is that which makes the difference that forces us to unfold the sign. We have formulated the question as a kind of suspension, a meanwhile, because, for Deleuze, "everything has its beginning in a question, but one cannot say that the question itself begins."<sup>99</sup> What is paradoxical about the question itself is that it is simultaneously the limit point and the beginning point of any determination as such.<sup>100</sup> The repetition of the question, the always renewed state of questioning, entails the continued *displacement* of origin, or the absence of any origin. The question, therefore, cannot be said to begin as the "imperatives which it exercises have no other origin than repetition."<sup>101</sup> In Deleuze's philosophy, everything hinges on the placement and displacement of the ground with the eternal return of differentiation, the point of the question which gives way to repetition. In what way does the questioning instance install the thinker in the



empty form of time? Or in what sense is it the unfolding of thought as such? Through our study of *Proust and Signs*, it has become clearer that the sign functions between different levels; that it causes the internal differentiation of problems when acting as a signal, and that such a “problematic structure is part of objects themselves, allowing them to be grasped as signs, just as the questioning or problematizing instance is a part of knowledge allowing its positivity and its specificity to be grasped in the act of learning.”<sup>102</sup> Deleuze argues that the unfolding of this problematic structure, the virtual part of the object, is an unconscious process. For him, questions and problems “belong to the unconscious, as a result [of which], the unconscious is differential and iterative by nature.”<sup>103</sup> This iterative nature of the unconscious is demonstrated by Deleuze with the impersonal game of the dice-throw. The game is meant to show that every encounter with a sign entails an affirmation of chance that raises the ground all the while transforming it. It is appropriate to refer to a game or the play of dice when depicting the apprenticeship of the unconscious, since there is something fortuitous in the questioning instance that seeks after the ground.<sup>104</sup> The process of learning is “something total every time, where the whole of chance is affirmed in each case, renewed every time, perhaps without any subsistent arbitrariness.”<sup>105</sup> While learning is itself a progressive determination of the ground, the search itself, the installment of the ground from the perspective of the question, is something total every time, something singular.<sup>106</sup> The each time in light of the question, is singular precisely because the question presents the point of the fracturing of the subject; the difference of ground with respect to the ungrounding that we never do away with as such.<sup>107</sup> The question being the point of chance from which the dice are thrown, is also the crack of thought, the zero point of thought, from the point of view of which the surface or field is itself constituted. The question from the perspective of which the repetitive field of the game is constituted presents “the primary intensity which marks the zero point of thought’s

energy, but also from which thought invests its new surface.”<sup>108</sup> In other words, for Deleuze, thinking itself emerges with this crack, fissure, or fracturing, intimate to the emission of singularities that constitute a repetitive field. In the “Tenth Series of The Ideal Game” in *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze writes that:

The ideal game of which we speak cannot be played by either man or God. It can only be thought as nonsense. But precisely for this reason, it is the reality of thought itself and the unconscious of pure thought. [...] Each thought emits a distribution of singularities. All of the thoughts communicate in one long thought.<sup>109</sup>

Here we have returned to our inquiry in the second chapter which is how Deleuze conceives of the relationship of events and thought. More will be said on thought below. Here, we want to note that for Deleuze the differentials that constitute the surface or field are also the differentials of thought, with ideas arising with the crack of thought.

We can now turn to the argument that apprenticeship to signs constitutes a problematic field or an Idea.<sup>110</sup> Since signs “cause problems,” in exploring the way in which learning constitutes a problematic field, we are again outlining the “double aspect of the quality of the sign”: its implication in problems, and its explication in solutions.<sup>111</sup> By arguing that the act of learning is a laying out of the ground that conditions how one learns, we are pointing towards the central paradox of the problematic field itself. In the first place, the constitution of the problematic field, along with the two moments of the determination of the Idea, refers to two complementary processes in the theory of learning. Deleuze argues that: “The paradoxical functioning of the faculties—including, in the first instance, sensibility with respect to signs—thus refers to the Ideas which run throughout all the faculties and awakens them each in turn.” Moreover, he notes that: “the exploration of Ideas, and the elevation of each faculty to its transcendental exercise, amounts to the same thing. These are *two aspects* of an essential apprenticeship or process of learning.”<sup>112</sup> He reiterates and clarifies this conception of learning, when noting that: “learning may be defined

in two complementary ways, both of which are opposed to representation in knowledge: learning is either a matter of penetrating the Idea, its varieties and distinctive points, or a matter of raising a faculty to its disjointed transcendent exercise.”<sup>113</sup> What sort of relevance do these two aspects have in the theory of learning? Are they merely two different ways of talking about learning, or does the change of perspective matter? By taking up the Idea, we want to show how a life is constituted in the process of learning, how an infinitive is determined in learning, and how the progressive determination of the Idea gives way to points of view, or individuations, indicative of what is learned. The paradox of learning arises in light of the learning and having learned, what we earlier tackled with respect to Plato’s *Meno* as the problem knowledge; that of knowing and being on the way to knowledge.

Deleuze’s chapter on “Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference,” in which he lays out the Idea through differential calculus, composes some of the most difficult pages of the text. Deleuze stresses, however, that mathematics are one way of formulating problems or rather, a *solution* to a problem. The problem itself need not be mathematical. This distinction between the problem-instance and solution-instance of Ideas is drawn from the work of Albert Lautman. Thus far, we have discussed how the structure of the problematic field is generated with the emission of singularities, which are themselves related to, or surrounded by, ordinary points in the progressive determination of the Idea. In doing this, we placed emphasis on the problematic field in *The Logic of Sense*. Now, we will expand on Deleuze notion of the problematic field by specifically looking at what he means by the different dimensions of Ideas. As a way to place into perspective what we are concerned with here, let us revisit the example of swimming. Deleuze argues that: “to learn to swim is to conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field.”<sup>114</sup> Or, stated slightly differently, “to learn is to enter

into [...] the relations which constitute the Idea, and into their corresponding singularities.”<sup>115</sup> The initial problematic of learning is that differential elements, which are considered ordinary in the progressive determination of the Idea and give way to real relations, are also the elements that compose singularities, effects or events that transform the entirety of the transcendental field. Since we have shown how this field or surface of bound effects is generated elsewhere, here, we would like to pose a problem that is central in the theory of learning; a problem that such a theory shares with the philosophy of event. The question that is most difficult to answer when exploring how ‘someone learns’ is the following: “how is a relation transformed into being, and being transformed into relation?”<sup>116</sup> Deleuze asks a similar question in *The Fold*: “how could the relation jump out of the non-relation [singularities]?”<sup>117</sup> How are we to grasp the divergent dimensions that configure an Idea-problem, that of the differential relations of elements, and their corresponding field of singularities (the being of the problematic constituted by differential relations)?<sup>118</sup> Let’s begin with how an Idea is constituted. Deleuze writes that an idea is

a multiplicity constituted by differential elements, differential relations between those elements, and singularities corresponding to those relations. These three dimensions, relations and singularities, constitute the three aspects of multiple reason: determinability or the principle of quantifiability, reciprocal and principle of qualifiability, and complete determination or the principle of potentiality. A singularity is the point of departure for a series which extends over all the ordinary points of the system, as far as the region of another singularity which itself gives rise to another series which may converge or diverge from the first. Singular and regular, distinctive and ordinary have for philosophy of ontology and epistemological importance much greater than those of truth and false in representation: for what is called *sense* depends upon the distinction and distribution of these shining points in the structure of a given Idea. It is therefore a play of reciprocal determination from the point of view of its relations, and of complete determination from the point of view of singularities, which makes an Idea in itself progressively determinable.<sup>119</sup>

All of the aspects that define the virtual structure of an Idea must be severed from actuality, or considered separately from that which exists. Deleuze expresses the multiplicities of the Idea with the deceptively simple equation,  $dx/dy$ . According to him, the object  $x$  or  $y$ , is actually

undetermined, while being completely determined in the Idea. In other words, the “object” of the virtual, what we have referred to as a complex theme of sense, is the objective dimension of real relations that is at each point completely determined, while the object itself and such real relations remain undetermined or undifferentiated.<sup>120</sup> The problematic field is not initiated by the common quality that two ordinary elements share (the identical  $d$ , or the One), but by a singular instance that emerges in the differential relation of the elements  $dx$  and  $dy$ ; as though pointing to a third element that differentiates them ( $dx/dy$ ). In other words, “the elements [ $dx$ ,  $dy$ ] reciprocally determined by these relations, [are] elements which cannot change unless the multiplicity changes.”<sup>121</sup> In addition to this,  $dy$  and  $dx$  do not exist independently of the structure in which they are developed, they are “perfectly determinable” in relation to the each other.<sup>122</sup> Deleuze writes that “for this reason a principle of determinability corresponds to the undetermined as such.”<sup>123</sup> We have referred to this point as the point of change from the perspective of the question. The multiplicity of the Idea itself changes with the introduction of a disparity or potential in the system that emits each singularity. Each event itself arises by uniting difference to difference in the entirety of the problematic field. It is defined by ideal connections of differential relations that determine a remarkable point in line with the difference in intensity introduced into a system. The entire system participates in the constitution of the singular points. We can also say the initial disparity introduced in the repetition of the past makes them be the events of repetition. What is repeated in the differential relation is the question.

The problem of the relation of differential elements is elaborated on by Deleuze in *Negotiations*. While in *Difference and Repetition*, as in *Proust and Signs*, he talks about learning and apprenticeship, in his other works they are replaced by the concept of becoming. In *Negotiations*, he gives the example of the mutual relation of the wasp and the orchid to

demonstrate what he calls a bloc of becoming or a singular becoming. He writes that “the orchid seems to form a wasp image, but in fact there is a wasp-becoming of the orchid, an orchid-becoming of the wasp, a double capture since ‘what’ each becomes changes no less than ‘that which’ becomes. [It is] one and the same becoming, a single bloc of becoming,” but an asymmetrical evolution of the two.<sup>124</sup> The bloc of becoming, what we have been referring to as the line of events, is not something that is common to both beings, although it consists of events that are co-created in-between as effects without being reducible to either one. The bloc of becoming forms what is considered by Deleuze to be a life that is “between the two [or] outside of the two.”<sup>125</sup> The second kind of becoming, the one referring to the wasp-becoming of the orchid, or the orchid-becoming of the wasp, although reciprocal, is an asymmetrical form of becoming. The two beings do not individuate the bloc of becoming in the same way, but each individuates insofar as there is a differentiation in the bloc of becoming itself. We will say more about individuation below. For now, we want to further elaborate on the two determinations of the Idea. The differential relation of elements has a different function depending on the dimension in which it is considered. To elaborate, the transformation of a relation into being and being into relation correspond to a doubled determination. Deleuze notes that the Idea “appears as a multiplicity which must be traversed in two directions, from the point of view of the variations of differential relations, and from the point of view of distribution of singularities which correspond to certain values of these relations.”<sup>126</sup> We have already seen how the game of dice-throws refers to a principle of complete determination, and that such a principle of complete determination is linked to the “power of difference, or the unequal in itself” which introduces the potentiality.<sup>127</sup> But we also referred to this inequality as an undetermined, which permits there to be any sort of determination by transforming the multiplicity of the Idea. Deleuze argues that “the differential is

‘an ideal difference’ without which [...] *undetermined quantity* could not carry out the determination expected of it. In this sense, the differential is indeed pure power, just as the differential relation is a pure element of potentiality” as the third element of a relation.<sup>128</sup>

The internal resonance of singular points is attributed to an intensive quantity, which essentially distributes the field of the problem by determining the values of singularities. Each singularity is itself a differential marking a differential relation, the potentiality of which is measured in the development of sub-series, or the elements of a relation. The transformation of the relation of ideal elements points us towards the other sort of determination, which is reciprocal inclusion, or an exchange of determination. From the point of view of reciprocal determination, singularities are themselves converging points of a changed relation. The difference between complete and reciprocal determination, is that the latter deals with the different degrees of differential relations (“diverse forms”), the way in which the relation changes, while the former deals with “the values of a relation,” or the distribution of the series of past events (“composition of a form”).<sup>129</sup> We already referred to the reciprocal determination of genetic elements when we noted that they are only determinable in relation to each other.<sup>130</sup> Reciprocal determination can, therefore, be circular if considered from the perspective of the elements that envelop singularities, and develop these qualitatively.<sup>131</sup> While both, reciprocal and complete determination condition the Idea, the way in which the Idea is expressed or explored depends on how we proceed, and from what perspective we understand it. Reciprocal determination demonstrates that the sub-series of the Idea, what we refer to the adjunct fields of problems, have a “dependence upon singular points,” while complete determination, at the same time, allows us to “pass from one part of the object where the function is represented by a series to another where it is expressed in a different

series;” meaning that we move from one singularity to the neighbourhood of another, by tracing the progressive development of the Idea.<sup>132</sup> Deleuze argues that

the completeness of the determination also implies the progressivity of adjunct fields. In going from A to B and then B to A, we do not arrive back at the point of departure as in a bare repetition; rather, the repetition between A and B and B and A is like progressive tour or description of the whole of the problematic field.<sup>133</sup>

Progressive determination likewise refers to reciprocal determination, since in the forced movement through which the problematic field arises, also involves the “varitable progression in which the reciprocal terms must be secured step by step, and the relations themselves established between them.”<sup>134</sup> Reciprocal and complete determination, which according to Deleuze form the sufficient reason behind all qualitative diversity, are synthesized in the progressive development of the Idea. Progressive determination, he writes, “unites in the same continuous movement the process of reciprocal determination and complete determination [...] It constitutes the total figure of sufficient reason into which it introduces time.”<sup>135</sup> The potential of complete determination is, according to Deleuze, “measured” or further determined by what he refers to as solution curves; the adjunct fields of problems. Progressive determination, therefore, serves to demonstrate the way in which an Idea is dis-continuously incarnated in qualities and real relations.<sup>136</sup> In other words, it is not the problem that is discontinuous, but the solutions that are discontinuous or discrete. Potentiality prepares a process of solvability in divergent fields “which correspond to—without resembling—a virtual multiplicity.”<sup>137</sup> These divergent fields, or what we understand as divergent time of progressive determination, are essential to grasping how the process of learning leads to individuation; how learning relates to the learned.

We previously discussed this process of individuation as a point of view in the Leibnizian sense. The same theme was also discussed in the second chapter where we explored with respect to the static ontological genesis. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze relies on Gilbert



Simondon's concept of individuation to lay out the explication of the field.<sup>138</sup> To grasp what the role of individuation is in the development of solutions, we have to return to intensive quantities, since quantities, according to Deleuze, dramatize the Idea (prepare it to be actualized). We must keep in mind that individuation does not presume the existence of an individual. It is, instead, meant to trace the process by way of which quantity, the affection on the self or becoming affected, is itself explicated in actual things. Since quantity is implicated in itself, and distributes the potentials of pre-individual singularities, in the process of individuation, intensive quantity must become subdivided, and must alter in some way. This is why Deleuze refers to secondary intensities when referring to individuation. The complexity of individuation lies in that it remains implicated in singularities which are completely determined or crystalize once the process of explication begins, and it is also folded in qualities, or what we understand with regard to the theory of learning as the sufficient reason behind sensibilities, traits, and characteristics. These sensibilities, traits, and characteristics are merely the products of individuation, or what we have been learning or learned. Learning entails the constitution of a problematic field, and the metamorphosis of the self, or the absence of the self in the process of individuation. The process of individuation which measures the potentiality of the virtual is explicated in qualities which "belong" to the self. Qualities can be thought to belong to the self, insofar as the explication of intensities disguises the very transformation of the self, in which essentially nothing is possessed by the subject or individual.<sup>139</sup> What is disguised in qualities, understood as responses to a problem, is the "other aspect" of individuation, its implication in singularities. This is why learning is reduced to mere habituation in the sense of the repetition of the same, when it is the repetition of the same that must be explained from the perspective of learning. By looking at the twofold process of learning, we see that what is *learned* is a sensibility, or a way of being, even

while learning itself always displaces the stability of any subject position by emerging with an essential differentiation. In turn, what is learned, the solutions to a problem, shape our occasions for learning, the sort of signs we become sensitive to, and to what extent we are capable of exercising the power of our faculties. We mean this in the Spinozist sense that the more a body experiences active affections and is affected in a variety of ways, the greater its capacity to individuate, to think, to learn, to grasp its power of action.

### **A Note on How to Play**

The entirety of the process of learning is encapsulated by Deleuze in the playing of the dice game. This dice game is not played by the subject as such, but instead opens up the space for the highest affirmation. The question that initiates the game is the hinge, “the form of empty time, the *Aion* through which pass the throws of dice.”<sup>140</sup> The chance point brings the future to beings, in turn, beings must respond in such a ways as to affirm the future, to say yes to the future. Deleuze tells us that: “If man does not know how to play: this is because, even when he is given a situation of chance or multiplicity, he understands affirmation as destined to impose limits upon it.”<sup>141</sup> The human way of playing the game is to impose limits on it; to tie the flow of time in which the greatest freedom of the future is affirmed, to predictable or predetermined ways of existing and experiencing life. A pure idea of play, instead, involves “a game which would be nothing else but play instead of being fragmented, limited and intercut with the work of man.”<sup>142</sup> According to Deleuze, what approximates this pure idea of play, or mirrors it from its other side, is the work of art, the way in which artists proceed in making art. In this respect, he follows a long tradition in which the idea of play is furthered. Heraclitus’ *Fragments*, Schiller’s *Aesthetic Education of Man*, Nietzsche’s *Ecce Homo*, and Fink’s “Oasis of Happiness: Towards an Ontology of Play”, are but

few works that have carried this tradition along. In his paper on the ontology of play, Fink, following the lead from Heraclitus, has the correct intuition when writing that “play is, as it were, existence centered in itself. [...] Unlike other activities, play does not fit into this style of life. It consists conspicuously with the future mode of being, and it cannot easily be fitted into the complex structure of goals. Play is not for the sake of a ‘final goal’” or *telos*.<sup>143</sup> This does not mean, however, that play is a purposeless activity. On the contrary, Fink argues that in being a creative act, play has a special relationship with the flow of time as it places no restrictions on it. Because it places no limits on the flow of time, it is the sort of activity that has an internal purpose, a self-sufficient meaning, which is the freedom to create. Such an interpretation of play is, of course, taken from Schiller, who claims in the *Aesthetic Education of Man* that the object of play is to create a living form, or what is also referred to as beauty. He writes that

by beauty, the sensuous man is led to form and to thought; by beauty the spiritual man is brought back to matter and restored to the world of sense. From this statement it would appear to follow that between matter and form, between passivity and activity, there must be a middle state, and that beauty plants us in this state.<sup>144</sup>

It is beauty, the creation of the living form in play, that human beings exchange this passivity for activity; the passive existence for an active one in which their freedom is affirmed. In other words, it is the aesthetic life that restores the greatest freedom. We are not saying that Deleuze’s philosophy agrees with Schiller’s on every point, but only that they share a certain tendency. This tendency is evident in Deleuze’s dice game, the game that the Aion plays with itself, which makes the form only to see it lost to the abyss; the formlessness which insists in the form, returns as the unformed which allows us to play the game again anew. Here, the repetitions are that activity that produces the beautiful, the aesthetic life, or life as art. In the pure idea of play, the making of a life is the continuous structuring and destroying of a form without melancholy. This is tragic joy.

## Event of Thought

A singular act of learning happens in an instant.  
But this instant can be the longest pause puzzling thought.

In the first chapter, we laid out the central problematic guiding this dissertation work, the two pathways of articulation which are engendered with respect to the paradoxical instance of the eternal return. In line with Deleuze's central thesis in *The Logic of Sense* that sense moves in two directions simultaneously, we have shown that the event is the expressed of the expression, at the same time that it is inexhaustible in the actual, always taking flight in the other direction. Since part of the event is non-actualisable, in the third chapter, we asked if it is something livable; if we can enter the region of the becoming of things by the thread of time. When we laid out our central problematic, we suggested that this is indeed the case from the point of the paradoxical instance. Not only can the non-actualisable part of the event be thought, but it is that which addresses itself to thought as such. If learning involves the constitution of a problematic field, this is always from the point of view of the paradoxical instance which, by fracturing the 'I', engenders thinking; a thinking that arises with differentiation, but is also one long thought as the differential of thought in the Idea. The paradoxical instance, which primarily presents itself as the encounter with a sign to which questioning corresponds, introduces the unequal in thought, the unfolding of thought, because of which thinking itself arises. It is, then, appropriate that we approach thinking through learning, since learning transforms thinking from being a mere possibility, to being something concrete. Just as we do not know how someone learns in advance, what sorts of encounters with signs weave a unique or singular art of living, thinking itself does not arise in conformity with a pre-established model. As Deleuze puts it, learning entails "thought which is born in thought, the act of thinking which is neither given by innateness nor presupposed by reminiscence but

engendered in its genitivity [in short, its genesis], [it] is a thought without image. But what is such a thought, and how does it operate in the world?”<sup>145</sup>

In “The Image of Thought” and elsewhere, Deleuze quotes Heidegger so as to argue that the act of thinking does not resemble its possibility alone, neither do we think because it is possible to do so: “man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone, however, is no guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking.”<sup>146</sup> The notion that we are not yet thinking, and that thinking is not reducible to possibility, is meant to reinforce the idea that the act of thinking is engendered in thought, rather than being something summoned at will. What is called thinking does not reflect a recognizable image of thought with respect to which its correctness could be verified. As Sartre has shown us, if recognition on the part of the ego were somehow implied in the act of thinking, it would bring it to a halt, severing thinking from the transcendental field in which it unfolds. If anything, acts of recognition hinder the act of thinking. In this respect, images of thought that imply its possibility can likewise be its impediment. So then how is that we become capable of thinking? While the approaches of the two are distinct, we would like to briefly lay out what Heidegger means by thinking, so as to demonstrate how Deleuze resolves the same problematic. In his introduction to *What is Called Thinking?*, Glen Gray sums up Heidegger’s position with the following:

For Heidegger thinking is a response on our part to *a call* which issues from the nature of things, from Being itself. To be able to think does not wholly depend on our will and wish, though much does depend on whether we prepare ourselves to hear the call to think [...]. Thinking is determined by that which is to be thought as well as by him who thinks.<sup>147</sup>

There is a tension running throughout Heidegger’s text on thinking. On the one hand, he argues that we are not yet thinking, because that which is to be thought “has turned away from us,” or it has withdrawn from us in being constituted. This argument is meant to preserve the notion that

thinking is not simply accessible to us whenever we set out to think. Heidegger also, however, proposes that there is a kind of reciprocity between thinking, and the call which emerges in our relatedness to beings. “Insofar as we are at all,” he notes “we are already in relatedness to what gives food for thought.”<sup>148</sup> Indeed, for Heidegger, what calls for thinking is that which is most thought-provoking (whatever we are concerned with), and it is thought-provoking precisely because it is that which is most proximal to us yet distant, as that which is concealed. He writes that, what gives us food for thought “wants itself to be thought about according to its nature [...]. [It] demands for itself that it be tended, cared for, husbanded in its own essential nature, by thought.”<sup>149</sup> Heidegger conceives of that which is thought-provoking as a gift, to which we, in turn, give thanks or thinking. How do we give thanks by thinking? Thinking itself is considered a gift by Heidegger, because it is in thinking that our essential nature is itself manifested: “original thinking is the thanks owed *for being*.”<sup>150</sup> By considering that which is thought-provoking as gift, he is not arguing that by thinking we can appropriate whatever spurs us to think; this would not be giving thanks *for being*, but a violation of it. Rather, it is that with which we are concerned with that “appropriates us to thought.”<sup>151</sup> The call remains a kind of imperative to which thinking responds by being devoted to that which is thought-provoking in its problematic being.<sup>152</sup> For Heidegger, we are devoted to that which gives food for thought by committing it to memory; by both saving it from perishing and recalling it. What does memory have to do with thinking? In the opening pages of the same text he writes that:

Memory is the gathering of thought. Thought of what? Thought of what holds us, in that we give it thought precisely because *It* remains what must be thought about. Thought has the gift of thinking back, a gift given because we incline toward it. Only when we are so inclined toward what in itself is to be thought about, only then are we capable of thinking. In order to be capable of thinking, we need to learn it first. *What is learning?* Man learns when he disposes everything he does so that it answers to whatever essentials are addressed to him at any given moment. We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think about.<sup>153</sup>

There are two central ideas that stem from the argument that memory is the gathering of thought. The two explain the tension that we outlined earlier. In the first place, memory as the keeping of that which essentially is, and, therefore, remains to be thought about, is intimately tied to concealment and forgetting. On the other hand, if memory is the gathering of thought, along with that which remains to be thought in what is recalled, then, thinking is, for Heidegger, the *unfolding* of memory.<sup>154</sup> It is a kind of recollection, a thinking back. In the first place, we become capable of thinking by learning. Learning, what we shall refer to with reference to Heidegger as being on the way to thinking, is the development of a sense of responsiveness, or becoming attuned, to the “presence of that which is present.”<sup>155</sup> It is by becoming disposed to the call of being in every instance, the presence of our essential relatedness to beings, that we are directed to recollect that which is committed to memory. This answer must be disappointing, since Heidegger does not tell us exactly how to learn. In inquiring, we return to the previous point, which is that we learn in every moment that we heed the call of that which gives us food for thought. This sort of approach is consistent with the argument that thinking cannot be taught, it does not consist of putting something into the soul, everyone must “learn to do it for” themselves.<sup>156</sup> Does this mean that thinking is a remembering? The idea of thinking that is put forth by Heidegger and advanced by Deleuze is one in which thinking itself plays a creative or inventive role, meaning that thinking aligned with learning no longer gives us an image of thought in which the object is merely represented.<sup>157</sup> The act of thinking does not address itself to an already constituted being. Both the subject and the object lose their identity in the act of learning. In his later works, Heidegger will refer to this turning towards that which, by gathering itself in memory, gives way to thought, as the event of appropriation. The event of appropriation, that which addresses itself to thought as a living problem, gives way to meaning.<sup>158</sup> In addition to the notion that thinking is the gathering of

memory, or the “the ground of meaning,” Heidegger will argue that Dasein “finds itself already claimed by an inherited meaning and then [...] responds creatively to this inheritance.”<sup>159</sup> The two moments of thought, thought as the gathering of memory and its inventiveness, find their place in Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze, however, does not conceive of thinking as a gift, since for him the event of thought is a violent occurrence. According to him, we become capable thinking in an encounter with a sign that violates the harmonious workings of the faculties.

If the act of thinking emerges in the encounter with a sign, hasn’t Plato already posited an accurate presentation of it? For Deleuze, Plato is the exception and the founder of the orthodox image of thought. He is the exception because in Plato’s philosophy

learning is truly the transcendental movement of the soul, irreducible to knowledge as to non-knowledge. It is from ‘learning’ and not from knowledge, that the transcendental conditions of thought must be drawn. This is why Plato determines the conditions in the form of reminiscence not innateness.<sup>160</sup>

If Plato does posit a form of learning that involves the transcendental movement of the soul, without reducing it to the empirical, to the division of non-knowledge and knowledge which remained problematic in the *Meno*, why does Deleuze reject his image of thought? The answer lies in the movement of the soul. As we have already discussed, not only does Plato posit a dogmatic image of thought when he makes the movement of the soul “disappear with the result,” but the act of learning, for Deleuze, does not primarily consist of the movement of the soul. Rather, it involves the introduction of time in thought.<sup>161</sup> The introduction of time in thought keeps open the inventive aspect of thinking. This is why Deleuze argues that a new *Meno* would involve a transcendental structure in the ‘form of an empty time in general,’ and not reminiscence of things past. If thinking were simply a remembering of things past we would never manage to think anything. Thinking instead addresses itself to the new. “What forces does this new bring to bear upon thought, from what bad nature or ill will does it spring, from what central ungrounding



which strips thought of its innateness and treats it every time as something which has not always existed, but begins, forces and under constraint?”<sup>162</sup> For Deleuze, it is an encounter with the other or sign that generates the act of thought.

Wherever the occasion for thinking presents itself as a chance encounter with a sign, thinking is no longer a mere possibility. Deleuze says: “Do not count upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an encounter with that which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a passion to think.”<sup>163</sup> It is a chance encounter with a sign, in this case, a signal of a difference in intensity that corresponds to a question, that the search itself is set off. As discussed previously, by search, we mean that the sign perplexes the apprentice, forcing him or her to unfold the problematic field. The search corresponds to an order according to which the transcendental use of the faculties becomes triggered. Although there is an order and communication amongst the faculties at their limits, the movement of one to the other is thought of as discordant by Deleuze. He argues that the “discord of the faculties, chain of forces and fuse along which each confronts its limit, receiving from (or communicating to) the other only a violence which brings it face to face with its own element, as though with its disappearance or its perfection.”<sup>164</sup> Rather than “converging and contributing to a common project,” the faculties emerge only to be exhausted in their own element or the nature that belongs to it alone.<sup>165</sup> Each faculty reaches this state of exhaustion, or is born in dissolving which is its perfection, because each one emerges already repeating something new implicated in the problematic field. Each dice throw implies the complete determination of the field itself, meaning that there is nothing else supplementing it. The potential generated in the field is that which propels the workings of the faculties to their limits. It is the dissolution of each that enables the others to emerge. The fundamental encounter in which

the transcendental faculties are awakened, “condenses all singularities, precipitate all the circumstances, points of fusion, congelation or condensation in a sublime occasion, *Kairos*, which makes the solution explode like something abrupt [...] this is having an Idea as well.”<sup>166</sup>

According to Deleuze, a chance encounter with a sign demonstrates the involuntary workings of the faculty of thought, the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself, where nothing outside of the field of its unfolding is presupposed.<sup>167</sup> The object of encounter is distinct from the object of recognition in that its object is the being of the sensible, an affection, that is not a quality, but the reason behind any quality as such.

In this sense it is opposed to recognition. In recognition, the sensible is not at all that which can only be sensed, but that which bears directly upon the senses in an object which can be recalled, imagined or conceived. [...] The object of encounter, on the other hand, gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense.<sup>168</sup>

As noted, Deleuze argues that this affective tone is not a quality or a sensible being which would reduce it to an object of recognition. Rather, it is the being of the sensible, the difference in intensity, that produces the sign. This difference in intensity, the affective tone itself, is the imperceptible from the point of view of recognition or the common sense workings of the faculties. The sign is a sort of limit of the sensible that forces emergence of the transcendental use of the faculties. Deleuze writes that, “that which can only be sensed (the *sentiendum* or the being of the sensible) moves the soul, perplexes it—in other words, forces it to pose a problem: as though the object of encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a problem.”<sup>169</sup> In what way does it raise the problem? The affection enables the unfolding of the problematic field, or the gathering of memory. Deleuze writes that “sensibility, forced by the encounter to sense the *sentiendum*, forces memory in its turn to remember the memorandum, that which can only be recalled.”<sup>170</sup> As we saw in the second section in the study of sensuous signs, involuntary memory intervenes with respect to the primary affection. Here, however, it is an inequality in intensity, and not a quality referring

to two moments, which triggers the being of the past. The being of the past is central insofar as, at its limits, the faculty of memory or memorandum, is no longer separated from what it forgets. The “forgotten thing,” Deleuze writes, “appears in person to the memory which apprehends it.”<sup>171</sup> He goes on to say that, that which has been disguised, or disguises itself in the movement of explication, “is no longer a contingent incapacity separating us from a memory which is itself contingent: it exists within essential memory as though it were the ‘nth’ power of memory with regard to its own limits or to that which can only be recalled.”<sup>172</sup> The tracing of the being of the past, not only involves that which has been thought in the process of learning, but also presents this in a way never seen before. We must remember that the being of the past is a singular time in which a differential relation is enveloped. It must be, as Deleuze notes, the *always has been seen* and the *never seen*, since it is both a life in which we are implicated, but one which always seems to escape us. We have already seen how the tracing of the field from one singularity in the field of the problem to its adjacent fields all the way to the vicinity of another one, belongs primarily to the being of the past explored by the faculty of memory. The being of the past plays a crucial role in the recollection of what has been learned, since it is the gathering and tracing of what the apprentice had been hitherto thinking. The tracing of the folding of singularities in the adjunct fields or centers of envelopment, offer an obscure image of the disconnected solutions of the problematic. As we saw in the second chapter, these are the analytic predicates, the learned as such, in which the event inheres. This sort of tracing of the line of singularities is itself informed by the difference in intensity; each is differentiated from another in intensity, even while each repeats the other. These singular events that condition the problem as such, are the “differential elements in thought,” the elements of its genesis.<sup>173</sup> We also, however, argued that this difference in intensity is developed or raises Mnemosyne as a function of an essential ungrounding. Time out

of joint here means that the ground itself emerges in being dissolved. At the limit of the faculty of memory, emerges that which is unequal to the events of the past. It is this unequal which gives way to the *cogitandum*. Deleuze writes that a “characteristic of transcendental memory is that, in turn, it forces thought to grasp that which might be something other than thought [...] as though this were both the final power of thought and the unthinkable.”<sup>174</sup>

Although we have spoken about the faculties in the order that they arise, a linear narrative does not inform their use. The being of the past does not merely dissolve because it is exhausted, it dissolves because it arises with respect to the empty form of time, or it emerges in being ungrounded. This is why Deleuze writes that “an origin assigns a ground only in a world already precipitated into universal *ungrounding*.”<sup>175</sup> Or, “beyond the grounded and grounding repetitions, [there is] a repetition of *ungrounding* on which depend both that which enchains and that which liberates.”<sup>176</sup> It is the future that is itself repeated in each and every singular point composing the conditions of the problematic. For Deleuze, the past is born in repeating the future; it can be recalled by virtue of an internal differentiation. We have already shown that all of the singular points that compose the line are, in retrospect, divergent, and that the entire image is thrown out of joint. This disjointing of the image gives birth to the act of thought, because, in light of it, thinking is no longer equal to that which it has thought through passively as a working thought, but must address itself to that which is to be thought on the basis of the different. This is what it means to “engender thinking in thought” or thinking as creation.<sup>177</sup> But what is this different? This difference, the unequal itself, is the object of encounter which is posed yet again in the being of the question. In other words, it coincides with the being of the question, the questioning instance, even if this only arises once we have thought through the field of determinations in a

passive way. As we have said, this question for Deleuze is “what difference is there?” Because the question addresses itself to thought, it is as though an imperative that implies

our greatest powerlessness, but also that point of which Maurice Blanchot speaks endlessly: that blind, acephalic, aphasic and aleatory original point which designates ‘the impossibility of thinking that is thought,’ that point at which ‘powerlessness’ is transmuted into power, that point which develops in the work in the form of a problem.<sup>178</sup>

The question presents the powerlessness of thought (the zero point of thought), that which is outside of thought addressing itself to it, but also that chance point when thought makes the greatest affirmation, or manages to give birth to the new. According to Deleuze, we manage to think something new when we “make something new of repetition itself,” when there is a difference made between the repetitions.<sup>179</sup> It is essentially the question that makes way for the highest affirmation, by opening up the way for the selective affirmation (the yes saying). The question ‘which one is the being,’ becomes the question, ‘what difference is there,’ in which the imperative to repeat generates the act of thought, the differential of thought. Deleuze writes that in the reversal of the field thought from the perspective of the caesura, “the frontier or ‘difference’ is [...] singularity displaced: it is no longer between the first time and the others, between the repeated and the repetition, but between these types of repetition. It is the repetition itself that is repeated” in the contemplative thought.<sup>180</sup> It is that which is disguised in the second repetition that addresses itself to thought, as the outside of thought; Thought-Nature. It is along with this reversal of the line that the highest selection is made, the affirmation of the being of becoming in the eternal return. From the initial sensibility with respect to the sign, to the question that correlates with it, we have the fracturing of the ‘I’ by the empty form of time, the indetermination, on account of which thinking emerges. Deleuze argues that “far from being the properties or attributes of a thinking substance, the Ideas which derive from the imperatives enter and leave

only by the fracture in the 'I', which means that another always thinks in me, another who must be thought."<sup>181</sup> In other words, thinking does not arise without "becoming something else, *something that does not think*—an animal, a molecule [...] that comes back to thought and revives it."<sup>182</sup> Here we do not think ourselves, but only think in becoming other.

The act of thought is revisited in *The Logic of Sense* with the paradox of the actor. In that text, Deleuze argues that there is something excessive about the event (the effect which is nowhere localizable in the present) that can never be actualized, but must nevertheless become accomplished or articulated. In the previous chapter, we mentioned that the present is transformed from the perspective of the being of the past. Deleuze now argues that there must be a third present pertaining to that which is excessive in the Event: "there must be a third [present], pertaining to the *Aion*. In fact, the instant as paradoxical element or the quasi-cause which runs through the straight line must itself be 'represented'."<sup>183</sup> This third present is introduced in that text because, for Deleuze, the part of the Event which is non-actualisable can only be accomplished in thought or by thought.<sup>184</sup> It can only be accomplished in thought because thinking is invested in the effects of the mixtures of bodies with respect to which it is endlessly born; "the incorporeal splendor of the event [is] that entity which addresses itself to thought, and which alone may invest it."<sup>185</sup> In other words, thought arises by being coupled to singularities or effects in which it is invested, or better yet, thinking arises with the difference of intensity, the unequal, the indeterminate, the unformed, with respect to which a new surface of singularities is emitted. This time of thinking which happens with time out of joint, the crack of thought, is accomplished in the third present, a

present without thickness, the present of the actor, dancer, or mime—the pure perverse 'moment'. It is the present of the pure operation, not of the *incorporation* [in worlds, individuals, and persons]. It is not the present of subversion or actualization, but that of the counter-actualization.<sup>186</sup>

The third present puts out of play the present of actualization; it is an interval, a minimal time. As we have noted, the events of the past are reviewed from the point of view of the future, even if this is not apparent in the tracing of the singular events that compose the problematic field. The path that the event traces is “invisible and becomes visible in reverse.”<sup>187</sup> The encounter with a sign, being that instant that sets off the unfolding of the transcendental field, suspends the incorporation of the event in the present. The intensity of the event is embodied by the actor, as “the most precise and the most instantaneous, the pure instant at which it divides itself into future and past.”<sup>188</sup> This is what Deleuze interprets as a “change of the will, a sort of leaping in place (*saut sur place*) of the whole body” in which the “organic will [is exchanged] for a spiritual will.”<sup>189</sup> The actor, being identical with the quasi-cause, or with the paradoxical instance with which it emerges, traces the problematic field as it unfolds with respect to the *Aion*. Being immanent to the flow of the transcendental field, the actor mimes the singular components of the Event. We have already highlighted that Deleuze conceives of this tracing as the working thought which affirms becoming. However, if the actor is identical with the quasi-cause, the reversal of the event in the direction of the future presents us, in turn, with the moment when the mime is called upon to become the actor, to begin again once all of the roles have been exhausted. The highest affirmation is not found in the repetition of the past to which the mime becomes equal, but the point at which the actor is faced with the question: Which one is the being? Or, as Deleuze frames this question: What difference is there? Here is the most instantaneous act of thought, as it turns about to affirm a being as event, by affirming the being of becoming. This is the highest test of the eternal return; the point at which before and after no longer coincide. In the doubled affirmation the actor does not affirm the predicate in a universal judgement, but has, instead,

learned that what a being is coincides with how that being becomes. This sort of affirmation was most appropriately expressed by Spinoza as an active joy or affection embodied by the actor.

For Deleuze, “either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us.”<sup>190</sup> Not to be unworthy of what happens to us, in the first place, means that we live in such a way as to affirm life, the active affections, and secondly, that the will that the quasi-cause creates in us calls for the articulation of the event in the form of a problem. Deleuze refers to the actor’s identification with the quasi-cause as humorous conformity, because the entirety of the process is produced from the perspective of the caesura which disjoins before and after. The event essentially awaits the actor, just as the actor patiently awaits the event. The event is the chance opened up to the actor, the actor, in turn, must be decisive in the affirmation. This is why, for Deleuze, “becoming the actor of one’s own events,” *amor fati*, “is one with the struggle of free men.”<sup>191</sup> The actor does not merely repeat the events of the being of the past which make a life in which they are implicated, but thinks the event from the perspective of that which is unequal to the past. If the actor brings “about the correspondence of the minimum time which can occur in the instant with the maximum time which can be thought in accordance with the Aion,” this is precisely because the paradox itself inheres in the highest thought; how to become worthy of the event.<sup>192</sup> With the doubled affirmation, we have the affirmation of the being of becoming; the affirmation of the differentiation of beings in which all beings return to themselves through the others. If the event of thought involves the greatest freedom, this is because the sort of thought that is created in light of the eternal return is one that affirms the differentiation of beings; beings taken as events. Although this is not what freedom is, in the negative sense, we could also say that beings are freed from utility, purpose, or having to coincide with their identity. The eternal return is the eternal truth of beings, their freedom



affirmed in the Event; to do away with one's carnal birth, to "thereby be reborn, to have one more birth."<sup>193</sup> This notion of freedom resonates with Heidegger's writings: "freedom for what is opened up in an open region lets beings be the beings they are. Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be."<sup>194</sup> While Deleuze does write in depth about freedom, the notion that what is affirmed in the eternal return is the continued becoming of beings, for us, resonates with Heidegger's idea of freedom as letting beings be what they are. Along with Constantin Boundas, we are convinced that the problem of freedom (especially the way in which it is linked with the dissolution of the subject and object in the eternal return) is an important one to understand Deleuze's philosophy of the future.<sup>195</sup> In his piece "Gilles Deleuze and the Problem of Freedom," Boundas writes that "Deleuzian freedom is nothing without the Nietzschean double affirmation of the eternal return, in other words, without the repetition and the counter-actualization that makes the difference."<sup>196</sup> That freedom is indeed central to the philosophy of the future is evident in the first few pages of *Difference and Repetition*:

Make something new of repetition itself: connect it with a test, with a selection or selective test; make it the supreme object of the will and of freedom. [...] [Repetition is not a matter of extracting from] it is rather a matter of acting, of making repetition as such a novelty; that is a freedom and a task of freedom.<sup>197</sup>

By letting beings be what they are, we are not saying, then, that the actor becomes indifferent or that they adopt an attitude of resignation. On the contrary, we are saying that becoming worthy of the event, means affirming life in such a way that the art of living, the creation of a life, becomes a problem. Deleuze writes that:

Only the free man, therefore, can comprehend all violence in a single act of violence, and every mortal event in a single Event, which no longer makes room for the accident, and which denounces and removes the power of *ressentiment* within the individual as well as the power of oppression within society. [...] It is this mobile and precise point, where all events gather together in one that transmutation happens: this is the point at which death turns against death; where dying is the negation of death, and the impersonality of dying no longer indicates only the moment when I disappear

outside of myself, but rather the moment when death loses itself in itself, and also the figure which the most singular life takes on in order to substitute itself for me.<sup>198</sup>

It is in this sense that the singular events of a life create a vocation that is not delimited to what is most personal in a life. For Deleuze, it is a matter of becoming a cosmic ego, a citizen of the world, or making the affirmation that is affirmed of all beings, which participate in one and the same Event.

### **Speaking the Event**

Throughout this chapter we have shown that learning involves making a life, and that this singular life produces a problem proper to it, the problem of the art of living. We have already discussed how propositions, as solutions to a problem, are produced in relation to what Deleuze calls “extra-propositional genetic elements.”<sup>199</sup> So as to turn to the other line of articulation, we have argued that the event must somehow become accomplished. The second type of articulation, the one in which the actual is counter-actualized, involves the creation of the means of expression in which the problem is expressed. We will return to the creation of a new type of enunciation in a moment. Here, it bears repeating that, for Deleuze, sense is essentially extra-propositional, meaning that it cannot be actualized in the solutions that it gives way to; the solution-instance differs from the problem-instance. “The mode of the event,” he writes, “is the problematic. One must not say that there are problematic events, but that events bear exclusively upon problems and define their conditions.”<sup>200</sup> Deleuze distinguishes the problem from solutions, because we cannot do away with the problem in the solutions. The solution in the propositional mode presents us with the instance of the acquisition of knowledge, but the problem itself persists in spite of it. This is because the problem defined properly does not concern the acquisition of knowledge, what we are concerned with in the problem-instance is the art of living, which, as we have seen thus far, is expressed in the infinitive as a becoming. The act of enunciating, likewise, cannot resolve the

problem once and for all, even if it is in a strange conformity with it; in other words, there isn't anything that bridges the learned and the action itself, or the thought and thinking for us. Just as the problem is disguised in the solutions, the act of enunciation is not some sort of a calculative move on the part of the thinker that would produce the result. This is precisely why, for Deleuze, the task of the thinker is not inspired by knowing, but involves inventing new possibilities of life or what he alternatively understands as belief in the world. "It may be that to believe in this world, in this life, has become our most difficult task, the task of a mode of existence to be discovered on our plane of immanence today."<sup>201</sup> To believe in the world consist of creating modes of existence that are affirmative: "It is to say yes to what is singular yet impersonal in living; and that one must believe in the world and not in the fictions of God or the self."<sup>202</sup>

The articulation of a becoming is an act in which we create or invent new possibilities of a life. But what is this articulation of this becoming in the infinitive a response to? In the first place, for Deleuze, the infinitive is the expression of being in that being is Voice, that it expresses itself in the verb: "The Verb is the univocity of language, in the form of an undetermined infinitive, without person, without present, without any diversity of voice. It is poetry itself. As it expresses in language all events in one, the infinitive verb expresses the event of language."<sup>203</sup> Why claim that the univocal being is poetry itself? In "An Unrecognized Precursor to Heidegger" Deleuze arrives at the argument that this poetic conception of language injected in the current language, generates

a kind of foot stomping, a stammering, an obsessional tom-tom, like a repetition that never ceases to create something new. Under the impulse of the affect [of such a language], our language is set whirling, and in whirling it forms a language of the future, as if it were a foreign language, an eternal reiteration, but one that leaps and jumps.<sup>204</sup>

The discourse of being is this language of eternal reiteration, of the repetition of difference. By approaching articulations of the event in this sense, language itself, for Deleuze, becomes a Sign able to give way to “the Thing in its muteness—vision [becoming is vision]. The thing is the limit of language, as the sign is the language of the thing [or] the Sign shows the Thing.”<sup>205</sup> We will briefly return to the relationship of these two languages in a moment. Here we want to highlight that this is a way of responding to the central question we laid out the introduction and developed in the course of laying out our problem: What does it mean to speak “for” another if the other is to be affirmed as event, and if all others are grasped as events? We posed this question because one and the same Event allows us to affirm the singular sense of a becoming, and all becoming as inter-expressive, or as said in the same sense (univocal being).<sup>206</sup> On a more basic level, with this question we have begun from the premise that speaking itself always involves another, is either a relation with another, or works to invent a new relation with another by approaching another as event. Deleuze and Guattari take up this question when writing the following in *What is Philosophy?*:

Artaud said: to write for the illiterate—to speak for the aphasic, to think for the acephalous. But what does ‘for’ mean? It is not ‘for their benefit’ or yet ‘in their place.’ It is ‘before’. It is a question of becoming. The thinker is not acephalic, aphasic, or illiterate, but becomes so. [...] We think and write for animals themselves. We become animal so that the animal also becomes something else. [...] Becoming is always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes the people to come and the new earth. The philosopher must become the nonphilosopher so that nonphilosophy becomes the earth and people of philosophy.<sup>207</sup>

The philosopher must become the non-philosopher, must become something else, so that something else is created through him or her; the philosopher, the thinker, must become the artist. We have already discussed how the thinker is coupled to that which does not think, that which speaks without speaking; these are the affections that compose a differential relation. It is through these affections that the authors conceive of double becoming. The thinker doubles the surface,

the mirror, in which another is reflected as a condensation of singularities.<sup>208</sup> One extracts the pure event from becoming, and articulates this event, so that that which they are in relation to becomes another, just as they become another. As we pointed out in chapter 1, such articulation involves two things: it involves a critique of knowledge as a critique of modes of living that diminish life, and the creation or invention of new modes of life. In “Literature and Life” Deleuze argues that:

Writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience. Writing is inseparable from becoming: in writing, one becomes-woman, becomes-animal or –vegetable, becomes-molecule, to the point of becoming-imperceptible. [...] To become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find a point of proximity, indiscernibility, or undifferentiation, where one can no longer be distinguished from *a* woman, *an* animal, or *a* molecule.<sup>209</sup>

We do not write for ourselves, we write for others. This writing is not about another, on behalf of, or in their place, so that we may impose a form on a being, so that we may represent it, or instruct others about it. Writing in a style that displaces such limits when equivalent to a becoming, opens up a world in which the Thing becomes a sign or affection doubling becoming.

The resoluteness to express the event, the affirmation that invests the thinker with the capacity to act, is first and foremost not a philosophical activity, for us, it is an ethical position. Deleuze finds this articulation in painting, cinema, and literature. With respect to literature, it is a matter of producing a new style of expression in a dominant language. Great writers, Deleuze argues, make a minor use of language, “they minorize this language, much as in music, where the minor mode refers to dynamic combinations in perpetual disequilibrium. [...] This exceeds the possibilities of speech and attains the power of language, or even of language in its entirety.”<sup>210</sup> In the minor mode, it is not a matter of addressing those “who are already there, awaiting their becoming conscious,” instead it is a matter of expressing blocks of sensations or pure affects, anticipating what, together with Guattari, he calls minority or non-human becoming(s).<sup>211</sup> If our

aim is to render the existence of something visible in a new light, then, what is at issue is the becoming-other of the subject, or, as Daniel Smith notes, its de-subjectivation. To carry language to its limit so that it falls silent giving way to the outside of language, would be a becoming-minor of a major language.<sup>212</sup> It is here that words themselves become “pure visions, but visions that are still related to language in that they constitute an ultimate aim, an outside, an inverse” of language.<sup>213</sup> This is what it means to become a foreigner in one’s language, to speak with an accent. As Deleuze notes, the style of expression “isn’t just an aesthetic matter, its [a matter of] ethics.”<sup>214</sup> Nevertheless, the enunciation itself in which we create new ways of living, or becoming in relation to a problem, is, for Deleuze and Guattari, the ultimate task of philosophy. In *What is Philosophy?*, the two argue that “the concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing—pure Event, a hecceity, an entity: the event of [another] or of the face (when, in turn, the face is taken as concept).”<sup>215</sup> The concept does not exist a priori, it is not somehow discovered or unearthed, but must be created in relation to a problem: “all concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning.”<sup>216</sup> Or alternatively, the concept “is the event as pure sense that immediately runs through [its] components.”<sup>217</sup> According to Deleuze and Guattari, the concept is distinguished from the proposition, because the concept itself has a becoming; it creates this becoming in the infinitive. The absolute survey of the plane of immanence, the ontology of the concept, pertains to the infinite speed of thought, or its self-positing; the becoming of thought. The relative becoming of concepts refers to the pedagogy of the concept, the way in which a concept along with its components or intensive features is created to resolve a problem. The resolution of a problem, expressed in the creation of a constellation of concepts, each traversing the other and transforming it, is the event expressed in philosophy.

The question that remains is in what way does a style of articulation create new modes of existence, or affirm in existence that which does not have existence. This question is relevant, since the concept speaks the counter-actualized event; the event as becoming, severed from the actual. Earlier we argued that the Event disjoins before and after. This disjointing does not merely pertain to the becoming with respect to the caesura, but pertains to the relationship of becoming to history. The event as a lived problem not only requires an articulation of a new way of living, but it also calls for a critique of evaluations that hinder life. We already suggested that the lived problem expressed in the infinitive, *to play*, opens up a critique of modes of evaluation that reduce beings to categories of knowledge in which they are conceived in accordance with a usefulness, utility or purpose; in which they are made to coincide with the identity we bestow upon them. Philosophy, then, according to Deleuze must find a place not only for the becoming expressed in the infinitive, the dice-thrower, but also for the idiot, the tyrant, the priest, god, the friend, the animal, and other conceptual personae that act out the theatre of events. Or better yet, conceptual personae “are thinkers, solely thinkers, and their personalized features are closely linked to the diagrammatic features of thought and the intensive features of concepts. A particular conceptual persona, who perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us.”<sup>218</sup> The conceptual personae are intrinsic to the act of thought; they arise along with it as the multiplicity of views engrossed in a thought. Again, these personae are not found in states of affairs, in History, but are articulated in relation to a problematic field in its becoming. The thinker “wrests them from both the historical state of affairs of a society and the lived experience of individuals, in order to turn them into the features of conceptual personae, or *thought-events* on the plane laid out by thought or under the concept it creates.”<sup>219</sup> In other words, while the event is itself a becoming, the critique of

evaluation has some sort of a relationship with the states of affairs. What is this relationship?

Deleuze and Guattari write that

history today still designates only the set of conditions, however recent they may be, from which one turns away in order to become [...]. Without history, becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not historical. Psychological types belong to history but conceptual personae belong to becoming. The event itself needs becoming as an unhistorical element.<sup>220</sup>

The event is extracted from the states of affairs as a becoming, or it is better to say that, the event opens up a region of being that is unhistorical. Its paradox is that it is “born in History [...] but is not of it.”<sup>221</sup> While History, even personal history, captures the actualization of events, events pertain to something which ultimately flees from History, so as to transform it by bringing about the new; the third present as the never finished with future of thought.<sup>222</sup> The conceptual personae have a bearing on their time, but they are nevertheless an invention that articulates a problem. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the thinker extracts the pure event in order to act “counter to the past, and therefore on the present for the benefit, let us hope, of a future—but the future is not a historical future, not even a utopian history, it is the infinite Now.”<sup>223</sup>



## *Conclusion*

Deleuze says something interesting about philosophical activity that should remain with us: “A philosophical theory is an elaborately developed question, and nothing else; by itself and in itself, it is not the resolution to a problem, but the elaboration, *to the very end*, of the necessary implications of a formulated question.”<sup>1</sup> We began this dissertation with the question, what does it mean to speak “for” another, because we wanted to underline that speaking is itself an ethical act that already always presupposes a relation with another being. Rather than asking what is x in the traditional sense, we set out to explore how something new is expressed of beings, in the course of which the question, what is x, is itself overcome. In the course of our study, we have asserted that the way in which something becomes is what that being in effect is, or as Deleuze would put it after Nietzsche, the becoming of beings is their future possibility of becoming-other or different, with the *how* pertaining to their relation to time. With the study of Spinoza in the introductory chapter, we were able to show how beings implicate being in their becoming; how it is that by having an adequate idea of the principle of production of all essences, we not only know our own, but manage to understand how all essences are comprised in being. By turning to Deleuze’s Nietzsche, we placed the emphasis on the way in which the eternal return displaces the traditional conception of being, in order to affirm the being of becoming, which is the repetition of difference itself. To begin with, this was in an effort to demonstrate how the simulated sense expressed of a singular becoming is dependent upon the ontological sense. Deleuze’s study of the doubled affirmation in Nietzsche’s thought, for us, however, gets at the heart of a problematic that we have explored in this study, that of the doubling of the line of articulation, or the two pathways of articulation.

The turning of the line of articulation, as Deleuze conceived of it in *Bergsonism*, always begins in an encounter with a sign that corresponds to a questioning instance. A sign can be thought of as either emitted by actual beings and tied to the present, or, as pointing to the turning of the line of articulation, to that perplexing encounter in which the Aion, at the edge of the present, perpetually puts it out of play. A sign is indeed effect or affection, but this affection supposes a change in the repetition of the encounter with another, a change that sets off the search or remembrance of things past. But this is only because the sign corresponds to a questioning instance that lends itself to the search: *What difference is there?* With the coincidence of the two, we have the most brilliant effect, the unfolding of the line of the Aion. What is this line? We have explored this line in several ways. We began with Deleuze's *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, in which this line was initially viewed as the affections or modifications of substance. These affections are the occasions for the re-expression of substance in the modes through the attributes as a degree of power of existing, or capacity to act. We argued that if a mode should exercise its capacity of affection in an active sense, then, its force of existing would show itself as equivalent to its essence. The third type of knowledge arises when a mode is overcome with active affections, and combines these affections with the understanding. In the third type of knowledge, a being is able to form, not only an idea of one's own essence, but to know how another essence is involved in the expression of its own, by having an adequate idea of substance as the cause. For Deleuze, however, it still seemed as though substance was independent of the modes, that the "modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than themselves."<sup>2</sup> According to him, being must be said of becoming, it does not imply anything more, while becoming itself, though not dependent on

actual beings for its being, must, nevertheless, solely pertain to their becoming. This minimal ontological proposition sends shockwaves across the line; the line takes on another face.

With the study of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* we wanted to explore how this line of becoming does not in any sense imply a power relation, but the will to power, which is a certain vitalism, a primitive affection for Deleuze. Here is where he will begin to conceive of the line as consisting of degrees of being or quantitative differences in the place of qualities. For Deleuze, the will to power has a special relationship with the eternal return. It is the chance point, the question corresponding to the sign, that gathers the degrees of being in a constellation, or as Nietzsche wrote, it “forces even chance events to dance in a stellar formation.”<sup>3</sup> The continuous variations of the constellation of being, is attributed to the chance point that traces the entirety of the line. After having reviewed the Stoic bond of event-effects which are gathered upon this line, we turned to the study of what Bergson called the virtual in the third chapter. It was our aim to demonstrate that these chance events, which are gathered upon the line, become the tracing of the being of the past. The primary encounter with a sign, the affection itself, awakens Mnemosyne. What are these events that are gathered upon the line as the ground of beings? From the perspective of the being of the past, these are memories of the constitution of the in-between of beings, that which is exchanged in the repetitious encounters of beings. In light of Spinoza-Nietzsche, we can say that they are that which is affirmative of a relation, or that which (re)makes the becoming of the relation as such. We traced this line of virtual past events many times over, demonstrating that from one sheet of the past to the next, the being of the past splits off into adjacent fields, which are former actualizations of events. The repetition of the line in itself, however, is a repetition of the different levels of the past. It has not yet been raised to the third repetition in which the entirety of the line is adequate to difference from the perspective of

which it emerges. By tracing the constellation of events many times over, we showed that this constellation becomes exhausted in one direction; it becomes a freeze-frame, or comes to a relative limit. At this limit, a simulated sense becomes articulable, which is the total effect of the becoming itself—the determined infinitive expressed in the proposition as verb. This is what we referred to with respect to *Nietzsche and Philosophy* as the principal affirmation. It is not us who make the sense. Instead, it is the singular becoming that *makes the sense*, allowing itself to be articulated in the propositional mode. We say that becoming says itself, that it expresses itself, precisely because what is expressed does not come from the one that articulates it. How does one speak “for” that which does not speak? As Deleuze argues, it is a matter of becoming.

The tracing of the being of the past in its passivity produces a working thought, a thought of that which we have been hitherto thinking, that which thought has been addressed to. This working thought has as its result the sense which becomes the expressed of the proposition and attributed to states of affairs. Our efforts in the second chapter were directed at showing that the event has a special relationship to language; that it is the essence of events to become expressed in language. The bond of effects of mixtures of bodies, explored in light of the Stoic distinction of corporeal and incorporeal entities, form the surface of sense that dis/joins the two series mentioned, that of the proposition and states of affairs. We then dealt with the intricacies of the expressed as the fourth dimension of the proposition so as to sever it from signification. Our aim was to demonstrate that sense is not the general concept, neither can it be expressed in the form of the function which is realized in particular cases. This was a way of saying that sense always arises as something new, as something singular, which cannot be subsumed in modes of recognition. Indeed, sense as produced from the perspective of nonsense or paradox, displaces common sense and good sense. It displaces good sense and common sense by displacing the one-

directionality of sense. In relation to nonsense, sense is always what is said of states of affairs, as sense is perpetually becoming in the other direction. As was noted, language is “endlessly born in the future direction of the Aion where it is established, and somehow, anticipated; and although it must also say the past, it says it as the past of the states of affairs, which go on appearing and disappearing in the other direction.”<sup>4</sup> This idea became more pertinent as we went on to consider the static ontological genesis by shifting from the sterility of sense to its genesis. In that section we showed how sense as the verb is expressed in the individual as predicate, but that for the individual indeed to actualize this predicate, it is as though the individual must become suspended, differentiated, metamorphosed. In other words, while the sense appears to be imprisoned in the predicate, it is likewise that which opens up the individual to its virtual half which is pre-individual. From the perspective of the virtual, the sense expressed is the expression of the becoming of beings, which amounts to saying that sense is continuously weaved in the direction of the future in which the coherence of subject and object is simultaneously dissolved. This dissolution is part of the effect itself which they both individuate.

This movement in the future direction of the Aion opens up the space for the ‘long error’, which is the equation of this sense with signification. The turning of the line of articulation with respect to the appropriation of sense as signification, gives way to the negative. With our short study of Hegel, we demonstrated how Deleuze distinguishes himself from the doubling of negation. For him, the turning does not express a contradiction or its resolution in a higher instance of grounding. Rather, it corresponds with the question, what difference is there, which allows us to raise the second repetition to the level of the third in the eternal return. Deleuze argues that the eternal return is

opposed to the coherence of representation; it excludes both the coherence of a subject which represents itself and that of an object represented. *Re-petition* opposes

*re*-presentation: the prefix changes its meaning, since in the one case difference is said only in relation to the identical, while in the other it is the univocal which is said of the different. Repetition is the formless being of all differences, the formless power of the ground which carries every object to that extreme ‘form’ in which its representation comes undone.<sup>5</sup>

We repeated this gesture in our study of Husserl in order to further demonstrate that the dividing line in philosophy is between those who interpret sense as abiding with models of recognition, and those who determine sense as co-present to paradox. Deleuze’s basic problem with the Husserl is that Husserl’s genesis is a “rationalized caricature of a true genesis.”<sup>6</sup> By exploring how Husserl’s stream of consciousness unfolds with the weaving together of the components of the noema and noesis, we wanted to show how he arrives at the two leveled predicative process; the explication and the apprehension of the content of the noema. The key critique of the two leveled process outlined was that Husserl must reduce sense to predictive generality in order to show how such sense is the same objective something intended to in consciousness by every ego, or that it is the common form in every act of judgement. In other words, he must render the something x in the noema capable of supporting the unification in the noesis. This sort of critique of Husserl becomes possible with Sartre’s paper on “The Transcendence of the Ego,” in which Sartre accuses Husserl of explicating more than he knows, in other words, of having doubled the stream of consciousness with the ego. The conclusion in our review of that essay is that Husserl had not adequately performed the phenomenological reduction on both sides of the stream; by both sides we mean the subject and the object. The question then became: If consciousness is essentially pre-individual and impersonal, how are thought and events linked in Deleuze’s philosophy? We turned to this question in the last two chapters.

In the third chapter, we turned in the other direction; we moved towards the virtual, rather than away from it. The response to the question, which way to go, away or towards the virtual,

marked the moment of this turning when time comes out of joint. In tracing the being of the past, we wanted to show that the ground is essentially raised from the perspective of the future, and that what is repeated in it once the line reverses itself is the third repetition itself. With the reversal the line because otherwise. Difference shows itself as having been disguised in the events of the past, which, for us, amount to the difference already in process of being made. It was there all along as that which raises the ground. This is precisely why continuity and moment, the form and the abyss, are both affirmed in Deleuze's philosophy. The continuity of becoming arises as a function of the eternal return, or the third synthesis of the future. The future is that which, then, dissolves the ground, expels the agent of the working thought that has become equal to the past, suspends the appropriation of the sense in the proposition, all so as to raise thought to the highest instance; thought becoming the most powerful affection, and a life of learning becoming the greatest vocation. We left off the third chapter with the notion that time out of joint produces the fissure of the subject, its splintering, which is the condition of thought. In other words, thinking requires this suspension of the subject, the ego consciousness, in order to emerge. We then turned to Deleuze's theory of learning in order to repeat the entirety of the process from the perspective of encounters with signs. The central idea in this theory of learning, the idea that animates the new Meno, is that learning is oriented towards the future, or it is concerned with the empty form of time. By tracing how the sign and the question coincide, prompting the apprentice to unfold a surface or problem (which is the determination of the infinitive) we showed how learning involves the linking of difference with difference, singularity with singularity, in the repetition of encounters. Now, this questioning which is synonymous with the time out of joint that seeks after the ground in which it makes the difference, is also considered by Deleuze as the zero point of thought, its powerlessness, from which the act of

thought emerges. While the tracing of the ground involves a certain passivity, the crack of thought, the turning itself with the question, pertains to the inventiveness of thought; to make something new of repetition. This doubling is not like Husserl's act of judgement in the predicative process. It is, instead, an articulation of the event with respect to what is excessive in it. To counter-actualize the event, in the first place requires that we maintain the paradoxical nature of this Event of thought, rather than subsuming it in modes of recognition. Becoming worthy of the event, becoming worthy of a life of learning, a problem that is most intimate to our life, but at the same time, one that involves an affirmation that affirms all of beings in one and the same Event, call upon us to not only pose the question, what does it mean to speak "for" another, but to abide by the humorous conformity of the Event. The third present of action means to never be done with the Event. The idea that the action is always awaiting with respect to what is excessive, does not mean that it can somehow be delayed for another time, but that we are never finished with it.



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## Introduction: The Question of Sense

<sup>1</sup> Marc Froment-Meurice quoted in Nancy's *The Sense of the World*. trans. Jeffrey Liberett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) p. 76 emphasis added

<sup>2</sup> A version of this question is presented by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?*. trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) p. 109. Referring to A. Artaud, the authors claim that philosophy must aim "to write for the illiterate—to speak for the aphasic, to think for the acephalous. But what does 'for' mean? It is not 'for the benefit,' or yet 'in their place.' It is 'before.'" When we ask what it means to speak for another, we are asking what it means to speak 'before' another, and what this speaking consists of. Our aim in this dissertation is not to speak "for" another. We are instead exploring how this question arises as a problem that we must reckon with. In a sense, speaking "for" another *requires this pause, a thinking through, that the saying itself demands of us once language ceases to lend itself to us*. Leonard Lawlor has also raised this question of speaking "for." He is currently working on a piece entitled "Speaking out for others: Philosophical Activity in Deleuze and Foucault (and Heidegger)," for *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, edited by Daniel W. Smith, Thomas Nail, and Nicolae Morar. A version of the question of the articulation of the new arises in Deleuze and Guattari's work *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003)

<sup>3</sup> Gilles Deleuze. *Negotiations*. trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) p. 1

<sup>4</sup> Gilles Deleuze & Claire Parnet, *Dialogues II*. trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) p. vii

<sup>5</sup> Gilles Deleuze. *Negotiations* p. 1

<sup>6</sup> The first of Deleuze's fundamental aims in *The Logic of Sense* is to displace essences and "to substitute events in their place, as jets of singularities" (p. 53). Once sense as event is severed from essences, or essence is sense now conceived of as *simulated*, sense belongs to what Deleuze calls problems, not theorems, propositional knowledge, or hypotheticals (p. 54). By linking sense to the problematic, Deleuze is returning to the Kantian notion that the problematic is the object of the Idea. In other words, Deleuze calls sense or the ideal stratum of sense on the whole, the Idea. This conception of sense as Idea is furthered in *Difference and Repetition*. We can see then that in the course of his study of sense, Deleuze conceives of it in different ways, as event, as effect in accordance with the Stoics, as Idea or problematic, as the expressed in the study of Spinoza, and as simulated sense. Nevertheless, in all cases, the basic conception of sense is that it is the *infinite* in its becoming, not a predicate or property. However elusive this sense is, Deleuze's commitment to its alternative formulation is evident in the "Fifteenth Series of Singularities." For him, the divided line in philosophy lies between those who conceive of the transcendental field as consciousness and/or as a "Being infinitely and completely determined by its concept", and those who conceive of sense as arising with the pure unformed (p. 106-7). When the transcendental field is determined along the lines of the former, according to Deleuze, it does not matter whether we make a claim to a supreme Self, Ego, or Being, the singularities which constitute the complex of sense are imprisoned in the predicate and are inevitably conceived of as originary. They are "either predicates considered in the infinite determination of the individuality of the supreme Being, or predicates considered in the finite formal constitution of the superior subject" (p. 106). This is what Deleuze calls the permutation Man-God, where sense is conceived of as either "divine sense forgotten by man or [...] a human sense alienated from God" (p. 106). The primary question for Deleuze is similar to the one that Jean-Luc Nancy deems relevant. What sort of sense is this which is weaved in the world as this world, prior to signification? To begin with, Jean Hyppolite's *Logic and Existence* will be of interest to Deleuze precisely because it furthers a genesis of sense that has renounced a second world beyond this one. His short study of that text will be the beginning point of the first chapter of this dissertation.

<sup>7</sup> Parmenides was the first to affirm the power of paradox, later taken up by his student Zeno.

<sup>8</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*. trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) p. 74

<sup>9</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*. trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) p. 275 On this notion of "speaking without being able to" see Nancy, *The Birth to Presence*. trans. Brian Holmes and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993)

<sup>10</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 1

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 75

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p. 77-78

<sup>13</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 134

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 134

<sup>15</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p.98

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p. 158

<sup>17</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 288

<sup>18</sup> Gilles Deleuze & Claire Parnet, *Dialogues II* p. 6

<sup>19</sup> Deleuze approaches encounters with beings as encounters with signs. Beings are signs because the virtual is part of the actual object itself, and the object itself points to the virtual aspect which is its objective dimension. Not all experience, however, gives way to an encounter with a sign that forces thought. This is why Deleuze deems it necessary to conceive of different kinds of signs.

<sup>20</sup> There are of course two sorts of becoming that are implied here, the becoming of beings and the becoming of a being. The two are not separate, however, and their relation is in question.

<sup>21</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 164

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 164

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p. 167

<sup>24</sup> The distinction between signification and sense can quite simply be demonstrated in the emphasis placed in the proposition, statement or what has also been called judgement: Socrates *is* playing, and Socrates *is playing*. We could distinguish them in the following terms: Sense is the expressed of a singular becoming in the infinitive, which essentially evades the propositional mode. Conversely, once sense is expressed in the propositional mode as this or that predicate, it becomes possible to then abstract this predicate from the genesis of the infinitive, from the singular becoming which grounds the articulation/sayable itself. Not only this, once the predicate becomes recognized in the propositional mode, or as Husserl might say, once it is thought to fit the noematic content as would a glove a hand, then, we essentially level the sense so as to equate it with the universal “sense” in the way in which the predicate has already always been taken. This is the recognitive moment when language seems to find the content of the form. It realizes itself in it. In other words, the paradoxical nature of this sense is already levelled once it is taken to be the same as the signification. But this is not what the singular sense of a becoming does for Deleuze. It is paradoxical because it continues in the other direction, hence the emphasis on the infinitive “to play” expressed by the verb above as playing. For us, the paradoxical nature of this sense articulated of a singular becoming is augmented by the very issue of it being the singular becoming of a differential relation. *In other words, once we posit the double series not simply as the relation of proposition and states of affairs, but a differential relation of beings in their singular becoming, that which is articulated of this singular becoming becomes much more difficult to express in the predicative form, or rather, it is that which carries the sense in the other direction, away from the predication in the attribution of sense, towards the higher instance of its articulation.*

<sup>25</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 285

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p. 287

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 289

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. p. 302

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p. 302

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p. 130

<sup>31</sup> Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*. trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997) p. 195

<sup>32</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 45

<sup>33</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 98

<sup>34</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 206

## Chapter 1: The Problem of Sense Introduced

<sup>1</sup> By sense we do not only mean here a simulated or distinct sense, but what Deleuze conceives of as univocal sense. What we are interested in here is the relationship of this distinct sense and the univocal sense.

<sup>2</sup> Deleuze, “Appendix” in *Logic and Existence* p. 193

<sup>3</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 45

<sup>4</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 35-6

<sup>5</sup> It is worthwhile pointing out that a number of French philosopher of the last century, including, Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his *Sense and Nonsense*, and, Jean-Luc Nancy’s *The Restlessness of the Negative*, have reflected on, and, have been influenced by, Hyppolite’s interpretation of Hegel.

<sup>6</sup> Jacques Derrida also makes a similar comment on Deleuze’s style in a short piece, “I’ll have to wander alone,” which he wrote after Deleuze’s death.

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- <sup>7</sup> In Simon Duffy's *The Logic of Expression Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze*. (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), he refers to Manola Antonioli, who likewise claims that: "The recourse to the negative and to contradiction is irreconcilable with the affirmative presuppositions of the Deleuzian philosophy, there is nothing 'to put together' between Deleuze and Hegel." p 4
- <sup>8</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence* p. 59
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 58
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 193
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 176
- <sup>12</sup> Deleuze, "Appendix" in *Logic and Existence* p. 195
- <sup>13</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence* p. 175
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 12
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid. p. 24
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid. p. 55
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid. p. 10, 27
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid. p. 17
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid. p. 10
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 13
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 11
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 171
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid. p. 173
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid. p. 6
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid. p. 24
- <sup>26</sup> See Hyppolite's commentary on Plato's *Sophist* on pages, 112-3
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 113
- <sup>28</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*. trans. J.B. Baillie (New York: Dover Publications, 2003) p. 59
- <sup>29</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence* p. 109
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid. p. 108
- <sup>31</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind* p. 60
- <sup>32</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind* p. 72-3
- <sup>33</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence* p. 115
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid. p. 114
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 113
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid. p. 114
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 120
- <sup>38</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 1
- <sup>39</sup> Žižek makes this argument in *Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2004)
- <sup>40</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 1-2
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid. p. 2; emphasis added
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 2
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid., p.2, 106
- <sup>44</sup> We recognize that it is Hyppolite who calls concept sense. But this is not what we are referring to here. When we say that that Hegel goes wrong by conceiving of the becoming of sense as the becoming of the concept we are making this remark from a Deleuzian perspective. For Deleuze, sense is not a concept.
- <sup>45</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence* p. 24
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid. p. 26
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid. p. 23-4
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid. p. 26
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid. p. 29
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 29
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid. p. 167
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid. p. 173
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid. p. 169

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p. 173

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p. 96

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. p. 99

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p. 173

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. p. 175

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. p. 176

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. p. 98

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. p. 175

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. p. 176

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. p. 161

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. p. 162

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. p. 195

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>71</sup> Nathan Widder asks in “Thought After Dialectics: Deleuze’s Ontology of Sense” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, “what concept of difference is needed for an ontology of sense to be adequate to a philosophy of immanence?” A similar question is posed by Leonard Lawlor in the first chapter of his *Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question*. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003). That chapter is also an excellent resource for anyone seeking to understand the role that Hyppolite’s reading of Hegel has played in contemporary French philosophy.

<sup>72</sup> Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence* p. 106 I’ve altered the quotation to eliminate the negatives. The original is awkwardly stated: “we cannot not ask this question”

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. p. 194

<sup>74</sup> Jay Lampert “Limit, Ground, Judgement... Syllogism: Hegel, Deleuze, Hegel and Deleuze,” p. 1 (unpublished manuscript) Published manuscript can be found in Karen Houle and Jim Vernon’s (eds) *Deleuze and Hegel Together Again for the First Time* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013)

<sup>75</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 54

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. p. 50

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. p. 57

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Jay Lampert “Limit, Ground, Judgement... Syllogism: Hegel, Deleuze, Hegel and Deleuze,” p. 13

<sup>80</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 106

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. p. 150; emphasis added

<sup>82</sup> A critique of Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza can be found in Duffy’s *The Logic of Expression* p. 3

<sup>83</sup> In *The Logic of Expression*, Simon Duffy takes up the complex relationship among Spinoza, Hegel, and Deleuze, in order to demonstrate not only Hegel’s critique of Spinoza in the *Science of Logic* and elsewhere, but also to show the way in which Deleuze returns to Spinoza as an alternative figure in the history of philosophy, in order to displace dialectical logic. For more on Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza see, Gillian Howie’s *Deleuze and Spinoza: Aura of Expressionism* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), Michael Hardt’s *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), and Audrey Wasser’s “Deleuze’s Expressionism” *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, 12:2 (2007): 49-66

<sup>84</sup> Hegel, *Hegel’s Science of Logic*. trans. AV. Miller (New York: Humanity Books, 1969) p. 580

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. p. 536-7

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. p. 581-2

<sup>87</sup> It is worthwhile noting, as Daniel Smith does, that Expressionism was written before *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. This is an important side note as we trace the development of the notion of sense in Deleuze’s work, particularly the different way in which he is thinking of the concept when reviewing key figures in the history of philosophy.

<sup>88</sup> Daniel Smith points out in his short piece on univocity, included in *Essays on Deleuze* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), that Heidegger also plays a crucial role in Deleuze’s development of a philosophy of difference, which must be realized in line with the univocal ontology.

<sup>89</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*. trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), p. 169

<sup>90</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics*. trans. Edwin Curley (New York: Penguin Books, 1996) p. 1; emphasis added

<sup>91</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 27

<sup>92</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics* p. 1; emphasis added

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- <sup>93</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 27 Essence as the expressed of substance is what can be understood as the singular or distinct sense. Expression on the other hand pertains to the univocity of being.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid. p. 27
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid. p. 27-8
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid. p. 37
- <sup>97</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics*, p. 3
- <sup>98</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 32; According to Spinoza, finite parts cannot reach infinity. He writes that: “a distinction would not be numerical if the things distinguished did not have the same concept or definition; but in that case the things would not be distinct, were there not an external cause, beside the definition, which determined that they exist in such a number. So, that two or more numerically distinct things presuppose something outside their concept.”
- <sup>99</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 33
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid. p. 34
- <sup>101</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>102</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics* p. 2
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid. p. 16
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid. p. 4
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid. p. 16
- <sup>106</sup> Ibid. p. 5
- <sup>107</sup> Ibid. p. 8
- <sup>108</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 35
- <sup>109</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>110</sup> Deleuze continues to note that “this is the same principle one finds in Leibniz, however different the context: each monad is an expression of the world, but the world therein expressed has no existence outside the monads that express it.” *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 42
- <sup>111</sup> Ibid. p. 42
- <sup>112</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>113</sup> Ibid. p. 43
- <sup>114</sup> Ibid. p. 43
- <sup>115</sup> Ibid. p. 21 The reason why one might be capitalized by Spinoza rather than both is because one pertains to God.
- <sup>116</sup> Ibid. p. 66
- <sup>117</sup> Ibid. p. 104-5 Here Deleuze will frame the so-called infinite proliferation of sense when noting that “for the sense of an initial proposition must in its turn be made the *designatum* of a second, which will itself have a new sense, and so on. [...] [The] attributes are in their turn expressed: they express themselves in modes which designate them, the modes expressing a modification.”
- <sup>118</sup> Ibid. p. 105
- <sup>119</sup> Ibid. p. 110-111
- <sup>120</sup> One of the critiques of Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza is based on the notion that the idea of expression is not a true to Spinoza’s philosophy.
- <sup>121</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics* p. 20
- <sup>122</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 110
- <sup>123</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics* p. 39
- <sup>124</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics* p. 34
- <sup>125</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 107
- <sup>126</sup> See the “Spinoza and the Three ‘Ethics’” in Deleuze’s *Essays Critical and Clinical*. trans. Daniel Smith and Michael Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997)
- <sup>127</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 94
- <sup>128</sup> Ibid. p. 95
- <sup>129</sup> Ibid. p. 91
- <sup>130</sup> Ibid. p. 93
- <sup>131</sup> This is Deleuze’s contribution to Spinoza in *Expressionism in Philosophy*. The problem for Deleuze is how singular essences are distinguished from one another, what will later be explored under the principle of individuation. His interest in developing this aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy is demonstrated when he argues that in the chapter on “Modal Essences” that: “Modal essences are thus distinction from their attribute as intensities of its quality, and from one another as different degrees of intensity. One may be permitted to think that, while he does not

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explicitly develop such a theory, Spinoza is looking toward the idea of a distinction or singularity belonging to modal essences as such” p. 127

<sup>132</sup> Ibid. p. 204

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. p. 205

<sup>134</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics* p. 32

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. p. 208

<sup>136</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 218

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. p. 214

<sup>138</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics* p. 35

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. p. 33

<sup>140</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 126

<sup>141</sup> Ibid. p. 303

<sup>142</sup> “Spinoza and Three ‘Ethics’” in Deleuze’s *Essays Critical and Clinical* p. 138-9; For an in-depth study of affect and affection see Brian Massumi’s text, *Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (London: Duke University Press, 2002)

<sup>143</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 222

<sup>144</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics* p. 178

<sup>145</sup> See Deleuze’s discussion on power in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988)p. 101-2; For a discussion of the formal cause, see Spinoza’s *Ethics* p. 174. The third kind of knowledge requires the working of the mind. The mind is formal cause because, according to Spinoza, it is itself eternal. By eternal, Spinoza means that the mind “conceives its body’s essence under a species of eternity,” or as caused by God. We have not had the opportunity to discuss duration and eternity in Spinoza. Deleuze tackles this problem in his chapter on “Beatitude” in *Expressionism in Philosophy*.

<sup>146</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 222

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. p. 303-4

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. p. 304

<sup>149</sup> Spinoza, *Ethics* p. 174

<sup>150</sup> Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy* p. 321-2

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. p. 15

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. p. 333

<sup>153</sup> Spinoza’s theory of action, which we now understand in connection with the affections of God and the attributes, will be instructive when we go on to reflect on the role of the actor in Deleuze’s logic. The power of action in Spinoza’s philosophy opens up a unique perspective as to what this action is directed at, or the two realms in which one can exercise the power of action. These two are the realm of bodily affections, particularly the desires themselves, and expressions in language or speech, literature, and philosophy. Deleuze’s political works with Guattari after the composition of *The Logic of Sense* are unique responses to the problem of action, one from the perspective of bodies in *Anti-Oedipus*, one with respect to linguistic expression, *A Thousand Plateaus*. Deleuze pursued such writings, among others, including, *The Logic of Sensation*, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, and, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, after he put forth a solution to the problem of univocal being.

<sup>154</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations* p. 141

<sup>155</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 40-1 Deleuze moreover writes in the concluding remarks to *Difference and Repetition* that: “All that Spinozism needed to do for the univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was to make substance turn around the modes—in other words, to realize univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal return [...]. Univocity signifies that being itself is univocal, while that of which it is said is equivocal: precisely the opposite of analogy. Being is said according to forms which do not break the unity of its sense; it is said in a single same sense throughout all its forms[...] That of which it is said however, differs; it is said of difference itself. It is not analogous being which is distributed among the categories and allocates a fixed part to beings, but the beings which are distributed across the space of univocal being, opened by all the forms. Opening is an essential feature of univocity [...] A single and same voice for the whole thousand-voices multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings: on condition that each being, each drop and each voice has reached the state of excess—in other words, the difference which displaces and disguises them and, in turning upon its mobile cusp, causes them to return.” p. 304

<sup>156</sup> See Chapters 2-3 of Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*

<sup>157</sup> Duffy, Simon, *The Logic of Expression*

<sup>158</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 41-2 For more on Duns Scotus see “Difference in Itself”

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- <sup>159</sup> While Heidegger puts forth this question, Michael Haar points out that he does not to put forth an adequate response to it. See Michael Haar's chapter, "The Overturning of Platonism and the New Meaning of Appearance," in *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996)
- <sup>160</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* p. 47
- <sup>161</sup> Ibid. p. 49
- <sup>162</sup> Ibid. p. 34 (see endnote 48)
- <sup>163</sup> We are by no means suggesting here that Spinoza has left being in the indefinite. When Deleuze says that Spinoza affirmed the philosophy of univocal being, he means the opposite.
- <sup>164</sup> Nietzsche "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks" (1873) in Keith Pearson and Duncan Large's (eds) *The Nietzsche Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) p. 107
- <sup>165</sup> Nietzsche, "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks" p. 106 Heraclitus is a thinker of the opposites, or how it is that a thing bears its opposite alongside with it. This contradictory nature, which he did not find problematic, was critiqued by Aristotle.
- <sup>166</sup> Nietzsche, "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks" p. 111
- <sup>167</sup> Nietzsche, "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks" p. 113
- <sup>168</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) p. 23-4; emphasis added
- <sup>169</sup> Nietzsche, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" in *The Portable Nietzsche*. trans. Walter Kaufman (London: Penguin Books, 1982) p. 270; emphasis added
- <sup>170</sup> Deleuze, "On the Will to Power and the Eternal Return" in *Desert Islands*. trans. Michael Taormina (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004) p. 121
- <sup>171</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* p. 30
- <sup>172</sup> Ibid. p. 33 Haar writes that: "The inclusion of *Chaos in the necessity* of the circle does not constitute a synthesis or reconciliation in the manner of Hegel: chance and disorder are not 'surpassed' by, but gathered into, the perfect circle being defective in its very essence."
- <sup>173</sup> Ibid. p. 33
- <sup>174</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 57, 88
- <sup>175</sup> In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze is still unsure what to call this sense. He refers to it different ways, as an effect, as a sign, as a simulated sense in relation to ontological sense, as Idea and as complex theme. The freeze-frame is interesting from the perspective of the study of cinema. Because, for Deleuze, all 'becoming is vision,' this becoming along with what he calls the freeze-frame, we think, orients his interest in cinema.
- <sup>176</sup> Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical* p. 96
- <sup>177</sup> Deleuze, *Desert Islands* p. 123 (minor changes to the original text)
- <sup>178</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 297
- <sup>179</sup> Ibid. p. 297
- <sup>180</sup> Ibid. p. 41
- <sup>181</sup> Ibid. p. 90
- <sup>182</sup> Ibid. p. 302
- <sup>183</sup> Ibid. p. 301
- <sup>184</sup> Ibid. p. 41-2
- <sup>185</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 179
- <sup>186</sup> Nietzsche, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" p. 296
- <sup>187</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 36
- <sup>188</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 222
- <sup>189</sup> Deleuze, Gilles. "Ontology-Ethics" Lecture 21/12/1980. trans. Simon Duffy. Accessible at: <http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=26&groupe=Spinoza&langue=1>
- <sup>190</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>191</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>192</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* p. 83
- <sup>193</sup> Nietzsche, "On the Despisers of the Body" in *The Portable Nietzsche*
- <sup>194</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* p. 119
- <sup>195</sup> Ibid. p. 100 Sometimes Haar discusses this line as a biological one, at other times as in-organic.
- <sup>196</sup> Ibid. p. 120
- <sup>197</sup> This is precisely how Deleuze and Guattari will interpret the brain.

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<sup>198</sup> Nietzsche, “The Unknown World of the Subject” in *Daybreak: Reflections on Moral Prejudice* (1881) accessible online: [http://www.lexido.com/EBOOK\\_TEXTS/DAYBREAK\\_.aspx?S=116](http://www.lexido.com/EBOOK_TEXTS/DAYBREAK_.aspx?S=116); the text is also known as *The Dawn* (early English translation by J.M. Kennedy).

<sup>199</sup> Nietzsche writes the following in a postcard to Overbeck: “I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza: that I should have turned to him just now, was inspired by “instinct.” Not only is his overtendency like mine—namely to make all knowledge the *most powerful affect*—but in five main points of his doctrine I recognize myself; this most unusual and loneliest thinker is closest to me precisely in these matters: he denies the freedom of the will, teleology, the moral world-order, the unegoistic, and evil. Even though the divergencies are admittedly tremendous, they are due more to the difference in time, culture, and science. *In summa*: my lonesomeness, which, as on very high mountains, often made it hard for me to breathe and make my blood rush out, is now at least a twosomeness. Strange! Incidentally, I am not at all as well as I had hoped. Exceptional weather here too! Eternal change of atmospheric conditions!—that will yet drive me out of Europe! I must have clear skies for months, else I get nowhere. Already six severe attacks of two or three days each!! — With affectionate love, Your friend” July 30, 1881

<sup>200</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. xxi

<sup>201</sup> Ibid. p. 244

<sup>202</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 178

<sup>203</sup> When we say that something is affirmed or we let something be (we recognize that Heidegger likewise approaches beings in this sense), then we are saying that we no longer recognize another as dependent on us for its being. The so called powers of the ego are dissolved. We are joyful that it has its own sphere of existence; it is free to become what it already is.

<sup>204</sup> See Jean-Luc Nancy text, *Creation of the World, or Globalization*. trans. Francois Raffoul and David Pattigrew (Albany: State University of New York, 2007), in which he discusses sense as the co-creation of the world in a similar way that Deleuze grasps the impersonal in a life.

<sup>205</sup> In his text *The Logic of Expression*, Simon Duffy takes note of this when writing, and we will quote in length here: “insofar as a mode’s conatus is the ‘effort to maintain the body’s ability to be affected in a great number of ways,’ which, for Deleuze, is the effort to maintain its capacity to be affected, it is the effort to maintain the extent to which it is further differentiated in a great number of ways. The greater the extent to which the global integration characteristic of a mode is further differentiated, the more composite are the global integrations in which it is implicated; the greater is its capacity to be affected, and consequently, the greater is its power to act. The conatus of a mode thus affirms the expression of its capacity to be affected as its power to act. Deleuze is therefore able to conclude that ‘the variations of conatus as it is determined by this or that [active] affection are the dynamic variations of our power of action.’ The conatus therefore affirms the expression of the dynamic variations of a mode’s power to act.” p. 153

<sup>206</sup> Deleuze writes in *Difference and Repetition* that “we must be like the father who criticised the child for having uttered all the dirty words he knew—not only because it was wrong but because he had said everything at once, because he kept nothing in reserve, no remainder for the subtle, implicated matter of the eternal return. Moreover, if the eternal return reduces qualities to the status of pure signs, and retains of extensities only what combines with the original depth, even at the cost of our coherence and in favour of a superior coherence, then the most beautiful qualities will appear, the most brilliant colours, the most precocious stones and the most vibrant extensions. For once reduced to their seminal reasons, and having broken all relations with the negative, these will remain for ever affixed in the intensive space of positive differences.” p. 24

<sup>207</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* p.1

<sup>208</sup> Ibid. p. 3

<sup>209</sup> We should note here that part of what we are doing is exploring the way in which Deleuze frames sense prior to writing *The Logic of Sense*. It is clear in other texts that sense is not a quality for Deleuze. This does not mean, however, that his comprehension of the Nietzsche’s sense as a manner of living, or a mannerism, is useless in the study of sense, especially if we recall that a manner of living involves a singular sense that beings actualize.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid. p. xvi also see p. 78-9 where Deleuze writes: “What does the one that says this, that thinks or feels that, will? It is a matter of showing that he could not say, think, or feel this particular thing if he did not have a particular will, particular forces, a particular way of being.”

<sup>211</sup> Deleuze, *Desert Islands* p.118

<sup>212</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* p. 3

<sup>213</sup> Ibid. p. 4

<sup>214</sup> Ibid. p. 62



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- <sup>215</sup> Deleuze, *Foucault*. trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006) p. 70
- <sup>216</sup> Zourabichvili, *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event*. trans. Kieran Aarons (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012) p.70
- <sup>217</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations* p. 110
- <sup>218</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* p. 4
- <sup>219</sup> Ibid. p. 8-9
- <sup>220</sup> Ibid. p. 9
- <sup>221</sup> Ibid. p. 10
- <sup>222</sup> Ibid. p. 71
- <sup>223</sup> Ibid. p. 50
- <sup>224</sup> Deleuze also refers to Henri Bergson's *elan vital* in the same sense. What he is trying to establish with these interchangeable terms is a certain kind of vitalism.
- <sup>225</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* p. 101
- <sup>226</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* p. 62
- <sup>227</sup> Deleuze is careful not to confuse the affects themselves with affections. He makes a point to distinguish them in his lectures on Spinoza. See *Lecture Transcripts On Spinoza's Concept of Affect*. 24/01/1978. Accessible at: [http://www.gold.ac.uk/media/deleuze\\_spinoza\\_affect.pdf](http://www.gold.ac.uk/media/deleuze_spinoza_affect.pdf)
- <sup>228</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* p. 110
- <sup>229</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* p.77. The predominant interpretation in the secondary literature is that the question "what is it" does not arise according to Deleuze. The notion that he puts forth some sort of a dictum against the question is a mistake. The question, "what is x", cannot be done away with once and for all. In actuality, one cannot eliminate this question even if one wanted to. This question is sometimes posed out of healthy curiosity, at other times out of pure desperation. Only the eternal return can break the shackles of this question, rendering it superfluous. It becomes superfluous because *no goal needs to be asserted of existence*. One of the texts in which this general sentiment is captured is Zourabichvili's *Deleuze: A Philosophy of Event*.
- <sup>230</sup> Alain Badiou has an interesting article on Deleuze's interpretation of value in Nietzsche, entitled, "Who is Nietzsche" in *Pli* 11 (2001). We agree with Badiou when he argues that the use of the term value here is problematic, at least in the ethical sense. The reason why we agree with Badiou in this respect—but maintain the notion that an affirmation is a sort of selection—is because a value, in the crude sense of the term, cannot be attributed to a being by a subject. There is something revolutionary in the idea that no value can be attributed to a being, or, more than this, that beings themselves challenge the estimation of value. See Deleuze course lecture "Ontologie-Ethique," in which he writes that "the essence taken as an end is value," in other words, Deleuze himself opposes this notion of value. To us, while Badiou's inquiry is interesting it is a misreading of this aspect of Deleuze's philosophy. Also see his "The Event in Deleuze" in *Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy*, Available online: <http://www.lacan.com/baddel.htm> where Badiou, once again, as in *Deleuze: The Clamour of Being*, effectively misreads Deleuze. Seeing that Badiou is aware of Deleuze's emphasis on the eternal return as both moment and continuity, it becomes questionable why he reiterates that Deleuze does not have an idea of some sort of "pure break". Indeed, even while Deleuze insists on the becoming, the greatest affirmation is in the being of becoming where time is out of joint. All becoming is a function of the caesura, and becoming in no sense validates the One. By displacing the verb to be, we hope that we have also put forth a challenge for Badiou.
- <sup>231</sup> Nietzsche quoted in Badiou's piece "Who is Nietzsche" in *Pli* 11 (2001)
- <sup>232</sup> In *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event*, Zourabichvili claims the following with respect to sense: "*sense concerns a will rather than a thing*, an affirmation rather than a being, a cleavage, rather than a content, a manner of evaluation rather than a signification. Thing, being, content, signification: this is what the phenomenon is reduced to when it is separate from its genesis." p. 63 All of this is indeed the case, but unless Zourabichvili is prepared to eliminate the specificity of a concrete or a *singular* becoming, and how it is that beings themselves implicate this becoming, in other words, how the univocal being is said of the multiplicity of senses that are themselves different, then, he cannot say that sense merely concerns a will rather than a "thing." We agree that there is no actual thing as such according to Deleuze, or that the sense is not the same as the essence of a thing, but this is meant to lend weight to a singular becoming in a univocal being. As we have shown, sense is meant in the two different ways, as a singular or simulated sense and the sense which is common to all senses. Zourabichvili has not considered the first sort, even while he is one of the few to discuss the differential relation as it is involved in the theory of sense.
- <sup>233</sup> In this respect, Deleuze finds Foucault to be an ally. For more see his text *Foucault*.

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## Chapter 2: The Split in the Pathway of Articulation of Sense

<sup>1</sup> Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, p. 56

<sup>2</sup> While this piece is brief, it clearly articulates what Deleuze understands as the actual and the virtual. I would suggest it as the primary piece to anyone interested in becoming oriented in his thought.

<sup>3</sup> Deleuze “The Actual and the Virtual” in *Dialogues II* p. 148

<sup>4</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 208-9

<sup>5</sup> Alexius Meinong. “The Theory of Objects” in *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology* (Free Press, 1960) p. 80-84

<sup>6</sup> Deleuze, “The Actual and the Virtual” p. 151

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 149

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 149-50; The actual being the “present which passes and the virtual image of the past which is preserved, are distinguished during actualization.”

<sup>9</sup> The translator of “The Actual and the Virtual” Eliot Ross Albert elaborates on this “inner circuit” when writing that this circuit “is what Bergson describes as the ‘moment when the recollection...is capable of blending so well with the present perception that we cannot say where perception ends or where memory begins.’”

<sup>10</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 144-5

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 151

<sup>12</sup> Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life” in *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*. trans. Anne Boyman ( New York: Zone Books, 2005) p. 25

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 29, 32; By an indefinite life, a life, Deleuze means that a “determination by immanence[...] the indefinite article (a life, a smile, a love) is the indetermination of the person only because it is determination of the singular.” p. 30

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 25

<sup>15</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 45

<sup>16</sup> Philosophical concepts, they write, “speak the event, not the essence or the thing—pure event, a haccuity, an entity: the event [for instance] of the other or of the face (when, in turn, the face is taken as a concept.” *What is Philosophy?* p. 143-4; For more on the concept see Paul Patton’s “Concept and Event” in *Man and World* 29: 315-326, 1996

<sup>17</sup> For instance, the problem of the other as event requires a specific conception of the other person. Rather than conceiving of the other person with reference to state of affairs, the concept articulates this other with the concept and its components, for instance, a component such as a face, which would be a sign of possible world, for example, a frightening, a sad, a joyful world, and so on.

<sup>18</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p.42

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p. 42; They are correlative, since it is indeed the plane of immanence that introduces something in thought which “does not think—an animal, a molecule, a particle—[...] that comes back to thought and revives it”

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 118

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 25; The authors continue to note that: “Every limit is illusory and every determination is negation, if determination is not in an immediate relation with the undetermined. The theory of science and functions depend on this”

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 122

<sup>23</sup> See Massumi’s introduction to, *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari* (New York: Routledge, 2002) p. 5

<sup>24</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 122

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. p. 156

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p. 33

<sup>27</sup> In *What is Philosophy?*, published some twenty years after *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that of all finite thought, logic is, by far, the most reductionist branch of science. The authors go so far as to question its scientific validity when they sever scientific statements from logical propositions, which they claim are mere forms of recognition. The central problem that Deleuze and Guattari raise with respect to formal logic is that it treats the concept as a propositional function, hence, reducing the task of philosophy to a mere reproduction of common sense. Let us take a simple function ‘x is rational.’ Being rational is not itself the function, but a value of the function, while the variable ‘x’ is the reference that completes the function or rather, it is its truth value. A set of variables that fulfill the propositional function are thought to constitute the extension of the concept. The intension of the concept now becomes a subset, which are the *conditions* of reference that justify the evaluation of the variable. We can already see a fundamental problem with the logical type of function. Because it “considers empty reference in itself

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as simple truth value, it can only apply it to already constituted states of affairs or bodies, in established scientific propositions or in factual proposition, [...] or simple opinions.”(p. 136-8) The problem is that logic begins with the corresponding states of affairs as already constituted, which it then assumes to be in strict conformity or correspondence with the value of the function. It is a mere model of recognition. It in no way puts into question the status of a subject or its relationship with objects.

<sup>28</sup> Frege, “On Sense and Reference” in Beaney, Michael, ed. *The Frege Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997) p. 37

<sup>29</sup> Frege, “Function and Concept” in *The Frege Reader* p. 138

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p. 337; Also see Daniela Voss’ discussion of Frege’s sense in “Deleuze’s Rethinking of the Notion of Sense” *Deleuze Studies* 7.1 (2013): 1-25

<sup>31</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 153; This problem is also explored by Daniela Voss in “Deleuze’s Rethinking of the Notion of Sense” *Deleuze Studies* 7.1 (2013): 1-25.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. p. 154

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p. 154

<sup>34</sup> Meinong, *The Theory of Objects* p. 78

<sup>35</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 157; When Deleuze says that sense is ideal or like the idea, it should not be mistaken with Frege’s notion of ideas, which are subjective or pertain to the individual. This would be what is referred to as manifestation.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p. 157

<sup>37</sup> This argument is also made by Daniela Voss in “Deleuze’s Rethinking of the Notion of Sense” *Deleuze Studies* 7.1 (2013): 1-25.

<sup>38</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 105

<sup>39</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 140

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>41</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 12

<sup>42</sup> For more on this theme see, Paul Livingston’s “Deleuze, Plato, and the Paradox of Sense” in *The Politics of Logic: Badiou, Wittgenstein and the Consequences of Formalism* (New York: Routledge, 2012)

<sup>43</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 134-5

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. p. 7; original emphasis

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. p. 132

<sup>46</sup> Adam Drozdek, “Lekton: Stoic Logic and Ontology” *Akademai Kiado*, 42, (2002) p. 95

<sup>47</sup> John Rist, ed. *The Stoics* p. 139

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p. 170

<sup>49</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 212

<sup>50</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 4

<sup>51</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 131

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. p. 163-4

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. p. 10

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. p. 94

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p. 136

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. p. 12

<sup>59</sup> Adam Drozdek, “Lekton: Stoic Logic and Ontology” p. 94

<sup>60</sup> Kahn, “Stoic Logic and Stoic Logos” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* Vol 51, 2 (2009) p.158 (158-172)

<sup>61</sup> See the Graeser’s “The Stoic Theory of Meaning” in *The Stoics*

<sup>62</sup> John Rist, ed. *The Stoics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) p.7; emphasis added

<sup>63</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 61

<sup>64</sup> For a discussion of logos as composition, see, “Logos as Composition” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, Vol, 33, No, 3 (Summer, 2003): 27-53, by Hoffman. Also see Heidegger’s *Introduction to Metaphysics*. When we say these extra-linguistic we have to keep in mind that Deleuze is speaking about the virtual aspect of language but also extra-linguistic elements that become expressible. It is the character of the events to be expressible. For a discussion of stoic presentation and its relationship to incorporeal intelligibles see Drozdek “Lekton: Stoic Logic and Ontology” p. 96

<sup>65</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 107

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- <sup>66</sup> See Gregg Lambert's "On the Way to Language" in *Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?* (New York: Continuum, 2006)
- <sup>67</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics* (London: Yale University Press, 2000) p. 182-4; Our position may not be entirely alien to the one held by the Stoics. As the Stoics scholar Max Pohlenz writes: "the articulation of voice is only a mirror image of the corresponding dynamics of the inner logos, the development and formation of *dianoia*" or thinking (*The Stoics* p. 94). Michal Frede also mentions that Logos was part of nature for the stoics "language was by 'nature'" (*The Stoics* p. 80).
- <sup>68</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 144-5
- <sup>69</sup> Drozdek, "Lekton: Stoic Logic and Ontology" p. 97
- <sup>70</sup> John Rist, ed. *The Stoics* p. 85
- <sup>71</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 8; Here, I changed from say to utter as not to confuse the reader about the subtle distinction between the proposition as expression and the expressed
- <sup>72</sup> John Rist, ed. *The Stoics* p. 86
- <sup>73</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 38 Deleuze refers to this paradox as Frege's paradox; the infinite proliferation of verbal entities.
- <sup>74</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 183
- <sup>75</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 5
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid. p. 6, 245 Deleuze will note that here the "mouth is liberated for speaking" (p. 240), that the event gives itself to be expressed in language. He formulates this shift from the corporeal to the incorporeal sphere by giving the example of the two series to eat/to speak. The two form the series of actuals and verbal expression with respect to the mouth.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid. p. 8; If a state of affairs no longer exists, the event would cease becoming or would no longer be expressible itself in it.
- <sup>78</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 12-13
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid. p. 14
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid., An example might be the following: beings that sweat must have pores, *therefore*, since human beings sweat they have pores.
- <sup>81</sup> Russell, "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types" *American Journal of Mathematics*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jul, 1908): p. 234
- <sup>82</sup> John Rist, ed. *The Stoics* p.1
- <sup>83</sup> Henry Somers-Hall, *Hegel, Deleuze and the Critique of Representation: Dialectics of Negation and Difference* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012) p. 48
- <sup>84</sup> Deleuze quoted by Henry Somers-Hall in *Hegel, Deleuze and the Critique of Representation: Dialectics of Negation and Difference* p. 32-33
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid. p. 53
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>87</sup> Russell, "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types" p. 222
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid. p. 224
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid. p. 227
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid. p. 234
- <sup>91</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 136-8
- <sup>92</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 154-5. Sense is "like" the idea because the idea also embraces nonsense alongside it, or as co-present to it.
- <sup>93</sup> Deleuze puts forth the example of Alice in *The Logic of Sense* as becoming larger and smaller at the same time. Being large is a product, *becoming* large and small at the same time is the sense, which relates the product, being large, to the process of production, becoming both at the same time.
- <sup>94</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 155
- <sup>95</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 19
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>97</sup> Also see "How do we recognize structuralism?" in *Desert Islands; The Logic of Sense* p.173
- <sup>98</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 184
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid. p. 215
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid. p. 25
- <sup>101</sup> Ibid. p. 245
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid. p. 106

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<sup>103</sup> In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze notes that structuralism agrees on one point, that sense is an effect: “structuralism, whether consciously or not, celebrates new findings in a Stoic and Carrollian inspiration. Structure is, in fact, a machine for the production of incorporeal sense” (p. 71). See Lacan’s discussion of sense as effect in *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge. Book XX Encore 1972-1973* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975). In that text, Lacan likewise links the contemporary interpretation of sense as effect to the Stoics.

<sup>104</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 37

<sup>105</sup> Ibid. p. 50

<sup>106</sup> Interestingly enough, the Stoics had similar notions of the void, place, and occupant. As Victor Goldschmidt points out, the void subsists as that entity which must be thought prior to the point at which “the world is brought into existence.” The void itself cannot be occupied because it is devoid of qualities, what the existent partially occupies is place, which is itself an incorporeal, so cannot be completely occupied. Sean Bowden, *The Priority of Events: Deleuze’s Logic of Sense*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011) p 21

<sup>107</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 51; The nonsense element is the abyss, chaos, the undetermined as such.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. p. 53

<sup>109</sup> It is worthwhile noting that these series can be a number of things: “We can consider a series of events and a series of things in which these events are or are not realized; or we can consider a series of denoting propositions and a series of denoted things; or a series of verbs and a series of adjectives and substantives; or a series of expression and senses and a series of denotations and denotata.” *The Logic of Sense* p. 37

<sup>110</sup> Ibid. p. 52 When we say that events ‘communicate’ in one and the same Event, we are addressing how an event “repeat one another in spite of all its difference, what makes it possible that a life is composed of one and the same Event” (p. 170). Because events are not concepts for Deleuze, the question is in what way do they repeat the same complex theme? Do they need to be in some sense compatible? Deleuze’s response is that events do indeed communicate in one and the same event, that they are repetitions of a theme, but that this repetition is based on divergence, rather than the convergence of series which is secondary.

<sup>111</sup> Alain Badiou has an interesting conception of the Event, and often distinguishes his philosophy from Deleuze’s. One of the interesting distinctions that he makes is between philosophy of truth and that of sense, which he argues is the theological One. He proposes that the univocity of Being is the One in Deleuze’s philosophy in *Deleuze: The Clamour of Being*. While we are sympathetic to Alain Badiou’s project, we cannot agree with him that Deleuze’s eternal return reinforces the notion of the One.

<sup>112</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 157; Also see Lacan’s “Rings of Strings” in *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge. Book XX Encore 1972-1973*, where these three abstract moments are formulated in much the same way: “what cuts a line is a point. Since a point has zero dimensions, a line is defined as having one dimension. Since what a line cuts is a surface, a surface is defined as having two dimensions. Since what a surface cuts is space, space has three dimensions” (p. 122)

<sup>113</sup> Deleuze, *Bergsonism*. (New York: Zone Books, 2006) p. 24-27

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. p. 27

<sup>115</sup> See the series on the “Ideal Game” in *The Logic of Sense*

<sup>116</sup> The idea of the crystal is discussed in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*

<sup>117</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 103

<sup>118</sup> Ibid. p. 60; This idea of thought, and the notion of consciousness that Deleuze is challenging in *The Logic of Sense*, will be explored in the latter part of this chapter. The relationship of thinking and the event will be explored in chapter four, especially in light of *Difference and Repetition*. While Deleuze talks about the metaphysical surface in *The Logic of Sense*, he does not go to great length to lay out his position. He seems to have presupposed a reading of *Difference and Repetition*, particularly his writing on the ideal game, the idea, and the image of thought.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. p. 66

<sup>120</sup> Ibid. p. 66

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. p. 71 For Deleuze, there is no such thing as a lack of sense or the absence of sense. Sense might be lacking in the series, but from the perspective of its production, there is always an excess of sense. It is the excess which produces the lack, not the other way around. The philosophical problem of the absence of sense is a false problem according to Deleuze.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. p. 70

<sup>123</sup> Ibid. p. 92

<sup>124</sup> Ibid. p. 167; emphasis added

<sup>125</sup> Ibid. p. 95

<sup>126</sup> Ibid. p. 97

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- <sup>127</sup> Don Welton, ed. *The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999) p. 238
- <sup>128</sup> Ibid. p. 28
- <sup>129</sup> Ibid. p. 32
- <sup>130</sup> Ibid. p. 36-7
- <sup>131</sup> Ibid. p. 52; emphasis removed
- <sup>132</sup> Ibid. p. 54
- <sup>133</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>134</sup> Ibid. p. 56
- <sup>135</sup> Ibid. p. 56
- <sup>136</sup> Ibid. p. 92 See the Husserl's "Noesis and Noema" and "Noematic Meaning and Relation to the Object" in *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931) p. 255-281
- <sup>137</sup> Don Welton, ed. *The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology* p. 83
- <sup>138</sup> Ibid. p. 84; minor change to suit sentence structure
- <sup>139</sup> Ibid. p. 68; Interestingly enough, Husserl argues that we constantly shift between non-actionality and actionality in our directedness to this objective something in consciousness. This also implies that actionality is always on the verge of changing into non-actionality, from explicit cogitations to implicit ones.
- <sup>140</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 97
- <sup>141</sup> Welton, Don, ed. *The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology* p. 67-70
- <sup>142</sup> For Husserl, the specificity of this stream of consciousness cannot be understated. Without it, we risk confusing the ideal components of the noema with the actual perceptions of the physical object in reality. While the components of the noema, the perceiving as such, are immanently given presentations in flux, the actual object, now considered transcendent, has a contingent existence. The distinction drawn by Husserl is that the "physical existence is never required as necessary by the givenness of something physical, but is always in a certain manner contingent. This means: it can always be that the further course of experience necessitates giving up what has already been posited with a legitimacy derived from experience. [...] Over against the positing of the world, which is a 'contingent' positing, there stands then the positing of my pure Ego, and Ego-life which is a 'necessary' absolutely indubitable positing. Anything physical which is given 'in person' can be non-existent' no mental process which is given 'in person' can be non-existent.'" In other words, the immediate intuitive acts in which we intuit the "it itself," are absolutely given. This sort of existence is factual, it cannot be negated.
- <sup>143</sup> Ibid. p. 74
- <sup>144</sup> Ibid. p. 99
- <sup>145</sup> Ibid. p. 97
- <sup>146</sup> Ibid. p. 92
- <sup>147</sup> Ibid. p. 105
- <sup>148</sup> Ibid. p. 106
- <sup>149</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>150</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>151</sup> Ibid. p. 278
- <sup>152</sup> Ibid. p. 277
- <sup>153</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>154</sup> Ibid. p. 279
- <sup>155</sup> Ibid. p. 283
- <sup>156</sup> Ibid. p. 284
- <sup>157</sup> Ibid. p. 284
- <sup>158</sup> Ibid. p. 286
- <sup>159</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 98
- <sup>160</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>161</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>162</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>163</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>164</sup> Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego: A sketch for a phenomenological description*. trans. Andrew Brown (New York: Routledge, 2004)
- <sup>165</sup> Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego* p. 4
- <sup>166</sup> Ibid. p. xi

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- <sup>167</sup> Ibid. p. 3  
<sup>168</sup> Ibid. p. 21  
<sup>169</sup> Sean Bowden, *The Priority of Events: Deleuze's Logic of Sense* p. 57  
<sup>170</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 109  
<sup>171</sup> Ibid.,  
<sup>172</sup> Ibid. p. 110  
<sup>173</sup> Ibid. p. 111  
<sup>174</sup> Ibid.,  
<sup>175</sup> Ibid. p. 111-2; original emphasis  
<sup>176</sup> Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* p. 53  
<sup>177</sup> Ibid. p. 52; Deleuze also refers to predicates as verbs in that text. One should not mistake the predicate, as event or infinitive as being the same as the analytic predicate.  
<sup>178</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 110  
<sup>179</sup> Ibid. p. 113  
<sup>180</sup> Ibid. p. 113  
<sup>181</sup> Ibid. p. 114  
<sup>182</sup> Ibid. p. 115  
<sup>183</sup> Ibid.,  
<sup>184</sup> Ibid. p. 60  
<sup>185</sup> Ibid. p. 118  
<sup>186</sup> Ibid. p. 118-9  
<sup>187</sup> Ibid. p. 119  
<sup>188</sup> Ibid. p. 215  
<sup>189</sup> Ibid. p. 75  
<sup>190</sup> Ibid.,  
<sup>191</sup> See "What is an Event?" in Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*  
<sup>192</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 76  
<sup>193</sup> Ibid. p. 78

### Chapter 3: The Theatre of Events and the Dividing Line of Time

- <sup>1</sup> Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007) p. 86  
<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 29, 32  
<sup>3</sup> Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (New York: Dover Publications, 1998) p. xii  
<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. xiii  
<sup>5</sup> We could also include Nietzsche here. See Deleuze's discussion of the concept in "Bergson's Conception of Difference" in *Desert Islands*  
<sup>6</sup> The sense of something is discoverable because of experience, while such experience supposes the recurrent encounters with something.  
<sup>7</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p.146  
<sup>8</sup> Bergson, *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New York: Dover Publications, 2007) p. 149; Deleuze discusses knowledge in Bergson's philosophy in *Desert Islands*.  
<sup>9</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 293  
<sup>10</sup> See "Repetition for Itself" in *Difference and Repetition*  
<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 21  
<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p. 70  
<sup>13</sup> Bergson, *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics* p.118  
<sup>14</sup> Ibid., Also see Deleuze's discussion in *Bergsonism* p. 41-2  
<sup>15</sup> Bergson, *Key Writings* (New York: Continuum, 2002) p. 43-4; emphasis added  
<sup>16</sup> Bergson, "Time and Free Will" in *Key Writings* p. 60  
<sup>17</sup> Ibid.,  
<sup>18</sup> Ibid. p. 62  
<sup>19</sup> Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay in Hume's Theory of Human Nature*. trans. Constantin Boundas. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) p. 87  
<sup>20</sup> Ibid.,  
<sup>21</sup> Ibid.,

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- <sup>22</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>23</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p.70
- <sup>24</sup> Jay Lampert, *Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy of History* (New York: Continuum, 2006) p. 13; Lampert points out that, because, "for Hume, 'experience' need not be founded on subjectivity; it is first of all a conjunction that allows data" to be contracted into one without any reference to an active subject. Deleuze finds his standpoint to be particularly useful. For a study of the living present, also see James Williams' *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Guide and Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003)
- <sup>25</sup> Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity* p. 91 In that text, Deleuze claims the problems of mind are the same as those of space, this is one of the reason why he may have deemed it necessary to begin with the discrete instants when laying out a philosophy of the present.
- <sup>26</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 71
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 70
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid. p. 71
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid. p. 71
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid. p. 70
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>32</sup> Jay Lampert puts this notion into question as well in his *Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy of History*
- <sup>33</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p.76; original emphasis
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid. p. 76; emphasis added
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 71
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid. p. 72-3
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 73; emphasis removed
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 74
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid. p. 74 In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson puts forth a similar question: "Is it possible to conceive the nervous system as living apart from the organism which nourishes it, from the earth which that atmosphere envelops, from the sun around which the earth revolves?"
- <sup>41</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 74
- <sup>43</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 77-8
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid. p. 77
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid. p. 73
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid. p. 78
- <sup>48</sup> Bergson, *Matter and Memory* p. 40-41
- <sup>49</sup> Bergson writes in *Matter and Memory* that "the greater the body's power of action (symbolized by a higher degree of complexity in the nervous system), the wider is the field that perception embraces" p. 57
- <sup>50</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p.78
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid. p. 79
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>53</sup> Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (New York: Dover Publications, 2004) p. 180
- <sup>54</sup> Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity* p. 96
- <sup>55</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 97
- <sup>56</sup> Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity* p. 96
- <sup>57</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 225
- <sup>58</sup> Deleuze, *Bergsonism* p. 56
- <sup>59</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 79
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid. p. 80
- <sup>61</sup> Deleuze, *Bergsonism* p. 58
- <sup>62</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 79
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid. p. 81
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>67</sup> Deleuze, *Bergsonism* p. 58



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- <sup>68</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>69</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 81
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid. p. 81-2
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid. p. 103
- <sup>72</sup> Deleuze, *Bergsonism* p. 54-5
- <sup>73</sup> Also see Jay Lampert discussion of the passing of the present in, “Living the Contracted Present—The first synthesis of time” in *Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History*
- <sup>74</sup> Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* p. 77
- <sup>75</sup> Deleuze, *Desert Islands* p. 44
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>77</sup> Jay Lampert, *Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History* p. 36
- <sup>78</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 82
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid. p. 83; emphasis removed
- <sup>80</sup> Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* p. 98
- <sup>81</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid. p. 83
- <sup>83</sup> Deleuze, *Desert Islands* p. 29
- <sup>84</sup> Bergson refers to these levels as degrees of freedom in *Matter and Memory* p. 294
- <sup>85</sup> Deleuze, *Bergsonism* p. 48
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid., emphasis added
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid. p. 48-9
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid. p. 48
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid. p. 83
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid. p. 80
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid. p. 77
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid. p. 83-4
- <sup>94</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 304
- <sup>95</sup> Deleuze, *Bergsonism* p. 42-3
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid. p. 95
- <sup>97</sup> Deleuze, *Desert Islands* p. 32
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid. p. 34
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid. p. 38
- <sup>101</sup> Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* p. 81
- <sup>102</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 274
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid. p. 272
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid. p. 84
- <sup>106</sup> Ibid. p. 274; minor change of sentence structure
- <sup>107</sup> Is a brilliant effect, or in French “fragment, flash, brilliance, Old French *esclat*, n. derivative of *esclater* to burst, break violently”; taken from *The Free Dictionary*. It is likewise defined in the *Oxford Dictionary* as taken from the French *eclater*, ‘to burst out’.
- <sup>108</sup> In *Pure Immanence* Deleuze writes: “a life contains only virtuals. It is made up of virtualities, events, singularities. What we call virtual is not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in the process of actualization following the plane that gives it its particular reality. The immanent event is actualized in a state of things and of the lived that make it happen. The plane of immanence is itself actualized in an object and a subject to which it attributes itself. But however inseparable an object and a subject may be from their actualization, the plane of immanence is itself virtual, so long as the events that populate it are virtualities. Events or singularities give to the plane all their virtuality, just as the plane of immanence gives virtual events their full reality. The event considered non-actualized (*indefinite*) is lacking in nothing. [...] A wound is incarnated or actualized in a state of things or of life; but it is itself a pure virtuality on the plane of immanence that leads us into a life. My wound existed before me: a transcendence of the wound as higher actuality, but its immanence as a virtuality is always within a milieu (plane or field)” (p. 31-32). A life is the indefinite, a wound, a smile, a love or a death, while the singularities which express this life are, together, what constitute the complex theme itself, for instance, to die, to smile, to love, to

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become wounded, in which the infinitive is itself determined. In speaking the Event of death, ‘to die,’ the infinitive would be the death of the subject and the object in their differentiation, while the actualized death, would be a personal death.

<sup>109</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 84-5; For a discussion of Kant’s influence on Deleuze’s theory of time see James Williams’ *Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Guide and Introduction* and Voss’ “Deleuze’s Third Synthesis of Time” *Deleuze Studies* 7.2 (2013): 194-216

<sup>110</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 85

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. p. 86

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. p. 87

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. p. 88

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>118</sup> Ibid. p. 292

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. p. 88

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., emphasis added

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. p. 89

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. p. 293

<sup>123</sup> The complex theme which consists of singularities, virtualities, events, can be conceived from two different perspectives, the past or the future. In the tracing of the past they are centers, or points of convergence of the two series, while with respect to the future they are points of divergence, or a differentiation which is made in the tracing of the past. Each singularity is produced by differentiation because of which the two series, terms or beings diverge. Nevertheless, this divergence in the process of actualization is reflected back on the virtual image and becomes a point of convergence where the lines intersect. See Deleuze’s discussion of *factual lines* in Bergson’s philosophy in *Desert Islands*.

<sup>124</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 120

<sup>125</sup> Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* p. 88

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>128</sup> Holderlin quoted in Nancy, *The Birth to Presence* p. 73

<sup>129</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 30, 119

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. p. 117

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>133</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 172

<sup>134</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 222

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. p. 237

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. p. 237-8

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. p. 241

<sup>138</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 179

<sup>139</sup> Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* p. 124

<sup>140</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 276

<sup>141</sup> Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (New York: The Free Press, 1978) p. 23

#### **Chapter 4: Deleuze’s New Meno: Learning, Time, and the Event of Thought**

<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche, “Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks” (1873) in Keith Pearson and Duncan Large’s (eds) *The Nietzsche Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) p. 111

<sup>2</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 206

<sup>3</sup> Deleuze’s infinite speed of thought can be understood with respect to the transcendental field as a “pure immediate consciousness with neither object nor self” (*Pure Immanence* p. 26). He writes that “as long as consciousness traverses the transcendental field at an infinite speed everywhere diffused, nothing is able to reveal it” (p. 26). In other words, thought as tracing the transcendental field moves at an absolute or infinite speed because it the plane of immanence is not thought to be immanent to anything, but also because this thought does not suppose a constituted

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subject or object, which would essentially transcend the same field. The discussion of the absolute speed of thought can also be found in *What is Philosophy?*.

<sup>4</sup> Michel Foucault, *Theatrum Philosophicum*. Accessed October 15, 2012: <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault5.htm>

<sup>5</sup> Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*. trans. Walter Kaufman and RJ Hollingdale. (New York: Vintage Books, 1989) p. 275

<sup>6</sup> Derrida, *Learning to Live Finally: The Last Interview* (Brooklyn: Melville Publishing, 2007) p. 24

<sup>7</sup> Plato, *Meno* (Toronto: Penguin Classics, 2005) p. 85 On the question of whether virtue is teachable also see Plato's *Protagoras*

<sup>8</sup> Plato, *Meno* p. 98 Since the parts participate in the whole, they are not considered false instances of the good. The problem is, instead, that knowing the parts does not mean that we know what being good is, and therefore cannot make a judgement of how the parts participate in the good. For an extended analysis of the first segment of the *Meno*, see Desjardin's "Knowledge and Virtue," and Gonzalez's "Failed Virtue and Failed Knowledge in the *Meno*." As Gonzalez points out in "Failed Virtue and Failed Knowledge in the *Meno*," in Gonzales' (ed) *Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry* (Evanston: NU Press, 1998) the kind of knowledge that Socrates is after cannot be grasped by us compiling true propositions and various properties of something such as virtue.

<sup>9</sup> We have to remember that this dialogue is orchestrated by Plato to demonstrate, not only the distinction between the sophist's and the philosophers' approach to teaching, but also their different positions on learning. Meno's demeanor and bafflement are meant to demonstrate that the sophist is not truly interested in learning, and that his method of acquiring knowledge from others is faulty. The dialogue, hence, puts into question the idea that knowledge is something teachable, but it does not dispute the idea that it is something that can be learned. Meno, on the other hand, does dispute that it can be learned since his inquisitive nature has been numbed, not by Socrates, but by his unwillingness to examine his own presuppositions.

<sup>10</sup> Plato, *Meno* p. 100

<sup>11</sup> See Gail Fine's "Inquiry in the *Meno*" in Richard Kraut's (ed) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (1992), for further discussion on how one might inquire in the absence of knowledge. Fine assumes that inquiry is possible so long as one has true belief, or what she refers to as partial knowledge (even though Plato does not recognize the idea of partial knowledge). Her position on the question of inquiry is discussed by McCabe in her paper, "Escaping One's own Notice Knowing: Meno's Paradox Again." McCabe problematizes Fine's response to the paradox when writing that, "belief is not enough to account for the interrogative." We might add to this that neither does belief settle the problem of recognizing knowledge once one no longer has true belief alone.

<sup>12</sup> Plato, *Meno* p. 100-1; emphasis added

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 101-2

<sup>14</sup> See Clair Colebrook's piece, "Leading Out, Leading on: The Soul of Education" in Inna Semetsky's (ed) *Nomadic Education: Variations on a Theme by Deleuze and Guattari* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2008)

<sup>15</sup> Plato, "Phaedo" in *Plato: Complete Works* (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997) (p. 63-4). Forgetting is just as relevant as recollection in maintaining the consistency of Plato's epistemology. The state of non-knowledge is understood as a state of forgetfulness, rather than a total lack of knowledge. For Plato, we recognize this state of forgetfulness, and what it is that we are searching for, when we recollect or learn what we have already always known. For more on the theory of recollection, see "Learning as Recollection" by Julius Moravcsik in Jay Dane's (ed) *Plato's Meno in Focus* (1994). For Moravcsik, learning is the recollection of a priori propositions. This position is flawed not only because Plato does not define virtue, but also as it does not focus in on the most relevant aspect of the theory of recollection, which is that of the state of the inquirer. His position that recollection consists of propositional knowledge is in opposition to Gonzalez' paper discussed earlier.

<sup>16</sup> Plato, *Meno* p. 102

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p. 112

<sup>18</sup> McCabe argues that the paradox remains problematic, because we do not know how someone comes to inquire in the first place.

<sup>19</sup> Plato, *Meno* p. 115; Gail Fine arrives at the wrong conclusion in her paper "Inquiry in the *Meno*" that the elenchus and the theory of recollection are two distinct methods of acquiring knowledge. She also makes the argument that the theory of recollection is not a claim that Plato was "committed" to, and that we need not comprehend knowledge as something that had been acquired previously by the soul. These arguments are unfounded since Plato does not discuss the theory of recollection in the *Meno* alone. His theory remains relevant in the *Phaedo*, *Theaetetus*, *Euthydemus*, *The Republic*, amongst other dialogues, in which the soul is considered as a separate entity from the

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body. Though one might question its explanatory power, and how one might inquire into something that one does not know to begin with, the theory itself cannot simply be surpassed in an effort to provide clear-cut resolutions to the paradox Plato presents.

<sup>20</sup> Plato, *Meno* p 123

<sup>21</sup> Francisco J. Gonzales (ed), *Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry* (Evanston: NU Press, 1998) p. 177

<sup>22</sup> Plato, *Meno* p. 134

<sup>23</sup> The care of the soul, along with the idea that Plato does not teach, can be found in the *Apology*.

<sup>24</sup> Francisco J. Gonzalez, "Failed Virtue and Failed Knowledge in the *Meno*" in *Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry* p. 174

<sup>25</sup> Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* (New York: Continuum, 2008) p. 58

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 3-4 For more on learning and signs see Ronald Bogue's paper "Search, Swim and See" in *Nomadic Education: Variations on a Theme by Deleuze and Guittari*

<sup>28</sup> Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* p. 16

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p. 50 The same critique is available the first few paragraphs of the "Image of Thought" in *Difference and Repetition*

<sup>30</sup> Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* p. 15

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. p. 4; emphasis added. We will soon see by this conception of learning as being taught by signs, that teaching resembles Plato's notion that he is not himself a teacher. Rather, for Deleuze, it is the question in correspondence with a sign that teaches us anything. This "correspondence" or what he hints at with the notion of vocation will be discussed later in this chapter with respect to the question.

<sup>32</sup> Deleuze, "Spinoza and Three 'Ethics'" in *Essays Critical and Clinical* p. 138-9

<sup>33</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* p.3

<sup>34</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 144-5

<sup>35</sup> We must here make a relation to Heidegger's notion of the "worldhood of the world," especially when Deleuze notes that such signs arouse a "nervous exaltation" in the apprentice.

<sup>36</sup> Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* p. 55

<sup>37</sup> Deleuze gives an example on p. 5 of *Proust and Signs*. He writes "nothing funny is said at the Verdurins', and Mme Verdurin does not laugh; but Cottard makes a sign that he is saying something funny, Mme Verdurin makes a sign that she laughing, and her sign is so perfectly emitted that M. Verdurin, not to be outdone, seeks in his turn an appropriate mimicry."

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 5

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. p. 18

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p. 19 emphasis added on "before he knows her," before becoming acquainted with her. This idea has some resemblances with Plato's notion that one must become acquainted before one can know anything about something.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. p. 20

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 21

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p. 24

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. p. 15; The same idea is reiterated on p. 21 when Deleuze writes that "superior men teach [the apprentice] nothing."

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. p. 5-6; Becoming sensitive to signs is not restricted to love relationships. Such sensitivity to signs arises when we become more proximal to others or when we individualize anything in the world. Any sort of intimate relations implies such sensitivity to signs. In addition to this, the possible world that the other entails need not be limited to the beloved.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. p. 7

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p. 34

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p 46-7

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. p. 48; emphasis added

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 13

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p. 17; emphasis added

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p. 14

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. p. 26

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. p. 17

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. p. 36; emphasis added

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- <sup>56</sup> Ibid. p. 38
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid. p. 38
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid. p. 18
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid p. 9 *Proust and Signs* was first published in 1964. Deleuze is still using the concept of essence to designate sense in that text.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid. p. 27 Essence or idea, Deleuze writes, “is the final revelation: it constitutes the sign insofar as irreducible to the object emitting it and constitutes meaning insofar as it is irreducible to the subject apprehending it” p. 25
- <sup>61</sup> I am referring to the two sides of aesthetics that Deleuze seeks to reconcile in *Difference and Repetition*
- <sup>62</sup> Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* p. 100
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid. p. 58
- <sup>64</sup> In *Proust and Signs* Deleuze conceives of “pure thought as a faculty of essences” p. 30
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid. p. 27
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid. p. 28; emphasis added
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid. p. 17
- <sup>68</sup> Ibid. p. 25
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid. p. 54, 57
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid. p. 28
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid. p. 28
- <sup>72</sup> Ibid. p. 28-29
- <sup>73</sup> Deleuze goes on to say that essences “are our ‘hostages’: they die if we die, but if they are eternal, we are immortal in some fashion. They therefore make death less likely; the only proof, the only hope, is aesthetic” p. 29
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid. p. 64
- <sup>75</sup> This is what Socrates claims in the *Meno* once the slave begins to recollect what he has already known.
- <sup>76</sup> Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* p. 69
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid. p. 73
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid. P. 104
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid. p. 72
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid. p. 31-2
- <sup>81</sup> We have referred to the sensed a number of times. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze argues that “empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity. It is in difference that movement is produced as an ‘effect’, that phenomena flash their meaning like signs.” p. 57
- <sup>82</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 20
- <sup>83</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 25
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid. p. 3
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid. p. 4-5
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid. p. 5
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid. p.1
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid. p. 10
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid. p. 22
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid. p. 22; emphasis added
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid. p. 141
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid. p. 22-23
- <sup>93</sup> Deleuze often uses the example of the battle to frame this notion.
- <sup>94</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics* (London: Yale University Press, 2000) p. 23
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid. p. 24, 30
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid. p. 25 We pose this question of the nothing because what is x is intimately related to the question why is there something rather than nothing, in the sense that when we search after the question what is x we are essentially leaving open the question of the nothing by opening up this or that thing to contrariety, to becoming what it is not. Instead of seeking after the nothing, we should seek after difference which is behind the metamorphosis of beings. This metamorphosis displaces the question what is x, so that the nothing is no longer a problem for us.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid. p.106; emphasis added
- <sup>98</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 77
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid. p. 200

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<sup>100</sup> On the relation of the question and the zero point of thought see Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 171-2

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. p. 200

<sup>102</sup> Ibid. p. 63-4 It is better to say that problems and questions are integral to learning, since Deleuze has displaced knowledge with learning. Deleuze has an ambivalent relationship to knowledge. Sometimes knowledge is treated as one and the same thing as the dogmatic image of thought, in other instances knowledge is thought of as the creation of concepts in philosophy along the lines that Nietzsche promotes, or it is conceived from the perspective of Bergson's concept of intuition. When Deleuze is critiquing knowledge it is to outline the illusions that stem out of the dogmatic image of thought. These illusions are understood from the Humean perspective, which according to Deleuze seems to have been picked up by Immanuel Kant. Conversely, the act of learning is a part of knowledge in that it gives way to the learned. Knowledge in this case would pertain to solutions, results, products.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid. p. 108

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. p. 114

<sup>105</sup> Ibid. p. 199

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. p. 113

<sup>107</sup> To learn is an infinitive, while learning is a verb in which the infinitive is determined in a life. For instance, one learns something new about love each time they encounter some sign that addresses itself to a sensibility which expresses this capacity to love. One is learning constantly, even if the qualities one manifests are the same in general. Let's say you are learning how to love. This loving gives way to a manner of being, and this manner of being in relation to loving is perpetually changed. One acts out different characteristics in which this loving is expressed, or the characteristics in which the loving is expressed become otherwise by becoming more intense, diminished, and so on.

<sup>108</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 219

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. p. 60

<sup>110</sup> When referring to a surface or metaphysical surface as Deleuze calls it in *The Logic of Sense*, we mean the same thing as ground, repetitious or problematic field as they are discussed in *Difference and Repetition*.

<sup>111</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 228

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. p. 164

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. p. 194

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. p. 165

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. p. 65

<sup>116</sup> I am borrowing this question from Michel Serres's study of the philosophy of multiplicities in Leibniz, entitled, *Genesis*. trans. Genevieve James and James Nielson (University of Michigan Press, 2005), p. 2

<sup>117</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 45

<sup>118</sup> Ibid. p. 279

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. p. 278; emphasis removed

<sup>120</sup> Ibid. p. 209

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. p. 182-3

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. p. 172

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>124</sup> Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II* p. 2

<sup>125</sup> Ibid. p. 7

<sup>126</sup> Deleuze, *Desert Islands* p. 100

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. p. 93

<sup>128</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 175; emphasis added

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. p. 175

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. p. 174

<sup>131</sup> James Williams makes the argument of circularity in "Immanence and Transcendence as Inseparable Processes," *Deleuze Studies* Volume 4 (March 2010): 94-106

<sup>132</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 176

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. p. 210

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. p. 210

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. p. 180

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. p. 188, 189

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. p. 212

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- <sup>138</sup> Leibniz refers to the best possible world and qualities or predicates which shape points of views reflect this perspective. Individuation cannot be reduced to the state of qualities or predicates manifested by the individual.
- <sup>139</sup> Here, we are referring to *The Fold* where Deleuze explores why the question of possession or belonging becomes important for Leibniz, but the same may be said of Hume's subject.
- <sup>140</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 284
- <sup>141</sup> Ibid. p. 115
- <sup>142</sup> Ibid. p. 283
- <sup>143</sup> Fink, Eugene. "The Oasis of Happiness: Toward an Ontology of Play" *Yale French Studies*, No. 41 (1968): 19-30
- <sup>144</sup> Schiller, J.C. Friedrich. *The Aesthetic Education of Man* (New York: P.F. Collier and Son Company, 1909-14) p.
- <sup>145</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*
- <sup>146</sup> Ibid. p. 144
- <sup>147</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. xi
- <sup>148</sup> Ibid. p. 49
- <sup>149</sup> Ibid. p. 121
- <sup>150</sup> Ibid. p. 142
- <sup>151</sup> Ibid. p. 121
- <sup>152</sup> Ibid. p. 146
- <sup>153</sup> Ibid. p. 3-4; emphasis added
- <sup>154</sup> Ibid. p. 145, 150
- <sup>155</sup> Ibid. p. 242
- <sup>156</sup> Ibid. p. xii See Deleuze's discussion of the Stoic sage/teacher in *The Logic of Sense*
- <sup>157</sup> Richard Polt, "The Event of Enthinking the Event" in Charles Scott's (et al) *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) p. 81
- <sup>158</sup> Ibid. p. 82
- <sup>159</sup> Ibid. p. 87
- <sup>160</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p.166
- <sup>161</sup> Ibid. p. 166
- <sup>162</sup> Ibid. p. 136
- <sup>163</sup> Ibid. p. 139
- <sup>164</sup> Ibid. p.141
- <sup>165</sup> Ibid., Deleuze writes "each one, in its own order and on its own account, has broken the form of common sense which kept it within the empirical element of *doxa*, in order to attain both its 'nth' power and the paradoxical element within transcendental exercise." p. 141
- <sup>166</sup> Ibid. p. 190
- <sup>167</sup> Ibid. p. 139
- <sup>168</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>169</sup> Ibid. p.140
- <sup>170</sup> Ibid. p. 141
- <sup>171</sup> Ibid. p. 140
- <sup>172</sup> Ibid. p. 141
- <sup>173</sup> Ibid. p. 162
- <sup>174</sup> Ibid. p. 141
- <sup>175</sup> Ibid. p. 202
- <sup>176</sup> Ibid. p. 292
- <sup>177</sup> Ibid. p. 147
- <sup>178</sup> Ibid. p. 199-200
- <sup>179</sup> Ibid. p. 6
- <sup>180</sup> Ibid. p. 295
- <sup>181</sup> Ibid. p. 200
- <sup>182</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 42; emphasis added
- <sup>183</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 168
- <sup>184</sup> Ibid. p. 220
- <sup>185</sup> Ibid. p. 221
- <sup>186</sup> Ibid. p. 168; emphasis added
- <sup>187</sup> Ibid. p. 120

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- <sup>188</sup> Ibid. p. 147
- <sup>189</sup> Ibid. p. 170
- <sup>190</sup> Ibid. p. 149
- <sup>191</sup> Ibid. p. 171
- <sup>192</sup> Ibid. p. 170
- <sup>193</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 150
- <sup>194</sup> Heidegger, *Pathmarks* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 144
- <sup>195</sup> See Deleuze and Philosophy p. 15 where Boundas discusses Deleuze's relationship with Sartre, and the way in which what he calls "double suicide" is linked to the problem of freedom. Also see his paper "Gilles Deleuze and the Problem of Freedom" in Holland, W. Eugene, et al., *Gilles Deleuze: Image and Text* (New York: Continuum, 2009)
- <sup>196</sup> Boundas, "Gilles Deleuze and the Problem of Freedom" in Holland, W. Eugene, et al., *Gilles Deleuze: Image and Text* (New York: Continuum, 2009) p. 222
- <sup>197</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 6
- <sup>198</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 152-3
- <sup>199</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 206
- <sup>200</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 54
- <sup>201</sup> Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life* p. 18
- <sup>202</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>203</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 185
- <sup>204</sup> Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical* p. 98
- <sup>205</sup> Ibid. p. 98 In "Alice's Adventure" *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze asks "what is a little girl" to respond "an entire oeuvre is needed, not in order to answer this question but in order to evoke and to compose the unique event which makes it into a question." (p. 238) In the "Thirty-Fourth Series of Primary Order" he again notes "'What is a little girl'—[...] this question must be replaced with a work of art yet to come, which alone would give an answer" p. 248
- <sup>206</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 176-9
- <sup>207</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 109
- <sup>208</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 178
- <sup>209</sup> Deleuze, "Literature and Life" trans. Daniels Smith and Michael Greco. *Critical Inquiry* 23 (1997) p. 225-226
- <sup>210</sup> Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical* p.111
- <sup>211</sup> Ibid. p. xliv
- <sup>212</sup> Ibid. p. 5, 109; The concept becoming-minor is one that Deleuze and Guattari put forth.
- <sup>213</sup> Ibid. p. 113
- <sup>214</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations* p. 100
- <sup>215</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 21
- <sup>216</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 16
- <sup>217</sup> Ibid. p. 144
- <sup>218</sup> Ibid. p. 69
- <sup>219</sup> Ibid. p. 70
- <sup>220</sup> Ibid. p. 96
- <sup>221</sup> Ibid. p. 110
- <sup>222</sup> See Baross' short piece "The 'Future of Deleuze: An Unfinished Project'" in Boundas' (ed) *Gilles Deleuze: The Intensive Reduction* (New York: Continuum, 2009)
- <sup>223</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 112

## Conclusion

- <sup>1</sup> Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity* p. 106 original emphasis
- <sup>2</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 304
- <sup>3</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, p. 33
- <sup>4</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 164
- <sup>5</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p. 57
- <sup>6</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* p. 98



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